













Thucydides - 477  
1850



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## BOOK V.

1. THE following summer, the truce for a year<sup>1</sup> continued till the Pythian games, and then ended. During the suspension of arms, the Athenians expelled the Delians from their island, thinking that they had been consecrated when in a state of impurity from some crime of ancient date; and, moreover, that this had been the deficiency in their former purification of it; in which case I have before explained that they considered themselves to have performed it rightly by taking up the coffins of the dead. The Delians found a residence at Atramyctium in Asia, given to them by Pharnaces, as each of them arrived there.

2. After the armistice had expired, Cleon, having persuaded the Athenians to the measure, led an expedition against the Thrace-ward towns, with twelve hundred heavy-armed, and three hundred cavalry of the Athenians, a larger force of the

<sup>1</sup> For the arguments with which Arnold establishes, as I think, this interpretation of the passage, see his Appendix. All the later German editors adopt, with little or no variety, the view of Heilmann, Böckh, and others, who suppose it to mean, that "in the following summer the truce was broken, and war renewed until the time of the Pythian games." In addition to what Arnold has observed respecting the unsuitableness of the superlative tense to such a mode of interpretation, it may be remarked that Thucydides applies the term *τὴν ἐκευεσίαν* to the year's truce in the last chapter but one of the preceding book; and therefore it is much more natural that the same armistice should be intended by the same term in this and the following chapters. It seems evident too that there is an *opposition* expressed by the *μέν* here and the *δέ* in the first line of the next chapter:—the one sentence stating how long the truce continued, viz. until the Pythian games, and the other, what military measure was first executed after its expiration; while the chief event which occurred during its continuance is mentioned parenthetically between the two. Nor, again, does it seem at all like the style of Thucydides to allude so cursorily, and by anticipation, to the Pythian games, as the cause which put a final stop to hostilities, and to make no subsequent mention of them at all in what would be the natural place for doing so; but to lead his readers to conclude that the proposals for peace originated solely in the difficulties of both the great belligerent powers, and their natural anxiety to be released from them; which is the sum and substance of his history from chap. 13 to 17.

allies, and thirty ships. After landing in the first place at Scione, which was still being besieged, and taking thence some heavy-armed from the garrison, he sailed into the port of the Cyplophonians, belonging to the Toronæans, and at no great distance from their city. Thence, having learned from deserters both that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that those who were in it were not strong enough to give him battle, with his land forces he marched against the city, while he sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. First, then, he came to the fortifications which Brasidas had raised anew round the city, from a wish to include the suburb, and so by taking down a part of the original wall had made it one city.

3. Pasitelidas, the Lacedæmonian commander, and the garrison that was there, went to the defence of the fortifications, and tried to resist the assault of the Athenians. When they were being driven in, and the ships that had been sent round were at the same time sailing into the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing that the ships might find the city deserted by its defenders before he could reach it, and that if the fortifications were carried he might be made prisoner in them, left them, and ran into the city. But the Athenians from the ships had had time to take Torone, and their land forces, rushing after him, on the very first assault burst in with him through the part of the old wall that had been removed. And thus some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans they slew immediately in close combat, and others they took alive, with Pasitelidas the commander. Now Brasidas was coming to the relief of Torone; but hearing of its capture while on his way, he went back again, having been but forty stades short of arriving in time. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one by the harbour, the other near the fortifications; and sold into slavery the women and children of the Toronæans, while the men themselves, with the Peloponnesians, and whatever Chalcidians there were besides, seven hundred in all, they sent off to Athens; whence some of them afterwards were dismissed, on conclusion of peace, while others were recovered by the Olynthians, through an exchange of prisoners. About the same time, too, the Bœotians took by treachery Panactum, a fortress of the Athenians on the borders. Cleon after establishing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor, sailed round Athos on his way to Amphipolis.

4. About this same time, Phæax, son of Erasistratus, with two colleagues, being commissioned by the Athenians, sailed with two ships as ambassador to Italy and Sicily. For on the departure of the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, the Leontines had enrolled a large number of new citizens, and the commons were thinking of dividing the land. When the aristocrática party were aware of it, they called in the Syracusans, and expelled the commons; who wandered about as they severally happened; while the nobles entered into an arrangement with the Syracusans, and having abandoned and laid waste their own city, lived at Syracuse with the enjoyment of the franchise. Afterwards some of them, in consequence of not being pleased, withdrew from Syracuse, and occupied a quarter of the city of Leontini, called Locceæ, and Bricinnia, which was a stronghold in the Leontine country. There the majority of the popular party who had been expelled, came to them, and having thus established themselves, they carried on the war from the fortifications. The Athenians, hearing this, despatched Phæax, to try if by any means they might persuade the allies they had there, and the rest of the Sicilians if they could, to join in attacking the Syracusans, on the strength of their gaining such additional power, and thus might save the commons of Leontini. So Phæax came, and prevailed on the Camarinæans and Agrigentines; but when the question was settled against him at Gela, he did not then proceed to the others, as he found that he should not prevail on them; but having returned through the country of the Sicels to Catana, and having on his route also visited Bricinnia, and encouraged its inhabitants, he sailed back again.

5. On his course to Sicily and return from it, he also communicated with certain cities in Italy on the subject of friendship with the Athenians. He likewise fell in with the Locrian settlers banished from Messina, who, after the pacification effected by the Sicilians, when the Messanians were divided into factions, and one of them had invited the Locrians to their aid, had been sent out for that purpose; and so Messina came into the hands of the Locrians for some time. Phæax then, having fallen in with these men on their way home, did them no harm, as proposals had been made to him by the Locrians for coming to terms with the Athenians.

For they were the only people of the allies who, when the Sicilians were reconciled to each other, did not make peace with the Athenians: nor would they have done it then, had they not been pressed by hostilities with the Itonæans and Melæans, who lived on their borders, and were a colony from them. So Phæax returned, and arrived at Athens some time after.

6. Now when Cleon, at the time we last mentioned him, sailed round from Torone to go against Amphipolis, making Eion the base of his operations, he assaulted Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, but without reducing it; but Galepus, the Thasian colony, he took by storm. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, that he might join him with an army according to the terms of their alliance, and others into Thrace, to Polles, the king of the Odomantians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could, he himself remained quiet in Eion, awaiting their arrival. On hearing this, Brasidas, on his side also, took up an opposite position on Cerdylum. This spot is in the Argilian country, being on the high ground on the other side of the river, not far from the city of Amphipolis; and every thing was distinctly seen from it; so that Cleon could not unobserved by him set out with his army; as he expected him to do, and despising the numbers of the Lacedæmonians to march up with the forces he had with him against Amphipolis. At the same time he was getting ready fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries, and was calling all the Edonians to his aid, both targeteers and cavalry; and he had a thousand targeteers of the Myrcinians and Chalcidians, in addition to those in Amphipolis. All his heavy-armed force too was mustered, about two thousand in number, and three hundred Grecian horse. With fifteen hundred of these Brasidas stationed himself on Cerdylum, whilst the rest were posted with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

7. Cleon remained quiet for some time, but was then compelled to do what Brasidas had expected. For his soldiers being annoyed at sitting still, and reflecting, with regard to his command, against what skill and daring in the enemy, with what ignorance and cowardice in himself it would be held, and how unwillingly they had accompanied him from home, he perceived their murmurs; and not wishing them to be exasperated by remaining stationary in the same place, he broke up his

camp and led them forward. And he adopted the same plan as he had also succeeded with at Pylus, and therefore felt confident in his own discernment. For that any one would come out against him to battle, he had not so much as a thought; but said that he was going up rather to see the place, and was waiting for his more numerous forces; not for the purpose of gaining a victory without any risk, should he be compelled to engage, but of surrounding the city on all sides, and so taking it by storm. Having come, therefore, and posted his army on a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, he himself proceeded to reconnoitre the lake formed by the Strymon, and what was the position of the city on the side of Thrace. He thought to retire, whenever he pleased, without a battle; for indeed there was neither any one seen on the wall, nor did any one come out through the gates, but they were all closed: so that he even considered he had made a mistake in not having come down with engines; for he believed that in that case he might have taken the city.

8. Immediately that Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he too went down from Cerdylum, and entered Amphipolis. Now for any regular sally, and array of troops against the Athenians, he made none; being afraid of his own resources, and considering them inferior to the enemy; not so much in numbers, (for they were pretty nearly equal,) but in character; (for <sup>2</sup>it was the flower of the Athenian force that was in the field, and the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians;) but he prepared to attack them by means of a stratagem. For if he showed the enemy his numbers, and the

<sup>1</sup> Or τῷ τρόπῳ may be understood, as by Haack and Arnold, "of the temper and habits of Cleon's mind." But the aorist tense of the verbs ἐχρήσατο, ἐπίστευσε, and ἡλπίσεν seems intended to refer to the single fact of his having adopted a particular plan, and his reasons for doing it, rather than to a continued state of mind, which would rather take the imperfect. And the following description of that plan, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλῆϊ—ἀλλ' ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βία αἰγίσαν τὴν πόλιν, agrees, as closely as the different position of the parties rendered possible, with that of the arrangements for the decisive battle in Sphacteria, which were made by Demosthenes, but the credit of which Cleon would, of course, assume to himself. Compare especially IV. 32-3, ὅπως ἐτι πλείστη ἀπορία ἢ τοῖς πολέμοις πανταχόθεν ῥακνυλῶμεν, καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ἐτι ἀντιτάξινται, ἀλλ' ἀμφὶ τοῖς γίνονται τῷ πλήθει, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "the Athenian force that was in the field had gone forth free;" i. e. free from all such things as might have marred their efficiency: κατὰ λόγους ἐκκρίθει, as he expresses it, VI. 31, 3.



equipment of the troops with him, which was such as <sup>1</sup> necessity alone dictated, he did not think that he should conquer them so well as he should without their seeing his forces beforehand, <sup>2</sup>and despising them on sufficient grounds. Having therefore himself picked out a hundred and fifty heavy-armed, and having put the rest under the command of Clearchidas, he purposed making a sudden attack on the Athenians before they could retire; as he did not think that he should catch them again so isolated, if once their reinforcements should have joined them. Calling therefore all his soldiers together, and wishing to encourage them and acquaint them with his design, he spoke to the following effect:

9. "Men of the Peloponnese, with regard to the character of the country from which we are come, namely, that through its bravery it has always been a free country, and that you are Dorians about to engage with Ionians, to whom you are habitually superior, let a brief declaration suffice. But with regard to the present attack, I will explain in what way I purpose making it; that the fact of your meeting the danger in small divisions, and not in one body, may not cause a want of courage by an appearance of weakness. For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting any one to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while, without any order, they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them <sup>3</sup>with regard to his own power, not so much in an open manner and in

<sup>1</sup> "ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν," i. e. not such as they would have wished, but such as they could get. Compare II. 70. 1, βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας, and I. 61. 2, εὐμέσασιν ἀναγκαίαν. — Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> Or, and ceasing to despise them on insufficient grounds." For the different explanations of this strange construction which have been proposed, see Poppo's note, in his last edition; which has been completed since this translation was commenced, and will be always referred to in future, unless the larger edition is expressly mentioned. The position of the *τι* seems to show that *καταφρονήσεως*, as well as *προσέψεως*, is dependent upon *ἀνεν*, and therefore that the *μή* must be considered as redundant. Or is it possible that it could have been uselessly used with a double force, qualifying at once both *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος* and *καταφρονήσεως*; as it is in a somewhat similar manner, I. 40. 2?

<sup>3</sup> "i. e. when it is deficient in actual strength, making up for it by a and by rapidity of movement." — Arnold.

regular battle-array, as with reference to his present advantage; that man would be most successful. And those stratagems by which one would most deceive his enemies, and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation. While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are drinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than remaining; while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division, and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed on the centre of their forces. And do you, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me now charging, and in all probability frightening them, take *your* division, both the Amphipolitans and the other allies, and suddenly opening the gates rush out against them, and make all haste to close with them as quickly as possible. For we may expect that in this way they will be most alarmed; since the force which follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than that which is already before him and engaged with him. And do you be a brave man yourself, as it is natural that you should, being a Spartan; and do ye, allies, follow him courageously; and consider that it is the proof of good soldiership to be willing, and to be alive to shame, and to obey your commanders. Reflect, too, that on this day you either gain your liberty, if you act bravely, and the title of confederates of the Lacedæmonians; or are slaves of the Athenians—if you fare as well as you possibly can, without being reduced to personal bondage, or put to death—and incur a more galling slavery than before, while you oppose the liberation of the rest of the Greeks. Do not you, then, act as cowards, seeing for how much you are struggling; and *I* will show you that I am not better able to give advice to others, than to carry it out in action myself.”

10. Having thus spoken, Brasidas himself prepared for marching out, and posted the rest of the troops with Clearidas at what were called the Thracian gates, to sally out after him, as had been arranged. His descent from Cerdylum having been observed, as also his sacrificing, when he was in the city—of which a view is commanded from the outside—near the temple of Minerva, and his being occupied with these measures, tidings were carried to Cleon (for he had gone forward at the time to look about him) that the enemy's whole force was visible in the city; and that under the gates were observed

many feet of horses and men, as though prepared to make a sally. On receiving this intelligence he came up to the spot; and when he saw that it was so, not wishing to come to a decisive engagement before his reinforcements also had arrived, and thinking that he should have time to retire, he at once gave orders for the signal to march back, and sent word to the troops on the retreat to draw off in the direction of Eion, moving on their left wing; which indeed was the only way they could. But when he thought there was a dilatoriness on their part, he himself made the right wing turn round, and presenting their exposed side to the enemy, began to lead off his troops. Upon this, Brasidas, marking his opportunity, and seeing that the Athenian force was on the move, says to his own company and the rest: "The men are not disposed to wait for us, as is evident by the motion of their spears and of their heads; for those who have this going on amongst them do not generally receive the charge of their assailants. So then let somebody throw open for me the gates I have mentioned, and let us march out against them as quickly as possible, and with good courage." He, accordingly, sallied out by the gates near the stockade, the first in the long wall which was then standing, and ran full speed along the high road, where the trophy now stands, as you go by the strongest part of the position; and falling on the Athenians, who were both terrified by their own disorder and confounded by his boldness, in the centre of their forces, he put them to the rout. Clearchus too, as had been arranged, sallied out after him by the Thracian gates, and rushed upon the enemy's troops. The consequence was, that by this unexpected and sudden charge on both sides, the enemy were thrown into confusion; and their left wing, on the side of Eion, which had already advanced some distance, immediately broke away and fled. When it was now on its retreat, Brasidas, in advancing along to attack the right wing, received a wound; and while the Athenians did not observe his fall, those who were near him took him up, and carried him off the field. The fight of the Athenians, however, stood its ground better; and though Cleon, who from the first had no intention of making a stand, immediately fled, and was overtaken and killed by a Myrcinian targeteer, his heavy-armed retreated in a close body to the hill, and repulsed the charge of Clearchus twice or thrice, and did not

give way till the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse, with the targeteers, having surrounded them, and pouring their missiles upon them, put them to the rout. And so now the whole army of the Athenians, flying with great difficulty, and taking many different roads over the mountains, effected their return to Eion; excepting such as were killed either in the immediate action, or by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers. Those who had taken up and rescued Brasidas, carried him still breathing into the city; where he lived to hear that his troops were victorious, but after a short interval expired. The rest of the army, on returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and erected a trophy.

11. After this all the allies attended in arms, and interred Brasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of the present market-place. And ever since the Amphipolitans, having enclosed his tomb with a fence, have made offerings to him as to a hero, and have given him the honour of games and annual sacrifices. They also referred the settlement to him as its founder, demolishing the buildings of Hagnon, and obliterating whatever memorial of his founding the place was likely to remain: for they considered that Brasidas had been their preserver; and at the present time too, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while, on the other hand, they thought that Hagnon, in consequence of their hostility towards the Athenians, would not retain his honours either so beneficially or so agreeably to them. The dead they restored to the Athenians. There were killed, of the Athenians, about six hundred; of their adversaries, only seven; because the battle was not fought with any regular order, but was rather brought on by such an accidental occurrence and previous alarm as has been described. After taking up their dead, the Athenians sailed away home; while Clearidas and his party proceeded to settle matters about Amphipolis.

12. About the same time, towards the close of the summer, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, led a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed to the Thracian towns, and on their arrival at Heraclea, in Trachinia arranged whatever appeared to them not to be on a good footing. While they thus prolonged their stay in the place, this battle of Amphipolis happened to be fought; and so the summer ended.

13. The following winter, Ramphias and his companions immediately passed through the country as far as Pierius in Thessaly; but as the Thessalians forbade their advance, and as Brasidas, moreover, was dead, to whom they were leading the force, they turned back home; thinking the time for action had gone by; as both the Athenians had departed in consequence of their defeat, and *they* were not competent to execute any of *his* designs. But, most of all, they returned because they knew that the Lacedæmonians, at the time of their setting out, were more strongly disposed for peace.

14. It happened too, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither party any longer applied themselves at all to the war, but they were rather inclined for peace. The Athenians were so, as having received a severe blow at Delium, and again shortly after at Amphipolis; and as no longer having that confident hope in their strength, through which they would not before accept the offered treaty, thinking, in consequence of their present success, that they should come off victorious in the struggle. Besides, they were also afraid of their allies, lest they should be encouraged by their reverses to revolt on a larger scale; and they repented not having come to an arrangement, when they had a fine opportunity, after the events at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, wished for peace, because they found protracted beyond their expectation those hostilities by which they imagined that in a few years they should reduce the power of the Athenians, if they ravaged their land; and because they had met with the disaster on the island—such as had never yet befallen Sparta: and in consequence of their country being plundered from Pylus and Cythera; while their helots also were deserting, and there was a constant apprehension lest even those that remained in the country, trusting in the support of those who were out of it, should, on the strength of the present state of things, adopt some revolutionary designs against them, as on a former occasion. It happened, too, that their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, unless the Cynurian territory were restored to them; so that it appeared impossible for them to carry on war at once with the Argives and Athenians. Besides, they suspected that some of the states in the

Peloponnesians would revolt from them to the Argives; as was really the case.

15. On these considerations both parties thought it best to conclude the arrangement; and particularly the Lacedæmonians, through the desire of recovering their men taken in the island; for those of them who were Spartans were of the highest rank,<sup>1</sup> and connected with themselves in the same way. They began therefore to negotiate immediately after their capture; but the Athenians, being so successful, would not yet make peace on fair terms. When, however, they had been defeated at Delium, immediately the Lacedæmonians, finding that they would now be more ready to accept their proposals, concluded the armistice for a year, during which they should meet together, and consult respecting a treaty for a longer period.

16. And when, moreover, the defeat at Amphipolis had befallen the Athenians, and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who on each side were most opposed to the cause of peace—the one, because he was successful and honoured in consequence of the war; the other, because he thought, that if tranquillity were secured, he would be more easily detected in his evil practices, and less believed in his calumniations—then the individuals who in either country were most desirous of taking the lead, namely, Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias son of Niceratus, who of all his contemporaries was most generally successful in his military commands, were much more anxious for peace than ever. Nicias was so, because he wished, while he had met with no disaster, and was in high repute, permanently to secure his good fortune; and both at present to obtain a respite from troubles himself and give his countrymen the same, and to hand down to futurity a name for having continued to the end without subjecting the state to any disaster; and he thought that such a result is secured by freedom from danger, and by a man's committing himself as little as possible to fortune, and that such freedom from danger is afforded by peace. Pleistoanax, on the other hand, took the same view, because he was

<sup>1</sup> Ὀμότως.] The meaning of this word is considered very doubtful; but me it appears to signify, that as the prisoners were men of the highest rank, (or whatever the dignity might be which was intended by the word πῦροι,) so they were connected with those amongst themselves who were of the same rank.

calumniated by his enemies on the subject of his restoration, and was continually being brought forward by them as the object of religious scruple on the part of the Lacedæmonians, whenever they met with any defeat; as though it were owing to his illegal restoration that these things befell them. For they charged him with having, in concert with Aristocles, his brother, prevailed on the prophetess at Delphi to give the following charge to such Lacedæmonians as went, during a long period, to consult the oracle; "that they should bring back the seed of the demigod son of Jupiter from a foreign land to his own; else they would plough with a silver share." And so they said that in the course of time, when he had gone as an exile to Lycæum, (in consequence of his former return from Attica, which was thought to have been effected by bribery,) and had then, through fear of the Lacedæmonians, half his house within the sanctuary of Jupiter, he induced them, in the nineteenth year of his exile, to restore him with the same dances and sacrifices as when they appointed their kings on first settling in Lacedæmon.

17. Being annoyed therefore by this calumny, and thinking that in time of peace, when no reverse was experienced, and when, moreover, the Lacedæmonians were recovering their men from the island, he too should give his enemies no handle against him; whereas, as long as there was war, the leading men must always be exposed to accusations from the occurrence of disasters; he was ardently desirous of the pacification. And so during this winter they were meeting in conference; and when it was now close upon spring, the terrors of an armament, for which orders were sent round to the different states, as though for the purpose of building forts, were held forth by the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians might the more readily listen to them. And when, after these conferences had been held, and they had urged many claims against each other, it was agreed that they should make peace on restoring what they had respectively taken during the war; but that the Athenians should keep Nisæa; (for on their demanding back Plataea, the Thebans said that it was not by force that they

i. e. that owing to the scarcity of provisions, they would have to buy them as dearly as though the implements used in raising them had made of silver.

Literally, "an armament was shaken on high before them;" i. e.

in terror, "over their heads, like a weapon brandished in a man's face

held the place, but in consequence of the inhabitants themselves having surrendered on definite terms, and not betrayed it to them; and the Atheſians maintained that, in the same way had *they* got possession of Nisæa;) then the Lacedæmonians convened their allies; and when all the rest, except the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, who were displeased with what was being done, had voted for putting an end to the war, they concluded the arrangement, and made a treaty and bound themselves by oaths to the Athenians, and they to them, to the following effect:

18. 1st, "The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, with their allies, 'made a treaty on the following terms, and swore to observe it, state by state. With regard to the temples common to the nation, that whoever wishes shall sacrifice, and go for that purpose, and consult the oracle, and attend the games, according to the custom of his fathers, whether proceeding by sea or land, without fear.

2nd, "That the temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi, and the Delphians, shall be independent, self-taxed, and self-judged, as regards both themselves and their territory, according to their hereditary usage.

3rd, "That the treaty shall be in force fifty years between the Athenians and their allies, and the Lacedæmonians and theirs, without guile or wrong, by land and by sea.

4th, "That it shall not be lawful to take the field for the purpose of inflicting injury, either for the Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, by any means whatever. But should any dispute arise between them, they must have recourse to justice and oaths, in whatever way they may arrange.

5th, "That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians. That of all the cities, however, which the Lacedæmonians may restore to the Athenians, the inhabitants shall be allowed to depart wherever they please, themselves and their property with them; and the cities shall

<sup>1</sup> ἐποίησαντο.] I have not translated this, as Hobbes and Bloomfield do, though it had the force of a perfect; because I think the aorist was purposely used in such passages with reference to those who would read the text at any future time; and not to those who then took part in making the treaty. Compare the use of the same tense for the same reason in the first line of the history, ἐποίησαν τοὺς νόμους.



be independent, only paying the tribute that was paid in the time of Aristides. That it shall not be lawful for the Athenians, or their allies, to take the field against them for their injury, after the treaty has been concluded. The cities referred to are Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. That these shall be considered as allies to neither party, neither the Lacedæmonians nor the Athenians; but if the Athenians gain the consent of the cities, then it shall be lawful for them to make them their allies, with their own free will. That the Mecybernæans, Samæans, and Singæans shall inhabit their own cities, like the Olynthians and Acanthians; but that the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panactum to the Athenians.

6th, "That the Athenians, also, shall restore to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedæmonians that are in prison at Athens, or any where else in all the Athenian dominions; and shall release those of the Peloponnesians who are being besieged in Scione; and all others in that place who are allies of the Lacedæmonians; and whoever amongst the allies of the Lacedæmonians is in prison at Athens, or any where else in the Athenian dominions."

7th, "That the Lacedæmonians too, and their allies, shall in the same way restore whomever of the Athenians and their allies they may have in their hands."

8th, "That in the case of the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermyliaus, and whatever other city the Athenians have possession of, respecting these and the rest they shall adopt such measures as they please."

9th, "That the Athenians shall take the oaths to the Lacedæmonians and their allies, state by state; and that every man shall swear by the most binding oath of his country, according to his respective state. That the oath must be to this effect; 'I will abide by these arrangements and articles of the treaty, honestly and without guile.' That in the same way an oath shall be taken by the Lacedæmonians and their allies to the Athenians; and that on both sides the oath shall be renewed yearly. That the contracting parties shall erect pillars at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclæ. That

"The temple of Apollo at Amyclæ might as well be called at Sparta, as

if they forget any thing, whatever it may be, and on whatever point, it shall be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Athenians and Lacedæmonians, by means of fair discussion, to change it in such manner as they please.

19. "The treaty commences from the ephorality of Pleistolas, on the 27th of the month Artemisium, and from the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, on the 25th of the month Elaphebolion. Those who took the oaths and subscribed the treaty were as follows : on the side of the Lacedæmonians, [Pleistanax, Agis,] Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippos, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus : on the side of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes."

20. This treaty was concluded at the end of the winter, when the spring was commencing, immediately after the city-festival of Bacchus, when just ten years had elapsed, <sup>1</sup> with the variation of a few days, since the invasion of Attica was first made, and this war commenced. But let every one regard this with reference to the periods of time, and not, as placing greater confidence in such a view, with respect to the enumeration of the public officers in the several places, or of the titles derived from any honourable appointment which serve to mark past events. For that gives no definite idea, as to who were in the commencement of their office, or in the middle of it, or whatever part it might be, when any event occurred. But if he reckon by summers and winters, as I have written my history, he will find that while each of these amounts to half a year, there were ten summers and as many winters included in this first war.

21. Now the Lacedæmonians (for it fell to their lot to be the first to restore what they held) immediately released the men who were prisoners in their country; and sending as

the temple of Juno was said to be at Argos, Thucyd. IV. 133. 2, although it was forty stadia distant from the city, Strabo, VIII. 6. 2; Herod. I. 31. 4."—Arnold.

<sup>1</sup> For an instance of *παράφρων*, used in this intransitive sense, like *διὰφρων*, compare Dionys. Hal. Ant. I. 27, p. 73, Reiske, *τούτων ἡ γλῶσσα, ἄλιγον παράφρων*; as quoted in Bloomfield's note, 2nd edition.

<sup>2</sup> Literally, "having the virtue, or sum, of the year in half measure."

ambassadors to the countries Thrace-ward, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, commanded Clearidas to restore Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of the states to accept the treaty, as it had been severally arranged for them. They, however, would not, as they thought it not favourable to them; nor did Clearidas restore the city, wishing to oblige the Chalcidians, and declaring that he could not give it up in opposition to them. He, however, went in haste to Lacedæmon with ambassadors from that place, to defend himself, if Ischagoras and his party should bring any charge against him for not obeying; and at the same time from a wish to know whether the arrangement might still be altered: but when he found the treaty secured, being sent back again himself by the Lacedæmonians, and ordered to deliver up the place, if possible, but if not, to bring out all the Peloponnesians that were in it, he set out with all speed.

22. Now the allies happened themselves to be at Lacedæmon, and those of them who had not accepted the treaty were commanded by the Lacedæmonians to adopt it. They, however, on the same grounds as they had at first rejected it, refused to accept it, unless they made a more equitable one than that. So when they did not listen to them, they sent them away, and themselves proceeded to conclude an alliance with the Athenians; thinking that the Argives (<sup>2</sup>since they refused, on Ampelidas and Lichas going to them, to make a fresh treaty) would be by no means formidable without the support of the Athenians, and that the rest of the Peloponnese would be most disposed to remain quiet; whereas they would have gone over to the Athenians, if they had had the power. Ambassadors, therefore, having come from the Athenians, and a conference having been held, they came to an agreement, and oaths were taken, and this alliance concluded, on the following terms:

23. "The Lacedæmonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years."

<sup>1</sup> Arnold translates *αὐτοῖς*, "of their own accord;" but Porpo remarks with truth, that this is in opposition to the statement that they had been summoned by the Lacedæmonians, ch. 17. 2, and 27. 1. He supposes, therefore, that it means "the allies, as well as Clearidas."

<sup>2</sup> For instances of the aorist, or the present, thus used after *οἶμαι*, Porpo refers to Xen. Anab. iv. 5. 15, and Hell. v. i. 32. Respecting the anacoluthon also in the following sentence, see his note, and that of Arnold.

2nd, "That should any come as enemies against the territory of the Lacedæmonians, and do them injury, the Athenians shall assist them in such manner as they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. • That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and be punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

3rd, "That, again, should any come as enemies against the country of the Athenians, and injure them, the Lacedæmonians shall assist them in whatever manner they can most efficiently, to the utmost of their power. That should they have ravaged the land and departed, that state shall be considered as hostile to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, and punished by both of them; and that both states shall make peace at the same time. That these conditions shall be observed honestly, heartily, and sincerely.

4th, "That should the slave population rise up against them, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their might, according to their ability.

5th, "That these articles shall be sworn to by the same persons as swore to the other treaty, on both sides. That they shall be renewed every year, by the Lacedæmonians going to Athens at the Dionysian festival, and by the Athenians going to Lacedæmon at the Hyacinthian. That they shall each erect a pillar, that at Lacedæmon near the statue of Apollo in the Amyclæum, and that at Athens in the citadel, near the statue of Minerva. That should the Lacedæmonians and Athenians choose to add to, or take away from, these terms of alliance, whatever they please so to do shall be consistent with the oaths of both parties."

24. The oath was sworn by the following on the side of the Lacedæmonians: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippos, Alcinaðas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, and Laphilus: and on the side of the Athenians, by Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theogenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This alliance was entered into not long after the treaty, and the Athenians restored to the Lacedæmonians the men taken from the island; and thus began the summer of the eleventh year. During these ten years, then, the first war was carried on continuously, and such is the history of it.

25. After the treaty, and the alliance between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, which were concluded at the end of the ten years' war, in the ephoralty of Pleistolas at Lacedæmon, and the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, those who had acceded to them were at peace; but the Corinthians, and some of the states in the Peloponnese, were trying to alter what had been done; and another disturbance immediately arose on the part of the allies against Lacedæmon. Moreover, the Lacedæmonians, as time went on, became suspected by the Athenians also, through not performing in some respects what had been agreed on, according to the treaty. And though for six years and ten months they abstained from marching against each other's territory, yet out of it, during the existence of a doubtful suspension of arms, they were doing one another the greatest possible damage. Subsequently, however, they were compelled to break the treaty concluded after the ten years' war, and again proceeded to open hostilities.

26. And the same Thucydides the Athenian has also written the history of these transactions in order, as they severally happened, by summers and winters, until the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the sovereignty of the Athenians, and took the long walls and Piræus. To the time of that event there were spent in the war seven and twenty years in all. With regard to the intervening arrangement, if any one shall object to consider it as a state of war, he will not estimate it rightly. For let him<sup>1</sup> regard it as it is characterized by the facts of the case, and he will find that there is no reason for its being deemed a state of peace; since during it they neither gave

<sup>1</sup> On this use of *διήρηται*, see Poppo or Bloomfield.—With regard to the *τί* in this clause, it is the opinion of Gœller that it refers to *καὶ* before *ἐπὶ*: but Poppo observes in opposition to this, that the imperative *ἀποτρεῖν* has a conditional force, as it frequently has in Greek, Latin, German, and French: “*si quis spectaverit, ingeniet*,” and therefore that *τί* has no force. Arnold and Bloomfield consider that it is answered by *ἔξω* *τῶν* *τοῦτων*. “First of all, the treaty was in itself practically inefficient, inasmuch as its very stipulations were not all fulfilled; and then there were mutual causes of complaint with respect to other matters, of which the treaty had made no mention.”

nor received back all they had arranged to do; and besides this, there were offences committed on both sides, as in the case of the Mantinea and Epidaurian wars, and other instances; and the Thrace-ward allies were in no respect less at war than before; while the Bœotians had only a truce from one ten days to another. Including, therefore, the first war of ten years, the suspicious cessation of hostilities which followed it, and the subsequent war which succeeded to that, any one will find that the number of years was what I have mentioned, (reckoning by the great divisions of time,) with only a few days' difference; and that such as positively asserted any thing on the strength of oracles, found this the only fact which proved true. At least I, for my own part, remember that all along, both at the beginning of the war, and till it was brought to a conclusion, it was alleged by many that it was to last thrice nine years. And I lived on through the whole of it, being of an age to comprehend events, and paying attention, in order to gain accurate knowledge on each point. It was also my lot to be banished my country twenty years after my command at Amphipolis; and thus, by being present at the transactions of either party, and especially of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment, to gain at my leisure a more perfect acquaintance with each of them. The difference, then, which arose after the ten years, and the breaking up of the treaty, and the subsequent course of hostilities, I will now relate.

27. When, then, the fifty years' treaty had been concluded, and the alliance afterwards, the embassies from the Peloponnese, which had been summoned for that business, returned from Lacedæmon. Accordingly the rest went home; but the Corinthians repaired to Argos, and in the first place held communications with some of the Argives who were in office, to the effect that, since the Lacedæmonians, not for the good, but for the subjugation of the Peloponnese, had entered into treaty and alliance with the Athenians, who were before their bitterest enemies; the Argives ought to consider how the Peloponnese might be preserved; and to pass a decree, that any city of the Greeks that wished, being independent, and giving

<sup>1</sup> *αἱ συμμαχίαι.*] Pöppo remarks, in his note on 48. 1, on this use of the plural noun with reference to a single alliance; but does not offer any explanation of it. Probably it arises from the separate ratification of the alliance by each of the two states so that it may be regarded as a twofold transaction.

judicial satisfaction for wrongs, on fair and equal terms, might enter into alliance with the Argives, on condition of defending each other's country: and that they should appoint a few persons as commissioners with full powers, instead of the discussion of the measure being held before the people; in order that those might not be known who had failed to persuade the multitude. And they asserted that many would come over to them for hatred of the Lacedæmonians. The Corinthians then, having suggested these things, returned home.

28. When those of the Argives who heard their proposals had reported them to the government and the people, the Argives passed the decree, and chose twelve men, with whom any one of the Greeks who wished should conclude an alliance, except the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, neither of whom should have liberty to enter into treaty without the consent of the Argive people. The Argives acceded the more readily to these proposals, because they saw that they should have the war with the Lacedæmonians, (for their treaty with them was on the point of expiring,) and also because they hoped to gain the supremacy of the Peloponnese. For at that time Lacedæmon was in very bad repute, and was despised in consequence of its misfortunes; while the Argives were in an excellent condition in all respects, as they had taken no part in the war against Athens, but had rather reaped the good fruits of having been in treaty with both sides. Thus, then, the Argives were admitting into alliance such of the Greeks as wished it.

29. The Mantineans and their allies were the first to join them, through fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a certain part of Arcadia had been reduced to subjection by the Mantineans, while the war with the Athenians was still going on; and they thought that the Lacedæmonians would not allow their sovereignty over it, since they had now<sup>1</sup> leisure to interfere; so that they gladly turned to the Argives, considering them to be a powerful state, and one which was always at variance with the Lacedæmonians, and under a democratical government like themselves. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of the Peloponnese also was thrown into commotion, with the idea that they too ought to do the same;

<sup>1</sup> The force of the καὶ before σχολή appears to be, "leisure, as well as inclination."

as they thought, that they had changed sides through knowing more than the rest. • At the same time they were angry with the Lacedæmonians, both on other grounds, and because it had been mentioned in the treaty with Athens, that it should be consistent with their oaths to add to it, or take from it, whatever might seem fit to both states, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. For, it was this clause, above all, that caused the excitement in the Peloponnese, and set them on suspecting that the Lacedæmonians, in concert with the Athenians, might wish to reduce them to slavery: for it was only just, they thought, that the alteration should have been referred to all the allies. The majority therefore, through fear, were eager to conclude the alliance with the Argives on their own part, respectively, as the Mantineans had done.

30. When the Lacedæmonians perceived this commotion which had arisen in the Peloponnese, and that the Corinthians were the advisers of it, and were themselves about to enter into treaty with Argos, they sent ambassadors to Corinth, wishing to prevent what was going to happen. They charged them therefore with suggesting the whole business; and said that if they withdrew from them, and became allies of the Argives, they would violate their oaths; and that they were already doing wrong in not accepting the treaty with the Athenians, when it had been declared, that whatever the majority of the allies decreed, should be binding, unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes. The Corinthians, in the presence of all the allies who, like themselves, had not acceded to the treaty, (for they had themselves previously invited them thither,) spoke in reply to the Lacedæmonians; not indeed directly stating the injuries they had received, namely, that they had not recovered Solium from the Athenians, nor Anactorium—with any other point on which they considered themselves to be aggrieved; but urging as a pretext their determination not to betray the Thrace-ward Greeks; for they had taken oaths to them, both by themselves, when in the first instance they revolted, in concert with the Potidæans, and others afterwards. They were not then, they said, violating their oaths to the allies by refusing to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; for since they had sworn to their Thrace-ward friends, with appeals to the gods, they should not show a proper regard for their oaths, if they betrayed



them. Besides, it had been expressly mentioned, "unless there were some impediment on the part of gods or heroes;" this, then, they considered an impediment on the part of the gods. Thus much they said on the subject of their former oaths: with regard to the Argive alliance, they would consult with their friends, and do whatever was right. So the envoys of the Lacedæmonians returned home. But there happened to be in Corinth at that time some ambassadors from the Argives also, who urged the Corinthians to enter at once into their confederacy, and not delay. They, however, told them to come to the next congress which was to be held in their city.

31. Immediately after, there came also an embassy from the Eleans, who concluded an alliance with the Corinthians in the first place, and then proceeded thence to Argos, as they had been previously instructed, and became allies of the Argives. For they were at variance with the Lacedæmonians just then about Lepreum. For a war having before this arisen between the Lepreans and some of the Arcadians, and the Eleans having been invited to alliance by the Lepreans, on condition of receiving half their territory, and having brought the war to a conclusion, the Eleans imposed on the Lepreans, who were themselves allowed to occupy the territory, the payment of a talent to the Olympian Jupiter. This they continued to pay till the Attic war broke out; when, on their ceasing to do so on the pretext of the war, the Eleans proceeded to compel them; on which they had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. When the case was thus submitted to the arbitration of the Lacedæmonians, the Eleans, suspecting that they should not have justice, renounced the reference, and laid waste the Leprean territory. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were independent, and that the Eleans were acting with injustice; and inasmuch as they had not stood by the arbitration, they sent into Lepreum a garrison of heavy-armed troops. So the Eleans, considering the Lacedæmonians to be receiving a city which had revolted from them, and alleging the agreement in which it had been declared, that whatever each party had when they entered on the Attic war, that they should also have when they retired from it; since they considered that they had not their due, they went over to the Argives; and thus they too, <sup>as they</sup> *καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς Ἀργεῖαν*. I do not think that this expression can signify,

had been previously instructed, concluded the alliance. Immediately after them the Corinthians and Thrace-ward Chalcidians also entered into alliance with the Argives; but the Bœotians and Megareans, holding each the same language as the other, remained quiet; being neglected by the Lacedæmonians, and yet thinking that the democracy of the Argives was less suited to them, with their oligarchical form of government, than the constitution of the Lacedæmonians.

32. About the same period of this summer, the Athenians,

according to Bloomfield's translation of it, which Poppo approves, "in the manner aforesaid;" i. e. by communicating with the twelve Argive commissioners, ch. 28. Surely, if that had been the writer's meaning, he would have used the *perfect* tense, not the *pluperfect*. Haack's interpretation therefore must be the correct one; "as had been previously ordered by their countrymen." And in sec. 5, where the same words are repeated with reference to the Eleans, they may either refer to the decree passed by the state at large for its own course of policy; or the whole people may be said to have joined the Argive league, though it was done through the agency of its *ambassadors*, in accordance with the commands they had received for the purpose.

[*περιορώμενοι*.] To the interpretation of this word which Arnold adopts from Bishop Thirlwall, Poppo, in his last edition, objects that there was nothing in the terms of the peace to raise such a feeling in the minds of the Bœotians and Megareans. But surely they might share the jealousy and suspicion which, we are told, were excited throughout the whole of the Peloponnese by the clause of the treaty empowering Sparta and Athens to make alterations in it by themselves, without the consent of the allies in general. Chap. 29. 3. At any rate, such a clause seems quite incompatible with the supposition of the Megareans and Bœotians having been treated at this particular time, however they might have been in general, with that extreme respect and attention which Poppo speaks of, and which Gölter and other commentators consider to be expressed by *περιορώμενοι*. The absence of *μέν* and *δέ*, which one would certainly have expected, to mark the opposition between the two clauses, may in some measure be supplied by the adversative force which I have given to the *καί*; that conjunction in Attic writers sometimes passing into the signification of *καίτοι*. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. §59. 3.—This difficulty would be entirely avoided, and a very appropriate meaning given to the whole sentence, if *περιορώμενοι* could be taken in the sense of "left to themselves, not interfered with, permitted to do what they pleased." The verb is very frequently used in a manner closely approaching to this, as well as the cognate ones from which it borrows some of its tenses; but in such cases it is usually followed by a participle, infinitive, or adjective, which serves to limit its meaning to some particular case. If, however, it should be thought possible for it to have been here used without such limitation, it would give a very good reason why the states should prefer the Lacedæmonian alliance to that of the restless and meddling Athenians. It would also express an important difference between the case of the Megareans and Bœotians and that of the Eleans, with whose policy towards the Lepreans Sparta is mentioned as having interfered; and that of the Mantineans, who are expressly said to have abandoned their connexion with her, because they expected similar interference. Ch. 29. 1, *ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους δεχθῆναι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον*.

having reduced the Scionæans to surrender, put the adult males to death; while they sold into slavery the women and children, and gave the territory for the Plateæans to occupy. On the other hand, they brought back the Delians to their country, from scruples arising from their disasters in different battles, and because the god at Delphi had so commanded them. At this time, too, the Phocians and Locrians commenced hostilities. And the Corinthians and Argives, being now in alliance, went to Tegea, to procure its revolt from the Lacedæmonians, seeing that it formed a considerable part of the Peloponnese, and thinking that, if it were added to them, they would command the whole of it. But when the Tegeans said they would do nothing in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, though hitherto very hearty in their measures, relaxed in their vehemence, and were afraid that none of the other parties might now come over to them. They went, however, to the Bœotians, and begged them to enter into alliance with themselves and the Argives, and act in all other respects in concert with them. With reference to the ten days' truces also, which had been made with each other by the Athenians and Bœotians not long after the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty, the Corinthians desired the Bœotians to accompany them to Athens, and obtain the same for them also, on the same footing as the Bœotians; and in case of the Athenians not acceding to this, then to renounce the suspension of arms, and in future to make no truce without being joined by them. On the Corinthians preferring these requests, the Bœotians desired them to desist on the subject of the Argive alliance: they went with them, however, to Athens, but did not obtain the ten days' truce; as the Athenians answered, that they were already in treaty with the Corinthians, inasmuch as they were allies of the Lacedæmonians. The Bœotians, then, did not any the more on that account renounce their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians called on them to do so, and expostulated with them on the ground of their having agreed to do it. Between the Corinthians, however, and the Athenians there was a suspension of arms<sup>1</sup> without any actual truce.

<sup>1</sup> By *ἀσπασμός* is meant a mere agreement in no solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, consider breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath. 6, 7."—*Arnold*.

33. The same summer, the Lacedæmonians made an expedition with all their forces, under the command of Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, their king, into the country of the Parrhasians in Arcadia, who were subject to the Mantineans, and who had invited their interference in the spirit of faction: intending also, if they could, to demolish the stronghold at Cypsela, which, being situated in the Parrhasian territory, the Mantineans had fortified and garrisoned with their own troops, for the annoyance of the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedæmonians therefore proceeded to ravage the land of the Parrhasians; while the Mantineans, having committed their city to the custody of Argive troops, themselves kept guard over their confederates' country. Being unable, however, to save the fort at Cypsela, and the towns in Parrhasia, they retired. The Lacedæmonians, after making the Parrhasians independent, and demolishing the fortress, returned home.

34. Moreover, in the course of the same summer, on the arrival of the troops from Thrace who had marched out with Brasidas, and whom Clearidas had brought back after the treaty was made, the Lacedæmonians decreed that the helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free, and live where they pleased; and not long after they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is situated on the borders of Laconia and Elis; for they were now at variance with the Eleans. But with regard to those of their own body who had been taken in the island, and had surrendered their arms, fearing they might suppose that they would be subjected to some degradation in consequence of their misfortune, and so, if allowed to retain their franchise, might attempt a revolution, they disfranchised them, even while some were holding offices; and with a disfranchisement of such a kind that they could neither take office, nor have power to buy or sell any thing. Subsequently, however, in the course of time, they were again enfranchised.

35. The same summer also the Dians took Thyssus on the

<sup>1</sup> "That the Neodamodes were a distinct class from the newly enfranchised helots seems clear from this passage and V. 87. 1: and Müller's supposition is highly probable, (Dorier, vol. ii. p. 45,) that the latter after a time rose to the condition of the former; possibly in the next generation; so that the son of an enfranchised helot became a Neodamode; like the distinction between Libertus and Libertinus."—Arnold.

promontory of Athos, a colony of the Athenians. And during the whole of this summer there was intercourse indeed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, but both parties suspected each other, from immediately after the conclusion of the treaty, on the ground of their not mutually restoring the places specified. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell first to restore Amphipolis and the other towns, had not done so : nor did they make their Thrace-ward allies accede to the treaty, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians ; though they were continually saying that, in conjunction with the Athenians, they would compel those states to do so, if they would not of their own accord. They also pleaded in excuse the fact of the time not being specified, at which those who did not accede to it, were to be considered as enemies to both sides. The Athenians therefore, seeing none of these things really performed, suspected that the Lacedæmonians had no upright intentions ; so that on their demanding back Pylus, they refused to restore it, (nay, they even repented of having given them back their prisoners taken in the island,) and kept the other places, waiting till they, on their part, performed for them what had been arranged. The Lacedæmonians said that they had done what was possible ; for that they had restored the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had recalled the troops in Thrace ; and whatever else they had in their power. With regard to Amphipolis, they were not, they said, masters of it, so as to give it up ; but they would endeavour to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians over to the treaty, and to recover Panactum ; and would restore as many of the Athenians as were prisoners in Bœotia. They required, however, that they should restore Pylus to them ; or if not that, should withdraw the Messenians and helots, as they, on their part, had withdrawn their troops from Thrace ; and that the Athenians themselves should garrison it, if they would. So when conferences had been held, many and often, during this summer, they prevailed on the Athenians to withdraw from Pylus the Messenians, and the rest of the helots, and all who had deserted from Laconia ; and they settled them at Cranii in Cephallenia. During this summer, then, there was peace and free intercourse with each other.

36. But the following winter, (different ephors happening now to be in office, and not those under whom the treaty had

been made, and some of them being even opposed to it,) when embassies had come from their confederacy, and the Athenians, Bœotians, and Corinthians were there, and they had held many discussions with one another, and come to no agreement; on their departing homeward, Cleobulus and Xenares—those of the ephors who most wished to break up the treaty—held a private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, advising them to pursue as far as possible the same policy; and that the Bœotians, after first entering into alliance with Argos themselves, should then endeavour to bring the Argives together with themselves into alliance with the Lacedæmonians. For in this way the Bœotians were least likely to be forced to accede to the Attic treaty; since the Lacedæmonians would prefer gaining the friendship and alliance of the Argives even <sup>1</sup>at the risk of the enmity of the Athenians and the dissolution of the treaty. For they knew that the Lacedæmonians were always desirous that Argos should be their friend on fair terms; thinking that so the war out of the Peloponnese would be more easily conducted by them. They begged the Bœotians, however, to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians; that by getting back Pylus, if they could, in exchange for it, they might more easily proceed to hostilities with the Athenians.

37. The Bœotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus, and such of the Lacedæmonians as were friendly towards <sup>2</sup>them, these instructions to carry to their governments, went each their way. But two persons of the Argives, who held the highest office in their country, watched for them by the way, as they were returning; and having met them, entered into conversation with them on the possibility of the Bœotians becoming their allies, as the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans had done; for if that could be well arranged, they thought they might then, on advantageous terms, both carry on war and make peace, both with the Lacedæmonians, if they should wish it,—holding the

<sup>1</sup> πρὸ.] More literally, "in the face of." Pappo adopts Dobree's explanation: "Pluris enim facturus Lacedæmoniorum Argivorum amicitiam et societatem quam Atheniensium inimicitiam ac fœderum cum ipsis junctorum violationem: i. e. magis illam cupere quam hanc metuere." For the force of καλῶς, in the next sentence, see Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> αὐτοῖς.] i. e. to the Bœotians and Corinthians, not to Xenares and Cleobulus, as Bloomfield supposes. Compare sec. 3.

same language all together—and with whomever else it might be necessary. The Bœotian envoys were pleased at hearing this; for they happened to ask the same things as their friends in Lacedæmon had instructed them to propose. So when the men from Argos perceived that they listened to their suggestions, they said they would send ambassadors to the Bœotians, and went away. The Bœotians, on their arrival, reported to the Bœotarchs what had been said to them, both at Lacedæmon, and by the Argives who had met them: and the Bœotarchs were pleased, and were much more eager in the business, since it had turned out so luckily for them in both quarters, that their friends amongst the Lacedæmonians requested the same things as the Argives were anxiously wishing. Not long after, ambassadors came from Argos with the proposals that have been mentioned; whom the Bœotarchs sent back after assenting to their terms, and, promising to send envoys to Argos on the question of the alliance.

38. In the mean time it was determined by the Bœotarchs, the Corinthians, the Megareans, and the ambassadors from Thrace, in the first place, to bind themselves by oaths to each other, that assuredly, when occasion offered, they would assist the party which needed it; and that they would carry on war with none, or make peace, without common assent; and that so the Bœotians and Megareans (for they had the same object before them) should then enter into treaty with the Argives. But before the oaths were taken, the Bœotarchs communicated these resolutions to the four councils of the Bœotians, which have the sole power of ratifying measures; and recommended to them that oaths should be exchanged with such cities as wished to league with them for mutual assistance. However, the members of the Bœotian councils did not accede to the plan, fearing that they should do what was displeasing to the Lacedæmonians, if they leagued with the Corinthians, who had separated from them. For the Bœotarchs did not tell them of what had taken place at Lacedæmon, namely, that Cleobulus and Xenares, amongst the ephors, and their friends, advised them first to enter into alliance with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to join the Lacedæmonians; as they imagined, that though they should not mention it, the council would decree nothing different from what they had previously determined on, and

[οφιοι προδιαγρόντες παρανοῦσιν.] Arnold is followed by Poppo and

now recommended to their country.' When the business had met with this check, the ambassadors from Corinth and Thrace departed without concluding any thing; while the Bœotarchs, who before intended, if they carried these measures, to attempt also to effect the alliance with the Argives, did not now bring the question of the Argives before the councils, or send to Argos the ambassadors they had promised; but there arose an indifference and procrastination in the whole business.

39. In the course of this same summer, the Olynthians assaulted and took Meciycerna, which was garrisoned by Athenians. After these events, conferences being continually held between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians respecting the possessions of each other which they still retained, the Lacedæmonians, hoping that, if the Athenians should receive back Panactum from the Bœotians, they would themselves recover Pylus, went on an embassy to the Bœotians, and begged them to deliver up to them Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they might recover Pylus in exchange for them. But the Bœotians refused to deliver them up, unless they would make an especial alliance with them, as with the Athenians. Although therefore the Lacedæmonians were aware that they should be acting wrong to the Athenians, since it had been stipulated that they should make neither peace nor war with any but by mutual consent; yet, as they wished to receive Panactum from them, believing that so they should recover Pylus, and as the party which was anxious to break up the treaty earnestly entered into the Bœotian negotiation; they concluded the alliance, when the winter was now closing and the spring at hand; and Panactum was immediately begun to be demolished. And thus ended the eleventh year of this war.

Bloomfield in supposing that *οφίσι* refers to the subject of *ψηφισθαι*; but as his explanation does not, I think, remove the extreme harshness of such a construction, Goller seems to be right in referring it to the Bœotarchs: except that he would not confine it, as he does, to Xenaros and Cleobulus, but extend it to the whole number of them; and suppose that it is either governed by *προδιαγνόντες*, meaning, "the plan which they had already decided on for themselves, and now recommended to the councils;" or that it signifies "their countrymen;" the executive being identified with the people at large, as it appears to be sec. 3. *Οἱ βωιωτάρχαι—παρήνουν γένει· θαι ἔρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ οφίσι· ἐνομιμῆναι*. If the former construction is preferred, *οφίσι* may be considered as a "dativus commodi." See Jelf, Gr. Gr. 59. 8.



40. As soon as the spring of the next summer commenced, the Argives, finding that the Boeotian ambassadors, whom they said they would send, did not come, and that Panactum was being demolished, and an especial alliance had been concluded by the Boeotians with the Lacedæmonians, were afraid that they might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over to the Lacedæmonians. For they supposed that the Boeotians had been persuaded by the Lacedæmonians both to demolish Panactum and to accede to the treaty with the Athenians; and that the Athenians were privy to these measures; so that they themselves had no longer power even to make alliance with the Athenians: whereas they hoped before, in consequence of the existing dissensions, that if their treaty with the Lacedæmonians should not continue, they would, at any rate, be in alliance with the Athenians. The Argives, then, were involved in these difficulties, and feared they might be engaged in war at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians: and consequently, though they did not before accept the treaty with the Lacedæmonians, but entertained the proud hope that they should enjoy the supremacy over the Peloponnese; they sent as envoys to Lacedæmon, as quickly as they could, Eustrophus and Æson, who were considered to be the most acceptable persons to them; thinking to live in quiet by making a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, as they best could under present circumstances, whatever might be the arrangement.

41. On the arrival of their ambassadors, they made proposals to the Lacedæmonians, as to the terms on which the treaty should be concluded between them. And at first the Argives claimed that they should have a judicial reference granted them, either to some state or individual, respecting the Cynurian territory; concerning which they have always been debating, as it is border-land: (it contains the towns of Thyrea and Anthene, and is occupied by the Lacedæmonians.) Afterwards, when the Lacedæmonians begged them not to mention that, but said that if they wished to make a treaty as before, they were ready to do so; the Argive ambassadors nevertheless induced the Lacedæmonians to agree to the following conditions: that at the present time, they should make

Or, "on whatever terms they might be allowed." \*See Bloomfield's Note.

a treaty for fifty years; but that on either party giving a challenge, at a time when there was neither plague nor war in Lacedæmon or Argos, they should be at liberty to decide by battle the question of this territory—as on a former occasion, when each side claimed the victory for themselves—but not to pursue the fugitives beyond the frontiers, whether towards Argos or Lacedæmon. Now the Lacedæmonians at first considered this as mere folly; but afterwards, (for they were anxious on any terms to have Argos for a friend,) they agreed to the conditions they demanded, and made a treaty with them in writing. Before, however, any thing was definitely arranged, the Lacedæmonians desired them to return first to Argos, and show it to their people; and if it pleased them, then to come at the Hyacinthia, to take the oaths. Accordingly they returned.

42. In the mean time, while the Argives were negotiating these matters, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromedes, Phœdinus, and Antimenidas, who were to restore Panactum to the Athenians, and to receive the prisoners from the Bœotians, and bring them back home, found Panactum demolished by the Bœotians themselves, on the pretext of there having been exchanged in former times between the Athenians and Bœotians, in consequence of a dispute about it, an oath that neither party should inhabit the place, but that they should graze it in common. The men, however, whom the Bœotians held as prisoners taken from the Athenians, Andromedes and his colleagues received from them, and conveyed to Athens, and restored. They likewise announced to them the demolition of Panactum, thinking that so they restored that too; for no enemy to the Athenians would in future inhabit it. On this announcement, the Athenians expressed great indignation; thinking themselves wronged by the Lacedæmonians, both with regard to the demolition of Panactum, which they ought to have delivered up to them standing, and the intelligence of their having on their own account made treaty with the Bœotians, though they formerly declared that they would join in compelling those who did not accede to the general treaty. They also looked for any other points in which they

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Poppo explains it, "that that very announcement was equivalent to restoring it."

had departed from their compact, and considered themselves to have been overreached by them; so that they gave an angry reply to the ambassadors, and sent them away.

43. When the Lacedæmonians, then, were in such a state of variance with the Athenians, those at Athens, again, who wished to do away with the treaty, were immediately urgent against it. Amongst others, who were so was Alcibiades son of Clinias, a man who in age was still at that time a youth, (as he would have been thought in any other state,) but honoured on account of the nobility of his ancestors. He considered that it was really better to side with the Argives; though he also opposed the treaty in the bitterness of wounded pride, because the Lacedæmonians had negotiated it through the agency of Nicias and Laches, having overlooked him on account of his youth, and not having shown him the respect suitable to the old connexion of his family as their *proxeni*, which, having been renounced by his grandfather, he himself thought to renew by showing attention to the prisoners taken in the island. Considering himself therefore to be in every way slighted by them, he both spoke against the treaty in the first instance, saying that the Lacedæmonians were not to be depended upon, but were only making a treaty in order that by so doing they might deprive Athens of the Argives, and again come against them when left alone; and at that time, when this difference had arisen, he immediately sent to Argos on his own account, urging them to come as quickly as possible with proposals for alliance, in company with the Mantineans and Eleans, since it was a fine opportunity, and he would co-operate with them to the utmost.

44. When the Argives received this message, and found that the alliance with the Boeotians had not been brought about in concert with the Athenians, but that they were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedæmonians; they thought no more of their ambassadors at Lacedæmon, who were just at that time gone thither on the subject of the treaty, but paid more attention to the Athenians; thinking that so, if they went to war, there would be on their side in it a state which had been their friend from of old, and was under a democratical form of government, like themselves, and wielded a great power in the command of the sea. They immediately

therefore sent ambassadors to the Athenians to treat of the alliance; and were also accompanied by envoys from the Eleans and Mantineans.

There came likewise with all speed, as ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians, persons who were thought to be favourably inclined towards the Athenians, namely, Philocharidas, Leon, and Ebulius; through fear that in their anger they might conclude the alliance with the Argives, and at the same time to ask back Pylas in exchange for Panactum, and to plead in excuse for the Bœotian alliance, that it had not been made for the purpose of hurting the Athenians.

45. By speaking in the council on these points, and declaring that they had come with full powers to effect a settlement of all their disputes, they made Alcibiades afraid that if they were to talk in the same strain to the popular assembly, they would win over the multitude, and the Argive alliance would be rejected. He adopted therefore the following device against them. He gained the confidence of the Lacedæmonians by giving them a solemn assurance, that if they would not acknowledge in the assembly that they had come with full powers, he would restore Pylus to them, (for he would himself persuade the Athenians to the measure, as he now opposed it,) and would settle all other points of difference. It was with a wish to withdraw them from the influence of Nicias that he did this; and in order that by accusing them before the people, as having no sincere intentions, and never saying the same thing, he might cause the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, to be taken into alliance. And so it turned out. For when, on coming before the people and being asked that question, they did not say, as they had said in the council, that they were come with full powers, the Athenians could endure it no longer; but on Alcibiades' exclaiming against the Lacedæmonians much more vehemently than before, they both listened to him, and were ready straightway to bring forward the Argives and those who were with them, and take them into alliance. An earthquake, however, having occurred before any thing was finally settled, that assembly was adjourned.

46. In the one which was held next day, although the Lacedæmonians had been outwitted, and he himself utterly deceived with regard to their confessing not to have come

with full powers, Nicias nevertheless maintained that they ought rather to become friends of the Lacedæmonians, and, deferring their measures with the Argives, to send once more to them, and ascertain their intentions. He represented that it was to their own honour, but to their rivals' discredit, for the war to be put off: for since their own affairs were in so good a condition, it was best to preserve their prosperity as long as possible; whereas to the Lacedæmonians, in their present misfortunes, it would be gain to run all hazards as quickly as possible. So he prevailed on them to send ambassadors, of whom he was himself one, to bid the Lacedæmonians, if they had any just intentions, to restore Panactum standing, with Amphipolis, and to give up their alliance with the Bœotians, if they refused to accede to the treaty; as it had been stipulated that they should make peace with none but by mutual consent. They told them also to say, that *they* too, if they had wished to act unjustly, might have already taken the *Argives* for their allies, since they were come to them for that very purpose. And whatever complaint they had against them, they gave instructions on the subject to Nicias and his colleagues, and then sent them off. When they came there, and, after delivering their other messages, finally declared, that unless they gave up their alliance with the Bœotians, in case of their not acceding to the treaty, the Athenians also would take as their allies the Argives and those who joined them; the Lacedæmonians refused to renounce the alliance with the Bœotians—the party of Xenares, the ephor, and all the rest who had the same views, having sufficient influence to secure that,—but the oaths they renewed at the request of Nicias: for he was afraid of returning with all his objects unaccomplished, and of being exposed to censure, (as indeed was the case,) since he was considered as the author of the treaty with the Lacedæmonians. On his return, when the Athenians heard that nothing had been done at Lacedæmon, immediately they were enraged; and since they considered themselves injured, the Argives and their allies happening to be present, (having been introduced by Alcibiades,) they

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold, Poppo, and others explain it, "advising that hostilities should be deferred." For a very similar use of *ἐν* with an adjective, compare I. 137. 6, *ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ ἀσφαλείᾳ μὲν ἐμὸν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀποκομιδὴν ἐγγίνετο*.

made a treaty and alliance with them on the following terms :

47. "The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans made a treaty for a hundred years, on behalf of themselves and the allies in their respective dominions, to be observed without guile or injury, both by land and by sea. That it shall not be allowed to take up arms with a mischievous design, either for the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, against the Athenians, or for the Athenians and their allies against the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, with their allies, by any means whatever.

• "That the following are the terms on which the Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be allies for a hundred years.

"That in case of an enemy marching against the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the succour of Athens, according to whatever message the Athenians may send them, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all these states ; and that no one of them shall be at liberty to terminate hostilities with that state, unless they all think fit to do so. That the Athenians likewise shall go to the succour of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, in case of an enemy marching against the Elean, Mantinean, or Argive territory, according to whatever message these states may send, in such manner as they can most effectually, to the utmost of their power. That in case of their having ravaged it and departed, that state shall be considered as an enemy to the Athenians, Eleans, Mantineans, and Argives, and shall be exposed to the vengeance of all of them ; and that it shall not be lawful to terminate hostilities with that state, unless all the states think fit to do so.

"That they shall not allow armed troops to pass for hostile purposes through their own land, or that of the allies in their respective dominions, nor by sea, unless all the states, the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, have decreed that their passage be allowed.

"That to the troops going as succours the state which sends them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their

arrival in the state which sent them word to succour it, and on their return in the same way: but that in case of their wishing to avail themselves of their service for a longer time, the state which sent, for them shall supply them with provisions, at the rate of three Æginetan oboli a day for a heavy-armed soldier, a light-armed, or a bowman, and of an Æginetan drachma for a horseman.

"That the state which sent for them shall have the command, while the war is in its own territory; but that in case of the states resolving to make a joint expedition in any quarter, an equal share of the command shall be enjoyed by all the states.

"That the treaty shall be sworn to, by the Athenians on behalf both of themselves and their allies, but on the part of the Argives, Mantineans, Eleans, and their allies, by each several state. That they shall swear that oath respectively which is the most binding in their country, over full-grown victims; and the oath shall be to this effect; 'I will stand by this alliance according to the stipulations, honestly, without injury, and without guile, and will not violate it by any method or means whatever.' That the persons to take the oath shall be, at Athens, the council and the home magistrates, the prytanes administering it; at Argos, the council, the eighty, and the *artynæ*, the eighty administering it; at Mantinea, the *demiurgi*, the council, and the other magistrates, the *theori* and the polemarchs administering it; at Elis, the *demiurgi*, the magistrates, and the six hundred, the *demiurgi* and *thesmophulaces* administering it. That the oaths shall be renewed, by the Athenians, on going to Elis, Mantinea, and Argos, thirty days before the Olympic festival; by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, on going to Athens, ten days before the great Panathenaic festival.

"That the stipulations respecting the treaty, the oaths, and the alliance, shall be inscribed on a stone pillar; by the Athenians, in the citadel; by the Argives, in the market-place, in the temple of Apollo; by the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter in the market-place: and that a brazen pillar shall be erected at their joint expense at Olympia, at the present festival. That should these states think it better to make any

<sup>1</sup> For what little is known of the several offices here mentioned, see Arnold's note, and the authorities quoted in it.

addition to the articles agreed on, whatever seems fit to all the states, on holding common deliberation, that shall be binding."

48. In this way were the treaty and alliances concluded, and yet that between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians was not renounced on this account by either party. But though the Corinthians were allies of the Argives, they did not accede to the new treaty. Nay, before this time, when an alliance was formed between the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, to be at war and peace with the same states, they did not join the league, but said that they were content with the first alliance which had been made for purposes of defence, on condition of succouring one another, but not joining to attack any party. The Corinthians, then, thus stood aloof from their allies, and turned their thoughts again towards the Lacedæmonians.

49. The Olympic festival was held this summer, that at which Androsthenes the Arcadian was victor the first time in the <sup>1</sup>pancratium. The Lacedæmonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists, as refusing to pay the fine to which the Eleans, by virtue of the Olympian law, had condemned them, alleging that they had attacked the fortress of Phyreus, and sent a body of their heavy-armed into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine imposed upon them was two thousand minæ, being two for each heavy-armed soldier, as the law ordains. But the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors, and pleaded that it had not been fairly imposed upon them; declaring that the truce had not yet been proclaimed at Lacedæmon, when they sent their troops into Lepreum. The Eleans, however, maintained that the cessation of arms in their country had already commenced, (for they proclaim it amongst themselves first,) and that while they were living in quiet, and not expecting any thing, as it was time of truce, the Lacedæmonians had committed an injury upon them by surprise. The Lacedæmonians replied, that there was no need of the Eleans having still proclaimed the truce at Lacedæmon, if they had thought them already guilty of injustice; but they had done so, as not thinking it; and they themselves had no longer gone any where to attack them. The Eleans, however,

<sup>1</sup> Consisting of wrestling and boxing.



adhered to the same statement, namely, that they could never be persuaded that they were not guilty; but that if they would restore Lepreum to them, they were ready to give up their own share of the money, and would themselves pay for them that which fell to the god.

50. When they did not comply, they required them again to do as follows: not to give back Lepreum, if they objected to it, but to mount on the altar of the Olympian Jupiter—since they were so anxious to have access to the temple—and swear before the Greeks that assuredly they would discharge the fine at a future period. But when they would not do this either, the Lacedæmonians were excluded from the temple—~~from the sacrifice and from the games~~—and made their offerings at home; while the rest of the Greeks, except the Lepreans, sent their deputations to the festival. However, the Eleans were afraid of their sacrificing by force, and kept guard with a heavy-armed company of their young men; while there also came to them a body of Argives and Mantineans, each a thousand strong, and some Athenian cavalry, that were at Argos, waiting for the festival. And a great alarm was produced in the assembly lest the Lacedæmonians should come in arms; especially after Lichas son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, was scourged on the course by the <sup>1</sup>lictors, because, on his horses being the winners, and the Bæotian people being proclaimed victor, on account of his having no right to enter the lists, he came forward on to the course, and crowned the charioteer, from a wish to show that the chariot was his. All therefore were now much more afraid, and thought there would be some disturbance. However, the Lacedæmonians kept quiet, and let the feast thus pass by.—After the Olympic festival, the Argives and their allies repaired to Corinth, to beg that state to come over to them. Some Lacedæmonian ambassadors, too, happened to be there; and after there had been much discussion, nothing was accomplished at last; but an earthquake having occurred, they dispersed to their several homes. And so the summer ended.

51. The following winter the Heracleans in Trachinia fought a battle with the Ænians, Dolopians, Maleans, and some of the Thessalians. For these nations were bordering on, and hostile to, their city; as it was against no other country but

<sup>1</sup> Or, "by the umpires," as Bredow, Haack, and others think.

theirs that the place was fortified. Accordingly they opposed the city on its first settlement, by annoying it as far as they could; and at this time they defeated the Heracleans in the engagement, Xenares son of Cpidis, a Lacedæmonian, being slain, and others of the Heracleans also cut off. And thus the winter ended, and the twelfth year of the war.

52. At the very commencement of the following summer, the Bœotians seized on Heraclea, when it was miserably reduced after the battle, and sent away Hegesippidas the Lacedæmonian, on the charge of governing it ill. They occupied the place through fear that, while the Lacedæmonians were distracted with the affairs of the Peloponnese, the Athenians might take it. The Lacedæmonians, however, were offended with them for what they had done. The same summer, Alcibiades son of Clinias, being one of the generals at Athens, having the co-operation of the Argives and the allies, went into the Peloponnese with a few Athenian heavy-armed and bowmen; and taking with him some of the allies in those parts, both proceeded to settle in concert with them other matters connected with the alliance, marching about the Peloponnese with his troops, and persuaded the Patreans to carry their walls down to the sea; intending also himself to build a fort beside the Achæan Rhium. But the Corinthians and Sicyonians, and all to whose injury it would have been built, came against him, and prevented his doing it.

53. The same summer a war broke out between the Epidaurians and Argives; nominally, about the offering to Apollo Pythæus, which the Epidaurians were bound to make, but did not, for certain lands by the river side; (the Argives had the chief management of the temple;) but even independently of this charge, Alcibiades and the Argives thought it desirable to get possession of Epidaurus, if they could; both to insure the neutrality of Corinth, and thinking that the Athenians would find it a shorter passage for their succours through Ægina, than by sailing round Scyllæum. The Argives therefore prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves, in order to exact the offering.

<sup>1</sup> I have adopted Poppo's reading, *παρὰ ποταμίων*, as Arnold himself confesses that the common one, *βορᾶμιον*, is perfectly inexplicable. Of Bloomfield's conjecture, *βοτανόμιον*, "pastures," Poppo says, "*refutatione non indiget.*"

54. The Lacedæmonians, too, at the same time marched out with all their forces to Leuctra, on their own borders, opposite Mount Lycæum, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, their king; but no one knew what was their destination, not even the cities from which contingents were sent. When, however, the omens from their sacrifices were not favourable for crossing the border, they both returned home themselves, and sent word to their allies to prepare to take the field after the ensuing month; (that being the month Carneus, a holy period amongst the Dorians). On their retiring, the Argives marched out on the 26th of the month preceding Carneus; and advancing that day the whole of the time, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and proceeded to lay it waste. The Epidaurians invoked the aid of their allies; but some of them pleaded the month as an excuse, while others, even after coming to the borders of Epidaurus, remained inactive.

<sup>1</sup> Duker and Poppo suppose the cities of Laconia to be here intended.

<sup>2</sup> I have followed Arnold's former interpretation of this very doubtful passage, as appearing less objectionable, on the whole, than any other that has been proposed; though he himself abandons it in his last edition. Göller and Bloomfield put the comma after ταύτην, and read *ἰσέβαλλον*; but to this there is what appears to me an insuperable objection. Often as the verb *ἰσέβαλλω* occurs in Thucydides, it is never used, when speaking of a country, to signify a continuance of offensive measures; but always expresses the one definite act of crossing an enemy's borders and invading his territory; and the case is the same with regard to the cognate substantive *ἰσβολή*. The imperfect tense therefore, though quite appropriate for expressing the ravages which troops continued to make when once in the country, is inappropriate with reference to the invasion itself; and could only be used with *πάντων τὸν χρόνον* on the supposition of the army retreating within its own frontier continually, and invading the country afresh; which is not only improbable in this particular instance, but in direct opposition to the first sentence of the next chapter: "*καὶ καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδαύρῳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν.*" Accordingly, in the very next chapter, sec. 2, we have the aorist *ἰσέβαλον* followed by the imperfect *ἰδόντων*; and as all the MSS. but two have the same reading here, there can be no doubt, I think, of its being the genuine one.—Poppo objects to Göller's explanation, but does not propose any thing himself. Bp. Thirlwall adopts that of Portus, Acacius, and Hoffmann; "although they had always kept that day holy." To this Arnold objects; "but can Thucydides have written *καὶ ἀγούρας* as signifying *καὶ περ ἀγούρας*? I certainly do not see why he could not, since he appears to have used a similar construction elsewhere; see VI. 16. 8, *ἔξ οὗ καὶ περ γενόμενοι τῇ μάχῃ οὐδέποτε καὶ νῦν βεβαίως θαρροῦσαι*; if not also 16. 4. But it is perhaps a more solid objection, that he never uses either *ἀγειν* with *ἡμέραν* in that sense (though he does with *ἰσχυρῶς*); nor *πάντα τὸν χρόνον* to signify "the whole course of time," as distinguished from "the whole of the time," i. e. of some definite period; not either *διὰ* or *διὰ παντός*. Nor, again, does the statement thus supposed to be made respecting the holy day rest on any thing but assumption.

55. At the time that the Argives were in Epidaurus, deputations from the states assembled at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. And when the conference began, the Corinthians said that their words did not agree with their deeds; since *they* were sitting in council on the subject of peace, while the Epidaurians with their allies and the Argives were arrayed against each other under arms. Deputies therefore from each party ought first to go and separate the armies, and then come and speak again on the subject of peace. In compliance with this sentiment, they went and brought back the Argives out of the Epidaurian territory. They then assembled again, but could not even then come to any agreement; but the Argives again invaded Epidaurus, and laid it waste. The Lacedæmonians, too, marched out to Caryæ; and returned again, when the omens on that occasion also proved unfavourable to them. The Argives, after ravaging about a third of the Epidaurian territory, returned home. Moreover, a thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians had come to their assistance, with Alcibiades as general; but on learning that the Lacedæmonians had ended their expedition, and that there was no longer any need for them, they returned home. And so the summer passed by.

56. The following winter, the Lacedæmonians eluded the vigilance of the Athenians in sending by sea to Epidaurus three hundred garrison troops, under command of Agēsippidas. The Argives therefore went to the Athenians, and complained, that though it had been specified in the treaty that they should not allow an enemy to pass through their respective countries, they had allowed them to go there by sea; and therefore they should consider themselves aggrieved, if the Athenians, on their side, did not take the Messenians and helots to Pylus, to annoy the Lacedæmonians. So the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, inscribed at the bottom of the Laconian pillar, that the Lacedæmonians had not adhered to their oaths; and they conveyed the helots who were at Cranii to Pylus, to plunder the country; though in other respects they remained quiet. Now in the course of hostilities during this winter between the Argives and Epidaurians, no pitched battle was fought, but there were only ambuscades and skirmishes, in which some were slain on each side, as might happen. When the winter was closing, and spring was

now at hand, the Argives went with scaling ladders to Epidaurus, supposing that it would be left unguarded on account of the war, and intending to take it by storm; but returned unsuccessful. And thus the winter ended, and the thirteenth year of this war.

57. In the middle of the next summer, when the Lacedæmonians saw that the Epidaurians, who were their allies, were in distress, and that the other states in the Peloponnese had either separated from them, or were unfavourably disposed towards them; thinking that if they did not quickly prevent it, they would proceed to a greater degree of disaffection, they marched with all their forces, themselves and the helots, against Argos, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. They were accompanied by the Tegeans, and as many others of the Arcadians as were in alliance with them. The allies in the rest of the Peloponnese also, and those beyond it, mustered at Phlius; the Bœotians with five thousand heavy-armed, the same number of light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and an equal number of <sup>1</sup> *hamippi*; the Corinthians with two thousand heavy-armed; the rest as might severally happen; but the Phliasians in full force, as the army was posted in their country.

58. Now the Argives had from the first been aware of the preparations of the Lacedæmonians; and when they were on their march for the purpose of joining the rest at Phlius, then they also took the field. They were reinforced by the Mantineans with their allies, and by three thousand heavy-armed of the Eleans. And as they advanced, they met the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium in Arcadia, and each army occupied a hill. The Argives then prepared to engage the Lacedæmonians, cut off as they were by themselves: but Agis broke up in the night, and eluding them, proceeded to the rest of the allies at Phlius. The Argives, on finding this, marched, as soon as it was morning, to Argos first, and then to where they expected the Lacedæmonians with their allies would descend into their country, namely, the road running by Nemea. Agis, however, did not take that road, as they expected him to do; but having given orders to the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he advanced by another and more

<sup>1</sup> i. e. light infantry who accompanied the cavalry into action See Poppe's note.

difficult route, and so came down into the plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians had been ordered to descend by that leading to Nemea, where the Argives were posted, in order that, if the Argives should advance into the plain against his own division, they might hang on their rear, and use their cavalry with effect. He then, having made these arrangements and entered the plain, proceeded to ravage Saminthus and other places.

59. The Argives, having discovered it, advanced from Nemea, when it was now day, to their succour, and falling in with the forces of the Phliasians and Corinthians, killed a few of the former, but themselves had rather more killed by the latter. And now the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians advanced, as they had been ordered, towards Nemea, and found the Argives no longer there; but they had gone down, on seeing their property ravaged, and were forming for battle; while the Lacedæmonians also were preparing to meet them. Now the Argives were intercepted in the midst of their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedæmonians and those with them excluded them from their city; above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and in the direction of Nemea the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. They had no cavalry with them; <sup>1</sup> for the Athenians alone of all the allies had not yet joined them. Now the mass of the Argives and their allies did not consider their present position so formidable; but fancied that the battle would be fought on favourable terms, and that they had intercepted the Lacedæmonians in their own country, and close by their city. But two individuals of the Argives, Thrasyllus, one of the five generals, and Alciphron, the *proxenus* of the Lacedæmonians, when the armies were now on the very point of engaging, went to Agis, and in a conference urged him not to bring on a battle; since the Argives were prepared to give and accept fair and equal arbitration for whatever complaints the Lacedæmonians had against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace for the future.

60. Those of the Argives who made these statements did so on their own authority, and not by order of the people; and

<sup>1</sup> Implies, of course, that the Athenians were the only people amongst the confederates who had any cavalry.

Agis on his own discretion received their proposals ; and without consulting, any more than *they* had, with the majority, but only communicating them to one of the officers who joined the expedition, granted a truce for four months, during which they were to fulfil their agreement. And so he immediately led back the army, without explaining the matter to any of the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians and allies followed, indeed, as he led them, out of respect for the law ; but amongst each other they blamed him exceedingly, considering that when they had had an opportunity of fighting on favourable terms, and their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by infantry and cavalry, they were returning without having achieved any thing worthy of their preparations. For indeed this was the finest Grecian army that had ever been brought together up to that time ; and it appeared such especially while it was still all united at Nemea, consisting of the Lacedæmonians in full force, the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans ; and those, too, all picked men from their respective populations, and thinking themselves a match, not only for the Argive confederacy, but even for another such added to it. Thus then the army, finding great fault with Agis, withdrew, and dispersed to their several homes. But the Argives, on their side, blamed far more severely still those who had concluded the truce without consulting the people ; as they too thought that the Lacedæmonians had escaped when they never could have had a finer opportunity of destroying them ; since the contest would have been decided near their own city, and in concert with many brave allies. On their return therefore they began to stone Thrasyllus in the bed of the Charadrus, where they try all causes that may arise from any expedition, before they enter the city. He escaped by flying for refuge to the altar ; his property, however, was confiscated by them.

61. After this, when the Athenian succours arrived, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred cavalry, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives being loath, notwithstanding their arrival, to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians, commanded them to go back, though they wished to make a communication to them, and did not grant them a public audience, until the Mantineans and Eleans, (for they were still there,) by their entreaties, con-

strained them to do so. The Athenians then—Alcibiades being present as ambassador—spoke before the Argives and their allies to this effect; that it was not right for the truce<sup>1</sup> even to have been made, without the consent of the other allies; and that now, since their force had come so seasonably, they ought to proceed to hostilities. And having persuaded the allies by their arguments, they immediately marched against Orchomenus, all but the Argives, who, though persuaded to the measure, still stayed behind at first; afterwards, however, they also went. Thus they all sat down before Orchomenus, and besieged it, and made assaults upon it; being for other reasons desirous to get possession of it, and especially as some hostages from Arcadia were deposited there by the Lacedæmonians. The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their wall and the number of the hostile forces, and fearing, since no succours had arrived, that they might perish before they did, surrendered on condition of joining the confederacy, giving hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and delivering up those whom the Lacedæmonians had deposited with them.

62. After this, when the allies were now in possession of Orchomenus, they consulted to which of the remaining places they should proceed first. The Eleans urged them to go against Lepreum, the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans. The Eleans, being angry at their not determining to march against Lepreum, returned home; while the rest of the allies made preparations at Mantinea for proceeding against Tegea; and a party of the Tegeans themselves in the town were ready to give up the government to them.

63. As for the Lacedæmonians, when they had returned from Argos after concluding the four months' truce, they blamed Agis exceedingly for not having brought Argos into subjection to them, when there was so fine an opportunity as they thought had never before presented itself; for it was no easy thing to find so many and such allies collected together. But when tidings also came of the capture of Orchomenus, they were far more enraged, and under the influence of anger resolved

<sup>1</sup> *καὶ γίνουτο*.] Arnold and Poppo agree with Bauer in thinking that *καὶ* ought to have been put before *αὐτοῖς*; but may it not be intended to qualify *γίνουτο* alone, as I have taken it? in which case it stands just as it ought.



immediately (contrary to their general habit) that they ought to demolish his house, and fine him ten thousand drachmas. But he besought them to do none of these things; for he would atone for his faults by good service when he next took the field, or they might then do to him whatever they pleased. Accordingly, they abstained from the fine and the demolition of his house, but passed a law at that time which had never before existed amongst them; for they chose ten Spartans to act as counsellors with him, without whose consent he should have no power to lead an army out of the city.

64. Meanwhile intelligence reached them from their friends in Tegea, that unless they came there quickly, Tegea would go over from them to the Argives and their allies, and that it had all but done so. Upon this then succour was given them by the Lacedæmonians and their helots in full force, with vigour, and in such a way as had never been done before. They advanced to Orestheum, in the Mænalian territory; and commanded those of the Arcadians who were their allies to muster and march close after them to Tegea; while they themselves, after coming all of them as far as Orestheum, from that place sent back home the sixth part of their force, in which were included those who were too old or too young for foreign service, to protect their property at home, and with the remainder of their army arrived at Tegea, where their allies from Arcadia joined them not long after. They also sent to the Corinthians, Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, with orders to reinforce them as quickly as possible at Mantinea. But to these the notice was short, and it was not easy, except in a body, and after waiting for each other, to cross the enemy's territory; for it closed up the communication, lying just in the way of it: however, they made all haste notwithstanding. The Lacedæmonians, meanwhile, taking with them their Arcadian allies who had joined them, invaded the territory of Mantinea, and having encamped near the temple of Hercules, laid waste the land.

65. The Argives and their allies, on seeing them, occupied a position that was strong and difficult of access, and drew up their troops for action. The Lacedæmonians and their allies immediately advanced against them, and proceeded to within stone's throw or arrow-shot; when one of the elders called out to Agis, "that he was purposing to cure evil with evil;" mean-

ing that his present unseasonable eagerness was intended to be a reparation of his culpable retreat from Argos. He then, whether in consequence of this exclamation, or because he was himself suddenly struck by some resolution different from what he had before adopted, led his army back again with all speed, before the engagement had begun; and going into the Tegean country, diverted over that of the Mantineans the water about which the Tegeans and Mantineans are continually engaged in hostilities, as it causes a general injury to whichever country it falls into. His object was to bring the Argives and their allies down from the hill, on their coming<sup>1</sup> to resist the diversion of the water, when they heard of it, and so to fight the battle on the plain. Accordingly, after staying there in the neighbourhood of the water during that day, he turned it off. The Argives and their allies, on the other hand, were at first amazed at his sudden retreat, when at so short a distance from them, and did not know what to conjecture. Afterwards, when the enemy had withdrawn out of sight, while they themselves remained still, and did not follow them, they then began to blame their generals again; both because, on the former occasion, the Lacedæmonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; and now, when they were running away, no one pursued them; but with perfect quiet the enemy were saving themselves, while they were being betrayed. The generals, then, were at the moment confounded, but afterwards they led them off from the hill, and having advanced on to the plain, pitched their camp, with the intention of advancing against the enemy.

66. The next day the Argives and their allies formed their line as they intended to engage, should they fall in with their opponents; and the Lacedæmonians, on going back again from the water to the temple of Hercules, into their old encampment, see the enemy at a short distance from them, all

<sup>1</sup> Though it is true, as Arnold observes, that neither *βουθούντας*, nor the participle in the other passages quoted by Poppo, is, strictly speaking, a present put for a future; yet the full meaning of those participles appears to be most naturally conveyed in English by the *sign* of the future, since they are expressive of intention; a force which the present indicative frequently has, and which might therefore be expected in the participle as well. For other instances of it in Thucydides, compare II. 65. 8, *διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὗ προσήκοντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν*. IV. 61. 1, *χρηὲς τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μάλλον ἢ τὰ ἐτοίμα βλάπτοντας συμμάχους τι ἐπάγεισθαι*, κ. τ. λ.

by this time in order of battle, and advanced from the hill. The Lacedæmonians, then, were on this occasion in the greatest consternation they had ever experienced within their memory. For their preparations had to be made on a short notice; and immediately they fell into their ranks in a hurry, Agis, their king, giving all orders, according to their law. For when a king is at the head of an army, all commands are given by him; and he communicates to the *polemarchs* what is to be done, they to the *lochagi*, those to the *penteconters*, these again to the *enomotarchs*, and these to their *enomoty*; and thus their orders, whatever they wish to be done, pass in the same manner, and quickly reach the troops; for pretty nearly all the army of the Lacedæmonians, a small portion excepted, are officers over officers; and to attend to what is going on is a duty incumbent on many.

67. On that occasion the Sciritæ formed their left wing; who alone of the Lacedæmonians have always that post by themselves. Next to them were the soldiers who had served with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamodes with them. Then came the Lacedæmonians themselves, with their *lochi* posted one after the other; by their side the Arcadians of Heræa; after them the Mænalians; and on the right wing the Tegeans, with a few of the Lacedæmonians holding the extreme position. Their cavalry was posted on each wing. The Lacedæmonians, then, were drawn up in this way. On the side of their opponents, their right wing was occupied by the Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country; and by their side were the Arcadian allies. Then came the thousand picked men of the Argives, for whom the state had for a long time furnished at the public expense a course of training in military matters; next to them the other Argives; and after these, their allies the Cleonæans and Orneans; then the Athenians, holding the extreme left, and their own cavalry with them.

68. Such was the order of battle and the preparation on both sides. The army of the Lacedæmonians appeared the larger of the two; but as for stating any number, either of the several divisions on each side, or of their collective force, I could not do it with accuracy. For the number of the Lacedæmonians, on account of the secrecy of their government, was not known; and that of the others, in consequence

of men's natural tendency to boasting with regard to their own numbers, was regarded with distrust. From the following mode of calculating, however, one may see the number of Lacedæmonians that was present on that occasion. There were engaged in the battle seven *lochi*, exclusive of the Sciritæ, who amounted to six hundred; and <sup>1</sup>in each *lochos* there were four *pentecostyes*, and in the *pentecosty* four *enomotiæ*.<sup>\*</sup> In the first rank of the *enomoty* there were four fighting men. <sup>2</sup>In depth, though they had not all been drawn up alike, but as each *lochagus* chose, they took their position on the field uniformly eight deep. And thus, along the whole line, the first rank consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, besides the Sciritæ.\*

69. When they were now on the point of engaging, the following admonitions were then severally addressed to them by their own generals. To the Mantineans, that the battle would be fought for their country, and to decide on the question of empire and slavery—that they might not be deprived of the former after tasting it, and might avoid again tasting the latter. To the Argives, that they would fight for their original supremacy, and not to brook being for ever deprived of their former equal share of the Peloponnese; and at the same time to avenge themselves on men who were their enemies, and near ones too, for many acts of injustice. To the Athenians, that fighting as they were in concert with many brave allies, it was a glorious thing for them to show themselves inferior to none; and that by defeating the Lacedæmonians in the Peloponnese, they would enjoy their empire more securely, and to a greater extent, while no one else would

<sup>1</sup> "The *regular* complement of the *enomotiæ* was twenty-four men, besides its captain: the *pentecosty* was composed of two *enomotiæ*, and the *lochos* of two *pentecostyes*."—*Arnold*. See his whole note on this passage.

<sup>2</sup> As the number of the ranks must have depended on that of the files, and have been the same throughout the army, if that were, or have differed, because that did; it is evident that any change which the commander-in-chief might have made in the previous dispositions of the several *lochagi*, must have affected the breadth of the ranks as well as the depth of the files, though the latter only is mentioned, or rather implied, by our author. The supposition of such a change is warranted by the variation in the tenses of the verbs; and is the only way of solving the difficulty noticed by Dobree—that the depth of the line in each *lochos* appears to be left to the discretion of its commander, even after the number of men in the front rank of all of them has been said to have been uniformly four; though after this had once been settled, the other must, of course, have been no less uniform. See Poppo's note

ever march against their country. To the Argives and their allies such were the admonitions that were addressed. The Lacédæmonians, on the other hand, both individually amongst themselves, and with their national war-songs, exhorted one another, as brave men, to remember what they had learned before; knowing that actual training for a long time previous was of more benefit than a brief verbal exhortation, however well expressed.

70. After this the conflict commenced: the Argives and their allies advancing with haste and impetuosity; the Lacédæmonians slowly, and to the music of many flute-players, placed amongst them according to custom, not with a religious object, but that they might advance evenly, stepping in time, and so that their line might not be broken, a thing which large armies are apt to do in their approaches to an enemy.

71. While they were yet closing in battle, King Agis resolved to execute a manœuvre, as follows. All armies, on going into battle, are forced out too much on their right wing; because the men, in their fear, each shelter, as far as possible, their exposed side with the shield of the man who is posted next to them on the right, and think that the closer they are locked together, the more effectually they are protected. The man who primarily gives occasion to this is he who stands first on the right wing, through wishing continually to withdraw from the enemy his own unarmed side; and the rest follow him under the influence of the same fear. And so, on that occasion, the Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the Sciritæ, and the Lacédæmonians and Tegeans farther still beyond the Athenians, inasmuch as their army was larger than theirs. Agis therefore, being afraid that their left might be surrounded, and thinking that the Mantineans were extending too far beyond it, gave orders for the Sciritæ and Brasidean soldiers to advance from their position with a part of their number, and equalize their line to that of the Mantineans; while into the void thus created he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristoteles, two of the polemarchs, to move over from the right wing with their *lochi*, and by throwing themselves into it to fill it up; thinking that their own right would still have an abundance of strength, and that the line opposite the Mantineans would be formed the more firmly.

72. Now as he gave these orders at the very moment of the

charge, and on a sudden, the consequence was, that Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move on, (they were for this offence afterwards banished from Sparta, being thought to have shown cowardice,) and that so the enemy closed with them before any thing could be done; and moreover, that when he ordered the Sciritæ to rejoin their comrades, since the *lochi* did not move on to their support, neither could these now fill up the line. But when the Lacedæmonians were most decidedly and in every respect beaten in point of skill, at that very time they proved themselves no less superior in point of courage. For when they had come to close quarters with their opponents, though the right wing of the Mantineans broke their Sciritan and Brasidean corps, and the Mantineans and their allies, with the thousand picked men of the Argives, rushing in through the open and unclosed part of the line, cut up the Lacedæmonians, having surrounded and broken them, and drove them to the baggage waggons, and killed some of the veterans who were posted as a guard over them: though in this part of the field, I say, the Lacedæmonians were worsted, yet with the rest of their forces, and especially the centre, where was King Agis, and around him the three hundred horsemen,<sup>2</sup> as they are called, they fell on the veterans of the Argives, and what are named the five *lochi*, with the Cleonæans, the Orneans, and those of the Athenians who were posted next to them, and put them to flight; the majority not having even waited to close with them, but having, on the approach of the Lacedæmonians, immediately given way, and some of them having been even trodden under foot,<sup>3</sup> in their hurry to avoid being anticipated and overtaken.

<sup>1</sup> Or, "proved that it was mainly through their courage that they won the victory."

<sup>2</sup> "He adds *καλούμενοι*, because, though called horsemen, they were really infantry. The actual cavalry were on the wings, as had been already stated, ch. 67. 1. These "three hundred horsemen," as they were called, "were originally, we may suppose, so many chiefs, who fought round their king, not on foot, but in their chariots; this being the early sense of *ἵππες*, and *ἵπποες*, as we find from Homer."—*Arnold*.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, "that the overtaking might not anticipate them." For the different explanations of this very doubtful expression, see Poppe's and Arnold's note. I have followed Heilmann and Haack in considering

Thucydides uses the  
without it, it expresses purpose, and not effect, or cause. See I. 4; II. 4.  
2 32. 1; V. 27. 2; VIII. 14. 1; 39. 4. The only one of these passages

73. When the army of the Argives and their allies had given way on this side, <sup>1</sup>their line was now broken off both ways; while at the same time the right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans was surrounding the Athenians with the troops which outflanked them, and they were encompassed with danger on both sides, as they were being surrounded on one, and were already beaten on the other. Indeed they would have suffered most severely of all the army, if the presence of their cavalry had not been of service to them. It happened too, that Agis, on perceiving the Lacedæmonian left wing, which was opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, to be hard pressed, gave orders for the whole army to advance to the support of the division which was being defeated. And when this was done, the Athenians meanwhile, as the enemy's forces passed on and withdrew from them, escaped at their leisure, and with them the beaten division of the Argives. The Mantineans and their allies, on the other hand, and the picked men of the Argives, were no longer disposed to press on their adversaries; but seeing their own side defeated, and the Lacedæmonians advancing against them, they took to flight. And of the Mantineans many were slain, but of the picked Argives the great majority escaped. However, the flight and retreat were not hard pressed, nor to any great distance; for though the Lacedæmonians, until they have routed their enemies, fight for a long time, and stubbornly, as regards standing their ground; yet when they have routed them, they pursue but for a short time and for a little distance.

74. Of such a character then, and answering as nearly as possible to this description, was the battle—the greatest that had occurred for a very long time amongst the Greeks, and fought by the most considerable states. The Lacedæmonians, after piling their arms in front of the enemy's dead, immediately erected a trophy, and stripped the slain; and taking up their own dead carried them back to Tegea, where they were buried, while they restored the enemy's under truce. There were killed, of the Argives, Ortheans, and Cleonæans, seven hundred; of the Mantineans, two hundred; and the same which might seem an exception to what has been stated, is the second; and that is not really one, if τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν be joined with διώκοντας, as Popp takes it.

<sup>1</sup> "i. e. by one part of it having advanced beyond it to pursue the enemy and by another part having been beaten back behind it."—Arnold.

number of the Athenians including the Æginetans, with their generals. On the side of the Lacedæmonians, the allies did not suffer to such an extent that any number worth mentioning were killed; and of themselves it was difficult to learn the truth, but about three hundred were said to have fallen.

75. Now when the engagement was about to take place, Pleistoanax also, the other king, set out to offer aid with those who were above and below the usual age for service, and reached as far as Tegea, but went back again on hearing of the victory. The Lacedæmonians sent, too, and turned back the allies from Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus; and having themselves returned and dismissed their allies, they kept the festival; (for it happened to be the time of their Carneia). And the imputations which at that time were urged against them by the Greeks, both on the score of cowardice in consequence of their disaster in the island, and of their bad management and dilatoriness in other respects, they wiped out by this one action; having been, as was now thought, reduced by fortune, but still the same men at heart.

Now the day before this battle it also happened that the Epidaurians with all their forces invaded the Argive territory, and cut off in great numbers, when they came out to give them battle, those of the Argives who were left behind to keep guard. Moreover, when three thousand of the Elean heavy-armed had come after the battle to the succour of the Mantineans, and a thousand Athenians in addition to their former force, all these allies at once marched against Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians were keeping the Carneia; and dividing the work between them, they began a wall of circumvallation round the city. And though the rest abandoned the work, the Athenians finished it round the promontory called the Heræum, the part which had been assigned to them. And having all joined in leaving a garrison in this fortress, they returned to their several cities. And so the summer ended.

76. At the beginning of the following winter, the Lacedæmonians, after they had celebrated the Carnean festival, immediately took the field; and on arriving at Tegea, sent on to Argos proposals for an accommodation. For there had been there previously a party in their interest, and desirous of putting down the democracy at Argos; and since the battle had been fought, they were much better able to persuade the



people at large to the proposed arrangement. Their wish was, after first concluding a treaty with the Lacedæmonians, then, in the second place, to enter into alliance with them; and so at length to attack the democracy. Accordingly, there came from the Lacedæmonians to Argos, Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, who was *proxenus* for the Argives, bearing two proposals, one as to the mode in which they should carry on hostilities, if they preferred it; the other, as to the footing on which they should remain at peace, if they preferred that. And after there had been much controversy on the subject, (for Alcibiades also happened to be present,) the party who negotiated for the Lacedæmonians, and who now ventured to do so openly, prevailed on the Argives to accept the proposal for an accommodation; which was to this effect:

77. "It seems good to the assembly of the Lacedæmonians to enter into agreement with the Argives on the following conditions:—That they shall restore their children to the Orchomenians, their men to the Mænalians, and the men deposited at Mantinea to the Lacedæmonians. That they shall evacuate Epidaurus, and demolish their fortification there: and that if the Athenians do not withdraw from Epidaurus, they shall be declared enemies to the Argives and Lacedæmonians, with the allies of both those states.—That if the Lacedæmonians have any children in their custody, they shall restore them to all the states.—That with respect to the offering to the god, <sup>1</sup> the Epidaurians shall be at liberty to take an oath on the subject, and that the Argives shall allow them to do so.—That the states in the Peloponnese, both small and great, shall be all independent, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That if any of those beyond the Peloponnese come against the Peloponnesian territory with evil intent, they shall repel the invader <sup>2</sup> by common counsel, on such terms as shall seem most just for the Peloponnesians.—That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedæmonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the allies of the Lacedæmonians and of the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—<sup>3</sup> That the contracting parties shall show these con-

[*ἀμὲν ἄν.*] For the various conjectures as to the true reading in this passage, see Poppo.

<sup>1</sup> *ἀμὲν.*] Or, as Arnold takes it, after Bredow, "affy where."

<sup>2</sup> *ἐν κοινῇ.*] Bloomfield supposes "the allies" to be the subject of this infinitive; but it surely must be the parties to which *ἐν κοινῇ* refers.

ditions to the allies, and enter into agreement with them, if they seem satisfactory to them; but that if any thing else seem good to the allies, they shall send them away home."

78. This proposal the Argives in the first place accepted, and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned home from Tegea. Afterwards, when intercourse with each other was now held by them, not long subsequently the same party again contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and conclude a treaty and alliance with the Lacedæmonians; which were to this effect:

79. "The following are the terms on which it seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives that a treaty and alliance should be concluded between them for fifty years.—That they shall afford to each other judicial decision of differences, on fair and equal terms, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That the other states in the Peloponnese shall participate in this treaty and alliance, as independent and self-governed, retaining their own possessions, and affording fair and equal judicial decisions, according to the institutions of their fathers.—That whatever people out of the Peloponnese are allies of the Lacedæmonians, they shall stand on the same footing as the Lacedæmonians, and the allies of the Argives on the same footing as the Argives, retaining their own possessions.—That if a common expedition to any quarter should be required, the Lacedæmonians and Argives shall consult upon it, deciding as may be most just for the allies.—That if any of the states, either in the Peloponnese or out of it, have any points of dispute, whether concerning their borders or any thing else, they shall be judicially decided.—That if any of

fers. The same parties must also be the subject of *ἀπιάλλειν* in the following sentence: but their object in thus sending them away is doubtful; whether it was that the ambassadors might consult their governments on the objections they had made to the treaty; or, that they might not, by their intrigues, attempt to unsettle the relations between Argos and Lacedæmon. The latter appears to me more accordant with the brief and summary expression, *οἰκὰδ' ἀπιάλλειν*.

[*διακριθῆμεν*.] Or, as Arnold takes it, simply "brought to an issue," of whatever kind it might be. Poppo agrees with Bloomfield that only an appeal to legal principles is here intended by the word; but observes that it is a less definite term than *ἐς πόλιν*—*ἰλθεῖν*, the method prescribed when both the contending states were members of the leagues; as including the decisions, not only of a third state, but also of the Delphian oracle, the Amphictyons, and of individual referees.

the allied states should have a quarrel with another, they shall have recourse to the arbitration of whatever third state may be thought impartial by both.—That the private citizens in each state shall have their causes tried according to the institutions of their fathers.”

80. This then was the treaty and alliance that was concluded; and whatever belonging to each other they had taken in the war, or whatever other ground of difference existed between them, they came to a settlement of all such matters. And as they now arranged their measures in concert, they adopted a resolution not to receive any herald or embassy from the Athenians, unless they withdrew from the Peloponnese, and evacuated their forts; and neither to make peace nor carry on war with any, except conjointly. And besides conducting their other measures with vehemence, they both of them sent ambassadors to the Thrace-ward towns, and to Perdiccas, whom they persuaded to join their league. He did not, however, immediately separate from the Athenians, but purposed doing so, because he saw that the Argives had also; for he himself was originally from Argos. They likewise renewed their former oaths with the Chalcidians and bound themselves by new ones. Moreover, the Argives sent ambassadors to the Athenians, commanding them to evacuate their fortress in Epidaurus. They therefore, seeing themselves to be but few against many who joined in garrisoning it, sent Demosthenes to lead their men out of it; who having arrived, and instituted, by way of pretext, a gymnastic contest outside the fortress, when the rest of the garrison had gone out, shut the gates upon them. Afterwards, having renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves gave up the fortress.

81. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the Argives from the confederacy, the Mantineans, after first holding out, and then finding themselves unable to do so without the Argives, came to terms on their part also with the Lacedæmonians, and relinquished their sovereignty over the cities. And now the Lacedæmonians and Argives, each a thousand strong, took the field together, and the Lacedæmonians by themselves went and put the government of Sicyon into the hands of a smaller num-

i. e. their subject allies, mentioned ch. 33 58. 1, and elsewhere.

ber than before, and then both of them together also put down the democracy at Argos, an oligarchy being established, in accordance with the interests of the Lacedæmonians. These things occurred at the close of the winter, when spring was now near at hand; and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

82. The following summer, the inhabitants of Dium on Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Achaia, which before had not been suitable to their views. And now the commons party at Argos, gradually combining and recovering their spirits, made an attack upon the oligarchical party, having watched their opportunity, when it was just the time of the Lacedæmonian Gymnopædiæ. And a battle having been fought in the city, the commons gained the victory, and slew some of them, and banished others. The Lacedæmonians, while their friends had been sending for them a long time before, did not go; but at length put off the Gymnopædiæ, and marched to their aid. On hearing at Tegea that the oligarchical party had been defeated, they would not advance any farther, though entreated by those who had escaped; but returned home, and kept the Gymnopædiæ. Afterwards, when ambassadors had come both from the Argives in the city and from those driven out of it, and when the allies also were present, and much had been said on both sides, they decided that the party in the city were in the wrong, and resolved to march against Argos; but much delay and procrastination ensued. In the mean time the commons at Argos were afraid of the Lacedæmonians, and as they courted the alliance of Athens again, and thought it would be of the greatest service to them, they built long walls to the sea; that if they should be excluded from the use of the land, the importation of things by sea, through the help of the Athenians, might be of benefit to them. Some of the cities in the Peloponnese were also privy to their building these walls. The Argives therefore were engaged in the work with all their population, themselves, their wives, and their slaves; while there came to them from Athens carpenters and stone-masons. And so the summer ended.

83. The following winter, when the Lacedæmonians were

[*ἀργύλλων*.] Bekker, Poppo, and Arnold all think this word corrupt; while Gölter understands by it a party in Argos who were in constant communication with Sparta: but surely that is a very forced interpretation.

aware of their building the walls, they marched against Argos, both themselves and their allies, excepting the Corinthians; communication being also held with them from Argos itself. The leader of the army was Agis, son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. With regard, then, to the advantages which they thought they had secured in the city itself, nothing more came of them; but the walls that were being built, they took and demolished. And having taken Hysia, a town in the Argive territory, and put to the sword all the free-men they got into their hands, they returned, and dispersed to their respective cities. After this, the Argives, in their turn, marched against the Phliasian country, and laid it waste before they returned, because they harboured their exiles; for the greater part of them had settled there. <sup>1</sup> The Athenians ravaged, too, during the same winter a part of Macedonia also, charging Perdiccas with the league he had entered into with the Argives and Lacedæmonians; and with the fact, that when they had prepared to lead an army against the Thrace-ward Chalcidians and Amphipolis, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, he had proved false to his allies, and the armament was chiefly broken up in consequence of his having deserted the cause. He was therefore proclaimed

<sup>1</sup> All the editors agree in thinking different parts of this sentence corrupt, and propose various emendations of it; but none of them, in my humble opinion, has struck at the root of the evil, which lies, I think, in the verb *κατέκλυσαν*. The idea of the Athenians "blockading" a whole country so extensive as Macedonia appears too extravagant to be admitted; particularly as no proof is adduced of *κατακλίσιν* being ever used in such a sense; but it always refers to men being "shut up" in particular places. Until Bloomfield therefore brings forward an instance of its being so employed, he must not assume that his reading of the passage "yields an excellent sense, and one not open to any well-founded objection." Krüger's conjecture *καταλήισαν* would suit the passage admirably; but Poppo observes that the active form of the compound verb is never used, and that the simple verb would be going too far from the traces of the common text. To rectify this

the whole passage would run thus: *Καὶ ἐλθὼσα δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Μακεδονίας Ἀθηναῖοι, Περδίκκα ἐπικαθ. κ. τ. λ.* Though *δέ* after *καὶ* is not used so frequently by Thucydides as by Xenophon and some other writers, it occurs in three other places, if not more; namely, I. 132. 2; II. 36. 1; and VII. 56. 3, at the beginning of a paragraph in the last instance, in a manner exactly similar to what is proposed here. *Καὶ ἦν δὲ ἔξως ὁ ἔχθρ' ἀπὸ πάντων ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.* I may add, that this reading is perhaps confirmed by, or at any rate agrees very well with, the next notice we have of Perdiccas, VI. 7. 4, where it is again mentioned that the Athenians *ἀκατοῦργον τῇ Περδίκκῳ*.

an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war.

84. The next summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized three hundred men, who were still thought to be suspicious characters, and to favour the cause of the Lacedæmonians; and these the Athenians deposited in the neighbouring islands within their dominions. The Athenians also undertook an expedition against the island of Melos, with thirty ships of their own, six of the Chians, two of the Lesbians, sixteen hundred of their own heavy-armed, three hundred bowmen, twenty mounted archers, and about five thousand five hundred heavy-armed of the allies and the islanders. Now the Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians, and would not submit to the Athenians, like the rest of the islanders, but at first remained quiet as neutrals, and then, when the Athenians tried to compel them by devastating their land, went openly to war with them. The generals therefore, Cleomedes son of Lycomedes, and Tisias son of Tisimachus, having gone and encamped in their territory with this armament, before injuring any part of the land, first sent ambassadors to hold a conference with them. These the Melians did not introduce to their popular assembly, but desired them to state the objects of their mission before the magistrates and the few. The ambassadors of the Athenians then spoke as follows:

85. *Ath.* "Since our words are not to be addressed to your populace, in order that the many may not be deceived, forsooth, by hearing at once in one continuous oration persuasive and irrefutable arguments, (for we know that this is the meaning of your introducing us to the few,) do ye who are seated here in congress pursue a still more cautious method. For do not ye, either, make one continuous speech on the several topics, but immediately taking us up at whatever does not appear to be advanced in accordance with your interest, decide that question. And first tell us if you are pleased with what we propose." The commissioners of the Melians made this reply:

86. *Mel.* "The fairness of thus calmly instructing each other is open to no objection: but your preparations for war,

<sup>1</sup> στρατοπεδευσάμενοι ἐν τῇ γῇ. ] A concise form for what is more fully expressed by διαμέντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, VIII. 26. 1; and by καταλείψαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, VIII. 79. 4.—*Porro*.

which are already here, and not merely coming, appear to be at variance with it. For we see that you are come to be yourselves judges of what will be said; and that the issue of the conference will in all probability bring us war, if we are stronger in the justice of our cause, and therefore refuse to submit; or slavery, if we are convinced by you."

87. *Ath.* "If now you have met to argue upon suspicions of the future, or to do any thing else but to consult for your country with a view to its preservation, according to what is present and before your eyes, we will stop; but if for this object, we will speak."

88. *Mel.* "It is but natural and pardonable for men so circumstanced to have recourse to many things, both in thinking and speaking. However, this our meeting is held with a view to our preservation; and let the discussion proceed, if you please, in the way which you propose."

89. *Ath.* "We then shall not ourselves advance fair pretences, either of our justly enjoying empire in consequence of having overthrown the Mede, or of now coming against you because we are being injured—and so make a long speech which would not be believed; nor do we wish you to think of persuading us by saying, either that you did not join the standard of the Lacedæmonians, though you were their colony; or that you have done us no wrong. But we advise you, according to the real sentiments of us both, to think of getting what you can; since you know, and are speaking to those who know, that, in the language of men, what is right is estimated by equality of power to compel; but what is possible is that which the stronger practise, and to which the weak submit."

90. *Mel.* "So far then as our opinion goes, it is for our ad-

<sup>1</sup> βουλευσάμενοι.] The active form of this verb occurs again, ch. III. 2, where Arnold explains it as expressing the act of the government, consulting for the safety of its subjects. Poppo, however, refers to a similar usage of it, IV. 41. 1, where there is apparently no such force intended.

<sup>2</sup> I have not followed Arnold's reading in this passage, though Bekker and Gölter also adopt it; because it seems improbable that *ἡ μὲν*, the reading of nearly all the MSS., should have been a mistake of the copyists for one so much easier, and so different from it, as *ἡμῖς*. At the same time I am far from certain whether *ἡ μὲν*, that which I have preferred, on the authority of Herman, Poppo, and Bloomfield, be really the true one; for in no other passage in Thucydides, I believe, has *ἡ* the force which is here given to it; and though Bloomfield quotes one instance of its being so used by Xenophon, he is there writing, not as an historian, but as a philosopher; and

vantage (for we must, since you have so prescribed, speak of what is expedient, to the neglect of what is right) that you should not take away what is a common benefit; but that for every one who at any time is in danger, what is reasonable should also be considered right; and that if he can gain assent to something which falls short of strict justice, he should have the benefit of it. And this is not less for your interest; inasmuch, as you would afford to others, should you fail, a pattern for inflicting the heaviest vengeance upon you."

91. *Ath.* "Nay, for our part, we are not disheartened about the end of our empire, even should it be brought to an end. For it is not those who rule over others, like the Lacedæmonians, that are to be feared by the vanquished. Nor is it with the Lacedæmonians that we have to struggle, but with the possibility of our subjects in any quarter by themselves attacking and overpowering those who have had rule over them. So on this point let the danger be left to us. But that we are come here for the benefit of our empire, and that we shall also speak on the present occasion for the preservation of your country, on these points we will give you proofs; since we wish to maintain our own sovereignty over you without trouble, and to have you preserved for the advantage of us both."

92. *Mel.* "And how then could it prove advantageous for us to serve, as it is for you to govern?"

93. *Ath.* "Because you would have the benefit of submitting before you suffered the last extremities; while we should be gainers by not destroying you."

94. *Mel.* "But would you not accept our proposals, on condition of our remaining quiet, and being friends instead of enemies, but in alliance with neither side?"

95. *Ath.* "No; for your enmity is not so hurtful to us, as we use it, as it is very commonly used by philosophical writers in later times. Should this objection be thought to have any weight, I would venture to propose *ἡμῖν*, which comes nearer to the various readings of the MSS. than *ἡμῖς*; and gives a sense in exact accordance with what follows: for *καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, at the beginning of the next paragraph, would stand in strong opposition to it: "For us, then, we certainly think it advantageous—and it is no less for your interest also." It may perhaps be regarded as some corroboration of this conjecture, that the scholar quoted by Arnold uses *ἡμῖν* in his paraphrase; *•νομίζομεν ἡμῖν προσήκειν μὴ καταλύειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.*

<sup>1</sup> This is pretty nearly the interpretation of the passage given by Bauer, and sanctioned by Poppo. For the many others that have been adopted, see the note of the latter.



your friendship is to our subjects an evident proof of our weakness, but your hatred, of our power."

96. *Mel.* "And do your subjects then take such a view of equity, as to put on the same footing those who are not at all connected with you, and those who, being in most cases your colonists, and in some cases having revolted from you, have been reduced to subjection?"

97. *Ath.* "Why, for an argument resting on justice they think that neither of us are at a loss; but that on the ground of their power they escape, and we, through fear, abstain from attacking them. So that, besides our ruling over more subjects, you would also through your subjection confer security upon us; especially by the fact that you who are islanders, and weaker too than some others, did not escape our dominion, who have the command of the sea."

98. *Mel.* "And do you consider that there is no security in that other case? (For here again, as you have excluded us from appeals to justice, and urge us to yield to considerations of your advantage, we too must explain what is expedient for us, and so endeavour to persuade you, if the same happen to be for your interest also.) For how can you avoid making enemies of all that are at present neutral, when, on looking to the present case, they reckon that some time or other you will proceed against them also? And by that course what do you do, but aggrandize your present enemies, and bring those upon you against their will who would never else be likely to become hostile to you?"

99. *Ath.* "Why, we do not consider those who live any where on the mainland, and who in consequence of their liberty will long delay taking precautions against us, to be so formidable to us as those who are islanders any where without being under our rule, like you, and those who by the severity of our rule are now exasperated against us. For it is these who would most give way to recklessness, and bring both themselves and us into danger that was evident beforehand."

100. *Mel.* "Surely then, if you run such a risk not to be deprived of your empire, and those who are already in subjection, to be released from it; for us who are still free it were great baseness and cowardice not to have recourse to every thing before we submit to it."

101. *Ath.* "No; not at least if you take a sensible view of

the case. For you are not on equal terms contending for honour, to avoid incurring disgrace; but you are rather deliberating for your preservation, to avoid resisting those who are far stronger than yourselves."

102. *Mel.* "But we know that warlike measures sometimes come to more impartial results than might have been expected from the different numbers on each side. And in our case to yield is immediate despair; but by making an effort there is yet hope of our keeping ourselves up."

103. *Ath.* "Hope, which is the solace of danger, when entertained by those who have abundant means, though it may injure, yet does not ruin them. But in the case of those who risk all they have on a throw, (for it is naturally an extravagant passion,) it is only found out at the time of their ruin, and leaves no room for guarding against it in future, when it is found out. Do not you then, weak as you are, and hanging on one single turn of the scale, be desirous of this fate, nor of resembling the greater part of mankind, who, when they might have been saved by human means, after visible hopes have failed them in their distress, betake themselves to such as are invisible, namely, prophecy, and oracles, and all such things as bring men to ruin, together with the hopes resting upon them."

104. *Mel.* "Difficult indeed even we, be well assured, consider it to contend against your power and fortune, unless we are able to do it on equal terms. However, we trust that in point of fortune we shall, by the favour of the gods, not be worsted, because we are standing up in a righteous cause against unjust opponents; and that our deficiency in power

<sup>1</sup> *ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι.*] Ducas and Gölter take *ἐς ἅπαν* separately from *τὸ ὑπάρχον*, but Poppo agrees with Arnold in uniting them, and thinks with Bloomfield that *κύβου* is properly understood with *ἀναρριπ-*

cannot, however, but think that a much more natural interpretation is that of Portus and Krüger, whom I have followed. Nōr is the sense given by them to *ἐλλείπει* so entirely destitute of authority as has been supposed; for the verb is used in exactly the same manner. Eur. El. 609, *σὺ δ', ἐκ βάθρων γὰρ πᾶς ἀνῆρησαι, φίλοις οὐδ' ἐλλείλοιπας ἐλπιδ', ἴσθι μὲν κλύων.* In the present passage we may perhaps understand *αὐτῷ* after it, so that the preposition may have its proper force. Bekker, in his edit. of 1832, proposes to read *οὐκίτι λείπει*.

will be made up by our Lacedæmonian allies; who are under a necessity of succouring us, if for no other reason, yet on account of our connexion with them, and for very shame."

105. *Ath.* "As regards then the favour of heaven, we trust that we too shall not fall short of it: since we are not requiring or doing any thing beyond the opinion of men, with respect to the gods, or their determination, with respect to themselves. For of the gods we hold as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that, in obedience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion, wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor were the first to carry it out when enacted; but having received it when already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force for ever, we only avail ourselves of it; knowing that both you and others, if raised to the same power, would do the same. And so, with regard to the gods, we are with good reason fearless of defeat. But with regard to your opinion respecting the Lacedæmonians, according to which you trust, that from a sense of shame, forsooth, they will assist you; though we bless your simplicity, we do not admire your folly. For with respect to themselves, and the institutions of their country, the Lacedæmonians do indeed to a very great extent practise virtue; but with respect to others, though we might descant at length on their conduct towards them, speaking most concisely we should declare, that of all the men we are acquainted with, they most evidently consider what is agreeable to be honourable, and what is expedient to be just. And yet such a view of things is not in favour of your present unreasonable hopes of safety."

106. *Mel.* "But it is on this very ground that we now rely on their sense of interest, and believe that they will not betray us Melians, who are their colonists, and so lose the confidence of those Greeks who wish them well, while they help those who are hostile to them."

107. *Ath.* "Then you do not think that interest is connected with security, whereas justice and honour are practised with danger; a course on which the Lacedæmonians, generally speaking, least of all men venture."

108. *Mel.* "Nay, but we are of opinion that they would even incur dangers for our sake, more than usual, and would

regard them as less hazardous than<sup>1</sup> in the case of others; inasmuch as we lie near the Peloponnese, for the execution of their measures; while in feeling we are, through our kindred with them, more to be trusted than another party would be."

109. *Ath.* "Ay, but to men going to take part in a quarrel safety does not appear to consist in the good feeling of those who call them to their aid, but in the fact of their being far superior in power for action; and the Lacedæmonians look to this even more than the rest of the world. At any rate, through their mistrusting their own resources, it is only in concert with many allies that they attack those who are near to them; so that it is not likely they will cross over to an island, while we are masters of the sea."

110. *Mel.* "But they would have others to send; and the Cretan sea is of wide extent, and to intercept a party in crossing it is more difficult for those who command it, than to escape is for those who wish to elude observation. Besides, if they should be disappointed in this, they would proceed against your territory, and to the remainder of your allies, such as Brasidas did not reach: and you will have to exert yourselves, not so much for territory which does not belong to you, as for your own confederacy and country."

111. *Ath.* "On this point you, as well as others, may learn by actual experience, and not remain ignorant, that from no single siege did the Athenians ever yet retreat through fear of others. But it strikes us, that though you said you would consult for the safety of your country, you have in all this long discussion advanced nothing which men might trust to for thinking that they would be saved; but your strongest points depend on hope and futurity, while your present resources are too scanty, compared with those at present opposed to you, to give you a chance of escape. And so you afford proof of great folly in your views, if you do not even yet, after allow-

<sup>1</sup> ἐς ἄλλους.] Arnold thinks that perhaps παρακινδυνεύσαι or παραβαλεῖν may be substituted for the kindred substantive κινδύνους, so as to avoid the harsh construction of κινδύνους ἐς ἄλλους, "pericula propter alios suscepta," as Scholefield renders it. But there seems no necessity for any such change if it be taken in the more common sense of solution, which it

be attributed to the genitive τῆς γνώμης in the last clause of the chapter: though Poppo objects to it, and proposes to substitute either the dative or accusative.

ing us to retire, adopt some counsel more prudent than this. For you surely will not betake yourselves to that shame, which in dangers that are disgraceful, because foreseen, destroys men more than any thing else. For in the case of many men, though they foresee all the time what they are running into, the thing which is called disgrace, by the influence of a seducing name, allures them on, enslaved as they are to the word, in fact to fall wilfully into irretrievable disasters, and to incur a shame more shameful, as the attendant on folly than on fortune. Against this then you, if you take good advice, will be on your guard; and will not consider it discreditable to submit to the most powerful state, when it offers you fair terms, namely, that you should become tributary allies, with the enjoyment of your own country; and when a choice of war or safety is given you, to avoid choosing through animosity what is worse for you. For whatever men do not yield to their equals, while they keep on good terms with their superiors, and are moderate to their inferiors, they would be most successful. Consider then, even after we have retired; and reflect again and again, that it is for your country that you are consulting, <sup>1</sup> which you can do but for one country, and for once, whether it prove successful or unsuccessful."

112. So the Athenians retired from the conference; and the Melians, having been left to themselves, as they still thought pretty nearly the same as they had maintained in the discussion, gave the following answer: "We neither think differently from what we did at first, Athenians, nor will we in a short space of time rob of its liberty a city which has now been inhabited seven hundred years; but trusting to

<sup>1</sup> The construction of this sentence, according to the common reading, is abandoned as desperate by all the editors. Göller and Bloomfield substitute *ἵσται* for *ἵσται*; but Poppo protests strongly against the change. With due deference to such authorities, I would venture to ask, whether the text, as it stands, may not be explained by supposing *βουλεύσθαι* to be understood with *ἵσται*—the infinitive being suggested by the indicative at the end of the antecedent clause—and referring *ἡν*, not to *πατρίδος*, as has been done hitherto, but to *βουλῆν*. *Ἐς μίαν* would then stand without its substantive, as it does Hom. Il. 2. 379, though in a different sense. Or, if that be considered a difficulty, it would perhaps be nothing inconsistent with the frequently careless style of Thucydides to suppose a confusion of two expressions, so that both *ἡν* and *μίαν* should be left in concord with *βουλῆν*. The sense of the passage would certainly be more natural, and the construction easier, if *ἡν* could be substituted for *ἡν*: but as MSS. afford no authority for the change, and as it does not appear absolutely necessary, it might be considered rash to adopt it.

the fortune which, by the favour of heaven, has hitherto preserved it, and to the help of man, especially of the Lacedæmonians, we will endeavour to save ourselves. But we propose to you that we should be your friends, and the enemies of neither party; and that you should retire from our country after making such a treaty as may appear suitable for both sides."

113. Such then was the answer which the Melians gave. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said: "Well then you are the only men who by these counsels, as appears to us, consider what is future as more certain than what is seen, and regard what is out of sight as already occurring, because you wish it; and having staked and relied most on [<sup>1</sup> such things as] Lacedæmonians, and fortune, and hopes, you will also be most disappointed."

114. So the Athenian ambassadors returned to their forces: and their generals, since the Melians did not listen at all to their proposals, immediately proceeded to apply themselves to war; and having divided the work between the different states, enclosed the Melians with lines on all sides. Afterwards, the Athenians left a part of their own troops and the allies, to keep guard both by land and sea, and returned with the main body of the forces. Those who were left behind remained and besieged the place.

115. About the same time an Argive force invaded the Phliasian territory, and being intercepted by an ambuscade of the Phliasiens and their allies, were cut off to the number of eighty. And now the Athenians at Pylus took great spoils from the Lacedæmonians; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians, though even then they did not renounce the treaty, and go to war with them, proclaimed that any of their people who pleased might plunder the Athenians. Moreover, the Corinthians proceeded to hostilities with the Athenians for some private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians remained quiet. The Melians, too, attacked by night the part of the Athenian lines opposite the <sup>2</sup> market-place, and slew some of the men; and having carried in corn, and as many useful things as they could, returned and

<sup>1</sup> These words are, I think, implied by the omission of the article before the following nouns.

<sup>2</sup> i. e. of the besieging force. See Bloomfield's note.

kept quiet; while the Athenians made better provision for the guard in future. And so the summer ended.

116. The following winter, the Laedæmonians intended to march against the Argive territory, but returned on finding, when at the frontier, that the sacrifices for crossing it were not favourable. Owing to this intention on their part, the Argives, suspecting a certain party in their city, seized some of them, while others escaped them. About the same time, the Melians again took a part of the Athenian lines in another direction, the garrison not being numerous. A fresh force having afterwards come from Athens in consequence of these occurrences, under the command of Philocrates son of Demeas, and the inhabitants being now vigorously blockaded, after there had also been some treachery practised by their own men, they surrendered at discretion to the Athenians; who put to death all the Melian adults they took, and made slaves of the children and women. As for the country, they afterwards sent out five hundred colonists, and inhabited it themselves.

## BOOK VI.

1. THE same winter the Athenians wished to sail again to Sicily, with a larger armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and bring it into subjection to them, if they could; the mass of the people being ignorant of the size of the island, and the number of its inhabitants, both Greeks and barbarians; and that they were undertaking a war not much inferior in magnitude to that with the Peloponnesians.

For the voyage round Sicily in a merchant vessel is one of not much less than eight days; and <sup>1</sup> though it is of such extent, it is only excluded by the space of about twenty stades of sea from being mainland.

2. Now it was settled originally in the following manner, and these were all the nations that occupied it. The earliest people said to have lived in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and Læstrygones; with regard to whom, I can neither tell their race, nor whence they came into it, nor whither they departed out of it: but let that suffice which has been said by the poets, and which every body in any way knows of them. The Sicanians appear to have been the first who settled in it after them; indeed, as they themselves assert, even before them, as being the aboriginal population; but as the truth is found to be, they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus, in Theria, by the Ligurians. And it was from them that the island was at that time called Sicania, having previously been called Trinacria; and still, even to this day, they inhabit Sicily in its western districts. But on the capture of Troy, some of the Trojans, having escaped the Greeks, came in vessels to Sicily, and having settled in the

<sup>1</sup> "The reasoning employed in the words *τοσαύτη οὔσα* is very much in the style of the geography of Herodotus. The notion is, that so large an island ought to have been in the midst of a wide sea, proportioned to its own magnitude; and not to have been so close upon the coast, as to seem a sort of appendage to the mainland."—*Arnold*.



neighbourhood of the Sicanians, they were all together called Elymi, and their cities, Eryx and Segesta. There were also settled with them some of the Phocians, who, while returning from Troy, were carried by a tempest, first to Libya, and then from that country to Sicily. The Sicels, again, went over into Sicily from Italy (for it was there that they used to live,) while flying from some Æpicans; crossing on rafts, (as is probable, and reported to have been the case,) having watched an opportunity for the passage, when the wind<sup>1</sup> set down the strait; or, perhaps, having sailed to it in some other way. Even to this day there are still Sicels in Italy; and it was in this way that the country was called Italy, after Italus, a king of the Sicels who had that name. Having gone, then, to Sicily with a great host, and being victorious in battle over the Sicanians, they compelled them to remove to the southern and western parts of it, and caused the island to be called Sicily, instead of Sicania, and occupied the best parts of the land; having held them, after they crossed over, nearly three hundred years before any Greeks came into Sicily; and still, even to this day, they retain the central and northern parts of the island. There were also Phœnicians living<sup>2</sup> around the whole of Sicily, having occupied promontories on the sea-coast, and the small islands adjacent, for purposes of trading with the Sicels: but after the Greeks sailed to it in great numbers by sea, in addition to those already there, they evacuated the greater part of them, and lived in Motya, Solois, and Panormus, near the Elymi, having united with them, both from confidence in their alliance, and because from that quarter the voyage from Sicily to Carthage is shortest. As regards barbarians, then, so many of them were there that inhabited Sicily, and in such a manner.

3. Of the Greeks, on the other hand, some Chalcidians of Eubœa first sailed with Thucles as the leader of the colony, and founded Naxos, and built the altar to Apollo<sup>3</sup> Archegetes,

<sup>1</sup> Or, "set steadily in that direction," i. e. was favourable.

<sup>2</sup> Or, as Poppo explains it, "all about the whole island." But the words immediately following are in favour of the other interpretation. Compare ch. 86. 2, *καί περ νησιώτας ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσι περὶ τὴν Πειλοπόννησον.*

<sup>3</sup> "The epithet ἀρχηγέτης, or ἀρχαγέτας, as the Dorians wrote the word, was given to Apollo, because the Chalcidian colony had sailed to Sicily by his direction. See Scholiast on Pindar, Pyth. V. 80."—Arnold.

which is now outside the city, and on which when any deputies to the games sail from Sicily, they first sacrifice. Syracuse was founded the next year by Archias, of the family of Hercules at Corinth, after he had first expelled the Sicels from the island; on which, being no longer surrounded with water, the inner city now stands; and at a later period the outer one also was enclosed within the wall, and became populous. Moreover, Thucles and the Chalcidians from Naxos set out in the fifth year after the founding of Syracuse, and having expelled the Sicels by arms, re-settled Leontini, and after it Catana, the Catanians themselves having chosen Evarchus as their founder.

4. At the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after settling in a place beyond the river Pantacyas, Trotilus by name, and subsequently removing thence, and uniting for a short time with the Chalcidians at Leontini, and being driven out by them, he founded Thapsus, and then he himself died; while the rest, being expelled from Thapsus, effected a settlement at Megara, called the Hyblæan, Hyblo, a Sicel king, having given up the place to them and led them in. After inhabiting it two hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled from the city and country by Gejo, tyrant of Syracuse. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after their settlement, they founded Selinus, having sent Pamillus for the purpose, who came from Megara, their mother-city, and joined them in founding it. Gela, again, was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete, who led a common colony, in the forty-fifth year after the founding of Syracuse. The name of the city was taken from the river Gelas, but the spot where "the city," [properly so called,] now stands, and which was first fortified, is named <sup>1</sup>Lindii. The institutions established amongst them were Dorian. Just about a hundred and eight years after their own settlement, the Geloans settled Acragas, [or Agrigentum,] naming the city from the river Acragas: they made Aristonous and Pystilus the leaders of their colony, and gave it the institutions of the Geloans. Zancle, again, was originally founded from Cuma, the Chalcidian city in the country of the Opici, by some freebooters who went there;

<sup>1</sup> "So named because Antiphemus and his Rhodian companions had principally come from Lindus in Rhodes. See Herod. VII. 153. 2."—*Arnold*.

but afterwards a great number went from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa, and shared with them in the occupation of the land; its founders being Perieres and Cratæmenes, one from Cuma, the other from Chalcis. As regards its name, it was at first called Zancle by the Sicels, because the site resembles a reaping-hook in figure, and the reaping-hook is called by the Sicels *zanclos*. Afterwards, these settlers were expelled by some Samians and other Ionians, who landed in Sicily while flying from the Medes; and again, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, having not long after expelled the Samians, and colonized their country with a mixed population, changed its name to Messana, after his own original country.

5. Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Saco, and most of those who went to the colony were Chalcidians, though there were also united with them some exiles from Syracuse, who had been defeated in a strife of factions—the Mylætidæ, as they are called. The language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Dorian; but the Chalcidian were the prevailing institutions. Acræ and Casmenæ were founded by the Syracusans; Acræ seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenæ nearly twenty years after Acræ. Camarina was in the first instance founded by the Syracusans, just about a hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse, its founders being Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinæans having been driven out after a war by the Syracusans on account of their revolting from them, some time after, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, having received their territory as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, himself acting as founder, re-settled Camarina. And having again been depopulated by Gelo, it was settled for the third time by the Geloans.

6. So many were the nations of Greeks and barbarians that inhabited Sicily, and such was the size of the island against which the Athenians were eager to make an expedition; being desirous (to mention their truest motive) of gaining dominion over the whole of it; but at the same time wishing, as a plausible pretext, to succour their own kinsmen, and the allies they had gained besides. Above all, they were instigated by ambassadors from the Segestans, who had come to Athens and invoked their aid more earnestly than ever. For being borderers of the Selinuntines, they had gone to war with

them on certain questions respecting marriage rights, and for some debated territory; and the Selinuntines, having taken the Syracusans for their allies, were pressing them hard with hostilities both by land and sea. Consequently the Segestans reminded the Athenians of their alliance, which had been formed in the time of Laches and of the former war with the Leontines, and begged them to send a fleet and assist them; alleging many other things, and, as the sum and substance of all, "that if the Syracusans should be unpunished for the depopulation of Leontini, and, by ruining such of the Athenian allies as were still left should themselves obtain the whole power of Sicily; there would be danger of their some time or other coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of Dorians, on the strength of their connexion, and, moreover, as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and so joining in the destruction of the Athenian power. It were wise therefore, in concert with the remaining allies, to resist the Syracusans; especially as they would themselves furnish money sufficient for the war." The Athenians, hearing these things in their assemblies from the Segestans and their supporters, who were repeatedly alleging them, <sup>1</sup> passed a decree on the subject; sending ambassadors, in the first place, to see about the money, whether it were already laid up, as they asserted, in the treasury and in the temples, and at the same time to ascertain what was the state of the war with the Selinuntines.

7. The ambassadors of the Athenians, then, were thus sent to Sicily. The same winter, the Lacedæmonians and their allies, except the Corinthians, having made an expedition into the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land, and took some yokes of oxen, and carried off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Ornææ; and having left them a few men from the rest of their forces also, and made a truce for some time, on condition of the Orneatæ and the Argives not injuring each other's land, they returned home with their army. But the Athenians having come no long time after with thirty ships and six hundred heavy-armed, the Argives, in conjunction with the Athenians, taking the field with all their force, besieged the men in Orneæ one day; but at night, the

<sup>1</sup> Or, "voted to send," &c., according to Bekker's and Poppe's reading of *τίμισαι*, instead of *πέμψαντες*.

army having bivouacked at some distance, they escaped out of it. The next day, the Argives, on finding this, razed Orneæ and returned, and the Athenians afterwards went home with their ships. Moreover, the Athenians took by sea some of their own cavalry, and the Macedonian exiles who were with them, to Methone, the country bordering on Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. The Lacedæmonians therefore sent to the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, who had a truce with the Athenians from one ten days to another, and urged them to join Perdiccas in the war; but they would not. And so the winter ended, and the sixteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

8. The following summer, as soon as the spring commenced, the ambassadors of the Athenians came from Sicily, and the Segestans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships which they were to beg them to send. And the Athenians having held an assembly, and heard from the Segestans and their own ambassadors a seductive and untrue report on the other subjects, and also, with regard to the money, that it was provided in abundance in the temples and the treasury; they voted to send sixty ships, with Alcibiades son of Clinias, Nicias son of Niceratus, and Lamachus son of Xenophanes, as commanders, with full powers, to assist the Segestans against the Selinuntines, and to join in re-founding Leontini, should they gain any advantage in the war, and to carry out all other measures in Sicily, as they should deem best for the Athenians.—On the fifth day after this, an assembly was again held, to consider in what way the preparations for the ships should be most quickly made, and whatever else was wanted by the generals be voted them for the expedition. Nicias then, who had been chosen against his will to take the command, and thought that the state was not well advised, but, on a trifling and specious pretext, was coveting the whole of Sicily—an arduous design to achieve—came forward with a wish to divert the Athenians from it, and advised them to the following effect:

9. "This assembly was, it is true, convened to consider the subject of our preparations, namely, in what way we ought to make the expedition to Sicily. My opinion, however, is, that we ought still to consider this very point, whether it be better to send out our ships; and not on such slight deliberation on

matters of great moment, at the instigation of aliens, to take upon ourselves a war, with which we have nothing to do. And yet I, for my own part, receive honour from such a policy, and have less fear than others for my own personal safety: (though I consider that man to be an equally good citizen who takes some forethought both for his person and his property; for such a man would, for his own sake, be most desirous that his country also should prosper :) nevertheless, neither aforetime have I ever spoken contrary to my convictions, for the sake of being honoured above others, nor will I now, but as I think best, so will I speak. And though against your inclinations my words would be powerless, should I advise you to keep what you have, and not expose your present possessions to danger for things which are uncertain and future; yet that neither are you timely in your haste, nor the objects of your ambition easy to attain, on these points I will give you instruction.

10. "I say then, that you wish, though leaving many enemies behind you here, to bring hither fresh ones besides, by sailing there. And you fancy, perhaps, that the treaty that has been made by you affords some ground of confidence. But though, as long as you remain quiet, that will, indeed, be a treaty—in name, (for to this condition have certain persons here and amongst your enemies brought it by their intrigues,) yet if we are ever defeated with any considerable force, those who hate us will quickly make an attack upon us; seeing, in the first place, that the arrangement was made of necessity by them, under circumstances of disaster, and of greater discredit to them than to us; and, secondly, that in this very arrangement we have many subjects open to debate. There are some, too, who have not yet acceded even to this composition, such as it is, and those not the least powerful states; but some of them are at war with us downright, and, in the case of others, because the Lacedæmonians remain quiet at present, they too are restrained by truces from one ten days to another. But probably, if they should find our power divided, (which we are now so anxious to bring about,) they would with all their might attack us, in conjunction with the Sicelots, whose alliance they would in time past have valued most highly. Every one therefore ought to look to

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "above many things." Compare I. 33.

this, and not presume to run risks with a state so unsettled, and to grasp at another empire before we have secured the one we have; seeing that the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, though they have revolted from us so many years, are still unsubdued; and there are some others on the different coasts of the mainland who yield us but a doubtful obedience. And so we are quick to succour the Segestans, who are our allies, forsooth, as being injured; but on those by whose revolt we have ourselves long ago been injured, we still defer to avenge ourselves.

1 k. "And yet the latter, if subdued, might be kept in subjection by us; but the former, even if we conquered them, we should hardly be able to govern, so far off and so numerous as they are. But it is folly to go against men whom we could not keep under, if we conquered them; while, if we did not succeed in the attempt, we should not be in the same position as we were before making it. Again, regarding the present condition of the Siceliots, they appear to me even still less likely to be formidable to us, if the Syracusans should have dominion over them; that supposition with which the Segestans especially try to frighten us. For at present they might, perhaps, come hither as separate states, to oblige the Lacedæmonians; but in the other case, it is not likely that they should undertake the expedition, empire against empire: for in the same manner as they, in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians, had taken away ours, it is probable that they would have their own taken away by the same Peloponnesians,<sup>1</sup> and by the same principle. And the Greeks in those parts would be most in awe of us, if we did not go there at all; and next to that, if after making a demonstration of our power we retired in a short time: but if we should meet with any reverse, they would very quickly despise us, and attack us in concert with our enemies here. For we all know that what is farthest off is most admired, and what gives the least room for having its fame tested. And this has at present been your case, Athenians, with reference to the Lacedæmonians and their allies; from having, contrary to your expectation, gained the advantage over them, (comparing your present position with the fears you at first entertained,) you have despised them,

<sup>1</sup> i. e. their wish to rescue the cities from the yoke of Syracuse, as they had done from that of Athens.

and are now desiring the conquest of Sicily. You ought not, however, to be elated through the misfortunes of your adversaries, but then only to feel confident when you have mastered their spirits; nor should you think that the Lacedæmonians are doing ought but considering, in consequence of their disgrace, in what way they may even now, if possible, overthrow us, and bring their own discredit to a happy termination; especially as they have studied a reputation for bravery, as a thing of the greatest importance, and for the greatest length of time. So that our great struggle will be, if we are wise, not for the Segestans in Sicily, men who are barbarians, but that we may vigorously guard against a state which is plotting against us<sup>1</sup> by the spread of oligarchical principles.

12. "We ought to remember, too, that we have but lately recovered a little from a great pestilence and war, so as to be somewhat recruited both in our property and persons; and that it is but fair for us to expend these here at home, on ourselves, and not on these exiles who are begging your aid; whose interest it is to utter specious falsehoods, and contending at their neighbours' risk, while they themselves only contribute words, either to show no proper gratitude if they succeed, or if in any instance they fail, to ruin their friends along with them. And if there be any one who is pleased at being appointed to command, and therefore urges you to make the expedition, looking to his own interest alone, (especially as he is yet too young for office,) in order that while he is admired, for his horse-keeping, he may also receive from his appointment some benefit on the score of expense; do not, either, allow that man to exhibit his own individual splendour at the peril of the state; but consider that such men injure the public interests, while they squander their private possessions; and that this is a business of great importance, and not one for a young man to deliberate upon, and rashly to take in hand.

13. "I am alarmed, indeed, when I see such characters sitting here at present by the side of that same individual, in compliance with his bidding; and in return I bid the older men—whichever of them may have one of those characters sitting by him—not to be put down through shame, in order to avoid being thought a coward if he should not vote for going

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold renders it, "in the way of oligarchy;" i. e. threatening us, not with the loss of our conquests, but with a change of government.



to war ; nor, as their opponents themselves might feel, to be madly enamoured of what they do not possess ; being convinced that in very few things do men succeed through desire, but in very many through forethought ; but in behalf of their country, as exposing itself to the greatest danger it has ever done, to give their support to the opposite side, and vote that the Siceliots keep the same boundaries with respect to us as at present—boundaries with which no one can find fault—namely, the Ionian Sea, if one sail along shore ; and the Sicilian, if one cross the open deep ; and that while they enjoy their own possessions, they shall also settle their own quarrels : and that we tell the Segestans in particular, that since they went to war with the Selinuntines in the first instance without consulting the Athenians, they may also make peace with them by themselves : and that we do not in future make alliance, as we have been accustomed, with men whom we shall assist when they are unfortunate, and when we ask assistance ourselves, shall not obtain it.

14. “And do you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the state, and if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put this to the vote, and take a second time the opinion of the Athenians ; reflecting, if you feel afraid to move the question again, that the violation of the law would not, with so many abettors, involve any guilt ; but that you would be acting as a physician to the state, when it had taken bad counsel ; and that good government consists in this,—for a man to do his country as much good as possible, or, at least, to do it voluntarily no harm.”

15. To this effect spoke Nicias. Of the Athenians, the greater part who came forward advised making the expedition, and not annulling what had been decreed ; though there were some also who spoke against it. But the man who most earnestly recommended the expedition was Alcibiades son of Clinias, who at once wished to thwart Nicias—both as being in other respects opposed to him in politics, and because he had alluded to him in a disparaging manner—and was most anxious to take the command, and hoped by that means to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and at the same time, in consequence of his success, to promote his own private interests in point of fame and wealth. For, being held in high repute by the citizens, he indulged his inclinations on too large a scale for his exist-

ing means, with regard to keeping horses, and all other expenses. And this too was what afterwards mainly caused the destruction of the Athenian state. For being alarmed at the extent of his disregard for the laws in his own person, with respect to his mode of life, and of his designs in the measures he severally undertook, in whatever business he might be engaged, the greater part of the people became his enemies on the belief of his aiming at tyranny; and though in his public capacity he conducted the war most ably, yet being severally offended at his habits in his private life, and committing the administration to others, after no long interval they brought their country to ruin. However, at that time he came forward, and advised the Athenians as follows:

16. "It is both <sup>1</sup>befitting, Athenians, for me, more than others, to enjoy command, (for with this topic must I commence my speech, since Cleon has attacked me upon it,) and at the same time, I deem myself worthy of it. For those things about which <sup>2</sup>I am so assailed with clamour, confer honour on my ancestors and myself, and benefit on my country at the same time. For the Greeks considered our state to be greater than they had ever done, even beyond its actual power, through the splendour of my display as its deputy to the Olympic games; (whereas they hoped before that it had been exhausted by the war;) inasmuch as I entered seven chariots—a number which no private individual had ever yet entered—and gained the first prize, and was second and fourth, and provided every thing else in a style worthy of my victory. For according to the usual view of them, such things are a subject of honour; while, from the practice of them, an idea of power is also formed. And again, whatever distinction I gain at home by my <sup>3</sup>exhibitions of choruses, or in any other way, it is naturally envied by my fellow-citizens, but for foreigners <sup>4</sup>this too has an appearance of power. And this is no useless folly, when a

<sup>1</sup> "προσέχει μοι, 'on account of my wealth, birth, and magnificent expenditure; 'ἀξίως ἄμα νομίζω εἶναι, 'on account of my personal worth and tried services.'"—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> Or, to use a more colloquial expression, "cried out against."

<sup>3</sup> On the whole subject of the χοροί, see Böckh *Public Econ. of Athens*, vol. ii. p. 207, Eng. Trans.

<sup>4</sup> *Arnold* translates this,—and *Bloomfield* borrows his version,—"this appears to be even strength:" but the position of the καὶ seems to me to be incompatible with such a sense; reading, as they both do αὐτῇ, instead of αὐτῇ.

man benefits at his own costs, not himself only, but his country also. Nor is it unfair for one who prides himself on his own prosperity, to refuse to be on an equality with the mass; since in the same way he who is unfortunate shares his calamities with no one else. But as we are not courted when in adversity, by the same rule let a man also submit to be slighted by the prosperous; or let him treat the unfortunate as on an equal footing, [when he is in prosperity,] and so claim the like treatment in return, [when he is himself in adversity]. I know, however, that men in such circumstances, and all who ever surpassed others in splendour of any kind, though disliked in their own life-time, most of all in their dealings with their equals, and then with the rest of the world also, have yet left to some of those who came after them a desire to claim connexion with them, even where there were no grounds for it; and a subject for glorying to the country they belonged to, not as for aliens, or offenders, but as for countrymen, who had achieved glorious things. And in my case, who aim at such things, and am therefore in private assailed with clamour, consider, with regard to public affairs, whether I administer them in a manner inferior to any one else, or not. For having united the most powerful states of the Peloponnese, without any great danger or expense to you, I brought the Lacedæmonians to a single day's struggle for their all at Mantinea; in consequence of which, although they were victorious in the battle, they do not ever now feel any firm confidence in themselves.

17. "In this way, then, did my youth and preternatural folly, as it is thought, deal with the power of the Peloponnesians by means of suitable arguments; and, <sup>1</sup>gaining credit by my vehemence, obtained their assent. And now too be not afraid of it; but while I am still in the flower of it, and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves fully of the services of each of us. And with regard to the expedition to Sicily, change not your determination from an idea that it would be undertaken against a great power. For it is only with a mixed rabble that its cities are populous; and they easily admit changes in their government, and adopt new ones. And for this reason no one is furnished, as though in behalf of his own country, either with arms for the person, or with ordinary

<sup>1</sup> For other modes of interpreting this sentence, see Poppe's note.

'resources, as regards the country'; but whatever each one thinks that he can get from the people, either by persuading them through his oratory, or by factious measures, and will so find a home in another land, in case of his not being successful, with that he provides himself. It is not likely, then, that a populace of such a character should either listen to any counsel with one heart, or apply themselves to action in common: but they would severally side with whatever was said to please them; especially if they are torn by factions, as we hear. Again, with regard to heavy-armed troops, neither have the Siceliots so many as are boasted of, nor did the rest of the Greeks prove so numerous as they severally reckoned themselves; but Greece had very much misstated them, and was with difficulty equipped with them in sufficient numbers on the outbreak of this war. The states in those parts, then, from what I learn by report, are of this character, and still more easy to deal with—for we shall have many barbarians, who from hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them—and those here will not prove an obstacle, if you take a right view of the matter. For our fathers had these very men, whom they say you would leave behind you in hostility

<sup>1</sup> τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ—κατασκευαῖς.] "This would refer not only to public works for the defence of the country, such as forts, or the fortifications of the city itself, but to what we should call ordinary improvements, such as roads, bridges, &c., and perhaps ornamental buildings, whether temples or theatres."—*Arnold*. I cannot but think that in addition to these objects of expenditure, if not before them all, reference is made to the slaves, cattle, and implements, with which the land ought to be stocked, but was not, in consequence of the unsettled state of the country. As οὐδείς seems to refer to *individuals*, not to states, in the preceding clause, it would naturally refer to them in this also; as ἕκαστος also does in the following sentence. And with regard to this signification of κατασκευή, it is one which both the noun and the verb formed from it repeatedly convey in Xenophon's political and economical treatises; e. g. *De Vectigalibus*, IV. 11, ὅπως θαρσοῦντες μὲν ὅτι πλείστον ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τὰ ἀργύρια ἀγῶμεν, θαρσοῦντες δὲ κατασκευάζομεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς. And again, 41, Εἰ δὲ τινες αὐφοῦνται, μὴ ματαίᾳ ἀν γένοιτο αὐτῇ ἡ κατασκευή, εἰ πόλεμος ἐγερθείη—τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς πόλεμον κτήμα χρησιμώτατον ἀνθρώπων. And in the same way, Thucydides himself uses the verb particularly with reference to slaves, as though they formed the chief stock in the country, in another speech which he puts into the mouth of Alcibiades; ch. 91. 7, Οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατασκευάσται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τὰ μὲν ληφθῆντα τὰ δ' αὐτόματα, &c. I think therefore that in the present passage also by the expression τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς he means the different parts of an agricultural property, and more especially the slaves, which formed the most valuable and important part, while a country was in a peaceful and prosperous condition; but one so likely to be lost in a period of war and revolution, that the Siceliots, according to the view of their unsettled state which Alcibiades here gives, would have very little inducement to invest their money in them.

when sailing there, and the Medes beside, as their enemies; and still they won their empire; though strong in nothing else but the superiority of their fleet. And as things stand now, never yet were the Peloponnesians more hopeless with regard to us: and even if they are ever so confident, for invading our country indeed they are strong enough, even though we do not undertake the expedition; but with their naval force they cannot hurt us, [though we do undertake it;] for we have a fleet left behind that is a match for them.

18. "On what reasonable argument, then, could we ourselves shrink from it; or on what plea addressed to our allies there could we refuse to succour them? For since we have entered into league with them, we ought to assist them, and not to object that they too have not assisted us. For we united them with us, not that they might come here to help us in their turn, but that by annoying our enemies there they might prevent their coming here to attack us. And it is in this way that empire has been won, both by us and by all others who have enjoyed it; I mean, by readily taking part with those barbarians or Greeks who from time to time called them to their aid; since if all should remain quiet, or nicely choose whom they ought to assist; we should make but slight additions to it, but should rather run a risk of losing even what it now is. For men do not only defend themselves against a superior when he has attacked them, but also strike the first blow, to prevent his attacking them. And it is not possible for us to portion out exactly how far we wish to hold dominion; but since we are in our present position, we must form designs against some, and not give up others; because we should be subjected to the rule of another party, if we did not ourselves rule over others. Nor must you take the same view of quiet as the rest of the world, unless you will also receive fresh institutions assimilating to theirs. Considering, then, that we shall rather aggrandize our possessions here, if we go in quest of those there, let us make the expedition; that we may both prostrate the pride of the Peloponnesians, by being seen, regardless of present peace, to sail even against Sicily; and at the same time, by either ruling, as we most probably shall, over the whole of Greece, through being joined by those there, or at any rate by injuring the Syracusans, by which both

<sup>1</sup> Or, "make distinctions of race in choosing," &c.; according to the reading *φυλοκρινοῖεν*, which Porro, Göller, and Bloomfield adopt.

ourselves and our allies will be benefited. And as for security, whether for remaining there, in case of any success, or for returning, our fleet will provide us with it : for by sea we shall be superior to all the Sicelioti put together. And let not the non-interfering policy which Nicias recommends in his speeches, nor his setting the young against the old, divert you from your purpose ; but acting in your usual order, just as our fathers, by consulting young with old, raised the state to its present height, do ye now too, in the same manner, endeavour to advance it ; being convinced that youth and old age can do nothing without each other ; but that the period of levity, and of mid-age, and of extreme preciseness, will have most power when joined together ; and that the state, if it remain quiet, will be worn out on itself, like any thing else, and its skill in every thing grow dull ; while by entering into contest it will continually gain fresh experience, and will find self-defence habitual to it, not in word, but rather in deed. My decided opinion then is, that I think a state of no inactive character would most quickly be ruined by a change to inactivity ; and that those men live most securely, who regulate their affairs in accordance with their existing habits and institutions, even though they may be of an inferior character, with the least variation."

19. To this effect spoke Alcibiades. When the Athenians had heard him and the Segestans and some Leontine exiles, who, coming forward, begged and entreated them to assist them, reminding them of their oaths, they were much more eager for the expedition than before. So Nicias, perceiving that he could not now turn them from it by the same arguments as he had used before, but might perhaps change their purpose by the amount of armament, if he should command a numerous one to be prepared ; he came forward again, and addressed them as follows :

20. "Since I see you, Athenians, altogether bent on making the expedition, may these things turn out, as we wish : at the present time, however, I will declare to you what my opinion is. We are about to go then, as I learn from report, against cities which are great, and not subject one to another, or in want of a change, like that by which men would gladly pass from a state of violent slavery to an easier condition instead of it ; which will reasonably refuse to accept our dominion

instead of freedom, and are many in number, considering that they are in one island, even those of Greek origin. For besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect will side with us on the strength of their connexion with Leontini, there are seven others, and those equipped with every thing in a style just agreeing with our own power, and most of all, those against which we are more especially sailing, namely, Selinus and Syracuse. For there are in them many, heavy-armed, and bowmen, and dartmen, with many firemes, and crowds to man them. They have money too, partly in private funds, and partly in the temples also at Selinus; while the Syracusans have also first-fruits paid them by certain barbarian tribes. But what they most of all excel us in is, that they possess many horses, and use corn of native growth, and not imported.

21. "Against such a power then we require, not only <sup>1</sup> a marine and inefficient armament, but that a large land force also should sail with us, if we are to achieve any thing suitable to our design, and are not to be shut out from the land by numerous cavalry; especially should the cities league together in their fear, and none but the Segestans be our friends, and furnish us with horse, wherewith to defend ourselves. But it were disgraceful to return by compulsion, or to send for fresh supplies afterwards, through having inconsiderately formed our plans at first. On the contrary, we must go against them with sufficient forces, knowing that we are about to sail far from our own country, and not on an expedition of the same kind as when you have gone at different times, in the character of allies, against any of your subjects in these parts, where supplies of additional necessities were easily obtained from the friendly territory; but departing to a land altogether alien to you, from which for <sup>2</sup> as many as four months in the winter it is not easy for a messenger to come here.

<sup>1</sup> ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς,] i. e. a force consisting only of the few fighting men on board the ships. Or even if the seamen themselves were joined with them, yet their want of arms and training for land service would render them a very inefficient and weak force against the troops of Syracuse, on shore, however efficient they might be on their own element.

<sup>2</sup> μηνῶν, οὐδὲ τρισσάρων,] I cannot at all agree with Poppo's remark: "That would certainly give a suitable and more easy sense to the passage, but if the position in which οὐδὲ stands in the great majority of the MSS., and which Poppo himself retains, be the correct one, it seems impossible that it should qualify any other word than τρισσάρων; and in that case its force appears to be what is here attributed to it."

22. "I think, therefore that we ought to take many heavy-armed, both of our own and of our allies, whether those who are subject to us, or any in the Peloponnese that we may be able either to prevail upon by argument, or to take into our pay; many bowmen also and slingers, to offer resistance to the Sicilian horse; and that in ships we should have a very decided superiority, in order that we may the more easily bring in what is necessary: while we take our corn from home also in merchant vessels, namely, wheat and parched barley, with bakers from the mills, compelled, in proportion to their numbers, to serve for pay; that should we any where be detained by stress of weather, the force may have provisions; (for so numerous as it is, it will not be one for every city to receive.) All other things too we must provide, as far as we can, and not depend upon others; but, most of all, we must take from home as much money as possible. For as for that of the Segestans, which is asserted to be there in readiness, believe that it is in the way of assertion, more than in any other way, that it will be ready.

23. "For supposing us to go hence, not only provided on a scale equal to the enemy, (<sup>2</sup>excepting, at least, their heavy-armed fighting force,) but even surpassing them in all respects; yet scarcely even then shall we be able to subdue that country, and to save this. Indeed we must consider that we are going to found a city amongst aliens and enemies; and such men must either, the first day they land, be at once masters of the country, or know that if they fail to do so, they will find every thing opposed to them. For myself then, being afraid of this, and knowing that on many points we must take good counsel, and on still more have good luck, (and that is difficult for such as are but men,) I wish to sail from home committing myself as little as possible to fortune, and secured against failure by our preparations, according to

<sup>1</sup> Τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν εἶπον.] Arnold thinks that τοῦ εἶπου would be a better reading; but there is no necessity at all for such a change, if the article be taken as only distinguishing the *class* of provisions here spoken of from another, viz. the corn they took with them, in opposition to that which they would get in Sicily, and which is mentioned in the words immediately preceding, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πάντα ἐκκομίζωμεθα.

<sup>2</sup> "Because as on the one hand it was impossible for the Athenian expedition to match the Syracusan infantry in point of numbers, so on the other hand they were so superior in discipline, that even with a great disparity of numbers they were fully able to cope with them."—Arnold.



all reasonable hopes. For this I consider to be at once most safe, for the state at large, and conducive to the preservation of us who will go on the expedition. But if any one think otherwise, I resign the command to him."

24. Thus much spoke Nicias, thinking that he should either deter the Athenians by the vast scale of his measures, or that if he were compelled to join the expedition, he should in this way sail on it most safely. They, however, had not their desire for the voyage taken from them by the burdensome nature of the preparations, but were much more eager for it than ever; and the result proved just contrary to what he had expected; for it was thought that he had given them good advice, and that now certainly they would have even abundant assurance of success. And so all alike were seized with a longing to go on the expedition: the elder, from a belief that they should either subdue the places against which they were about to sail, or that a large force would meet with no misfortune: those in the prime of life, from a desire of foreign sights and spectacles, and because they were in good hope of returning safe from it: the mass of the people and of the soldiery, from thinking that they should both make money at present, and gain additional power, from which an unfailing fund for pay would be obtained. So that owing to the excessive desire of the majority for the measure, even if any one were not pleased with it, he was afraid that by voting against it he might appear ill-affected to the state, and therefore held his peace.

25. At last one of the Athenians came forward, and calling on Nicias, said that he ought not to make excuses and to procrastinate, but to say now before them all, what forces the Athenians should vote him. He then, though reluctantly, said that he would deliberate more leisurely on the question, in concert with his colleagues: as far, however, as he saw at present, they should not sail with less than a hundred triremes, (as many of the Athenian ships as might be thought fit would carry the heavy infantry, while others must be sent for from the allies,) with not fewer than five thousand heavy-armed in all, of the Athenians and the allies, and even more, if at all possible; and that they would get ready and take with them

<sup>1</sup> i. e. according to Arnold's explanation, "they, including himself, who was to command the expedition:" according to Haack's and Poppe's, Nicias himself and his colleagues. The latter seems the more natural of the two.

the rest of the armament in proportion, both archers from home and from Crete, slingers, and whatever else should be thought proper.

26. The Athenians, after hearing him, immediately voted that the generals should be invested with full powers, to make arrangements, both concerning the number of troops, and every thing connected with the whole expedition, as they might judge to be best for Athens. After this, the preparations began to be made; and they both sent to the allies, and drew up their muster-rolls at home. The city had lately recovered itself from the plague, and from continued hostilities, as regarded both the number of young men who had grown up, and the accumulation of money in consequence of the truce; so that every thing was the more easily provided. And thus they were engaged in preparations.

27. In the mean time, of all the stone Mercuries in the city of Athens, (they are, according to the fashion of the country, those well-known square figures, numerous both in private and sacred door-ways,) the greater part had their faces mutilated in one night. The perpetrators of this offence were known to no one; but search was made for them, with great rewards for information offered at the public expense. Moreover, the people voted, that if any one knew any other act of impiety to have been committed, whoever wished, whether citizen, alien, or slave, should without fear give information of it. And they took the matter up more seriously<sup>1</sup> than it deserved; for it was considered to be an omen of the expedition, and also to have been done on the strength of a conspiracy for bringing about a revolution, and for putting down the democracy.

28. Information therefore was given by some naturalized aliens, and slaves who were in personal attendance on their masters, though not at all respecting the Mercuries, yet of certain mutilations of other images which had before been perpetrated by some young men in a drunken frolic: and, moreover, that in certain private houses the mysteries were celebrated in mockery. In this charge they implicated Alcibiades; and those took it up who were most hostile to him, as being an obstacle to their own taking the permanent lead of the people.

<sup>1</sup> Or the comparative may, perhaps, mean "more seriously than they would have done under other circumstances." Or it may be used here, as in other places, with a force scarcely distinguishable from that of the positive.

Thinking therefore, that if they expelled him, they would have the first place, they magnified the business, and raised an outcry, to the effect that both the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Mercuries had been done for the abolition of democracy; and that there was none of all these things that had been executed without his assistance: alleging in proof of the assertion his general contempt for the law in his personal habits, so opposed to the spirit of democracy.

29. He at once defended himself against these charges, and was ready to submit to trial, as to his being guilty of any of these things, before going on the expedition, (for by this time all things necessary for the armament had been provided,) and if he had done any of these things, he was willing to be punished; but if he were acquitted, to take the command. He protested, too, that they should not listen to slanders against him in his absence, but put him to death at once if he were guilty; and that it was more prudent not to send him out at the head of so large an armament, with such an accusation attaching to him, before they had decided the question. But his enemies being afraid of the army, lest he should have its good wishes, if at once brought to trial; and lest the people should relent, who courted him, because for his sake the Argives and some of the Mantineans were joining in the expedition; they wished to put it off, and earnestly dissuaded the measure, by bringing forward other orators, who urged that at present he should sail, and not delay the departure of the army, but should on his return take his trial within such a number of days as might be appointed. For they wished to have him sent for, and brought home for trial on a graver charge, which they could more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was resolved that Alcibiades should sail.

30. After this, when it was now midsummer, the departure for Sicily took place. Now to the greater part of the allies, with the provision ships, and the smaller craft, and all the other vessels that accompanied them, orders had before been given to muster at Corcyra, with a view to their crossing the Ionian Sea in a body from that place to the Iapygian foreland. But the Athenians themselves, and such of the allies as were present, went down to the Piræus on an appointed day, as soon as it was light, and proceeded to man their ships for the purpose of putting out to sea. The whole multitude too, (so to speak,)

that was in the city, both of citizens and foreigners, went down with them. The natives accompanied, respectively, those who belonged to them, whether friends, kinsmen, or sons; and went at once with hope and with lamentations; with hope, that they would attain what they went for; but with lamentation, as doubtful if they should ever again see their friends, when they remembered on how long a voyage they were setting out from their country. At the present time too, when they were now to take leave of each other on a perilous undertaking, the thought of the dangers struck them more forcibly than when they were voting for the expedition: though, nevertheless, they were cheered by the sight of their present strength, through the numbers of each part of the armament which they beheld. As to the foreigners, and the rest of the multitude, they went to see the sight, as that of an enterprise worthy of their notice, and surpassing belief.

31. This armament which first sailed out, going from a single city, and consisting of a Grecian force, was the most costly and splendid of all up to that time. Yet in number of ships and of heavy-armed, that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and the same when going against Potidæa under Hagnon, was not inferior to this: for there were in it four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians themselves, three hundred horse, and a hundred triremes, with fifty of the Lesbians and Chians, while many allies besides joined in the expedition. But they were despatched on a short voyage and with scanty preparation: whereas this expedition started with the expectation of its being a long one, and was equipped for both kinds of service, whichever might be required, with ships and land forces at the same time. The fleet was elaborately fitted out, at great expense both on the part of the captains and of the state. For the treasury gave a drachma a day to each seaman, and furnished empty vessels, sixty fast sailers and forty transports; while the captains provided the best crews for them, and gave gratuities in addition to the pay

<sup>1</sup> παρασκευὴ αὐτῇ πρώτῃ.] I have followed Gölle's and Arnold's interpretation of these words in preference to that of Poppo, who joins πρώτη with πολυτελεστάτῃ δῇ, and renders the passage thus: "hic enim fuit apparatus primus sumptuosissimus profectus;" which appears to imply that there could be *more than one* expedition that was the most costly of all up to that time.—Unless "primus" is intended by him to express quality, and not time; which does not seem probable.

from the treasury, to the *thranitæ*, and to the petty officers ; and made use besides of expensive ensigns and equipments ; each one of them being in the highest degree desirous that his own ship should excel most in beauty and fast sailing. The land forces, on the other hand, were selected from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each other in great attention to their arms and personal accoutrements. The consequence was, that there was at once a rivalry amongst themselves, in the arm of the service to which they were severally appointed ; and that with the rest of the Greeks it was imagined to be a display of power and resources, rather than an armament raised against an enemy. For if any one had reckoned the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals ; with regard to the state, what sums it had already spent upon it, and what it was sending out in the hands of the generals ; and with regard to individuals, what each had laid out on his personal equipment, and, in the case of a captain, on his ship, with what he was likely to lay out still ; and, moreover, what it was probable that every one had provided, independently of his pay from the treasury, towards the expenses of a voyage expected to be so long ; and what each soldier or trader took with him for the purpose of exchange ; [if all these sums, I say, had been calculated,] it would have been found that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. And the expedition was no less celebrated through men's astonishment at its boldness, and the splendour of its appearance, than for the superiority of the armament, compared with those whom they were going to attack ; and from the fact of its being the longest passage from their own country that had hitherto been undertaken, and with the greatest hope of future advantages in comparison with their present means.

32. Now when the ships were manned, and every thing was put on board that they meant to set sail with, silence was proclaimed by trumpet, and they offered the prayers which are usual before putting out to sea ; not ship by ship singly, but all together, responding to a herald ; having mixed

[*ἑσπείρας*,] i. e. the highest of the three banks of rowers in a trireme, whose labour was greater in proportion to the greater length of the oars they worked. Göller supposes *ὑπηρεσίας* in this passage to signify "the servants of the sailors," and Poppe agrees with him, if the text be allowed to be sound. I have followed Arnold's interpretation. See his note on the passage.

bowls of wine through the whole armament, and both seamen and their officers making oblations with gold and silver goblets. They were joined also in their prayers by the rest of the multitude on shore, both the citizens and whoever else was there that wished them well. When they had sung their hymn, and finished their libations, they weighed anchor; and having at first sailed out in a column, they then raced each other as far as Ægina. And thus they hastened to reach Corcyra, where the remaining force of the allies was also assembling.

Now tidings of the expedition were brought to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time received no credit at all. Nay, even when an assembly was held on the subject, both by others were speeches to the following effect delivered, (some believing the report of the Athenian expedition, while some contradicted it,) and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, coming forward to them, from a conviction that he had accurate information on the subject, addressed to them the following advice:

33. "I shall, perhaps, appear to you, as some others have done, to speak what is incredible concerning the reality of the expedition that is coming against us: and I know that those who either make statements, or bring reports, which do not seem to be credible, not only fail to convince, but are also thought to be foolish. Nevertheless I will not, through fear of this, hold my tongue when the state is in danger, since I am myself at any rate persuaded that I speak with more certain knowledge than others. For the Athenians, much as you are surprised at it, have set out against us with a large force both for sea and land service, nominally, on account of an alliance with the Segestans, and for the purpose of settling the Leontines, but really through desire for Sicily, and most of all, for our city, thinking that if they get this, they will easily get the rest also. With a conviction, then, that they will quickly be here, consider how with your present resources you may best defend yourselves, and may neither through despising the matter be taken off your guard, nor through disbelieving it neglect the common weal. But if, on the other hand, I appear to any one to speak credibly, let him not be struck with consternation at their boldness and power. For neither will they be able to do us more harm than they receive, nor, because they are coming against us with a great armament, are they on that

account without advantage for us; but it is much better with respect to the rest of the Siceliots, (for they will be the more willing, in their consternation, to join our alliance,) and in case of our either defeating them, or repulsing them without their obtaining the objects of their ambition, (for certainly I am not afraid of their gaining what they expect,) it will prove the most glorious achievement for us, and one which, by me at least, is not unexpected. For few have been the great armaments, either of Greeks or barbarians, which have gone far from home and proved successful. For they come not in greater numbers than the natives of the country and those who live near to it, (since all league together through fear,) and if they fail through want of provisions in a foreign land, even though they fail chiefly through their own fault, they nevertheless leave a proud name to those who were the objects of their attack. Just as these very Athenians, when the Mede, contrary to expectation, was so signally defeated, grew great on the strength of the report, that it was against Athens that he had come. And there is reason for hoping that in our case the result may be the same.

34. "With good courage, then, let us both make our preparations here, and send to the Sicels, to strengthen the attachment of some of them, and endeavour to enter into friendship and alliance with others; while we despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, to prove that the danger is common to all; and to Italy, that either we may gain their alliance for ourselves, or they may refuse to receive the Athenians. I think it better, too, that we should also send to Carthage. For this is nothing unexpected by them; but they are always in fear that they may some time or other find the Athenians coming against their country; and therefore thinking, perhaps, that if they abandoned these places, they would themselves be brought into trouble, they might be willing to assist us; at least secretly, if not openly; or at any rate in some way or other. And they are more able to do it, if they please, than any men of the present day; for they possess most gold and silver; and it is by means of these that war, like every thing else, prospers. Let us likewise send to Lacedæmon and Corinth, begging them to come hither to our aid as quickly as possible, and to stir up the war there. And what I think the most expedient course, though you, through your habitual

love of quiet, would be least quickly persuaded to adopt it, shall, notwithstanding that, be mentioned. If then, we Siceliots—all in one body, if possible; but if not, as many as possible in concert with us—would launch the whole of our present navy, with two months' provisions, and go to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian foreland, and show them that they will not have to fight about Sicily before they have fought for their own passage over the Ionian Sea; we should strike them with the greatest fear, and set them on considering that we are starting from a friendly country as its guardians, (for Tarentum is ready to receive us,) but that for them the tract of open sea is a wide one to cross with all their armament; which would hardly remain in order through so long a voyage, and would be easily attacked by us, while it came on slowly and in small divisions. But supposing, on the other hand, that, having lightened their ships, they should attack us with the better sailing part of their fleet in a more compact body; then, if they use their oars, we shall fall on them when they are wearied; or if we should not choose to do so, we may also retire to Tarentum: while they, having crossed with few provisions, on purpose for an engagement, would be at a loss what to do in uninhabited regions; and would either be blockaded, if they remained, or if they attempted to sail along the coast, would abandon the rest of their armament, and would be dispirited, from having no certainty whether the cities would receive them or not. I therefore, for my part, am of opinion, that being deterred by this consideration, they would not so much as put out from Coreyra; but would either, after deliberating and reconnoitring how many we are, and in what position, be driven on by the season of the year into winter; or, in consternation at the unexpected result, break up the expedition: especially since the most skilful of their generals, as I hear, is taking the command against his will, and would gladly seize an excuse to return, if any considerable resistance were seen on our part. We should be reported too, I am quite sure, as being more than we really are: and in accordance with what is told them are men's feelings also affected; and of those who are beforehand in attacking, or, at any rate, let those who are going to attack

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "on the side of more, or excess;" like *ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον*, I. 10. 8.



them see beforehand that they will defend themselves, they stand in greater fear, considering them equal to the danger. And this would be the case now with the Athenians. For they are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance; with good reason contemning us, because we did not join the Lacedæmonians in destroying them. But if they saw us acting with courage beyond their expectation, they would be more dismayed at that unlooked-for result, than at the power which we really possess. Be persuaded, therefore to show this boldness, if possible; but if not, then, as quickly as possible, to get ready all other resources for the war; and to think, every one of you, that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds; but that, for the present, to consider those preparations most safe which are made with a feeling of fear, and to act as in a season of danger, would prove most to your advantage. For those men are both coming against us, and already, I know for certain, on their voyage, and all but here."

35. Such was the speech of Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at great strife one with another; some maintaining that the Athenians would by no means come, and that what he said was not the truth; others asking what they could do, if they did come, which they would not suffer on a larger scale in return. Others, again, treated the matter with utter contempt, and turned it to ridicule; while there were but few who believed Hermocrates, and were afraid of what was coming. Athenagoras, who was a leader of the people, and most influential with the multitude at the present time, then came forward to them and spoke as follows:

36. "With regard to the Athenians, whoever does not wish them to be so senseless, and to be reduced into subjection to us by coming here, is either a coward, or ill affected towards his country. But with regard to those who bring such tidings, and fill you with such excessive fear, I wonder at them, not for their audacity, but for their folly, if they imagine that they are not seen through. For being afraid themselves, they wish to throw the whole city into consternation, in order that they may get their own terror thrown into the shade by the general alarm. And now this is the real value of these reports: they do not arise in a natural way, but are concocted by men who are always raising commotions here. But you, if well advised,

will not look at and estimate probabilities by the news which these persons bring, but by what men of talent and great experience, as I presume the Athenians are, would be likely to do. For it is not probable that they, leaving the Peloponnesians behind them, and not having yet brought the war at home to a sure conclusion, should voluntarily come here for another no less arduous; since, in my opinion, they are quite contented that *we*, with so many and so great cities as we have, are not going against *them*.

37. "But, indeed, if they should come, as they are said to be coming, I consider Sicily more competent to bring the war to a termination than the Peloponnesians, (inasmuch as it is better provided in all respects,) and our city by itself far stronger than the army which is now, as they say, coming against us, even though it came twice as large as it is. For I know that neither will any horses accompany them, or be provided for them here, except some few from the Segestans, nor heavy-armed equal in number to our own, coming, as they must have done, on board ship. For it is a great thing for even the ships themselves, lightly laden, to perform so long a voyage hither; and for all the other provisions required against such a city, (which will be no few,) to be furnished. So far then am I from believing this, that I think if they came with another city as large as Syracuse in their possession, and living there on our borders carried on the war, they would hardly avoid utter ruin: much less then, surely, with the whole of Sicily hostile to them, (for it will league together;) and with an army established in the country from on board ship; and while they are not permitted by our cavalry to advance far from their wretched tents, and such poor equipments as they are compelled to put up with. In short, I do not think they would even effect a landing; so far superior do I consider our forces to be.

38. "But the Athenians, as I tell you, being aware of this, are engaged, I am well assured, in preserving their own possessions; and it is persons here that are making up these stories of what neither is, nor could ever be, the case. And I am not now for the first time convinced of them, but have ever been so, that they wish to terrify your populace by such tales as these, and still more wicked ones, if not even by deeds;

and so themselves to have the rule of the city. And in truth I am afraid, lest some time or other, by making many attempts, they should even succeed; while we are ill disposed, before we are in the act of suffering, to take precautionary measures against them, and after finding them out, to proceed against them. And so by these means our city is seldom at rest, but is involved in many feuds and conflicts—not more frequently with its enemies than with itself—and sometimes in tyrannies and unprincipled cabals. But I will endeavour, if only you will follow my advice, to let none of these things occur in our time; by convincing you who form the mass of the people, and by chastising those who plot such things; not only when convicted in the act, (for it is difficult so to catch them,) but also for what they have the wish, though not the power, to do. For we must avenge ourselves on our enemy, not only for what he does, but beforehand also, for his intention to do it; inasmuch as if we are not first in guarding against him, we shall be first in suffering. With regard to the oligarchs, on the other hand, I shall reprove them on some points, watch them on others, and warn them on others; for in this way I think I shall best deter them from their evil practices. And, indeed, what is it (a question which I have often asked) that ye really wish, ye young men? Is it to enjoy power at once? But that is not lawful; and that law was so enacted in consequence of your incompetency, rather than with a wish to degrade you when competent for the task. Well then, is it to avoid being under the same laws with the people at large? And how then is it right for the same people not to be thought worthy of the same privileges?

39. "Some one will say, that a democracy is neither a sensible nor an equitable thing, but that those who have property are also most competent to rule best. But I say, in the first place, that 'democracy' is a name for all, but 'oligarchy' for only a part; and, in the second place, that though the rich are the best guardians of property, the intelligent would be the best counsellors, and the mass of the people the best judges after hearing measures discussed; and that all these things, both severally and collectively, have their due share allotted to them in a democracy. An oligarchy, on the other hand, admits, indeed, the many to a share of dangers, but of advan-

tages it not only enjoys the larger part, but even takes away and keeps the whole. And this is what the powerful and young among you desire—a thing impossible to attain in a great city.

40. "Nay then at length, even now, <sup>1</sup>O ye dullest of all men—(for of all the Greeks I know, are you either most senseless, if you are not sensible that you are coveting evil things; or most unprincipled, if you know it, and still dare to pursue them:)—nay then, I say, either acquire that knowledge, or change those principles, and so advance the interest of the city, which is the common interest of all. For consider, that those who are good among you will share that in an equal, or even greater degree, than the mass of the people in the city; but that if you wish any thing else, you run a risk of being deprived of all. And have done with such reports as these, knowing that they are brought to those who are aware of, and will not tolerate, your designs. For this city, even if the Athenians are coming, will resist them in a manner worthy of itself; and we have generals who will look to these matters. And if none of the reports be true, (which is my opinion,) it will not lay a voluntary slavery on itself, by being panic-struck at your intelligence, and by choosing you as its rulers; but will look at the circumstances itself, and consider the words spoken by you as equivalent to deeds; and will not be deprived of its present liberty by listening to you, but will endeavour to preserve it by being cautious in its actions, and not allowing you to go unpunished."

41. To this effect spoke Athenagoras. One of the generals then rose up, and would no longer permit any one else to come forward, but himself spoke on the subject before them to the following effect: "It is neither prudent for any parties to utter calumnies against each other, nor for those who hear them to admit them; but rather to see, with regard to the intelligence brought to us, how we may prepare, both each man severally and the whole city together, to defend ourselves well against the invaders. And even supposing it not to be required, there is no harm, at any rate, in the state being equipped with horses, and arms, and every thing else in which war rejoices. And we ourselves will undertake to attend to and

<sup>1</sup> I have attempted to translate this passage as it is found in the MSS., but must refer to the different editors for the emendations which they propose for what they all agree in thinking the corrupt part of it.

examine these things, and to send round to the cities, both for observation, and whatever else may appear to be expedient. To some of them, indeed, we have already attended; and whatever we discover, we will lay before you." After the general had said thus much, the Syracusans departed from the assembly.

42. Now the Athenians were by this time at Corcyra, themselves and all their allies. And in the first place, the generals reviewed the armament a second time, and made their dispositions, as they were to come to their moorings, and to form their camp; making three squadrons, and allotting one to each of their body, that they might not, by sailing in company, be at a loss for water, and ports, and provisions, on their touching any where; and that they might in other respects be more orderly and easy to control, by being put under a particular commander, according to the several squadrons. They next sent forward three ships to Italy and Sicily, to ascertain which of the cities would receive them; with orders to come out again and meet them, that they might know this when they put in.

43. After this, the Athenians at length weighed anchor, and proceeded to cross over from Corcyra to Sicily, with the following force; viz.—a hundred and thirty-four triremes, in all, and two Rhodian fifty-oared galleys; (a hundred of these were Athenian vessels, sixty of which were fast sailers, the rest troop ships; the remainder of the fleet being composed of Chians, and the other allies;) of heavy-armed, in all, five thousand one hundred, (of which there were raised by the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred, and seven hundred<sup>1</sup> Thetes serving as Epibatae on board the ships; the rest of those who joined the expedition being allies, some of them sent by their subjects, others by the Argives, to the number of five hundred, with two hundred and fifty Mantineans, who were also mercenaries;) of archers, in all, four hundred and eighty, (eighty of which were Cretans;) of Rhodian slingers, seven hundred; of light-armed Megareans, who were exiles, one hundred and twenty; and one horse transport, carrying thirty horses.

<sup>1</sup> Θῆτες,] i. e. men included in the lowest of the four classes into which Solon divided the Athenian people, and which consisted of all whose land brought in less than two hundred medimni of corn yearly. See note<sup>1</sup>, p. 167.

44. Such was the amount of the first armament which sailed over for the war. For these troops thirty ships of burden, laden with corn, carried provisions, with the bakers, stone-masons, carpenters, and all the tools for building fortifications; and also one hundred boats, which, together with the ships of burden, were pressed into the service; while many other boats and ships of burden followed the armament voluntarily, for purposes of commerce; all of which proceeded at that time to cross the Ionian Gulf from Corcyra. When the whole armament had made the coast at the Iapygian foreland, and Tarentum, and as they severally could, they sailed along the coast of Italy, as the cities did not afford them a market, or the protection of their walls, but only water and anchorage, (and Tarentum and Locri not even these,) until they came to Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. There they at once mustered, and pitched a camp outside the city, (as they would not receive them within the walls,) in the sacred enclosure of Diana, where they afforded them a market; and having drawn up their ships ashore, they remained quiet. They then entered into communication with the Rhegians, calling upon them, as Chalcidians, to assist the Leontines, who were Chalcidians also. They, however, said that they would join neither party, but whatever the rest of the Italiots should collectively determine, that they would do. The Athenians then turned their attention to the state of things in Sicily, considering in what way they would best deal with them; and at the same time were waiting for the arrival from Segesta of the ships which had been sent on in advance; wishing to know respecting the money, whether there were such a sum as the messengers stated at Athens.

45. To the Syracusans, in the mean time, reports were being brought from all quarters, and from those who had been sent by them to reconnoitre came positive intelligence that the ships were at Rhegium; and on the belief of this, they began to make preparations with all their heart, and were no longer incredulous. Accordingly they sent about to the Sicels, in some cases, guards; in others, ambassadors; and were putting garrisons into the stations of the <sup>1</sup>*peripoli* in their country; while in their city they were seeing if the equipments were

<sup>1</sup> See note, p. 266.

complete, by examining arms and horses; and were settling every thing else, in expectation of a war that was quickly coming on them, and all but present.

46. Now the three ships sent on in advance came from Segesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with tidings that the other money which they had promised was not there, but that only thirty talents were to be seen. • The generals then were immediately in a state of great despondency, because this their first hope had disappointed them; as had the Rhegians also, by their unwillingness to join their standard—the people they had first attempted to persuade, and for whom it was most natural to assist them, as they were of the same race as the Leontines, and always favourably disposed towards themselves. Nicias, indeed, was prepared for the tidings from the Segestans, but by the other two it was quite unexpected. For the Segestans had recourse to the following contrivance, at the time when the first envoys of the Athenians came to them to see the state of their funds. They took them to the temple of Venus at Eryx, and showed them the treasures deposited there, consisting of bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and other articles of furniture in no small quantity; which being made of silver, presented, with a value really trifling, a much greater show of wealth. And in their private receptions of the triremes' crews, having collected the cups both of gold and silver that were in Segesta itself, and borrowed those in the neighbouring cities, whether Phœnician or Grecian, they each brought them to the entertainments, as their own. And thus, as all used pretty nearly the same, and great numbers of them were every where seen, it created much astonishment in the Athenians from the triremes; and on their arrival at Athens they spread it abroad that they had seen great wealth. Those, then, who had been themselves thus outwitted, and had at that time persuaded the rest, were severely blamed by the soldiers, when the report went abroad that there was not at Segesta the money they had expected. •

47. The generals now took counsel on the present state of affairs. • The opinion of Nicias was, that they should sail to Selinus with all their forces, that being the object for which they had, most of all, been sent: and in case of the Segestans supplying money for the whole armament, that then they should determine accordingly; otherwise, that they should

beg them to give provisions for their sixty ships, the number which they had asked for; and remaining there should bring the Selinuntines to terms with them, either by force or by treaty; and so, after coasting along by the other cities, and displaying the power of the Athenian state, as well as proving their zeal in the cause of their friends and allies, they should sail back home;—(unless they should be able, on a sudden, and without expecting it, either to do the Leontines service, or to bring over some of the other cities;)—and not expose their state to danger by spending its own resources.

48. Alcibiades, on the other hand, said that they ought not, after sailing from home with so large a force, to return with dishonour and without effecting their purpose; but to send heralds to all the other cities, except Selinus and Syracuse, and endeavour also to get some of the Sicels to revolt from the Syracusans, and to gain the friendship of others amongst them, with a view to obtaining corn and troops; but first of all to win over the Messanians; (for they lay just in the passage and approach to Sicily, and there would be a harbour for them there, and the most suitable station for observing the enemy.) When, then, they had brought over the cities, and knew with whose assistance they would carry on the war, then they should attack Syracuse and Selinus, if the latter did not come to terms with Segesta, and the former permit them to settle the Leontines.

49. Lamachus, again, urged that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse, and immediately fight the battle under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were most unprepared and panic-struck. For every armament was most formidable in the first instance; but if it spent much time before coming into sight, men grew bold again in spirit, and felt more contempt for it even on its appearance. If, then, they attacked them on a sudden, while they were still with terror looking for them, they would gain the most decided advantage over them, and strike fear into them in every way; by their sight of the forces, (for they would appear most numerous at the present time,) by their expectation of what they would suffer, and, most of all, by the immediate peril of the engagement. It was probable, too, that many would be surprised outside the city in consequence of their not believing



that they would come; or, <sup>1</sup>if they were now carrying in their effects, yet the army would be in no want of property, if it sat down in superior force before the city. And so the rest of the SiceliotS would then the more shrink from entering into alliance with the Syracusans, and join the Athenians; and would not put off, while they waited to see which party would be the stronger. As for a naval station, he said that after retiring [from before Syracuse,] and bringing their ships to anchor, they should establish one at Megara; which was an uninhabited place, at no great distance from Syracuse either by sea or land;

50. Though Lamachus spoke to this effect, he nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades sailed across in his own ship to Messina, and made proposals to them for forming an alliance; but when he did not prevail on them, but they answered that they could not receive him within their city, though they would afford him a market outside, he sailed back again to Rhegium. Then the generals immediately joined in manning sixty ships out of the whole number, and, taking provisions for them, coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium with one of their own body. On the Naxians' receiving them within their city, they coasted on to Catana; and when the inhabitants refused to admit them, (for there was in that place a party that favoured the cause of the Syracusans,) they proceeded to the river Terias. Having spent the night there, the next day they sailed in column towards Syracuse, with the rest of the ships; for ten of their squadron they had sent on before, to sail into the great harbour, and observe whether there were any fleet launched; and to proclaim from their ships, "that the Athenians were come to reinstate the Leontines in their own country, on the ground of alliance and kindred; and therefore that such of them as were in Syracuse should withdraw from it, and without any apprehension join the Athenians, as friends and benefactors." So when this proclamation had been made, and they had reconnoitred the city, the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have to make the base of their operations in the war, they sailed back again to Catana.

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Arnold renders it, "*while they were carrying,*" &c.

51. An assembly having been held there, the inhabitants did not admit the armament, but told the generals to come in and say what they wished. While Alcibiades was speaking, and the attention of those in the city was turned to the assembly, the soldiers, without being observed, broke through a postern which had been ill built up in the wall, and entering the city stationed themselves in the market-place. When those of the Catanæans who favoured the Syracusans saw the army within the walls, being immediately very much alarmed, they secretly went out of the place, as they formed but a small party; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians, and begged them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and having now put out with all their armament for Catana, on their arrival there established themselves in their camp.

52. Now tidings were brought to them, both from Camarina, that if they went there, the inhabitants would go over to them; and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. They coasted along therefore with all their force, in the first instance, to Syracuse; and when they found no fleet manning, they again proceeded along the shore towards Camarina; and having brought to at the beach, sent a herald to the people. They, however, did not admit them, saying that their agreement on oath was to receive the Athenians, when they sailed to them with only a single ship, unless they should themselves send for more. Being thus unsuccessful, they sailed back again; and after they had landed on a part of the Syracusan territory, and the cavalry from Syracuse had come to the rescue, and killed some stragglers of the light-armed, they went back to Catana.

53. There they found the ship Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades—to order him to sail back and defend himself against the charges which the state brought against him—and for some others of the soldiers, who with him had been informed against, as being guilty of impiety with regard to the mysteries, and some of them with regard to the Mercuries also. For the Athenians, after the armament had sailed away, made no less investigation into what had been done in the case of the mysteries and in that of the Mercuries; and as they did not test the character of the informers, but in their suspicious

<sup>1</sup> Or, according to Poppe's reading, πάντα, "taking, or regarding, every thing in a suspicious light."

mood admitted all who came forward, on the credit of unprincipled men they arrested and threw into prison very excellent citizens; thinking it more expedient to sift the matter and find it out, than that, in consequence of the bad principle of an informer, an accused person, even though he had a good character, should be unquestioned, and escape. For the commons, knowing by report that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had proved galling at last, and, moreover, that it had not even been put down by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedæmonians, were always afraid, and took every thing suspiciously.

54. For the daring deed of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence of a love-adventure; by relating which, at some length, I shall show that neither other people, nor the Athenians themselves, give any accurate account of their own tyrants, or of what has happened amongst them. For when Pisistratus had died at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, it was not Hipparchus, as the generality suppose, but Hippias, that was eldest of his sons, and obtained the government. Now Harmodius being in the flower of youth and beauty, Aristogiton, a citizen of middle rank in the city, was enamoured of him, and enjoyed his favour. Harmodius, then, being solicited by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, and not prevailed upon, denounced him to Aristogiton. He, lover-like, being exceedingly indignant, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him by force, immediately formed a design, (such as he could in the position he held,) for putting down the tyranny. In the mean time Hipparchus, having again solicited Harmodius with no better success, would not indeed offer any violence to him, but prepared to insult him in some secret way or other, as though it were not on that account. For neither in his general government was he severe towards the mass of the people, but conducted it without exciting any odium; and, for tyrants, these men in the greatest degree studied virtue and intelligence; and though they exacted from the Athenians only a twentieth of their income, they adorned their city in a beautiful manner, and carried on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. The state enjoyed, too, the laws which had been previously enacted, in all other respects, except that they always

took care that one of their own family should hold the offices. Amongst others of them who held the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the Hippias who had been tyrant, who bore his grandfather's name, and dedicated, while archon, the altar to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct. The Athenian people having afterwards made an addition to the length of that in the market-place, obliterated the inscription on the altar; but that in the Pythian precinct is even still visible, though in faded letters, to this purport:

"Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, here,  
In Pythian precinct, marked his archon year."

55. Now that Hippias, as being the eldest son, succeeded to the government, I both positively assert, because I know it by report more accurately than others, and one may also learn it from this very fact. He alone of the legitimate brothers appears to have had children; as both the altar shows, and the pillar commemorating the wrong committed by the tyrants, placed in the Athenian citadel, on which is inscribed the name of no child of Thessalus, or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, who were born to him of Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides. For it was natural that the eldest should have married first. And he is the first mentioned<sup>1</sup> on the pillar after his father; and that, too, not unnaturally, as he was the eldest next to him, and enjoyed the tyranny. Nor, again, do I think that Hippias would ever have obtained the tyranny with such ease at the moment, if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and Hippias had had to establish himself in it on the same day. But owing to his former habit, both of striking fear into the citizens, and of paying strict attention to his mercenaries, he retained his sway with superabundant security; and was at no loss, as though he had been a younger brother, and so had not previously been familiar with<sup>2</sup> the constant exercise

<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ στήλῃ.] As I do not think that *πρώτη* can bear the meaning which Arnold, though with great doubt, proposes to give it, and as no other editor professes to understand its force, I have not translated it at all.

<sup>2</sup> ἐννεχώς ἀμιλῆκει τῇ ἀρχῇ.] These words seem to refer to the *temporary* exercise of power which he might have enjoyed as archon for a year, in opposition to the *permanent* exercise of it as tyrant, which he would not have enjoyed, had he been the younger son of his father.

of power. But it was the lot of Hipparchus, because he was rendered famous by the sad fate which befell him, to receive also in succeeding ages the repute of having enjoyed the tyranny.

56. So then, when Harmodius had resisted his solicitation, he insulted him, as he intended. For after summoning a sister of his, a young girl, to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, they rejected her when she came, saying that they had not summoned her at all, as she was <sup>1</sup> not worthy of the honour. Harmodius being very indignant at this, Aristogiton also was, for his sake, much more exasperated than ever. And now all their other arrangements had been made with those who were to join them in taking the business in hand; but they were waiting for the great Panathenaic festival, on which day alone it was not considered a suspicious circumstance that those of the citizens who had conducted the procession should meet together in arms; and they were themselves to begin, but the rest immediately to join in aiding them against the body-guards. The conspirators were not numerous, for security's sake; for they hoped that if any number whatever dared to make the attempt, even those who were not before privy to it would be willing at the moment, inasmuch as they had arms in their hands, to join in effecting their own freedom.

57. When therefore the festival arrived, Hippias, with his body-guard, was arranging outside of the walls, in what is called the Ceramicus, how the several parts of the procession were to proceed. And when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippias, (for he was easy of access to all,) they were alarmed, and thought that some information had been laid against them, and that they would be almost immediately arrested. They wished therefore to avenge themselves beforehand, if possible, on the man who had aggrieved them, and for whose punishment they were exposing themselves to all that danger; and so they rushed straightway within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by the Leocorium, at once fell on him in a reckless manner, under the influence of the most vehement passion, inspired by love in

<sup>1</sup> Either because her family was of Phœnician extraction, which excluded her from an honour confined to pure Athenians; or because her immoral character, as they insinuated, incapacitated her for an employment in which none but virgins of unblemished reputation could take a part.

the one case, and by insult in the other, and smote him, and slew him. Now one of them, namely, Aristogiton, escaped from the guards at the moment, through the crowd running up; but was seized afterwards, and disposed of in no gentle manner. Harmodius was immediately slain on the spot.

58. When the news were brought to Hipplias in the Cericus, he proceeded immediately, not to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the procession, before they were aware of the matter, in consequence of their being at some distance from the spot; and with his countenance feigned to suit the occasion, so as not to betray his feelings, he pointed out a certain spot, and desired them to retire into it without their arms. Accordingly they withdrew, supposing that he would deliver an address to them; while he, after commanding his guards to remove the arms, immediately picked out such men as he was disposed to think guilty, and whoever was found with a dagger; for it was only with shield and spear that they were accustomed to make their processions.

59. In this manner both the original conspiracy was entered into by Harmodius and Aristogiton for a love offence, and their rash venture attempted through their alarm at the moment. After this, the tyranny was more severe on the Athenians than before; and Hippias, being now in greater apprehension, both put to death many of the citizens, and kept his eye also on foreign states, in whatever quarter he had a prospect of a safe retreat being secured for him, in case of any revolution. At any rate, he married his daughter Archedice to Æantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus—<sup>1</sup> Athenian as he was, to a Lampsacene—because he saw that they had great influence with king Darius. There is a monument to her at Lampsacus, with this inscription:

“Beneath this dust Archedice finds peace,  
Whose sire was Hippias, peerless once in Greece.  
She, though of tyrants daughter, sister, bride,  
And mother, ne’er was lifted up with pride.”

With regard to Hippias, having retained the tyranny at

<sup>1</sup> i. e. to a native of a place so very far beneath his own country in reputation. Compare III. 59. 6, *μη Πλαταιῆς οὐτὲς—Θηβαίους—παράδοθῆναι*: where, as in many other places, the omission of the article with the name of a people expresses something respecting the character of the people, whether good or bad.

Athens three years longer, and being deposed in the fourth year by the Lacedæmonians and the banished Alcmaeonidæ, he went, under treaty, to Sigeum, then to Æantides at Lamp-sacus, and thence to the court of king Darius; from which also he set out twenty years after, when now an old man, and accompanied the Median forces to Marathon.

60. Reflecting, then, on these things, and recalling to mind all that they knew by report concerning them, the Athenian people was wrathful at that time, and suspicious of those who had incurred accusation on the subject of the mysteries, and thought that every thing had been done on the strength of a conspiracy for establishing an oligarchy, or a tyranny. So when, in consequence of their anger on this account, many persons of consideration were already in prison, and the matter appeared not to be stopping, but they were daily proceeding to greater severity and to more numerous arrests; under these circumstances one of the men in confinement, who was thought to be the most guilty of them, was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to give information, whether true or not; for suppositions are entertained both ways, and the certain fact respecting those who had done the deed no one was either able to state then, or has since been able. By his arguments then he persuaded him, that he ought, even if he had not done the deed, both to save himself, by gaining a promise of impunity, and to stop his country from its present suspiciousness: for that his preservation was more sure, if he confessed with a promise of impunity, than if he denied it, and were brought to trial. Accordingly he informed both against himself and some others, respecting the Mercuries; and the Athenian people having gladly ascertained, as they supposed, the truth of the matter, and having been before indignant at the thought of not discovering those who had plotted against their commons, immediately set at liberty the informer and his companions, such as he had not accused; while with regard to those who were charged with the crime, having brought them to trial, they executed all of them who were seized, and having passed sentence upon those who had fled, proclaimed a reward in money for any one who shew them. By this course, though it was doubtful whether those who suffered had been punished unjustly or not, yet the rest of the community were manifestly benefited.

61. With regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians took a severe view of the case, being instigated by his enemies, the same men as had also attacked him before his going on the expedition. And when they fancied they were in possession of the truth respecting the Mercuries, they thought much more than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was implicated, had been done by him with the same design, and in connexion with the plot against the democracy. For a small force of Lacedæmonians happened too, just at the time when they were in commotion on these subjects, to have advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Bœotians. They thought therefore that it had come by agreement, through his agency, and not on account of the Bœotians; and that if they had not, in consequence of the information they had received, been beforehand in the arrest of the party, the city would have been betrayed to them. One night indeed they even slept in arms in the temple of Theseus within the walls. The friends, too, of Alcibiades at Argos were at the same time suspected of a design to attack the popular government; and those persons of the Argives who had been deposited in the islands the Athenians on that occasion gave up to the Argive commons to put to death on that account. Thus on all sides there arose suspicion against Alcibiades; and consequently wishing to bring him to trial, and put him to death, in this way they sent the ship *Salaminia* to Sicily, both for him and for the rest who had been informed against. Their orders were, to charge him to accompany the vessel home to plead his defence, but not to arrest him; for they were at the same time careful to avoid raising a commotion amongst both their own soldiers in Sicily and their enemies, and especially wished the Mantineans and Argives to remain there, whom they considered to have been prevailed on by Alcibiades to join them in the expedition. He then, with his own ship and those who had been accused with him, sailed away in the company of the *Salaminia* from Sicily, as though to return to Athens. But when they had reached Thurii, they followed it no further, but left the vessel and concealed themselves, being afraid of going home to trial with such a prejudice existing against them. The crew of the *Salaminia* for some time made search for Alcibiades and his companions, but when they were no where to be found, they departed on their voy-



age back. Alcibiades therefore, being now an outlaw<sup>†</sup>, crossed not long after on board a boat from Thurii to the Peloponnese : and the Athenians, 'when they were not forthcoming, passed sentence of death upon him and those with him.

62. After these things, the remaining generals of the Athenians in Sicily, having made two divisions of the army, and each taken by lot one of them, sailed with the whole force for Selinus and Segesta ; wishing to know whether the Segestans would give the promised money, and at the same time to inspect the condition of the Selinuntines, and to learn the state of their differences with the Segestans. And so coasting along Sicily, with the shore on their left hand, on the side towards the Tyrrhene gulf, they landed at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in that part of the island. When they would not receive them, they proceeded on their voyage ; and as they coasted along, took Hyccara, which, though a Sicanian town, was engaged in war with the Segestans, and was a petty sea-port. Having taken the inhabitants of the town for slaves, they gave it up to the Segestans, (for some of their cavalry had joined them,) and they themselves returned by land through the country of the Sicels, till they came to Catana ; while their ships sailed along the coast with the prisoners on board. Nicias, however, coasted along straightway from Hyccara to Segesta ; and after transacting his other business, and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They then sold their slaves, from which were realized a hundred and twenty talents ; and sailed round to the allies of the Sicels, giving orders to send them troops. With half of their own force, too, they went against Hybla, in the territory of Gela, which was hostile to them ; but did not take it. And thus the summer ended.

63. The following winter, the Athenians at once began to prepare for their advance upon Syracuse, and the Syracusans also, on their side, for marching against them. For when they did not, in accordance with their first alarm and expectation, attack them immediately ; as every day went on, they regained their courage more. And when they were seen to be sailing on the other side of Sicily, far away from them, and had gone to Hybla, and made an attempt on it without taking it by storm, they despised them still more, and called on their ge-

<sup>†</sup> ἰσχυρὸν δίκην.] Literally, "by a deserted, or abandoned trial." See Herman. Pol. Ant. 144.

nerals—acting as a multitude is wont to do when full of confidence—to lead them against Catana, since the enemy would not come to them. Moreover, Syracusan parties of horse, sent out to reconnoitre, were continually riding up to the Athenian armament, and asking them, amongst other insulting expressions, whether they had come themselves to settle with them in a strange country, rather than to reinstate the Leontini.

64. The Athenian generals were acquainted with these things, and wished to draw them as far as possible from their city with their whole force, and themselves, in the mean time, to coast along with their ships by night, and quietly occupy a place for encampment in a favourable position; knowing that<sup>1</sup> so they would be better able to do it, than if they should land from their ships in face of an enemy, prepared to receive them, or should be known to be going by land; (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous, while they themselves had none, would do great mischief to their light-armed and mob of camp-followers;) and that thus they would take a position where they would not be annoyed by the cavalry in a degree worth speaking of; (for some Syracusan exiles who accompanied them told them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they actually occupied.) The generals, therefore, adopted the following stratagem in furtherance of their wishes. They send a person who was a faithful friend to them, and no less in the interest of the Syracusans, according to *their* opinion. The man was a Catanian, and said that he was come from certain individuals in Catana, with whose names they were acquainted, and whom they knew to be still left in the town amongst those who were well affected to them. He stated, then, that the Athenians passed the night at some distance from their arms, within the walls of the city; and that if the Syracusans would come with all their force early in the morning of an appointed day to attack their armament, the Catanians would close the gates on

<sup>1</sup> Οὐκ αὖ ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες καὶ εἰ.] Poppo, Göller, and Bloomfield, all bracket the καὶ in this passage, as utterly marring the sense of it; while Arnold only objects to the interpretation of the Scholiast, without attempting to explain it himself. In support of the translation which I have ventured to give, compare I. 143. 4, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἄπασαν, and VII. 28. 4, Αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως κατὰ πρῖν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μέρους καθίστασαν, κ. τ. λ. In the latter passage the idea of excess is distinctly asserted, after being previously implied, as in the other passages, by the words οὐχ ὁμοίως καί.

. the men who were with them, and would fire their ships; while the Syracusans would easily take <sup>1</sup> the armament by an attack on their stockade. There were many too of the Catanians, he said, who would co-operate with them in this, and were already prepared to do so; namely, the party from which he had himself come.

65. The generals of the Syracusans, besides feeling confident in other respects, and intending, even without this, to make their preparations for marching to Catana, gave far too inconsiderate credence to the man, and immediately fixing a day on which they would be there, dismissed him; while they themselves (for by this time the Selinuntines and some other of their allies had also come) gave orders for all the Syracusans to march forth in a body. When their preparations were made, and the time at which they had agreed to come was near at hand, they set out for Catana, and bivouacked on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory. The Athenians, on learning their approach, took the whole of their own force, with such of the Sicels, or any other people, as had joined them, and putting them on board their ships and boats, sailed by night to Syracuse. And thus, when the morning came, the Athenians were landing on the ground opposite the Olympieum, for the purpose of securing their camp; and at the same time the Syracusan cavalry, having ridden up first to Catana, and found that the whole armament had put to sea, returned and carried the news to the infantry, when they all turned back together, and went to the aid of the city.

66. In the mean time, as the march they had to make was a long one, the Athenians quietly pitched their camp in a favourable position, where they would be able to commence an engagement just when they pleased, and the Syracusan horse would cause them the least annoyance, both during the action and before it. For on one side they were flanked by walls, houses, trees, and a marsh: on the other, by cliffs. They also felled the trees near to them, and carrying them down to the sea, fixed a palisade by their ships; while with rude stones

<sup>1</sup> τὸ στράτευμα.] I see no reason at all for altering this, as Arnold proposes, into τῶ στρατεύματι; as it evidently refers to all the other forces of the Athenians left behind in their camp, in opposition to the heavy infantry represented as being in the town. Compare 63. 3, where the term is undoubtedly used with reference to the encampment of the Athenians.

and woud they hastily erected a fort at Dascon, where their position was most open to the enemy's attack, and broke down the bridge over the Anapus. While they were making these preparations, no one came out from the city to stop them; but the Syracusan cavalry was what first came against them, and afterwards all the infantry was mustered. And at first they advanced near the camp of the Athenians; then, when they did not go out against them, they withdrew, and crossed the road to Helorus, and were encamped for the night.

67. The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, and made their dispositions as follows. The right wing was held by the Argives and Mantineans, the centre by the Athenians, and the remainder of the line by the rest of the allies. Half of their force was posted in advance, drawn up eight deep; the other half, close upon their tents, in a hollow square, which was also formed eight deep, with orders to look out where any part of the army might be most distressed, and go to its support. Within this body of reserve, too, they placed the camp-followers. The Syracusans, on the other hand, drew up their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the Syracusans in full force, and as many allies as had joined them: (they were reinforced most extensively by the Selinuntines; next to them, by the Geloan cavalry, to the number of two hundred in all; and by about twenty horse, and fifty archers, from Camarina.) Their cavalry they posted on their right flank, amounting to not less than twelve hundred, and by their side the dartmen also. The Athenians being about to commence the attack, Nicias advanced along the line, and addressed the following exhortation to them, both in their several nations, and collectively:

68. "What need is there, soldiers, that we should have recourse to long exhortation, <sup>1</sup> who are come here for the same struggle? For our force itself seems to me more capable of supplying confidence, than well-spoken words with a weak army. For where we have in the field Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the prime of the islanders, on what grounds ought

<sup>1</sup> "We are all engaged in one common cause, and the sight of each other should mutually encourage us."—*Arnold*. As οἱ παρόντες seems to refer to the whole force, and not to the general only who was addressing them, χρῆσθαι must be taken in a sense sufficiently wide to include both the speaker and his hearers

we not, with allies so brave and numerous, to entertain every one a strong hope of victory? especially as we are opposed to men who are defending themselves in a promiscuous crowd, and not chosen troops, as we are; and moreover, against Siceliots, who despise us indeed, but will not receive our attack, because they have less skill in arms than boldness. Let this thought too be entertained by each of you; that we are far from our own land, and with no friendly country near us, but such as yourselves win by fighting. And so I offer to you an admonition, the very reverse of the exhortation which our enemies are, I well know, addressing to each other. For *they* are urging, that the battle will be for their country; but *I*, that it will be fought in what is *not* our country, but where you must conquer, or not easily get away: for their cavalry will press upon us in great numbers. Remembering then your own high character, make a spirited attack on your opponents, and regard your present necessity and difficulties as more formidable than the enemy."

69. Nicias delivered this address, and immediately led on his troops. As for the Syracusans, they were not expecting to engage at present, and some of them, as their city was close at hand, had actually gone away to it; and these, although they went to the aid of their comrades in haste, and at a full run, were too late [to take their proper place in the ranks,] but posted themselves as each one came up to the main body. For in truth they were not deficient in zeal, or in daring, neither in this battle, nor in the others; but though not inferior in courage, so far as their military science served, yet in consequence of, that failing them they reluctantly abandoned their resolution also. Although therefore, as I have said, they did not imagine that the Athenians would be the first to make an attack, and although they were compelled to defend themselves on a short warning, they took up their arms, and immediately advanced to meet them. And in the first place the stone-throwers, and slingers, and archers on each side began skirmishing, and successively routed each other, as light troops might be expected to do. Then there were priests bringing forward the usual victims for sacrifice, and trumpeters stirring on the heavy-armed to the charge. And so they advanced; the Syracusans, to fight for their country, and their own personal safety at present, and freedom in future;—

the Athenians, on the side of their opponents, to fight for another people's land, that they might win it as their own; and to avoid weakening their own by defeat;—the Argives and the independent allies, to join them in securing the objects they had come for, and by means of victory to look again on the country that was already theirs;—while the subject allies showed a ready zeal, most of all, for their immediate safety, which was hopeless unless they conquered; then, as a secondary consideration, for the chance of serving on easier terms, in consequence of having assisted to reduce a fresh country under the Athenian dominion.

70. When they had come to close combat, they withstood each other's attacks for a long time. And there happened to come on at once both thunder, and lightning, and heavy rain: so that to those who were fighting for the first time, and had had very little acquaintance with war, even this helped to increase their fear; while to the more experienced party these occurrences appeared to be produced simply by the season of the year, but the fact of their opponents not being defeated caused far greater alarm. But when the Argives had first driven in the left wing of the Syracusans, and after them the Athenians had repulsed those opposed to them, the rest of the Syracusan army was now also broken and put to flight. The Athenians did not pursue them to any great distance, (for the Syracusan horse, which was numerous and unbroken, kept them in check, and by charging their heavy infantry, wherever they saw any pursuing in advance of the rest, drove them back again.) However they followed them in a body as far as was safe, and then returned again, and erected a trophy. The Syracusans, on the other hand, having collected themselves again on the Helorine road, and put themselves in as good order as present circumstances would permit, sent, notwithstanding their defeat, a garrison to the Olympieum, fearing that the Athenians might take some of the treasures that were there; while the rest of them returned into the city.

71. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but after carrying their own dead together, and laying them on a funeral pile, passed the night on the ground. The next day they restored to the Syracusans their dead, under a truce, (there had fallen, of them and their allies, about two hundred and sixty,) and collected the bones of their own, (about fifty

of themselves and their allies having been killed,) and with the spoils of the enemy sailed back to Catana. For it was winter, and they thought it impossible at present to carry on war before Syracuse, till they had sent for cavalry from Athens, and also raised some from their allies in the country, to avoid being utterly defeated by the enemy's horse. They wished too, at the same time, to collect money in the island, and to get a supply from Athens; as also to win over some of the cities to their cause, which they hoped would more readily listen to them after the battle; and to provide themselves with corn and every thing else they might require, with a view to attacking Syracuse in the spring.

72. They, then, with these intentions sailed off to Naxos and Catana, for the winter. The Syracusans, on the other hand, after burying their dead, held an assembly. And now came forward to them Hermocrates son of Hermon, a man at once second to none in general intelligence, and who had proved himself able in war through his experience, and a person of signal bravery. He encouraged them, and told them "not to submit in consequence of what had happened; for it was not their spirit that was vanquished, but their want of discipline that had been so injurious. They had not, however, been so much inferior to their enemies as might have been expected; especially since they had been matched against the first of the Greeks—<sup>1</sup>mere amateurs, so to speak, against regular workmen. They had also been much hurt by the great number of their generals and the multiplicity of orders, (for their generals were fifteen in number,) and also by the tumultuous insubordination of the troops in general. But should only a few men of experience be elected generals, and prepare their heavy-armed force for service during that winter, by furnishing with arms those who did not possess any, in order that they might be as numerous as possible, and by compelling them to attend to their training also; they would, he said, in all probability have the advantage over their enemies; since courage they already possessed, and discipline for the execution of their measures would thus have been acquired.\* For

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Bloomfield renders it, "raw-hands." See his note. Poppo reads *χρηστίχων*, and renders the passage, "Quod cum ii. qui primi Græcorum peritia (rei militaris) essent, idiotæ, propemodum dixerim operarii, pugnant.".

both these things would improve; their discipline being practised in the midst of dangers; and their courage growing more confident than ever from being accompanied by the assurance of science. They ought, then, to elect their generals both few in number and invested with absolute authority; taking to them the oath, 'that assuredly they would allow them to command as they might think best.' For so what ought to be kept secret would be more effectually concealed; and every thing else would be prepared in due order and without listening to any excuses."

73. The Syracusans, after hearing his speech, voted every thing as he advised; and elected Hermocrates himself as general, with Heraclides son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus son of Execestes, these three. They also despatched envoys to Corinth and Lacedæmon; that an allied force might join them, and that they might persuade the Lacedæmonians, for their benefit, to carry on the war with the Athenians more decidedly, by open measures; that either they might be compelled to return from Sicily, or might less easily send fresh succours to their army now there.

74. As for the Athenian forces at Catana, they sailed immediately to Messana, in expectation of its being betrayed to them. But the intrigues that were being carried on did not come to any thing. Nor Alcibiades, when he was now summoned home, and had left his command, knowing that he would be outlawed, gave information of the intended movement, to which he was privy, to the friends of the Syracusans in Messana; and they had both previously put to death the men implicated in it, and at that time such as were on the same side, breaking out into sedition, and taking up arms, prevailed so far as to prevent their admitting the Athenians. When they, therefore, after staying ten days, were suffering from the severe weather, had no provisions, and found none of their plans succeed, they retired to Naxos, and having made a pillisade round their encampment, took up their winter quarters there. They also sent a trireme to Athens for both money and cavalry, to join them in the spring.

75. The Syracusans, on their part, both built in the course of the winter a wall to their city, along the whole quarter looking towards Epipolæ, including the Temenites, to prevent their being circumvallated so easily as they would



with a less circuit, in case of their being defeated; and also fortified Megara as an out-post, and another in the Olympieum. They fixed palisades, too, along the edge of the sea, at all points where there were facilities for landing. And as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched in full force to Catana, and both ravaged part of their land; and after burning the tents and encampment of the Athenians, returned home. Hearing, moreover, that the Athenians were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of that alliance concluded under Laches, to try if by any means they might win them over to their side, the Syracusans also sent a counter-embassy. For they had suspicions of the Camarinæans, both that they had not sent heartily what they sent to join in the first battle; and that for the future they would not wish to assist them any more, since they saw that the Athenians had been successful in the engagement, but would be persuaded to join the invaders on the strength of their former friendship. On the arrival therefore at Camarina of Hermocrates and some others from Syracuse, and of Euphemus and others from the Athenians, an assembly of the Camarinæans having been convened, Hermocrates, wishing to prejudice them beforehand against the Athenians, addressed them as follows:

76. "It was not, Camarinæans, from any fear of your being terrified at the present forces of the Athenians that we came on this embassy, but rather from apprehension that the words which would be spoken by them before you heard any thing from us might prevail upon you. For they are come to Sicily on the pretext, indeed, which you hear, but with the purpose which we all suspect; and, in my opinion, they are wishing, not to restore the Leontines to their home, but to eject us from ours. For surely it is not consistent that they should depopulate the cities in Greece, but re-settle those in Sicily; and that they should care for the Leontines, who are Chalcidians, because of their connexion with them, but keep in slavery the Chalcidians in Eubœa, from whom these are a colony. But the method is the same, by which they both gained possession of those places, and are attempting to do so with these. For after they had been appointed leaders, by the free choice both of the Ionians and of all who were of Athenian origin, for the purpose of taking vengeance on the

Mede; by charging some of them with failure in military service, others with mutual hostilities, and others on any specious plea which they severally had to urge, they reduced them to subjection. And so they did not withstand the Mede for the sake of liberty—neither these men for that of the Greeks, nor the Greeks for their own—but the former did it to enslave the Greeks to themselves, instead of to the Mede; the latter, to get a new master, one not more unwise, but more wise for evil.

77. "But, open as the Athenian state is to accusation, we are not come at the present time to prove before those who know this already, in how many respects it is committing injustice; but much rather to censure ourselves, because, with the warnings given us by the Greeks in those quarters, how they were enslaved through not assisting one another, and with the same sophisms being now practised on ourselves—their re-instatements of their Leontine kinsmen, and succours to their Segestan allies—we will not unite together, and show them that the people here are no Ionians, or Hellespontines and islanders, who are always passing to a new master, either the Mede or some one else, and still kept in slavery, but free Dorians from the independent Peloponnese now living in Sicily. Or do we wait till we have separately been subdued, city by city? knowing, as we do, that in this way only are we vincible; and seeing them having recourse to this method, so as to set some of us at variance by words; to set others at war through hope of finding allies; and to injure others by saying something flattering to them, as they severally can. And do we then think, that if our distant fellow countryman is destroyed before us, the danger will not come to each of ourselves also, but that he who suffers before us keeps his misfortune to himself?

78. "If, again, the thought has presented itself to any one, that although the Syracusans are hostile to the Athenians, he himself is not; and if he consider it a hardship to incur dangers for our country, let him reflect that it is not for ours especially, but in like manner for his own also that he will fight in ours; and that he will do it with proportionately greater safety, inasmuch as he will not enter on the struggle after we have been first ruined, but with us for allies, and not left by himself. And let him consider that the wish of the

Athenians is, not to chastise our enmity, but, making us their excuse, to secure no less his own friendship. If, moreover, any one envies us, or is afraid of us, (for to both these feelings are more powerful states exposed,) and for this reason wishes Syracuse to be brought down, that we may be taught moderation, but yet for his own safety's sake would have it escape destruction, he indulges a wish beyond the limit of human power. For it is not possible for the same man to be alike the arbiter of his own desire, and of fortune. And should he fail in his views, then, <sup>2</sup> while lamenting his own misfortunes, he might, perhaps, some time or other, wish again to envy our advantages. But that will be impossible if he abandon us, and will not take his part in the same perils; which are incurred, not for names, but for realities; for though nominally he would preserve our power, he would really secure his own safety. And it was reasonable that you especially, Camarinæans, who live on our borders, and are the next to incur the danger, should have provided for this, and not have joined us remissly, as you are now doing; but rather that you should yourselves have come to us; and what you would have entreated, while calling us to your aid, if the Athenians had first come against Camarina, that ought you now, on the same principle, to have come and urged on us as an exhortation, that we should on no point submit. But neither have ye, hitherto, nor the rest, bestirred yourselves for these objects.

79. "But through cowardice, perhaps, you will study what is just, both towards us and towards the invaders, and allege that there is an alliance between you and the Athenians. Yes, but you did not conclude that to the injury of your friends, but in case any of your enemies might attack you; and to assist the Athenians, surely, when they were wronged by others, and not when they were themselves wronging their neighbours, as they are now. For not even do the Rhegians, although of Chalcidian extraction, consent to join in the reinstatement of the Chalcidian Leontines. And it is a strange thing if they, suspecting the real meaning of this fine pretence, are wise without any reason to offer for their conduct, while you, with a <sup>3</sup> reasonable plea to urge, choose to assist your na-

<sup>1</sup> "i. e. so to reduce the power of every state in the island, that none shall have any alternative but to remain the faithful allies of Athens."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> δλοφροβείας,] or, as Pontus and Poppo take it, "lamented."

<sup>3</sup> εὐλόγῳ προφάσει.] Εὐλογος is so constantly used to signify what

tural enemies, and, in concert with your bitterest foes, to ruin men who are still more your natural connexions. Nay, that is not just; but rather, to assist us, and not to be afraid of their armament. For it is not formidable, if we all take our stand together; but only if, on the contrary, we are separated from each other, which they are so anxious to effect: since even when they came against us alone, and were victorious in battle, they did not achieve what they wished, but quickly went away again.

80. "Surely then, if we were united, it were not reasonable for us to be disheartened: but we ought to enter more heartily into alliance, especially as succours will join us from the Peloponnese also, the inhabitants of which are altogether superior to these men in military matters. And no one should think that forethought of yours to be *fair to us*, while it is *safe for you*; I mean your assisting neither party, as being allies of both. For it is not fair in fact, as it is in profession. For if it be through your not siding with us that both the sufferer is defeated and the conqueror gains the victory, what else do ye but refuse, by the self-same standing aloof, to aid the one party for their preservation, and to prevent the other from behaving basely? And yet it were honourable for you, by joining those who are injured, and at the same time your own kinsmen, to guard the common interest of Sicily, and not to permit the Athenians, your friends forsooth, to do wrong. In short, we Syracusans say, that it is of no use to afford certain information, either to you or to the rest, about what you know yourselves, as well as we; but we entreat you, and at the same time protest, if we do not prevail on you, that we are plotted against by Ionians, who are always our enemies, while we are betrayed by you, Dorians by Dorians. And if the Athenians reduce us to subjection, though it is by your decisions that they will gain the victory, it is in their own name that they will enjoy the honour; and they will receive no other prize for the victory than those men who put the victory into their hands. If, on the other hand, we are the conquerors, you will

really is reasonable, in opposition to *εὐπειρία*, what only *appears* to be so, that I cannot agree with Arnold and Poppo, who give a different sense to it in this passage; the former rendering it "with a seeming reasonable pretext;" the latter, "utentes probabili (seu speciosa) excusatione (quâ vestram rationem tueamini)."

also have to submit to the punishment due to the authors of our dangers. Consider then, and choose at once, either immediate slavery without any peril, or the chance of gaining the victory with us, and so avoiding a disgraceful submission to these men as your masters, as also of escaping our enmity, which would be of no trivial kind."

81. Hermocrates spoke to this effect; and after him, Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, as follows:

82. "Though we are come hither for the purpose of renewing our former alliance, yet, as the Syracusan orator has attacked us on that head, we must also address you on the subject of our empire, to show that we enjoy it on just grounds. The strongest proof, then, of this he himself has mentioned, in his assertion that the Ionians have ever been hostile to the Dorians. And such too is the case. For we, who are Ionians, considered, with regard to the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, and more numerous than ourselves, and living near us, in what way we might be least subject to them. And after the Median invasion, having got a fleet, we released ourselves from the empire and supremacy of the Lacedæmonians; since they had no more right to command us than we them, except so far as they were at present more powerful. Thus having been ourselves appointed leaders of those who were before under the king, we so continue; considering that in this way we should least fall under the power of the Peloponnesians, by having a force with which to defend ourselves; and, to speak accurately, not having unjustly, either, reduced the Ionians and islanders to subjection, whom the Syracusans say that we have enslaved, though our kinsmen. For they came against their mother-country, against us, I mean, in company with the Medæ; and could not bring themselves to revolt from him, and to sacrifice their property—as *we* did, when we evacuated our city—but chose slavery themselves, and to bring the same on us also.

83. "Wherefore we are worthy of the empire we enjoy, because we supplied the most numerous fleet, and showed uncompromising zeal in behalf of the Greeks; and because these men, by so readily acting as they did, even in favour of the Medæ, inflicted injury on us; while at the same time we aim at gaining strength against the Peloponnesians. And we make

<sup>1</sup> i. e. of one so utterly opposed to the good of Greece.

no fine professions of justly enjoying dominion, either as having by ourselves overthrown the barbarian, or as having faced danger for the liberty of these men, more than for that of all, and of ourselves at the same time. For in no one is it an invidious thing to provide for his own safety. And now, having come hither also for the sake of our own security, we see that these same things are expedient for you likewise. And we prove it from what these men state to our prejudice, and what you, in your too great alarm, suspect; <sup>1</sup> knowing that those who through fear are suspicious, though pleased at the moment by the charms of oratory, yet afterwards attend to their real interests in what they undertake. For we have said that we hold our dominion there under the influence of fear, and that for the same reason we are come to put the states here on a safe footing, in concert with our friends; and not to enslave them, but rather to prevent their being so treated.

84. "And let no one suppose that we are interesting ourselves in you without any connexion existing between us; since he must know that through your being preserved, and resisting the Syracusans, (being not too weak to do so,) we should be less readily hurt by their sending a force to the Peloponnesians. In this way, then, you are connected with us in the greatest degree; and on this account too it is reasonable that we should reinstate the Leontines, not as subjects, like their kinsmen in Eubœa, but in as powerful a condition as possible; that from their own country, living as they do close to these men's borders, they may in our behalf be annoying to them. For in Greece we are by ourselves able to cope with our enemies; and the Chalcidians, after whose subjugation the orator says that we are inconsistently giving liberty to those here, are advantageous to us by being, without any armament, and only paying us money; but the people here, both the Leontines and our other friends, by being left as independent as possible.

85. "To an individual, however, who has absolute power, or to a state that holds dominion, nothing is inconsistent that

<sup>1</sup> "Hermocrates had endeavoured to excite the jealousy of the Camari-neans, by telling them, that the Athenians did but pretend to aid the Leontines, while their real object was the subjugation of all Sicily. 'Such language,' says Euphemus, 'may possibly beguile you for the moment; but when you come to act, you will follow your real interests.'"—Arnold.

is profitable, nothing reckoned as kindred that does not command confidence; but in every case, as opportunity may serve, you must become either a foe or a friend. And in our case, our advantage here consists in this,—not that we should reduce our friends to weakness, but that, owing to the strength of our friends, our foes should be powerless. Nor ought you to doubt this. For even in the case of our allies in those parts, as they are severally useful to us, so we govern them; the Chians and Methymnæans as independent, on condition of their supplying ships; the greater part of them on more stringent terms, subject to contribution of money; but others, although they are islanders and easy to reduce, as allies on terms of entire freedom, because they lie in favourable positions around the Peloponnese. So that here also it is natural that we should regulate them with an eye to our advantage, and, as we say, with reference to our fear of the Syracusans. For they are aiming at dominion over you, and wish, after uniting you on the strength of your suspicions of us, themselves to sway the empire of Sicily, by force, or through your forlorn condition, when we have departed without gaining our object. And it must be so, if you unite with them; for neither will so great a force, when united, be any longer easy for us to manage, nor would these men want strength to deal with you, when we were not here.

86. "And whoever does not think this to be the case, the very fact itself convicts him of being wrong. For on a former occasion you called us to your aid by holding out to us no other fear, than that, if we permitted you to fall under the Syracusans, we ourselves also should be exposed to danger. It is not right therefore now, that you should refuse to be persuaded by that self-same argument by which you wished to persuade us; or that, because we are come with a larger armament, you should be suspicious of us; but much rather, that you should mistrust these men. We, at least, have no power to remain amongst you without your support; and even if we should show ourselves base, and bring you into subjection, we should be unable to keep you under our dominion, both on account of the length of the voyage, and the difficulty of keeping guard over cities so great in extent, and of an inland character, as regards their resources. These men, on the other hand, living near you as they do, not in a camp, but in a city far

stronger than our force here present, are constantly plotting against you; and when, in each particular case, they have got an opportunity, they do not let it slip, (as they have shown both in other instances, and in that of the Leöntines,) and at the present time they have the hardihood to urge you, as though you were void of sense, against those who are preventing this, and who have held up Sicily hitherto from sinking under them. But we, in opposition to them, urge you to a far more real safety, begging you not to betray that which is secured to both of us by each other; and to consider, that while for them, even without any allies, the way to you is always open, you will not often have a chance of defending yourselves in conjunction with so large a force of auxiliaries; of which, if through your suspicions you allow it to depart, either unsuccessful, or, perhaps, even defeated, you will wish yet to see even a very small portion, when its presence will no longer accomplish any thing for you.

87. "But neither do ye, Camarinæans, nor the rest, be persuaded by these men's calumnies. For we have told you the whole truth concerning these things about which we are suspected, and will still remind you briefly of them, and so try to persuade you. We say then, that we exercise dominion over the men in those parts to avoid being subject to another; but that we liberate those who are here, to avoid being hurt by them; that we are compelled to meddle with many things, because we have also many things to guard against; and that we came, both now and before, as allies to those of you here who were being injured, not without being invited, but after receiving an invitation. And do not ye, either as judges of what is done by us, or as moderators, attempt to divert us, (which would now be difficult,) but so far as any thing in our meddling policy and disposition is at the same time profitable for you, that take, and make the most of it. And believe that it is not equally injurious to all, but that to a large majority of the Greeks it is even beneficial. For every one in every place, even where we are not already present, both he who thinks that he will suffer wrong, and he who is meditating to commit it, through having a prospect ever close at hand, the one, of obtaining help from us against his injurer, the other, that if we come, they run a risk of not being free from alarm, both,

<sup>1</sup> I see no reason, either for changing *dôsis* into *dôse*, as Dobree and



I say, are alike compelled, the one, to be moderate against his own will, the other, to be saved without his own exertion. This security, then, which is common to all who require it, and which is now presented to you, do not ye reject; but, acting like others, instead of constantly guarding against the Syracusans, now unite with us, and take at length your equal share in plotting against them."

88. To this effect spoke Euphemus. Now "the Camari-næans had felt on the subject as follows: Towards the Athenians they were well inclined, except so far as they might think that they would subjugate Sicily, but with the Syracusans they had always, in the spirit of borderers, been at variance. Being, however, more afraid of the Syracusans, who were close at hand, lest they might, even without their assistance, gain the ascendancy, they both sent them in the first instance that small body of horse, and determined for the future to do more actual service for the Syracusans, (though as sparingly as possible;) but for the present, that they might not seem to show less respect for the Athenians—since they had even proved the stronger in the battle—they resolved to give a verbal answer that should be fair to both parties. Having, therefore, adopted this counsel, they answered, "That since mutual hostilities were being carried on by parties who were both in alliance with them, they thought it to be most consistent with their oaths to aid neither party for the present." And so the ambassadors on each side returned.

The Syracusans were now preparing their forces for war, while the Athenians encamped at Naxos were negotiating with the Sicels, to get as many as possible to join them. Now such of the Sicels as lived more on the plains, and who were subject to the Syracusans, in most cases stood aloof from them; but those who occupied the interior, their homes having before this always been independent, immediately, with a very few exceptions, sided with the Athenians, and carried down corn for the army, and in some cases money also. Against those who did not come over to them the Athenians made an expedition, and compelled some, but were prevented from compelling others by the Syracusans' sending them garrisons, and coming to their aid. Having moved their station for the winter from Naxos

Arnold wish to do, or for taking the word with an active signification, though it may possibly be so used sometimes.

to Catana, and having raised again the camp which had been burned down by the Syracusans, they remained there the rest of that season. They sent at this time a trireme to Carthage with proposals of friendship, on the chance of their obtaining any help, and another to Tyrrhenia, as some of its cities had of their own accord offered to join them in the war. They also despatched messengers about to the Sicels, and likewise to Segesta, desiring that they would forward to them as many horses as possible; while they also prepared for the circumvallation bricks, iron, and all other requisites, intending to commence hostilities in the spring. The Syracusan ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been despatched to Corinth and Lacedæmon, both endeavoured, as they coasted along, to persuade the Greeks of Italy not to look with indifference on the proceedings of the Athenians, since they were aimed equally at themselves, and when they were come to Corinth, delivered an address to them, begging for assistance on the ground of their connexion. The Corinthians immediately, in the first place, themselves voted to assist them with the greatest zeal, and then sent envoys with them to Lacedæmon, to join in persuading that people also both to carry on the war with the Athenians more openly at home, and to send succours to Sicily. Accordingly the ambassadors from Corinth came to Lacedæmon, and Alcibiades also, with his fellow exiles, who had crossed straightway on board a vessel of burden from Thuria to Cyllene, in the Elean territory, in the first instance, and then afterwards, when the Lacedæmonians themselves had sent for him, proceeded to Lacedæmon under treaty; for he was afraid of them, owing to the part he had taken in the Mantinean business. And the result was, that in the Lacedæmonian assembly the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, by urging the same request, prevailed on the people there. But when the ephors and the authorities, though they purposed sending ambassadors to Syracuse, to urge them to make no terms with the Athenians, were not disposed to assist them, Alcibiades came forward, and exasperated and instigated the Lacedæmonians by addressing them as follows:

89. "It is necessary that I should first address you on the subject of the prejudice felt against me, that you may not, through your suspicions, attend to me the less on matters of

public interest. When, then, our ancestors had, on the ground of some quarrel or other, renounced their connexion with you as your *proxeni*, I myself,\* from a wish to resume it, paid attentions to you, both in other respects, and in the case of your misfortune at Pylus. And when I continued thus zealous, you, at the time you were concluding peace with the Athenians, conferred influence on my enemies, by negotiating through them, but brought dishonour on me. For these reasons it was with justice that you received harm at my hands, both when I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and on whatever other occasions I opposed you. And now, if there be any one who at that time, while he was suffering, was unfairly angry with me, let him look at the question in the true light, and be led to a different conviction. Or if there be any one who formed a worse opinion of me, because I rather attached myself to the popular party, let him not on this ground, either, suppose that he was with good reason offended at me. For we have always been foes to tyrants; and all that are opposed to the dominant faction are called by the name of 'people.' It was from this, then, that our taking the lead of the populace continued; and besides, as the state was under a democratical government, it was necessary on most occasions to follow the existing order of things. However, we endeavoured to be more moderate in politics than suited the intemperate spirit which had before prevailed. But there were others, both in times of old and now, who led on the multitude to more evil courses—the very party which also banished me. But in our case it was the whole body of the people that we headed; thinking it right to assist in preserving that form of government under which the country was most great and free, and which we had received. For with regard to democracy, all of us who had any sense knew what it was; and I myself, perhaps, better than any one, <sup>2</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> ἡμῶν.] Arnold accounts for the use of the plural here, and in other parts of the chapter by supposing the speaker to join with himself some relations, as well as personal friends, who had been banished with him.

<sup>2</sup> ὅσω καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι.] I have given what appears to be the meaning of this passage; though it is doubtful whether it can be extracted from the Greek as it now stands. Arnold supposes that "some words have been lost before λοιδορήσαιμι, so that the words οὐδενὸς δὲ χεῖρον properly belong to that verb, and after ὅσω καὶ there should be supplied μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτῆς φθίσειν." But this is perhaps a more ingenious than safe correction. I had myself conjectured before I found that Bloomfield had done the same,

proportion as I could also abuse it more. But of an acknowledged absurdity nothing new could be said; and yet to put it aside did not appear to us safe, while you, as our enemies, were so closely besetting us.

90. "With regard then to your prejudices against me, such were the facts: but with regard to what you must deliberate upon, and I, on whatever point I am better informed, must advise, now learn from me. We sailed to Sicily, in the first place, to subdue the Sicelioti, if we could; after them, again, the Italioti; and then also to make an attempt on the dominion of the Carthaginians, and on their own city. If either all or most of these schemes proved successful, then we intended to attack the Peloponnese, after bringing here the united force of the Greeks that had joined us in those parts, taking many barbarians into our pay—both Iberians and others of those nations, confessedly <sup>1</sup> the most warlike barbarians at the present day—and building many triremes in addition to what we have, (since Italy contains timber in abundance). Blockading the Peloponnese with these round its coasts, and at the same time attacking it with our soldiers on the land side, after taking some of the cities by storm, and walling in others, we hoped with ease to reduce it, and after that to enjoy the sovereignty of the whole Grecian race. And as for money and provisions, to render each of these measures more practicable, the newly acquired places in those quarters would by themselves supply sufficient, independently of our revenues from these parts.

that *καί* might be a corruption of *κάν*, a contraction which occurs ch. 92. 4; and this very slight change is perhaps sufficient to remedy the evil.—Though *γγνώσκωμι* is probably understood with *άν* in the preceding clause, I cannot think that it could ever have been expressed, as Bloomfield proposes to do; at least not in the position which he would give to it, immediately after *λοιδορήσασθαι*, thus giving by the concurrence of the two optatives a most unmusical termination to the paragraph.—With regard to the word *ὅσων*, it seems doubtful whether it is to be considered as qualifying a comparative understood, as the commentators suppose, or as used absolutely, as in some other passages of our author, signifying "inasmuch as;" e. g. chap. 92. 4, *κάν φίλος ὅν ικανῶν ὠφελοῖν, ὅσων τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ' ὑμέτερα ἴκαζον*. If the former be the real construction, it is possible that the whole expression, *οὐδενος ὅν χείρων*, was intended to be supplied from the preceding clause; and so there would be no necessity for even the slight alteration of *καί* into *κάν*.

<sup>1</sup> *Μαχίμοτάτους*.] Poppo reads *μαχιμωτάτων*, "of the barbarians confessedly the most warlike," &c., "which," says Arnold, "undoubtedly affords an easier sense."

91. "Thus, then, concerning the expedition which has now sailed, you have heard its objects from the man who knows with the greatest accuracy what we purposed by it: and the generals who still remain there will, if they are able, carry them out in the same way. But that the people there will not escape their attack, unless you succour them, you must now learn. The Siceliots indeed, although untrained, might still even now gain the victory, if united in one body. But the Syracusans alone, defeated as they have already been in battle with all their forces, and hemmed in by sea at the same time, will be unable to hold out against the Athenian armament now there. And if that city is taken, the whole of Sicily also is in their possession, and Italy, too, straightway; and the danger which I just now mentioned as impending from that quarter, would in no long time fall upon you. Let no one then think that he is deliberating about Sicily alone, but about the Peloponnese also, unless you quickly adopt these measures; unless, I mean, you send thither on board ship such a body of troops, as, after working their own passage, shall immediately act as heavy infantry; and also, what I consider to be still more serviceable than troops, a Spartan as commander, both to discipline their present forces, and to compel those who are unwilling to serve. For so the friends you already have will feel the greater confidence, and those who are doubting between the two sides will more fearlessly join yours. You must also carry on hostilities here in a more decisive manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you take an interest in them, may offer the greater resistance; and that the Athenians may the less easily send reinforcements to their troops. And for that purpose you must fortify Decelea, in Attica; a blow of which the Athenians have always been most afraid, and the only one which they think they have not experienced in the present war. And in that way would one most surely hurt his enemies, if, acting on certain information, he should inflict upon them those things which he knows them to fear most: for it is but reasonable that every people should know most accurately its own dangers, and fear them accordingly. But with regard to the difficulties which, while you benefit yourselves, you will create for your opponents by thus fortifying the place, though I pass over many, I will briefly mention the chief. Whatever then the country is

stocked with, the greater part will come to you, either through being captured, or <sup>1</sup> of their own accord. They will also at once be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, with the advantages they now derive from their land and their <sup>2</sup> courts of justice; but, especially, of the revenue from the allies, which will be less regularly paid by them, when they consider that the war on your part is now vigorously prosecuted, and so think lightly of them. To have each of these things done with greater speed and spirit rests with you, Lacedæmonians; for that they are possible I am very confident, and I do not think that I shall be proved to have been mistaken.

92. "And now, I beg that I may not be the worse thought of by any among you, because I am now strenuously attacking my country with its bitterest enemies, though I formerly had a reputation for patriotism; and that my words may not be suspected on the score of an exile's forwardness. For though I am an exile, as regards the villany of those who banished me, I am not one, as regards assistance to you, if you will be persuaded by me: and the party hostile to me was, not you, who only hurt your foes, but rather they who compelled their friends to become their foes. My patriotism, too, I keep not <sup>3</sup> at a time when I am being wronged, but only while I enjoyed my civil rights in security. Nor do I consider myself to be going against what is still my country, but much rather to be recovering that country which is mine no more. And the patriot, in the true sense, is not that man who, when he has unjustly lost his country, abstains from aggression upon it, but he who, because of his longing for it, endeavours by all means to regain it. Thus, as far as I am concerned, I beg

<sup>1</sup> τὰ δ' αὐτόματα,] i. e. the slaves, which I believe to be chiefly alluded to by the expression οἱς ἡ χώρα κατεσκειύσασται, (see note on ch. 17. 3,) though it may also include, as Arnold supposes, cattle, sheep, farm-houses, trees, and other articles of dead as well as live stock.

<sup>2</sup> δικαστηρίων,] i. e. in various fees and fines; on which see Boeckh Publ. Œcon. i. p. 250.

<sup>3</sup> ἐν ᾧ.] Or, as Arnold renders it, "in a state where," &c.; but the expression is much more commonly significant of time than of condition. Compare I. 39, Οὗς χοῆν ὅτε ἀσφαλιστάτοι ἦσαν, τότε προσίεναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῖς μὲν ἡδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μήδ' ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς—αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἔχετε, πάλαί δὲ κ. τ. λ. There is, however, so close a connexion between the ideas of a particular period and of the circumstances by which it is characterized, that it is sometimes of comparatively little importance which of the two is supposed to be expressed.

you, Lacedæmonians, fearlessly to command my services, both for danger and trouble of every kind; knowing that argument which is advanced by all, namely, that if as your enemy I did you very great harm, I might also as your friend do you great service; inasmuch as I *know* the plans of the Athenians, while I only *guessed* yours. I beg too, that on your own part also, being convinced that you are consulting about your greatest interests, you will not shrink from the expedition both against Sicily and Attica; that by joining them with a small part of your forces, you may at once preserve the great states in Sicily, and overthrow the present and future power of the Athenians; and may afterwards live in security yourselves, and enjoy a voluntary supremacy over the whole of Greece, resting not on force but on affection."

93. Such was the address of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians, who of themselves were previously intending to make an expedition against Athens, but were still acting with delay and circumspection, were far more determined, when he had informed them of these several particulars, and when they considered that they had heard them from the man who had most certain knowledge of them. So that they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and to immediately sending some assistance to the Sicilians. Having appointed therefore Clearidas to the command of the Syracusans, they instructed him to deliberate with that people and the Corinthians, and to provide for succours reaching them on as large a scale, and with as much speed, as present circumstances permitted. Accordingly he desired the Corinthians to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to let the rest, as many as they purposed sending, be equipped and in readiness to sail, when the proper time came. Having arranged these points, they returned from Lacedæmon.

Now, too, arrived the Athenian trireme from Sicily, which the generals had sent for money and cavalry. And when the Athenians had heard their request, they resolved to send both the supplies for their armament and the cavalry. And so the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

94. At the very commencement of the spring of the next summer, the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and coasted along towards the Sicilian Megara, from which the

Syracusans, in the time of their tyrant Gelo, (as I have before mentioned,) drove out the inhabitants, and themselves continue to occupy the territory. Having landed therefore, they ravaged the country; and after going against a fort of the Syracusans without taking it, they again proceeded both with their land force and ships to the river Terias, and advancing inland, both laid waste the plain, and fired the corn. After falling in with a small body of the Syracusans, killing some of them, and erecting a trophy, they returned to their ships. When they had sailed back to Catana, and supplied themselves with provisions there, they went with their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, and returned after getting possession of it by capitulation, burning at the same time the corn of the Inessæans and Hyblæans. • On their arrival at Catana, they found the horsemen come from Athens, two hundred and fifty in number, without their horses, but with their equipments, in expectation of horses being provided there, with thirty mounted archers, and three hundred talents of silver.

95. The same summer the Lacedæmonians also marched against Argos, and went as far as Cleonæ, but, on the occurrence of an earthquake, returned. The Argives, after this, made an incursion into the Thyrean country, which lies on their borders, and took much booty from the Lacedæmonians, which was sold for no less than five and twenty talents. The commons of the Thespians also, this same summer, and not long after what has been mentioned, having attacked those in office amongst them, did not get the better; but Theban succours having arrived, some of them were made prisoners, and others fled the country and went to Athens. •

96. The Syracusans, the same summer, hearing that the cavalry had joined the Athenians, and that they were about to march against them, and thinking that unless the Athenians were masters of Epipolæ, a precipitous tract, and lying right above their city, they could not, even if defeated in battle, be easily circumvallated, they determined to guard <sup>1</sup>the approaches to it, that the enemy might not gain the heights

<sup>1</sup> Τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν,] by which the ridge might be ascended, and peculiar."—*Arnold*. On the topography of Syracuse, before it, see his excellent Memoir in his third volume; as well as the other authorities quoted by Poppo in his note on ch. 98. 2.



without their observation; for in no other way could they, as they thought, effect it. For the rest of the position rises high, sloping down to the city, and being all visible within it: and so it is called by the Syracusans, from lying above the rest, "Epipolæ," [or, "Overton."] They, then, went out at day-break with all their forces into the meadow along the course of the river Anapus, (Hermocrates and his colleagues having just come into office as their generals,) and held a review of their heavy-armed, having first selected from those troops a chosen body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to be a guard for Epipolæ, and quickly to muster and present themselves for whatever other service they might be required.

97. The Athenians, on the other hand, held a review the day following this night, having already, unobserved by them, made the coast with all their armament from Catana, opposite a place called Leon, about six or seven stades from Epipolæ, and having landed their soldiers, and brought their ships to anchor at Thapsus; where there is a peninsula running out into the sea, with a narrow isthmus, being not far from the city of Syracuse, either by land or by water. The naval armament of the Athenians lay quiet at Thapsus, having thrown a stockade across the peninsula; but the land forces proceeded at full speed to Epipolæ, and had time to ascend it, on the side of Euryelus, before the Syracusans, on perceiving it, could come to them from the meadow and the review. They came, however, against them, both the rest, as quickly as each could, and Diomilus, with his six hundred: but they had a distance of not less than five and twenty stades to go, before they came up to them from the meadow. Falling on them therefore, under these circumstances, in considerable disorder, and being defeated in an engagement at Epipolæ, the Syracusans returned into the city, Diomilus being killed, and about three hundred of the rest. After this, the Athenians having erected a trophy, and restored to the Syracusans their dead under a truce, came down the next day to the city itself; but when they did not come out against them, they returned, and built a

ἔστησαν, καὶ ἔλαβον, κ. τ. λ.]. "They had landed their men during the night, and had then stationed their ships at Thapsus; while the soldiers, as soon as it was light, after a brief muster of their force, hastened to ascend to the Hog's Back behind Epipolæ."—*Arnold*.

fort on Labdalum, on the highest point of the cliffs of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, to be a magazine for their baggage and treasures, whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall.

98. Not long after, there came to them from Segesta three hundred cavalry, and about a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and some others, while there were already two hundred and fifty from Athens, for whom they had received some horses from the Segestans and Catanæans, and had bought others; so that altogether a body of six hundred and fifty cavalry was mustered. Having established a garrison in Labdalum, the Athenians advanced to Syca, where they posted themselves, and built with all speed <sup>1</sup>the central point of their wall of circumvallation. They struck the Syracusans with consternation by the rapidity of their building; and consequently they resolved to march out against them and give them battle, and not allow them to proceed with the work. When they were now being drawn up in battle-array against each other, the Syracusan generals, perceiving that their forces were broken, and did not easily fall into line, led them back again into the city, excepting some part of their cavalry. These, staying behind, prevented the Athenians from carrying their stones, or dispersing to any great distance; until <sup>2</sup>one tribe of the Athenian heavy-armed, with all their cavalry, charged and routed the Syracusan horse, killed some of them, and erected a trophy for this cavalry action.

99. The next day some of the Athenians were building the wall to the north of the central point, while others were collecting stones and timber, and laying them along the line, to the point called Trogilus; keeping in the direction in which their wall of circumvallation would be completed in the shortest distance from

<sup>1</sup> ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον.] To avoid appearing to assert that the whole line of circumvallation was at once completed, I have rendered κύκλον in this passage by one of the terms applied to it in Arnold's note; where he says that "ὁ κύκλος which is spoken of as finished, was on the one hand a part of the circumvallation, but was also a complete work in itself,—something, that is, of an entrenched camp, which was to be the point of junction and key of the two lines which were to run respectively to the sea by Trogilus, and to the great harbour," &c.

\* We learn from Herodotus, VI. 111. 2, that the soldiers belonging to the different tribes at Athens, were not mixed together in an engagement, but were kept separate; an arrangement which appears from ch. 100. 1, to have been observed by the Syracusans also.

the great harbour to the sea. The Syracusans meanwhile, at the suggestion of Hermocrates, more than of their other generals, were no longer disposed to run the risk of general actions with the Athenians, but thought it better to build a counter-wall in the direction in which they intended to carry their works; thinking that if they anticipated them with this, there would be an interruption to their lines; and that, if at that time they should come to oppose them, they themselves would send a part of their forces against them, and have time to occupy the approaches beforehand with their palisade, while the Athenians would cease from their work, and all turn their attention to them. They went out, therefore, and proceeded to build, beginning from their city, and carrying a cross wall below the Athenian lines, cutting down the olives of the sacred ground, and erecting wooden towers. The ships of the Athenians had not yet sailed round from Thapsus into the great harbour, but the Syracusans still commanded the sea-shore, and the Athenians conveyed their provisions from Thapsus by land.

100. When the Syracusans thought that those parts of their counter-work which had been completed by means of palisades and masonry were sufficient, and when the Athenians did not come out to stop them, as they feared that the enemy would more easily contend with them when they were divided, and at the same time were hurrying to complete their own wall of circumvallation; the Syracusans, having left one tribe to guard the building, returned into the city. The Athenians, in the mean time, destroyed their pipes which ran under ground into the city, carrying water for drinking; and having watched when the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at mid-day, and some of them had even gone away into the city, while those in the stockade were keeping but a careless guard, they appointed three hundred picked men of themselves, and a chosen body of the light troops, armed for the purpose, to run suddenly at full speed to the counter-work, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, one with one of the generals to the city, in case they should come to the rescue, the other with the other general to the stockade near the postern. Accordingly the three hundred assaulted and took the stockade, the guard evacuating it, and taking refuge

<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῷ σταυρωματι. ] "Apparently a stockade in advance of the cross wall, ὑποτείχιον, and covering the approach to it."—Arnold.

in the outworks around Temenites. Their pursuers also burst in with them, but, after getting in, were forcibly driven out again by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians were slain there. And now the whole army having returned, threw down the wall, tore up the palisades, transferred the pales to their own lines, and erected a trophy.

101. The next day the Athenians, setting out from their lines, began to build at the cliffs over the marsh, which on this side of Epipolæ looks towards the great harbour, and in which direction their wall of circumvallation would be finished in the shortest distance by their going down over the plain and the marsh to the harbour. The Syracusans meanwhile went out, and on their part also began again to interrupt the line by a palisade, commencing from the city across the middle of the marsh; and at the same time dug a ditch parallel with it, that it might not be possible for the Athenians to carry their wall of circumvallation as far as the sea. They, after their work at the cliff was completed, again assaulted the palisade and ditch of the Syracusans. They had ordered their fleet to sail round from Thapsus to the great harbour of Syracuse, while they themselves descended at dawn from Epipolæ into the plain, and laying doors and planks over the marsh, where the mud was most firm, crossed it upon them, and in the morning carried the palisade, excepting a small part of it, and the ditch, and afterwards the remaining part. On this occasion a battle was fought, in which the Athenians were victorious, those of the Syracusans posted on the right wing flying to the city, those on the left, to the river. Wishing to intercept the passage of these, the three hundred chosen troops of the Athenians pressed on at full speed to the bridge; but the Syracusans were alarmed, and, as the greater part of their forces were there, closed on these three hundred, routed them, and drove them in on the right wing of the Athenians. By their charge the tribe posted first on the wing was also thrown into panic; on observing which, Lamachus came to their assistance from their left, with a few archers and the Argives, and having crossed a ditch in advance, and being cut off from the rest, with only a few who had crossed with him, was killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans immediately snatched up, and had time to get over the river into

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "where it was muddy and most firm"

a place of security; while their own troops retreated, as the rest of the Athenian force was now coming against them.

102. Meanwhile, those of them who had at first fled for refuge to their city, when they saw what was going on, resumed their courage, and coming thence, themselves drew up against the Athenians in front of them, and sent a part of their numbers to the lines on Epipolæ, thinking they should take them while unguarded. And they did, indeed, take and destroy their outwork of a thousand feet in length, but the lines themselves Nicias prevented their taking, as he happened to have been left behind in them through illness. He ordered the servants to set fire to the engines, and all the timber that had been thrown down in front of the wall; as he knew that for want of men they could not escape in any other way. And such was the result; for the Syracusans no longer came against them on account of the fire, but withdrew again. Indeed, by this time succours had gone up to the lines from the Athenians below, who had repulsed the enemy in that part; and at the same time their ships from Thapsus were sailing, as they had been ordered, into the great harbour. At the sight of this, those on the heights retreated with all speed, and the whole army of the Syracusans retired into the city, thinking that they would no longer be able with their present force to prevent the building of the wall down to the sea.

103. After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, restoring their dead to the Syracusans under a truce, and receiving back those who had fallen with Lamachus, as well as himself. And as they now had with them their whole force, both naval and military, they began from Epipolæ and the cliffs, and cir-

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ δακτύλιον προτείχισμα.] Arnold supposes this to have been "a sort of redoubt, or covering outwork, raised before that part of the line on which the Athenians were at work, to protect the workmen, and to cover the stones, timber, cranes, scaffoldings, and other things used for the building." But the expression seems more suitable for a stationary outwork, than for one which, according to this description, would be moved about as the building progressed; and the last passage in which the building operations are mentioned, transfers them from Epipolæ to "the cliff, which formed the southern extremity of the high ground above the valley of the Anapus." (See ch. 101. 1, with Arnold's note on it.)\* It would therefore be better, perhaps, to consider the outwork in question to have been intended as an additional defence for the central point of the lines, τὸν κύκλον, in which Nicias might naturally have been left, as the place of greatest security. The engines and timber which were not required for immediate use, might have been kept near the redoubt for the same reason.

cumvallated the Syracusans down to the sea with a double wall. Provisions were now brought for the armament from all parts of Italy. Many of the Sicels too, who before were looking to see how things went, came as allies to the Athenians; as did also three fifty-oared galleys from Tyrrhenia. And every thing else was prospering, so as to give them hope. For the Syracusans no longer thought that they could escape by military measures, since no assistance had reached them from the Peloponnese; but were proposing terms of capitulation, both among themselves and to Nicias: for he alone held the command since the death of Lamachus. No decision, indeed, was come to; but, as was natural for men who were in difficulties, and besieged more closely than before, many discussions were held with him, and still more in the city. For they also entertained some suspicion of one another, in consequence of their present misfortunes, and deposed the generals under whose command these things had befallen them—thinking that it was either through *their* bad fortune, or treason, that they were suffering—and chose others in their stead, namely, Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

104. In the mean time, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were now off Leucas, wishing to come to the aid of Sicily with all speed. When therefore tidings were carried to them of an alarming nature, and all concurring in the same falsehood, namely, that Syracuse was by this time entirely cumvallated, Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily; but wishing to save Italy, he himself, and Pythen the Corinthian, with two Laconian and two Corinthian ships, crossed the Ionian Sea as quickly as possible to Tarentum; while the Corinthians having manned, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and three Ambracian vessels, were to sail after them. Gylippus, then, having first gone on an embassy from Tarentum to Thuria, on the ground of his father's having formerly been presented with the franchise there, and not being able to bring them over, weighed anchor, and coasted along Italy. Having been caught, when opposite the Terinæan gulf, by a wind which in this quarter blows violently and steadily from the north, he was carried out to sea, and after enduring exceedingly foul weather, again made Tarentum, and there drew up and refitted such of his ships as had suffered from the tempest. Nicias, on hearing of his ap-

proach, despised the number of his ships, (as had been the feeling of the Thuriæns also,) and thought that they were sailing more like a piratical armament than any thing else; and so at present he took no precautions against him.

105. About the same period of this summer, the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, themselves and their allies, and ravaged the greater part of the country. The Athenians went to the assistance of the Argives with thirty ships; and it was these that broke their treaty with the Lacedæmonians in a most decisive manner.\* For before this they only joined in hostilities with the Argives and Mantineans by plundering excursions from Pylus, and by landing on the other coasts around the Peloponnese, rather than on the Laconian; and though the Argives often desired them only to touch at Laconia with their heavy-armed, and to withdraw after devastating it with them ever so little, they would not do it. But at that time, having landed under the command of Pythodorus, Læspodias, and Demaratus, at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiæ, and other places, they ravaged part of the territory, and so rendered the excuse of the Lacedæmonians more plausible now for defending themselves against the Athenians. After the Athenians had with their fleet withdrawn from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also, the Argives having made an irruption into the Phliasian territory, ravaged part of their land, killed some of their men, and returned home.

## BOOK VII.

1. GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. And now, on receiving more correct information, namely, that Syracuse was not yet entirely invested, but that it was still possible for a party coming with troops to enter it on the side of Epipolæ, they deliberated whether they should keep Sicily on their right hand, and so run the risk of sailing into it; or whether, keeping it on the left hand, they should first sail to Himera, and take with them both the people there, and any other forces that they might prevail on to join them, and so proceed by land. They determined, then, to sail for Himera, especially as the four Athenian ships had not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias, on hearing of their being at Locri, notwithstanding his contempt for them, had sent out. Having anticipated therefore this guard-squadron, they crossed over the strait, and after touching at Rhegium and Messana, arrived at Himera. While they were there, they persuaded the Himærans to join them in the war, and both themselves to accompany them, and to furnish arms for such of the seamen from their ships as had none, (for they had drawn up their ships on shore at Himera.) They also sent and desired the Selinuntines to meet them at a certain place with all their forces. That people promised to send them a force of no inconsiderable amount, as did the Geloans also, and some of the Sicels, who were ready to join them with much greater forwardness, both in consequence of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king over some of the Sicels in that part, and a man of considerable influence, was a friend of the Athenians, and because Gylippus was thought to have come from Lacedæmon in a spirited manner. Thus Gylippus took with him those of his own seamen and *Epibatæ* who were provided with arms, about seven hundred in number, the Himæran heavy and light



troops, together mustering about a thousand, with a hundred horse, some light-armed and horse of the Selinuntines, a few Geloans, and a thousand Sicels in all, and so advanced against Syracuse.

2. The Corinthians, meanwhile, were coming to their assistance from Leucas with their other ships as quickly as they could, and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who had put to sea last of all with a single vessel, arrived first at Syracuse, though but a little before Gylippus. Finding them on the point of holding an assembly to consult on bringing the war to a conclusion, he prevented their doing so, and reassured them by saying that there were other ships still sailing up, and Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, sent by the Lacedæmonians in command of them. Upon this the Syracusans were reassured, and immediately went out in full force for the purpose of meeting Gylippus; for by this time they perceived him actually near at hand. He, having taken on his passage Jetæ, a fortress of the Sicels, and having formed his men for battle, arrived at Epipolæ; after mounting which, on the side by Eurymelus, where the Athenians also had ascended at first, he advanced in company with the Syracusans against the Athenian lines. He happened to have come at so critical a time, that a double wall of seven or eight stades length had already been completed by the Athenians, extending to the great harbour, except for a short distance near the sea, which they were still building. For the rest of their lines, to Trogilus on the other sea, stones had already been laid for the greater part of the distance, and some points were left half finished, while others were entirely completed. To such extreme danger had Syracuse been reduced.

3. The Athenians, though thrown into consternation at first by the sudden attack made upon them by Gylippus and the Syracusans, quickly drew up for battle. Gylippus halted near them, and sent on a herald to tell them, that if they chose to depart from Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce to that effect. They, however, paid no attention to him, and sent him back again without giving any answer. After this, they made their preparations against each other. And Gylippus, seeing the Syracusans in disorder and not easily falling into line, drew off his forces more into the open ground; while Nicias did not lead

the Athenians against them, but remained still near his own wall. When Gylippus found that they were not advancing, he withdrew his army to what is called the citadel of Temenites, and there they stationed themselves for the night. The next day he took the greater part of his forces, and drew them up near the walls of the Athenians, to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, while he sent a detachment to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and put to the sword all the men he found in it; the place not being within sight of the Athenians. On the same day, too, a trireme of the Athenians, moored off the harbour, was taken by the Syracusans.

4. After this, the Syracusans and their allies, commencing at the city, began to build upwards along Epipolæ a single wall in a cross direction, that the Athenians, if they could not stop their progress, might no longer be able to invest them. The Athenians had by this time gone up to the heights, after completing their wall down to the sea; and there being one weak part in the Athenian wall, Gylippus took his forces by night and made an attack upon it. When the Athenians were aware of his approach, (for they happened to be bivouacking outside,) they advanced to meet him; on observing which, he led back the troops on his side as quickly as he could. The Athenians having then raised it higher, themselves kept guard at this point, and now disposed the other allies along the rest of the works as they were severally to man them. Nicias determined also to fortify what is called Plemyrion, a headland opposite the city, which runs out beyond the great harbour, and narrows its mouth. If this were fortified, he thought that the introduction of provisions would be more easily effected; as they would carry on their blockade from a less distance, near the port occupied by the Syracusans, and would not, as now, put out against them from the bottom of the great harbour, in case of their stirring at all with their fleet. And he now paid more attention to the maritime operations of the war, seeing that their affairs by land were more hopeless since the arrival of Gylippus. Having, therefore, crossed over with a body of troops and his ships, he completed the building of three forts, in which were deposited the greater part of the stores; the

<sup>1</sup> i. e. the lesser port, as it was called, to distinguish it from the greater, in which the Athenian fleet now lay.

larger boats and the fast-sailing ships being now also moored there. And in consequence of this, it was chiefly at that time that the wasting of the crews first began. For as they had but a scanty supply of water, and that not close at hand; and, moreover, as the sailors from time to time went out to gather firewood, they were cut off by the Syracusan horse, which had the command of the country. For a third part of their cavalry had been posted by the Syracusans in the small town in the Olympieum, with an eye to the troops on Plemyrrium, to prevent their marching out to commit ravages. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships also were sailing to the island, and sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locri, Rhegium, and the approaches to Sicily.

5. Gylippus, on the other hand, was at once building the wall across Epipolæ—making use of the stones which the Athenians before had thrown down along the line for their own use—and leading out continually the Syracusans and their allies, and drawing them up before the works; while the Athenians formed their line against them. When Gylippus thought it a favourable opportunity, he commenced the attack; and, having closed in battle, they fought in the space between the works, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use. When the Syracusans and their allies had thus been defeated, and had taken up their dead under truce, and after the Athenians had erected a trophy, Gylippus called his army together, and said, that “the fault was not theirs, but his own; for he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and dart-men by his arrangements for the battle, which he had made too far within the works: wherefore he would now lead them again to the charge. And he begged them to make up their minds to this view of the case—that they would not have the worse, as regarded forces, and that with respect to resolution, it would be intolerable if they should not determine, Peloponnesians and Dorians as they were, to get the better of Ionians, and islanders, and a mixed rabble of men, and to drive them out of their country.” •

6. After this, when a favourable opportunity presented itself, he led them a second time against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought, that even if the Syracusans should not wish to commence an engagement, it was necessary

for themselves not to permit their wall to be carried past their own: for by this time the enemy's work had all but passed the termination of the Athenian lines; and if it went on any further, it was at once all the same to them, whether they were continually fighting and victorious, or did not fight at all; and therefore they advanced to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led his heavy-armed further beyond the fortifications of the two parties than before, and so engaged them, posting his cavalry and dart-men on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the works connected with both walls terminated. During the battle, the cavalry charged the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was defeated by the Syracusans, and driven within their lines. The following night they had time to build up to the Athenian works, and to pass them; so that now they could no longer be stopped by the enemy, while they deprived *them*, even if victorious, of all chance of investing the city in future.

7. After this, the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, having eluded the observation of the Athenian guard-force, sailed into harbour, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, and joined the Syracusans in completing the remainder of their works up to the cross wall. And now Gylippus went away into the rest of

<sup>1</sup> ἐνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπόν, κ. τ. λ.] Göller and Bishop Thirlwall understand this of the completion of the Syracusan counter-work, which they suppose to have been before left in an imperfect state, at some points where the position was naturally stronger than at others, but to have been now carried to an uniform height up to the Athenian wall, here called τοῦ ἰγκάρσιου τείχους, as running at right angles to the counter-work. This, however, appears to be an exceedingly doubtful interpretation of the passage, like every other that has been proposed. For the supposition of the counter-work having been left in an imperfect state has nothing whatever to support it in our author's description of it in the preceding chapters, which would naturally, I think, lead one to just the opposite conclusion. Nor does the description of the actual surface of Epipolæ, as given in Arnold's Memoir, make it probable that there would be, in the course of the wall, any points of such natural strength as to have encouraged them to dispense, even for a time, with the ordinary means of securing their work; as it does not appear probable that it passed over any of the "four decided slopes of rock," by which alone the "gradual and almost imperceptible ascent" is broken. And although ἰγκάρσιον, as "a mere relative expression," might be applied to either of the two works whose relative position it describes, it is surely most improbable, that after using it as our author undoubtedly, I think, does in every other passage with reference to the work of the Syracusans, he should in this single instance employ it in the very contrary manner. On these

Sicily for forces, intending to raise them both for sea and land service; and at the same time to bring over any of the cities that was either not hearty in the cause, or had hitherto stood entirely aloof from the war. Other ambassadors of the Syracusans and Corinthians were also sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, in order that a fresh force might be sent over to them, in whatever way might answer best, whether in merchantmen, or boats, or any how else; since the Athenians too were sending for reinforcements. Moreover, the Syracusans proceeded to man and practise a fleet, for the purpose of making an attempt in that way also, and were in other respects much more full of confidence.

8. Nicias observing this, and seeing that the enemy's strength and their own difficulties were every day increasing, sent, on his side also, to Athens; having, indeed, on many other occasions sent messengers at the time of their several operations, but doing so then especially, because he thought

grounds I think that Arnold's hypothesis is, on the whole, more probable; viz. that he alludes to some additional work carried out by the whole force of the Syracusans from the city wall, to join, and so strengthen, the counter-wall. Or, if this should be thought inconsistent with the terms in which the counter-wall is afterwards described, ch. 42. 4, the joint operations here spoken of, may perhaps refer more generally to the building of out-works, extending at intervals up to it; especially as three such *προτειχίσματα* are actually mentioned as existing there, (ch. 43. 4,) though we are not expressly told when they were raised.—With regard to the verb *ξυμτείχισαν* being used with reference to the nominative *αἱ νῆες*, I cannot agree with Arnold that "this is not the way in which Thucydides commonly writes;" or suppose, for *this* reason at least, that "something has dropped out of the text." The other conclusion mentioned by him seems much more probable, viz. "that the whole passage was written caplessly." There would seem to be no abstract reason why actions should not be attributed to ships, which could only have been performed by the men in them; in the same way as they are continually attributed by our author to countries, cities, &c. And the following passages, amongst others which might be quoted, appear to prove that "this is the way in which Thucydides writes," at least not unfrequently:—I. 116. 1, *ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν* (i. e. *τῶν νηῶν*) *ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπήν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νηῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλονται βοηθεῖν*. II. 69. 1, *ἑτέρας δ' ἔξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελίσσανδρου στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτά τε ἀρغنυρολογῶσι καὶ τὸ Ληπτικόν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἰῶσιν*, κ. τ. λ. III. 33. 1, 3, *ᾠφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμίνιας καὶ Παράλου ἐπὶ περὶ Κλάρον ὁρμῶν, — αὐτὰγγελιοὶ δ' αὐτὸν ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἢ τῇ Παράλῳ καὶ τῇ Σαλαμίνῳ ἔφρασαν*.—Bloomfield most strangely misrepresents the meaning both of Thucydides and of Bishop Thirlwall, by giving in his note, as the translation of *μέχρι τοῦ ἑγκατασίου τείχεως*, the words, "beyond the interval where the two walls converged towards each other;" which are evidently intended by the historian thus misquoted to be explanatory of *ἐξω τῶν τειχῶν*, ch. 6. 2.

that they were in a perilous condition, and that unless those at home recalled them as quickly as possible, or sent out no small reinforcement, there was no hope of preservation for them. Fearing, however, that those who were sent by him, either through incapacity for speaking, or through being deficient<sup>1</sup> in sense, or from a wish to say something to please the multitude, should not report the real facts of the case, he wrote a letter, thinking that by this means, more than any other, the Athenians would learn his own sentiments, without their being at all obscured by the messenger, and so would deliberate on the true state of the case. Accordingly, those whom he sent departed with the letter and all that they were to say; while he himself attended to the affairs of the armament, being engaged now in precautionary measures, rather than in perils voluntarily incurred.

9. At the close of the same summer, Evetion, an Athenian general, having in concert with Perdicas marched against Amphipolis with a numerous body of Thracians, did not take the city, but after bringing round some triremes into the Strymon, blockaded it from the river, making his approaches from Himeræum. And thus the summer ended.

10. The following winter, the messengers of Nicias arrived at Athens, where they stated by word of mouth what had been told them, answered whatever further question any one asked, and delivered the letter; which the secretary of state came forward and read to the Athenians, being to the following purport:

11. "With our former operations, Athenians, you have been made acquainted by many other letters; but at present, it is especially seasonable that you should deliberate with a knowledge of the position we are in. When, then, we had in many engagements defeated the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls in which we are now lying, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, came with an army from the Peloponnese and some of the cities in Sicily. And though in the first battle he was beaten by us, in the one fought the next day we were driven from the field by numerous cavalry and dart-men, and retired within our walls. At present,

<sup>1</sup> γνώμης.] In corroboration of Arnold's argument for this reading in preference to μνήμης, compare the three requisite qualifications of an orator, mentioned II. 60. 5, ὅς οὐδενός οἴομαι ἥσσω, εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων, κ. γ. λ.

therefore, we have ceased working at our line of circumvallation, in consequence of the enemy's numbers, and are lying still; (for we should not, indeed, be able to avail ourselves of all our force, since the guarding of our lines has exhausted a considerable part of our heavy-armed;) while they, on the other hand, have carried past us a single wall, so that it is no longer possible to invest them, unless one should assault this counter-work with a large force, and take it. And the consequence is, that we who are thought to be besieging others, are rather being besieged ourselves, as far as operations by land are concerned; for we cannot even go out far into the country because of their horse.

12. "They have also sent ambassadors to the Peloponnese for fresh troops, and Gylippus is gone to the cities in Sicily, to persuade some of them which are at present neutral to join in the war, and to bring from others, if he can, an additional land force, as well as naval armament. For they intend, as I hear, at the same time to attempt our walls with their army, and to attack us by sea with their fleet. And let none of you think it strange that I say *by sea* also. For although, (as the enemy also are aware,) our fleet was at first in fine condition, as regards both the soundness of the ships and the completeness of their crews, yet now both the ships are leaky, from having already been at sea so long a time, and the crews have been wasted; it being impossible to haul up and careen the vessels, because those of the enemy, being more than equal in number, are continually causing expectation of their sailing against us. For they are seen practising, and it rests with them to make the attack [when they please]; and they have greater facility of careening their ships, since they are not engaged in blockading others.

13. "We, on the other hand, could scarcely enjoy this advantage, though with a great superabundance of ships, and though we were not compelled, as at present, to keep guard with all of them. For if we relax our watching even in a slight degree, we shall have no provisions; since even now we find difficulty in bringing them in past their city. On this account our crews have been wasted and are still wasting; as some of our seamen, in consequence of their fetching wood, of foraging, and of distant watering, are cut off by their cavalry; while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equal footing,

desert from us, and those of the foreigners who went on board, as pressed men straightway depart to the several cities; while those, again, who were at first elated by the high pay, and supposed that they were going to make money, rather than to fight, since they have unexpectedly seen both the fleet and every thing else on the side of the enemy offering resistance to us, either leave us on finding some excuse for going over to the enemy, or in whatever way they severally can, (<sup>1</sup> and Sicily is a large country;) while in some instances, by engaging in traffic themselves, after persuading the captains to take Hyccarian slaves on board in their stead, they have destroyed the perfection of our navy.

14. "For you, to whom I am writing, know that <sup>2</sup> the flower of a crew is limited in number, and that there are but few seamen who will get a ship under weigh, or keep the rowing in time. But the most distressing of all these things is, that I, their general, have no power to put a stop to these abuses, (for your tempers are difficult to command,) and that we have no means of recruiting our ships' crews, (which the enemy can do from many quarters,) but both what is kept, and what is expended, must be taken from what we brought with us. For the cities which are at present in alliance with us, namely, Naxos and Catana, are powerless. If, indeed, one additional advantage be still gained by the enemy, I mean, that the places in Italy which supply us with food, seeing the condition we are in, and in case of your not reinforcing us, go over to the enemy, the war will be brought to a conclusion by them without a single battle, through our being <sup>3</sup> starved out. I might, it is true, have had more agreeable things than these to write to you, but none more useful, if it is necessary for you to deliberate with a clear knowledge of affairs here. And besides, knowing as I do your temper, that you wish, indeed, to receive the most pleasing statements, but find fault afterwards, should any thing in consequence of them turn out different

<sup>1</sup> And, therefore, as he implies, "there were so many points of refuge open to them that their escape was easily effected." See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> ὅτι βραχεία ἀκμή πληρώματος.] Or, as others take it, "that the bloom of a crew is but of brief duration." But that statement has been already made in the preceding chapter, see 3; and the words which follow are evidently intended to explain this expression.

<sup>3</sup> ἐκπολιορκηθέντων.] Literally, "compelled to surrender;" but the correctness of Arnold's version, which I have adopted, seems proved by the passage quoted by him from I. 134. 2, ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῶ.



to what you expected, I thought it safer to lay the truth before you.

15. "And now be assured of this, that for the business on which we first came here, neither your troops nor your generals have become inadequate: but since the whole of Sicily is being united together, and a fresh force is expected by them from the Peloponnese, you must now deliberate with a conviction that your troops are not a match even for their present enemies, but that you must either recall these, or send in addition to them another armament not less numerous, both military and naval, and no small sum of money, as well as some one to succeed me, since I am unable to remain at my post in consequence of a nephritic disease. And I think that I may claim some consideration at your hands; for when I was in health, I did you much service during the periods of my command. But whatever you mean to do, do it at the very commencement of spring, and without any delay; since the enemy will in a short time provide themselves with the succours from Sicily, and though not so quickly with those from the Peloponnese, yet if you do not pay attention to them, in some respects they will elude your observation, as before, and in others will anticipate you."

16. Such was the purport of Nicias's letter. The Athenians, after hearing it, did not allow him to resign his command, but till the arrival of others who were elected as his colleagues, they joined with him two of those who were there on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus, that he might not in his illness bear the labour alone; while at the same time they voted to send fresh forces, both naval and military, composed of Athenians on the muster-roll, and of their allies. They also elected as his colleagues, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon son of Thucles; the latter of whom they despatched to Sicily immediately, about the winter solstice, with ten ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and orders to tell the troops there that succours would come to them, and that attention would be paid to their interests.

17. Demosthenes, in the mean time, stayed behind, and made preparations for the expedition, intending to start as soon as it was spring; while he sent the allies word to levy troops, and got ready at home money, ships, and heavy-armed. The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise round the Pelop-

ponnese, and to keep guard that none might cross over from Corinth and the Peloponnese to Sicily. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors came to them, and brought a more favourable report of affairs in Sicily, thinking that they had not been unseasonable in sending their former squadron, were now much more encouraged, and prepared, on their part, to despatch heavy-armed troops for Sicily in vessels of burden, as the Lacedæmonians did likewise from the rest of the Peloponnese. The Corinthians manned also five and twenty triremes, to try the result of a battle with the squadron keeping watch at Naupactus, and that the Athenians there might be less able to prevent their transports from putting out, having to keep an eye upon the Corinthian line of triremes drawn up against them.

18. The Lacedæmonians prepared, too, for their invasion of Attica, both in accordance with their own previous resolution, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and Corinthians, since they had heard of the reinforcements about to be sent from Athens to Sicily; that they might be stopped by an incursion being made into the country. Alcibiades also kept urgently advising them to fortify Decælea, and not to let the war rest. But most of all had they gained confidence, because they thought that the Athenians, being engaged in a two-fold war with both themselves and the Siceliots, would be more easily subdued; and also because they considered them to have first broken the truce. For in the former course of hostilities they thought the guilt lay more on their own side, both because the Thebans had entered Plataea during a time of truce; and because, when it had been specified in the former treaty, that none should take up arms against others, if they were willing to submit to a judicial decision, they themselves had not listened to the Athenians when appealing to such a decision. On which account they considered that they were justly unsuccessful, and made both their misfortune at Pylus, and whatever other might have befallen them, a subject of <sup>1</sup> serious reflection. But when the Athenians had set out from Argos with those thirty ships, and ravaged a part of Epidaurus, Præsiæ, and some other places, at the same time that they were also <sup>2</sup> spreading devastation from Pylus;

<sup>1</sup> Or, "of religious scruple," as in some other passages.

<sup>2</sup> ἄγροτεύοντο.] Or, as Arnold renders it, "they, the Lacedæmonians

and when they refused to intrust the matter to arbitration, though the Lacedæmonians, as often as differences had arisen concerning any of the debatable points in the treaty, appealed to a judicial decision; then, indeed, the Lacedæmonians thought that the violation of the law, which in the former instance had been committed by themselves, had now, again, come in the same way to attach to the Athenians, and they were, therefore, eager for hostilities. Accordingly, during this winter they sent round to their allies orders for iron and were getting all the tools ready for building their fort. At the same time they were themselves raising supplies, and compelling the rest of the Peloponnesians to do so, with a view to despatching in the merchantmen succours to those in Sicily. And so the winter ended, and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history.

19. The following spring, at its very commencement, the Lacedæmonians and their allies made a very early incursion into Attica, under the command of Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. In the first place, then, they ravaged the parts of the country about the plain, and then proceeded to fortify Decelæa, dividing the work amongst the contingents of the different states. The place is distant from the city of Athens about a hundred and twenty stades, and about the same, or not much more, from Bœotia. Now the fortress was raised for the annoyance of the plain and the richest parts of the country, being visible as far as Athens. Thus, then, the Peloponnesians in Attica, and their allies, were engaged with their building. Those in the Peloponnese, about the same time, were sending off their heavy-armed troops to Sicily in the merchantmen, the Lacedæmonians having picked for the purpose the best of the Helots and Neodamodes, amounting both together to seven hundred, with Ecritus, a Spartan, in command of them, and the Bœotians, three hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Xeno and Nico, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespiæ. These started amongst

were continually being plundered;" referring to V. 14. 2, *ληστυομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου*. Porpo prefers the active sense, and is inclined to admit *ἐλίσσενον*, as Becker has done on the authority of one MS., the middle form not being used elsewhere. As both the preceding and following verbs refer to the Athenians, the change of subject is certainly very harsh, if *ἐλίσσενον* be referred to the Lacedæmonians; even more so, I think, than in that remarkable instance which occurs II. 3. 3.

the first from Tænarus, in Laconia, and put out into the open sea. Not long after them, the Corinthians despatched five hundred heavy-armed, some from Corinth itself, and some hired from Arcadia besides, having appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to the command of them. The Sicyonians also sent off, at the same time with the Corinthians, two hundred heavy-armed under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. In the mean time the five and twenty ships of the Corinthians, which had been manned in the winter, were stationed in opposition to the twenty Athenian vessels at Naupactus, till they had got these heavy-armed on board the merchantmen out to sea: for which purpose, indeed, they had been originally manned, that the Athenians might not attend to the merchantmen so much as to the triremes.

20. Meanwhile the Athenians, at the time of the fortification of Decelea, and at the very commencement of the spring, sent thirty ships to cruise round the Peloponnese, under the command of Charicles son of Apollodorus, who was ordered to go to Argos also, and call for a contingent of their heavy-armed to go on board, according to the terms of their alliance. Demosthenes, too, they despatched to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty Athenian ships, and five Chian, twelve hundred Athenian heavy-armed from the muster-roll, and as many islanders as they could possibly raise from the several places; while they also supplied themselves from the other subject allies with whatever they could get in any quarter that would be of service for the war. Moreover, he was instructed, as he sailed round, to join Charicles first in his military measures on the coast of Laconia. So Demosthenes, after sailing to Ægina, waited for any part of the armament that might have been left behind, as well as for Charicles to fetch the Argive troops.

21. In Sicily, about the same period of this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse, bringing from the cities which he had persuaded to join him as large a number of troops as he respectively could. And now, having called the Syracusans together, he said that they ought to man as many ships as possible, and try the experiment of a sea-fight; for that he hoped to produce thereby a result worth the risk, towards the issue of the war. Hermocrates, too, most earnestly joined him in trying to persuade them, in order that they might not want courage for attacking the Athenians by sea; observing,

“that that people had no more than themselves enjoyed an hereditary and perpetual experience at sea, but had become a naval power after being, even more than the Syracusans, an inland one; and only because they were compelled to do so by the Medes. And to men of a daring character, like the Athenians, those who were daring in opposition to them would appear most formidable: for the terror with which that people paralysed their enemies, not, in some cases, by being superior to them in power, but by attacking them with confidence, <sup>1</sup> they, too, would in the same way strike into their opponents. And he was well assured, he said, that the Syracusans, by unexpectedly daring to offer resistance to the navy of the Athenians, would in a greater degree gain advantage from the surprise of the enemy on that account, than the Athenians by their skill would harm the unskilful Syracusans. He urged them therefore to proceed to the trial with their fleet, and not to shrink from it.” Accordingly the Syracusans, at the persuasion of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and whoever else joined them, resolved on the sea-fight, and proceeded to man their ships.

22. When Gylippus had prepared the fleet for action, he took the whole army under cover of the night, and himself intended to assault by land the forts on Plemyrion, while at the same time, according to agreement, thirty-five of the Syracusan triremes sailed to the attack from the great harbour, and forty-five sailed round from the lesser, where their arsenal was situated; wishing to effect a junction with those within, and at the same time to sail against Plemyrion, in order that the enemy might be disconcerted by an attack on both sides. The Athenians, on the other hand, having with all speed manned sixty ships to oppose them, with five and twenty of them engaged the five and thirty of the Syracusans that were in the great harbour, and with the remainder went to meet those that were sailing round from the arsenal. Thus they immediately entered into action before the mouth of the great harbour, and for a long time resisted each other, the one side wishing to force an entrance, the other being anxious to prevent them.

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἑφ᾽ αὐτοὺς, κ. τ. λ.] Or, “they” (i. e. the Athenians) “would themselves also be subject to before their enemies:” supposing, as De Tree does, that ἑφ᾽ αὐτοὺς is here equivalent to ἀνὰ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

23. In the mean time Gylippus, when the Athenians in Plemyrion had gone down to the sea, and were paying attention to the naval engagement, surprised them by suddenly at daybreak assailing the forts, of which he took the largest first, and then the other two; their garrisons not having awaited his attack, when they saw the largest easily carried. From the first that was taken the men escaped with difficulty to their camp, as many of them as took refuge in their boats and merchantmen; for as the Syracusans were getting the better in the engagement with their ships in the great harbour, the fugitives were chased by one trireme, and that a fast sailer; but when the other two forts were taken, at that time the Syracusans, in their turn, were now being beaten, and so those who were flying out of the forts sailed along shore with greater ease. For the Syracusan ships that were fighting before the mouth of the harbour, having forced their way through those of the Athenians, sailed in without any order, and being entangled with one another, transferred the victory to the Athenians; who routed both these, and those by which they were at first being defeated in the harbour. They also sank eleven of the Syracusan ships, killing most of the men on board of them, excepting those whom they took prisoners from three vessels; while on their own side three ships were lost. After hauling up the wrecks of the Syracusans, and erecting a trophy on the small island in front of Plemyrion, they withdrew to their own encampment.

24. But although the Syracusans had thus fared with regard to the sea-fight, they were still in possession of the three forts on Plemyrion, and erected three trophies for them. One of the two forts last taken they razed, but the other two they repaired, and held with garrisons. In the capture of the forts many men were killed, and many made prisoners, and a large amount of property in all was taken: for inasmuch as the Athenians used them as a magazine, there was in them much property and corn belonging to merchants, and much also belonging to trierarchs, since there were taken in them, besides other things, masts for forty triremes, with the rest of their equipments, and also three triremes which had been drawn up on shore. Indeed, what most and principally ruined the army of the Athenians was the taking of Plemyrion; since even the entrance into the harbour was no longer secure for carry-

ing in provisions; (for the Syracusans, blockading them at that point with their vessels, prevented it, and their getting them in was now always effected by battle;) and in other respects it struck consternation and dismay into their forces.

25. After this, the Syracusans sent out twelve ships, with Agatharchus, a Syracusan, on board of them as commander. One of these went to the Peloponnese, carrying ambassadors, both to tell of their own affairs, "of the hopes they were full of, and to excite them to the still more vigorous prosecution of the war in those parts. The other eleven ships sailed to Italy, hearing that some vessels laden with treasure were on their way to the Athenians. Having fallen in with these vessels, they destroyed most of their contents, and burnt a quantity of timber in the Caulonian territory, which had been got ready for the Athenians. After this they came to Locri, and while lying at anchor there, one of the merchantmen from the Peloponnese put in to shore, carrying a heavy-armed band of Thespians. Having taken these on board their ships, the Syracusans coasted on homewards. The Athenians, with their twenty vessels at Megara, being on the look-out for them, took one ship with its crew; the rest they could not overtake, but they escaped from them to Syracuse. There was also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans had driven in the sea in front of the old docks, in order that their ships might lie at anchor within them, and the Athenians might not sail against them, and injure them by their charge. For the Athenians having brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden, carrying wooden towers and screens, from their boats fastened ropes round the piles, and raised them with windlasses, and tore them up, or, diving down, sawed them in two. The Syracusans plied their missiles on them from the docks, and the men on the ship of burden discharged theirs in return; and at last the Athenians removed the greater part of the piles. But the most dangerous part of the stockade was that out of sight: for there were some of the piles which they drove that did not rise above the surface of the sea, so that it was dangerous to approach, lest any one, through not seeing them beforehand, might strike his ship on them, as on a sunken rock. But even in the case of these, divers went down and sawed them off for a reward; but the Syracusans made, notwithstanding, a fresh stockade. Many

other also were the contrivances which they employed against one another, as was natural with the armaments lying near, and opposed to, each other ; and they were engaged in skirmishes, and attempts of every kind. The Syracusans also sent to the cities embassies composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedæmonians, with tidings of the capture of Plemyrion, and to state, with regard to the sea-fight, that it was not so much by the power of the enemy as by their own confusion that they had been beaten ; while, in other respects, they were to inform them that they were in good hope, and to call upon them to come to their aid, both with ships and troops ; as the Athenians also were expected with a fresh force, and if they could but destroy their present armament before it came, there would be an end to the war. The parties in Sicily, then, were thus engaged.

26. Demosthenes, on the other hand, when the armament had been collected by him with which he was to sail to Sicily to the aid of the force there, having put to sea from Ægina and sailed to the Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. After receiving the heavy-armed troops of the Argives on board their ships, they sailed to Laconia, and in the first place ravaged a part of Epidaurus Limera. Then, landing on the coast of Laconia opposite Cythera, where stands the temple of Apollo, they fortified a certain place in the form of an isthmus, in order that the Lacedæmonian helots might desert to them there, and at the same time foraging parties might make incursions from it, as from Pylus. And now, immediately after assisting to occupy this spot, Demosthenes sailed on for Cœrcyra, that he might take up some of the allies there also, and proceed as quickly as possible on his voyage to Sicily. Charicles, on the other hand, waited until he had entirely fortified the place ; when, having left a garrison there, he, too, afterwards returned home with his thirty ships, and the Argives at the same time.

27. There came also to Athens this same summer, to serve as targeteers, a body of Thracians who carry swords, of the tribe of the Dii, thirteen hundred in number, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes ; but as they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back again to Thrace, the country they had come from, as it seemed too expensive to keep them for the war carried on from Decælea,



since each of them received a drachma a day. For since Decelea had been first fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and afterwards was occupied for the annoyance of the country by garrisons coming from the states at successive periods, it greatly injured the Athenians, and was amongst the principal things that ruined their interests, both by the destruction of property and the loss of men. For previously the invasions were but of brief duration, and did not prevent their enjoying their territory at other times; but then, when the enemy were continually stationed there for their annoyance, and sometimes attacked them with a more numerous force, while at other times the regular garrison<sup>1</sup> of necessity made incursions on the land, and forayed it, Agis the Lacedæmonian king being also present, (who made no by-work of the war,) the Athenians suffered severely in consequence; for they were deprived of their whole country, and more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them being artisans; and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost. Their horses also, as the cavalry were daily on the move, making excursions to Decelea and keeping guard in the country, were either lamed by being worked on rocky ground, and that continually, or were disabled by wounds.

28. The conveyance also of provisions from Eubœa, which was before effected more quickly by land from Oropus, through Decelea, was now carried on with great expense by sea, round Sunium. Indeed the city required every thing alike to be imported; and instead of being a city, it was reduced to a garrison. For the Athenians were harassed by keeping guard on the fortifications, in succession by day, and all of them (excepting the cavalry) by night—some being on duty where the arms were piled, and others on the walls—both summer and winter alike. But what<sup>2</sup> pressed hardest on them was, that they were engaged in two wars at once, and had arrived at such a pitch of obstinate animosity as no one would have believed, if he had heard it before it actually occurred. For that even when besieged by the Peloponnesians from the fortress in their country, they should not even then have withdrawn from Sicily, but have proceeded, in their turn, to besiege Syracuse in the same manner, a city not less than Athens, considered by itself; and that they should

<sup>1</sup> ἡ ἀνὰ γκαρ,] i. e. for their own support.

have exhibited to the Greeks so unexpected a display of power and daring, that whereas, in the beginning of the war, some of them thought they might hold out one year, some two, some even three, but no one longer, if the Peloponnesians should invade their country, they *now*, in the *seventeenth* year after the first invasion, went to Sicily, when distressed by hostilities in every way, and entered upon another war besides, not less important than that which they already had with the Peloponnese,<sup>1</sup> [who, I say, would have believed this before it actually took place?] It was owing to these things, then, to the great injury which Decelea inflicted on them, and the other great expenses which befell them, that they were reduced to straits for want of money; and it was at this time that they imposed on their subjects the tax of <sup>2</sup>the twentieth on all sea-borne commodities, instead of the tribute, thinking that thus a larger amount of money would be raised by them. For their expenses were not on the same scale as before, but much greater; inasmuch as the war also was greater, while their revenues were being destroyed.

29. These Thracians, then, who came too late for Demosthenes, as they did not, in consequence of their present want of money, wish to incur expense, they immediately sent back, having commissioned Diitrephes to convey them, and instructed him at the same time to inflict by their means whatever harm he could on the enemy during the voyage along shore, (for they were to pass through the Euripus.) Accordingly he landed them at Tanagra, and carried off some plunder in a hurried manner; and then in the evening sailed across the Euripus from Chalcis in Eubœa, and landing them in Bœotia, led them against Mycalessus. During the night he bivouacked unobserved near the temple of Mercury, distant from Mycalessus about sixteen stades, and at day-break assaulted the town, which was not a large one, and took it; having fallen on the inhabitants whilst off their guard, and not expecting that any one would ever march up the country so far from the sea to attack them; their wall, too, being weak, and in some parts even fallen down, while in other parts it

<sup>1</sup> Owing to the length of the sentence in the original, the apodosis was forgotten. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> τὴν εἰκοστὴν.] "An ad valorem duty of five per cent. on all commodities carried by sea to or from any port in the Athenian dominion."—Arnold.

was built but low; and the gates, moreover, being open through their feeling of security. The Thracians, then, having burst into Mycalessus, plundered both private houses and temples; and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither old age nor youth, but killing one after another all they met with, both children and women, nay, further, even cattle and beasts of burden, and whatever other living things they saw. For the Thracian race, like the most blood-thirsty of the barbarians, is most so when secure from resistance. And thus on that occasion there was no little confusion in other respects, and every form of butchery was exhibited. And, in particular, they attacked a boys' school, the largest there was in the place, (which the children had just entered,) and cut them all to pieces. And this disaster, which fell on the whole town, was inferior to none in extent, while it was more unexpected and shocking than any other.

30. When the Thebans were aware of it, they marched to the rescue; and having overtaken the Thracians when they had not at present advanced any great distance, they both recovered their plundered property, and having struck them with panic pursued them down to the sea, where their boats which conveyed them were lying at anchor. And they slew the greatest part of them during their embarkation, as they could not swim, and as those on board the boats, on seeing what was going on ashore, moored them out of bow-shot. For in the rest of the retreat the Thracians advanced in no contemptible manner to meet the Theban horse, which first fell upon them; and closing their ranks, according to their native tactics, defended themselves against them; and thus only a few were killed in that part of the affair. Some portion of them also were surprised in the city, through their eagerness in plundering, and perished. Altogether, there fell of the Thracians two hundred and fifty out of thirteen hundred; while of the Thebans and the rest who joined in attacking them they slew about twenty, horse and foot together, and amongst the Thebans, Scirphondas, one of the Bœotarchs. On the side of the Mycalessians a considerable part of the population was cut off. With regard, then, to Mycalessus, which experienced, considering its extent, a calamity not less lamentable than any which happened in the war, such were the things which occurred there.

31. Now Demosthenes being at that time on his voyage for Corcyra, after he had built the fortifications on the side of Laconia, fell in with a merchant vessel anchored at Phea in the Elean territory, in which the Corinthian heavy-armed were to cross over to Sicily; and he destroyed the ship itself, but the men escaped from it, and having subsequently got another, proceeded on their voyage. After this, having come to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took on board a body of heavy-armed, sent for some of the Messenians from Naupactus, and then crossed over to the opposite coast of Acarnania, on the continent, to Alyzia and Anactorium, which the Athenians had in their own hands. While he was in these parts, he was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily; who had been sent out with treasure at the time that has been mentioned, during the winter, and told him, amongst other tidings, that he had heard, when already on his voyage, that Plemvrium had been taken by the Syracusans. Conon, too, who was in command at Naupactus, came to them, with information that the five and twenty Corinthian ships stationed opposite to <sup>1</sup> the Athenian squadron did not give up hostilities, but were prepared for an engagement. He begged them therefore to send him some ships, as his own eighteen were not competent to fight the enemy's five and twenty. Accordingly Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent with Conon the ten best sailers of all they had, to join those at Naupactus. They themselves at the same time made preparations for the muster of their forces, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, urging them to man fifteen ships, and enlisting heavy-armed troops, (for he now shared the command with Demosthenes, and had turned back again, in consequence of his election,) and Demosthenes raising slingers and dart-men from the parts about Acarnania.

32. As for the ambassadors who had gone at the time mentioned—after the taking of Plemvrium—from Syracuse to the cities, they had prevailed on them to join their side, and had raised and were just about to lead off the force, when Nicias, receiving early intelligence of it, sent to those of the Sicels who held the passes, and were in alliance with the Athenians,

<sup>1</sup> σφίσιν.] In this and in many other similar passages, the reflexive pronoun is used in the plural with reference to the *countrymen* of the speaker in general, rather than to himself individually.

namely, the Centotripes, Alicyæans, and some others, to beg them not to give free passage to the enemy, but to unite together and prevent their marching through their country, since there was no other by which they would attempt to do so, as the Acragantines would not grant them a passage through theirs. When therefore the Siceliots were even on their march, the Sicels, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, laid an ambuscade for them in three different places, and falling upon them while off their guard and without any notice, killed about eight hundred of them, with all the ambassadors except one, namely, the Corinthian, who led to Syracuse those that had escaped, to the number of fifteen hundred.

33. About that same time the Camarinæans also came to their help with five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred dart-men, and three hundred bow-men. The Geloans, too, sent a squadron of five ships, four hundred dart-men, and two hundred horse. For by this time pretty nearly the whole of Sicily—excepting the Acragantines, who were neutral—the rest, I say, who before had waited to see the result of events, now united with the Syracusans, and assisted them against the Athenians. The Syracusans, then, after the disaster in the Sikel country had befallen them, ceased for the present from attacking the Athenians. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, on the other hand, their forces being now ready both from Coreyra and the continent, crossed the Ionian gulf with all their army to the Iapygian foreland. Starting thence, they touched at the Chœrades islands, lying off Iapygia, and took on board their ships some Iapygian dart-men, one hundred and fifty in number, of the Messapian tribe; and after renewing an old friendship with Artas, who also had provided them with the dart-men, being one of their chieftains, they arrived at Metapontum in Italy. After persuading the Metapontines to send with them, on the strength of their alliance, three hundred dart-men and two triremes, with this addition to their armament they coasted along to Thuria. There they found the opponents of the Athenians recently expelled in consequence of a sedition. And as they wished to muster there the whole army, in case any part had been left behind, and to review it, as well as to persuade the Thurians to join them as zealously as possible in the expedition, and to have

considering their present position, the same foes and friends as the Athenians, they waited awhile in Thuria, and were prosecuting these designs.

34. About the same time, the Peloponnesians in the five and twenty ships, who, to secure the passage of the merchantmen to Sicily, were anchored over against the fleet at Naupactus, having made their preparations for a sea-fight, and having manned some additional ships, so that they were now but little inferior to the Athenian force, stationed themselves off Erineus in Achæa, in the territory of Rhypa. And the place in which they were stationed being in the form of a crescent, their land forces which had come to their assistance from the Corinthians, and from their allies on the spot, were ranged on the projecting headlands on both sides; while the ships occupied the intervening space, blocking up the entrance. The commander of the fleet was Polyantbes, a Corinthian. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with three and thirty ships, under the command of Diphilus. The Corinthians at first remained stationary, but afterwards, having raised their signal for battle, when there appeared to be a favourable opportunity, they advanced upon the Athenians, and engaged them. For a long time they resisted each other; at length three ships on the side of the Corinthians were destroyed, while on that of the Athenians none was absolutely sunk, but some seven were disabled, being struck prow to prow, and having their foreships stove in by the Corinthian vessels, which were provided with stronger 'cheeks than usual for this very purpose. After fighting on equal terms, so that either party might claim the victory, (though the Athenians, nevertheless, had got possession of the wrecks, through the wind driving them out into the open sea, and the Corinthians no longer advancing against them,) they separated from each other, and there was no pursuit made, nor were any prisoners taken on either side: for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians easily effected their escape, as they were fighting near shore, and no ship on the side of the Athenians went down. When, however, the Athenians had sailed back to Naupactus, the Cor-

[ τὰς ἐπρωτίδας.] "The word is known only in its technical sense, as signifying two beams, projecting from a ship's head, on each side of her beak, from which the anchors were suspended, something like what are called in our ships the 'cat-heads.'"—*Arnold*. I have borrowed from Dobree the word by which I have rendered ἐπρωτίδας.

inthians immediately erected a trophy, as conquerors ; because they had disabled a greater number of their enemy's ships, and considered that they were not beaten, for the very same reason that the other party considered them not to have conquered : for the Corinthians regarded themselves as having the advantage if they were not decidedly beaten, and the Athenians considered them to be worsted, because they were not decidedly conquerors. But when the Peloponnesians had sailed off, and their troops had dispersed, the Athenians erected a trophy on their side also, as having gained the victory, in Achæa, at about twenty stades distance from Erineus, where the Corinthians were stationed. And so ended the sea-fight.

35. Now Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians were prepared to join them in the expedition with seven hundred heavy-armed and three hundred dart-men, gave orders for the ships to coast along towards the Crotonian territory ; while they themselves, having first reviewed all the land forces on the river Sybaris, proceeded to lead them through the Thurian country. When they were on the banks of the river Hylia, and the Crotonians sent to them, and said that they should not choose the army to pass through their territory, they descended towards the shore, and encamped for the night by the sea, at the mouth of the Hylia, their ships also meeting them at the same point. The following day, having put their men on board, they coasted along, touching at all the cities, excepting Locri, until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory.

36. The Syracusans, in the mean time, hearing of their approach, wished to make a second attempt with their fleet and other forces on shore, which they were collecting for this very object, being desirous of striking a blow before they came. Now they had equipped the rest of their navy according as they saw, from the result of the former sea-fight, that they would obtain any advantage ; and having cut down their ships' prows into a less compass, they made them firmer than usual, by fixing stout cheeks to them, and attaching stays from these to the ships' sides, for the length of six cubits both

<sup>1</sup> "The epotides were laid on the bow or stem of the vessel, and were partly within and partly without the frame of the hull, just as a ship's bowsprit is at present. For the length of six cubits, whether from the prow, as Doree understands it, or from the inner extremity of the epotides, they supported these cheeks by a set of spars (*ἀντηπίδας*) that went from the cheeks to the ship's side, both inside and outside the ship."—*Arnold*.

inside and outside the vessel; in the very same way as the Corinthians had equipped their ships ahead against the squadron at Naupactus, and then proceeded to engage it. For the Syracusans thought that in this way they would have an advantage against the Athenian vessels, which were not in the same manner built to resist them, but were slight ahead, (because they did not charge prow to prow so much as on the side, after taking a circuit;) and, moreover, that the battle being fought in the larger harbour, against a great number of ships in no great space, would be in their favour; for that by charging stem to stem they would stave in their prows, striking as they would with solid and stout beaks against hollow and weak ones. Nor would the Athenians in their narrow room have opportunity<sup>1</sup> of sailing round or cutting through their line, the manœuvres of their naval science in which they most confided; for they themselves, to the best of their power, would not allow them to cut through their line, and the want of room would prevent their making a circuit. And what was before thought to be want of skill in masters, namely, to charge stem to stem, was the very method they would chiefly adopt; for they would have the advantage in it; as the Athenians, if forced out of the line, would have no means of backing water in any direction but towards shore, and that, too, at only a short distance from them, and for a short space, namely, just opposite their own encampment. The rest of the harbour they should themselves command; and the enemy, if forced at any point, by crowding together into a confined space, and all to the same point, would run foul of each other, and be thrown into confusion; (the very thing, indeed, which most hurt the Athenians in all their sea-fights, since they had not, like the Syracusans, the power of retreating over the whole harbour.) And as for making a circuit into clearer sea-room, since they themselves commanded the entrance from, and the retreat into, the open deep, they would not be able to do it; especially as Plemyrion would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was not large.

37. Having adopted such contrivances to suit their own de-

<sup>1</sup> περίπλουν—διέκπλουν.] These manœuvres, as well as the ἀνέκρουσις afterwards mentioned, were different methods of giving the ship a momentum required for a second attack. See Arnold's notes on I. 49. 3, and II. 89. 12.



gree of knowledge and power, and at the same time feeling now more assured in consequence of their former battle, the Syracusans prepared to attack them at once by land and by sea. Those of their land forces which were in the city Gylipus led out a little before, and brought them up to the wall of the Athenians, at that part of it which looked towards the city; while the troops from the Olympieum, both all the heavy-armed that were there, and the horse and light-armed of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall on the other side; immediately after which, the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians thought at first that they would make an attempt on the land side alone, but when they saw their fleet also suddenly coming against them, they were thrown into alarm; and some were making preparations on and in front of the walls to meet the attack, while others marched out against those who with all speed were coming from the Olympieum and the parts outside the city—both horse in great numbers and dart-men—and others proceeded to man the ships, and at once ran to the beach to oppose the enemy. And when they were manned, they put out against them with seventy-five vessels, those of the Syracusans being about eighty in number.

38. For a great part of the day they continued advancing and retiring and making attempts upon one another; and when neither party could gain any advantage worth mentioning, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenians' ships, they separated; and the troops at the same time withdrew from the walls. The next day the Syracusans remained quiet, without showing at all what were their plans for the future. Nicias, on the other hand, seeing that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack them again, compelled the captains to refit their ships, whichever of them had at all suffered; and stationed merchantmen before the stockade which had been fixed in the sea in front of their ships, to serve the purpose of an enclosed harbour. These vessels he placed at intervals of two hundred feet from each other, that if any ship were hard pressed, it might have means of retreating in safety and sailing out again at leisure. The Athenians, then, continued to make these preparations during the whole day until the night.

39. The day following, the Syracusans engaged the Athe-

nians at an earlier hour, but on the same plan of attack, both by sea and by land. And being opposed in the same manner with their ships, they again continued making attempts upon each other for a great part of the day; until Aristo son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, and the most able master the Syracusans had, persuaded their naval commanders to send to those who had the direction in the city, and beg them to remove as quickly as possible the supply of things for sale, and to bring it to the sea-side; and whatever eatables any one had, to compel all to come *there* and sell them; that so <sup>1</sup> they might enable them to land their seamen and take their dinner immediately by the side of their ships, and, after a short interval, again the very same day to attack the Athenians, when they were not expecting it.

40. They, then, in compliance with this request sent a messenger, and the market was prepared: upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and sailed to the city, landing immediately, and taking their dinner: while the Athenians, supposing that they had retreated to the city because they were worsted by them, went ashore at their leisure, and were engaged both with other matters and with providing their dinner, imagining that for that day at least they would not have to fight again. But the Syracusans having suddenly manned their ships, sailed out against them a second time; while *they*, in much confusion, and most of them unrefreshed, went on board without any order, and with great difficulty put off to meet them. For some time they forbore from attacking each other, and stood on their guard; but afterwards the Athenians did not choose through their own act to be worn out with fatigue by waiting there, but to attack them as quickly as possible; and so they advanced with a cheer, and commenced the action. The Syracusans received them, and charging with their ships stem to stem, as they had determined beforehand, with their beaks equipped as they were, they stove in the Athenian vessels to a considerable extent of the foreships, while the dart-men fighting on their decks inflicted great damage on the Athenians, and still more those Syracusans who were sailing about in their small boats, falling close in upon

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῖς.] "According to the rule given in the note on III. 98. 1, the dative expresses the action in its relation to another party, namely, the Syracusan government."—*Arnold*.

the oars of the enemy's ships, sailing up to their sides, and thence discharging their darts upon the seamen.

41. At length, by fighting in this way with all their might, the Syracusans gained the victory, and the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued them as far as those vessels; but then the beams that were hung from the merchantmen over the passages between them, with <sup>1</sup>dolphins attached to them, stopped their progress. Two, however, elated by their victory, came up close to them, and were destroyed, one of them being captured with its crew. After the Syracusans had sunk seven Athenian ships and disabled many more, having taken some of the men prisoners and killed others, they retired, and erected trophies for both the engagements; entertaining now a confident hope that by sea they were very decidedly superior, and thinking that they should conquer the enemy's land forces also. Accordingly they began to prepare for making another attack in both ways.

42. At this time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens, consisting of above seventy-three ships (including the foreign ones) and about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and the allies, with dart-men, both Grecian and barbarian, not a few, slingers, bow-men, and the rest of the armament on a large scale. No slight consternation was produced at the moment amongst the Syracusans and their allies, at the thought that they were to have no final deliverance from their dangers, seeing that there was newly come, none the less for the fortification of Decelea, an armament equal, or nearly so, to the first, and that the power of the Athenians appeared great on all sides; while in the former Athenian forces fresh confidence (considering their late misfortunes) had now sprung up. Demosthenes, on the other hand, seeing how matters stood, thought that it was not possible for him to waste the time, and so to experience the fate which Nicias had done. For although that general spread terror on his first arrival, he was despised, through not immediately attacking Syracuse, but spending the winter at Catana, and Gylippus anticipated his success by arriving with forces from the Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for at all if he had immediately attacked them; for while

<sup>1</sup> i. e. heavy weights made something in the form of that fish.

fancying themselves a match for him, they would at once have discovered their inferiority, and have been invested; so that, even if they had sent for them, they would not then have done them the same service. Reviewing these things, then, and thinking that he himself too was decidedly most formidable to the adversary at the present time, even the very first day, Demosthenes wished, as quickly as possible, to avail himself to the utmost of the present dismay of their forces. And seeing that the counter-wall of the Syracusans, by which they had prevented the Athenians from circumvallating them, was but a single one, and that if any one had carried the ascent to Epipolæ, and then the camp on it, the work might easily be taken, (for no one at all would so much as wait his attack,) he was in a hurry to make the attempt. And this he thought was his shortest way of bringing the war to a conclusion; for he would either gain possession of Syracuse by succeeding in his design, or lead back the armament, and not exhaust for no purpose both the Athenians who joined the expedition and the whole state. In the first place, then, the Athenians went out and ravaged a part of the Syracusan territory, about the Anapus, and were superior in force, as they had originally been, both by land and by sea: (for in neither way did the Syracusans come out against them, except with their cavalry and dart-men from the Olympieum.)

43. Afterwards, Demosthenes resolved first to make an attempt on the counter-work with engines. But when the engines, after he had brought them up, were burnt by the enemy who were making a defence from the wall, and they were beaten back when charging at many points with the rest of his forces, he determined to delay no longer; but having gained the assent of Nicias and the rest of his colleagues, according to the plan he had formed, he proceeded to the attempt on Epipolæ. Now, in the day-time it seemed to be impossible for them to approach and make the ascent unobserved. But having issued orders for five days' provisions, and taken all the stone-masons and carpenters, with all the other apparatus besides, both arrows and every thing else that was necessary for them, should they succeed, to have while they were building, he himself, with Eurymedon and Menander, took the whole force, after the first watch of the night, and advanced against Epipolæ, Nicias being left behind in the lines. When they

had come up to the hill on the side of Euryelus, the same way that the former army also had in the first instance made the ascent, they escaped the observation of the Syracusan guard, and having gone to the fort of the Syracusans which was there, they took it, and put part of the garrison to the sword. But the greater part fled immediately to the camps, (of which there were three on Epipolæ, in outworks, one composed of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of their allies,) and informed them of the attack, and told it to the six hundred Syracusans who had formed the original guard at this part of Epipolæ. They immediately went against them; and Demosthenes and the Athenians falling in with them, routed them, though they made a spirited resistance. They then immediately pressed on, that they might not be retarded in their present eagerness for accomplishing the objects they had come for: while others of them proceeded, as their first measure, to take the counter-wall of the Syracusans, and pull down its battlements. The Syracusans and their allies, as well as Gylippus and his division, went to the rescue from the outworks; and as they had had this daring attack made on them in the night, they engaged the Athenians in some dismay, and were at first compelled to retreat. But when the Athenians were now advancing in greater confusion, as having gained the victory, and were anxious to pass as quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy which had not yet been engaged, that they might not rally again through their relaxing in the attack; the Boeotians were the first to oppose them, and both broke them by their charge, and put them to flight.

44. Now, the Athenians were by this time in much disorder and perplexity; but on this subject it was not easy for me to ascertain from either side, in what way each event occurred. For in the day-time the parties engaged have, indeed, a clearer knowledge, though not a perfect one even then, for each man barely knows what happens in his own part of the field. But in a night engagement, (and this was the only one which occurred between great armies during this war,) how could any one have a distinct knowledge of any thing? For though there was a bright moon, they only saw one another (as was natural they should by moonlight) so as to discern the form of the body before them, but to mistrust their knowledge

of its being that of a friend. And there were no few heavily-armed on each side moving in a narrow space. Thus on the side of the Athenians some were even now being defeated, and others coming up unconquered for their first attack. A large part, too, of the rest of their forces had only just ascended, and others were still ascending; so that they did not know on what point to advance. For in consequence of the rout which had taken place, every thing in front was now in confusion, and it was difficult to distinguish orders through the uproar. For the Syracusans and their allies, on gaining the advantage, were cheering each other with no little shouting, (it being impossible during the night to express themselves in any other way,) and at the same time were receiving the charge of their assailants: and the Athenians were in search of one another, and thought that whoever met them was a foe, even though he might be a friend, belonging to those who were now flying back. And by their frequently asking for the watchword, because they could not by any other means distinguish them, they both caused great confusion on their own side by all asking at once, and made it known to the enemy; while theirs, on the other hand, they did not so easily discover, because, as they were victorious and not dispersed, they were better recognised by each other. So that if they fell in with any of the enemy with the advantage of numbers on their own side, the Syracusans escaped from them, inasmuch as they knew the Athenian watchword; but if they themselves [in such a case] did not answer, they were put to the sword. But what especially and in the greatest degree hurt them, was the singing of their hymns; for as it was very similar on each side, it occasioned perplexity. For the Argives, the Corcyraeans, and all of the Dorian race that were with the Athenians, struck terror into them whenever they raised their pæan; and so did the enemy likewise. Thus having at last, when once they were thrown into disorder, come into collision with each other in different parts of the army, friends with friends, and countrymen with countrymen, they were not only full of fear, but even closed in battle with each other, and were with difficulty parted. And now, as they were being pursued, the greater part threw themselves down the cliffs, and perished; as the way down again from Epipolæ was narrow. And when those who escaped from the heights had

reached the plain, though many of them, especially such as belonged to the former armament, through their greater acquaintance with the localities escaped safely to the camp, some of those who had lately arrived lost their way, and wandered about the country; and these, when it was day, the Syracusan horse intercepted, and put to the sword.

45. The next day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolæ, where the enemy's approaches had been made, and the other on the spot where the Boeotians first withstood them; while the Athenians recovered their dead under truce. No few were killed, both of themselves and their allies, though still more arms were taken than in proportion to the number of the dead: for of those who were compelled to leap down the cliffs unencumbered by their shields, though some perished, yet others escaped with their lives.

46. After this, the Syracusans being again, as before, restored to confidence on the strength of such unexpected good fortune, despatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Acragas, which was torn by factions, to induce the city to join them, if he could: while Gylippus again went by land to the other parts of Sicily to bring more forces, being in hope of even taking the Athenian lines by storm, since the affair on Epipolæ had turned out as it did.

47. The Athenian commanders, in the mean time, consulted on the disaster which had befallen them, and on the want of vigour which at present on all accounts prevailed in their camp; seeing that they were both unsuccessful in their attempts, and that the soldiers were annoyed by their stay in the country. For they were suffering with sickness from two different causes, both because this was the season of the year at which men are most liable to disease, and at the same time, too, because the position in which they were encamped was marshy and unfavourable; while they were also distressed because every thing else appeared hopeless to them. Demosthenes, then, was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but, according to the plan with which he had hazarded the attack on Epipolæ, since that had failed, he gave his vote for departing, and not wasting the time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and while, as regarded forces, they might command the superiority with the squadron that had lately joined them, at any rate. He said, too, that it would be more beneficial to the

state to carry on the war against those who were building fortresses for their annoyance in their own country, than against the Syracusans, when it was no longer easy to subdue: nor, again, was it right for them to waste large sums of money to no purpose by continuing the siege. Such, then, was the view entertained by Demosthenes. •

48. Nicias, however, though he too considered their circumstances to be bad, yet did not wish to display their weakness by words, nor that they should become a laughing-stock to their enemies by voting for the retreat openly, and in conjunction with many; for so they would far less elude their observation in executing it, whenever they might wish. To a certain extent also the affairs of the enemy, judging from what he, more than others, knew of them, still afforded some hope that they would be worse than their own, should they persist in carrying on the siege; for so they would exhaust them by want of funds; especially, too, as they had now, with their present fleet, a more extensive command of the sea. A party in Syracuse also, which wished to surrender the city to the Athenians, was sending messengers to him, and urging him not to raise the siege. Knowing these things, then, he was in fact waiting because he was still inclined both ways, and wished to see his course more clearly; but in the speech openly made by him<sup>o</sup> on that occasion he said, "that he refused to withdraw the forces; for he well knew that the Athenians would not put up with such a step on the part of the generals—their returning, he meant, without a vote from themselves to authorize it. Besides, those who would vote in their case, would not give their verdict from seeing the facts, as they themselves had done, instead of hearing them from the invectives of others; but whatever calumnies any clever speaker threw upon them, by those would they be persuaded. Many too, nay, even the greater part of the soldiers present on the spot, who were now clamouring about their perilous condition, would, he said, on arriving there, raise the very contrary clamour, namely, that their generals had utterly betrayed them for money, when they returned. For himself, then, he did not wish (knowing as he did the Athenian character and temper) to die under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence

<sup>1</sup> μετὰ πολλῶν,] i. e. with the Taxiarchs and Trierarchs, who attended when a regular council of war was held. Compare ch. 60. 3.



at the hands of the Athenians, rather than run the risk, in his own individual case, of meeting his fate at the hands of the enemy, if it must be so. As for the affairs of the Syracusans, however, he knew that they were in a still worse condition than their own. For supporting mercenaries as they had to do with their funds, and at the same time spending them on guard-posts, and maintaining, moreover, a large navy, as they had now done for more than a year, they were in some respects ill provided, and in others would be still more at a loss, as they had already expended two hundred talents, and still owed many more; and should they lose any part whatever of their present forces through not giving them supplies, their cause would be ruined, as it was supported by voluntary aid, rather than by compulsory exertions, like theirs. He maintained, therefore, that they must continue to carry on the siege, and not go away defeated in point of money, wherein they were decidedly superior."

49. Such were the views which Nicias was positive in stating, from having gained an accurate acquaintance with the state of affairs in Syracuse, and their want of money; and because there were some who were desirous that the state should fall into the hands of the Athenians, and were sending messages to him not to abandon the siege; and at the same time, <sup>1</sup> because he was influenced by confidence in his fleet, at any rate more than before. Demosthenes, however, would not at

<sup>1</sup> *θαροῦσαι κρατήσεις.*] I have given what appears to me the only sense that this participle can bear, though different from any that has been attributed to it by others. Compare the somewhat similar use of the verb *ἡσσωμαι*, in the sense of "yielding," or "giving way to," e. g. III. 38. 5, *ἡδονὴ ἡσσωμένοι;* and with a genitive, IV. 37. 1, *ἡσσηθεὶς τοῦ παρόντος δαιμό.* If, however, it should be thought that neither this meaning, "nor" (to use the words of Arnold) "any other, can be fairly extracted from the text as it now stands," I should be disposed to adopt a rather bolder emendation than the mere substitution of *κραυγαίς*, which Bauer and so many others after him have admitted, but which, as Poppo observes, leaves the passage scarcely less strange in its phraseology than before. From the fact that six MSS. have *γ' ἂν*, instead of *γούν*, it seems probable that an infinitive mood originally formed part of the sentence; and I venture therefore to propose the following correction: *καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γούν* (or *γ' ἂν*, whichever may be preferred) *ναυαίῳ ἢ πλεονέκῳ θαροῦσαι κρατήσαι*, taking *κρατήσαι* in the same absolute sense as *κρατεῖν* has already borne in a very similar passage, III. 47. 3. If the objections urged by Gölter against understanding *μάλιστα* before *ἂν* be thought valid, his correction *ἢ* may be admitted; "from feeling confident that they should at any rate have the advantage at sea, as they had formerly;" i. e. before their recent defeat in the naval engagement.

all listen to the proposal for continuing the siege; but if it were necessary for them not to withdraw the forces without a decree from the Athenians, but to remain in the country, he said that they should either remove to Thapsus and do so, or to Catana, where they could overrun with their troops a large part of the country, and support themselves by ravaging their enemies' property, and so might injure *them*; while at the same time with their fleet they would fight their battles on the open deep, and not in a confined space, which was more in favour of the enemy, but rather with spacious sea-room, where their skill would be of service to them, and they would have an opportunity of retreating and advancing in no narrow and circumscribed space, both on putting out and coming to land. In a word, he did not, he said, at all approve of remaining in their present position, but of removing immediately without delay. Eurymedon also supported him in this view. But as Nicias objected to it, a degree of diffidence and hesitation was produced in them, and a suspicion also that Nicias might be so positive from knowing something more than he expressed. The Athenians, then, in this way lingered on, and remained where they were.

50. In the mean time, Gylippus and Sicarus had come to Syracuse; and though Sicarus had failed in winning Acragas, (for while he was still at Gela, the party <sup>1</sup> friendly to the Syracusans had been driven out;) yet Gylippus came with fresh troops raised from the rest of Sicily, and with the heavy-armed which had been sent out from the Peloponnese in the spring, on board the merchantmen, and had arrived at Selinus from Libya. For when they had been carried by a tempest to Libya, and the Cyrenæans had given them two triremes, and pilots for their voyage, during their passage along shore they entered into alliance with the Euesperitæ, who were being besieged by the Libyans, and defeated the latter people; and after coasting along thence to Neapolis, an emporium of the Carthaginians, from which the distance is shortest to Sicily, namely, a voyage of two days and a night, they crossed over there from that place, and arrived at Selinus. Immediately on their arrival, the Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again on both sides, by sea and by land. When the Athenian generals, on the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> Literally, "the party for the Syracusans, for friendship with them," as Arnold renders it. See his note.

saw that a fresh force had joined them, and that their own circumstances at the same time were not improving, but were daily becoming worse, and most especially were depressed through the sickness of the men, they repented of not having removed before. And as even Nicias did not now oppose them in the same degree, except by begging them not openly to vote on the question, they gave orders, as secretly as they could, for all to sail out of their stations, and to be ready when the signal should be given. And when, after all was in readiness, they were on the point of sailing away, the moon was eclipsed; for it happened to be at the full. The greater part therefore of the Athenians urged the generals to stop, regarding the matter with religious scruple; and Nicias (for he was somewhat over addicted to superstition, and such feelings,) declared that he would not now so much as consider the matter, with a view to moving, until, as the soothsayers directed, he had waited thrice nine days. And so the Athenians, having been stopped on this account, remained in the country.

51. When the Syracusans, too, heard this, they were much more stimulated not to relax in their efforts against the Athenians, since they themselves had now confessed that they were no longer their superiors, either by sea or by land, (for they would not else have meditated sailing away;) and at the same time, because they did not wish them to go and settle in any other part of Sicily, and so to be more difficult to make war upon; but were desirous of forcing them to a sea-fight there, as quickly as possible, in a position that was advantageous to themselves. They manned their ships therefore, and practised as many days as they thought sufficient. And when a favourable opportunity presented itself, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian lines; and a small division of their heavy-armed and horse having sallied forth against them through certain gateways, they intercepted some of the heavy-armed, and routed and pursued them back; and as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses, and some few heavy-armed.

52. On that day,\* then, the army of the Syracusans drew off; but on the next they both sailed out with their ships, seventy-six in number, and at the same time advanced with their troops against the walls. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, and closed and fought with them.

Now when Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, and wished to surround the ships of the enemy, had sailed out from the line too much towards the shore; the Syracusans and their allies, after first defeating the centre of the Athenians, intercepted *him* also in the bottom and furthest recess of the harbour, and both killed him, and destroyed the ships that were following him. After which the Syracusans closely pursued all the ships of the Athenians, and drove them ashore.

53. When Gylippus saw the enemy's ships defeated, and carried beyond the stockades and their own station, wishing to cut off the men that were landing from them, and that the Syracusans might more easily tow off the vessels, through the land being in possession of their friends, he ran down to meet them at the break-water with some part of his army. The Tyrrhenians (for it was they who were keeping guard at this point) seeing them coming on in disorder, advanced towards them, and fell upon and routed their van, and drove them into what was called the marsh of Lysimelea. Afterwards, when the force of the Syracusans and their allies had now come up in greater numbers, the Athenians also advanced against them, being afraid for their ships, and entered into action with them, and defeated and pursued them to some distance, killing a few heavy-armed. They saved also the greater part of their own ships, and brought them together alongside their station; eighteen of them, however, the Syracusans and their allies captured, and put all the men to the sword. Wishing also to burn the rest of them, they filled an old merchantman with faggots and pine-wood, and having thrown fire into it, and the wind blowing right on the Athenians, they let the vessel drift towards them. The Athenians, alarmed for their ships, contrived, on the other hand, means for checking and extinguishing it; and having stopped the flames and the near approach of the merchantman, they thus escaped the danger.

54. After this, the Syracusans erected a trophy, both for their sea-fight, and for the interception of the heavy-armed above, at the wall, where they also took the horses; while the Athenians did the same for the rout of those of the infantry whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and for that which they themselves effected with the rest of their army.

55. When the victory had now been so decisive on the side

of the Syracusans, even at sea, (for before this they were afraid of the ships newly come with Demosthenes,) the Athenians were in a state of utter despondency; and great was their disappointment, but far greater still their regret, for having made the expedition. For these were the only states they had hitherto attacked with institutions similar to their own, and living under a democracy like themselves; possessing, too, ships, and horses, and greatness: and as they were not able either to introduce any change, as regarded their government, to create dissension among them, by which they might have been brought over, nor to effect that by means of their forces, (though <sup>1</sup> they were far superior,) but had failed in most of their attempts, they were even before this event in perplexity; and after they were defeated even at sea, which they could never have expected, they were far more so still.

56. The Syracusans, on the other hand, immediately began to sail without fear along the harbour, and determined to close up its mouth, that the Athenians might not in future sail out, even if they wished it, unobserved by them. For they were no longer attending to their own preservation merely, but also to the prevention of the enemy's escape; thinking (as was the fact) that with their present resources their own cause was decidedly the stronger; and that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies both by land and sea, the victory would appear a glorious one for them in the eyes of the Greeks. For of the rest of the Greeks some in that case were straightway liberated, and others released from fear, (as the remaining power of the Athenians would no longer be able to bear the war that would afterwards be waged against them;) while they themselves also, being regarded as the authors of this, would be greatly admired, both by the rest of the world, and by posterity. And the contest was indeed worth encountering,

<sup>1</sup> *κρείσους*.] I have taken this as a nominative case, with Arnold and others, rather than as an accusative, as Poppo is inclined to do in his larger edition; because the superiority of the Athenian forces at the beginning of their operations is quite evident from many other passages, even besides those referred to in Arnold's note; and the use of the participle *ἐπελθόντες* at the beginning of the section is more suitable to the commencement of the siege, than to the later period of it, when the Syracusans could with truth be said to be superior to their assailants. Besides, *όντες* is found after *κρείσους* in three of the MSS. With regard to the construction of *ἐκ παρασκευῆς*, it seems to depend upon *προσάγεισθαι* understood from the preceding *προσέγερτο*, as Bloomfield observes in the note to his translation.

both on these grounds, and because they were winning the victory, not only over the Athenians, but over the other numerous allies also; and, again, not winning it by themselves, but also in company with those who had joined in assisting them; having taken the lead, too, with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and given their own city to stand the first brunt of the danger, and paved the way, in great measure, for their naval success. For the greatest number of nations met together at this single city, excepting the whole sum of the confederates assembled, during the war, at the city of Athens or of Lacedæmon.

57. For the following were the states on each side that repaired to Syracuse for the war, coming against Sicily, or in its behalf, to assist the one side in winning, and the other in keeping possession of the country; taking their stand with one another, not so much on the ground of right, or of kindred, but as they were each circumstanced with respect either to expediency or to necessity. The Athenians themselves went willingly, as Ionians against the Dorians of Syracuse; and with them went, as their colonists, having the same language and institutions as themselves, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Æginetans, who <sup>1</sup>then occupied Ægina; as also the Hestians, who inhabited Hestia, in Bœotia. Of the rest, some were serving with them as subjects; others in consequence of their alliance, although independent; and others as mercenaries. Amongst their subjects and tributaries were the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians, of Eubœa. From the islands were the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians: from Ionia, the Milesians, Samnians, and Chians. Of these, the Chians joined as independent allies, not being subject to tribute, but supplying ships. All these were chiefly Ionians, and descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians, who were Dryopes; and though subject, and going from necessity, <sup>2</sup>still they followed at any rate as Ionians against Dorians. Besides these, there were of Æolic race, the Methymnæans, subject to supplying ships but not tribute; and the Tenedians and Ænians, who were tributaries. These, although Æolians, were by

<sup>1</sup> Implying that the present were not the original inhabitants of it.

<sup>2</sup> *ἰσθὲς γὰρ ἐστὶ ἀσπίδας.*] "That is, it was not unnatural or irksome to them to serve against their natural enemies, although it was not in a quarrel of their own."—*Arnold*.

compulsion fighting against Æolians, namely, the Bœotians, their founders, who were on the Syracusan side. But the Plateans alone fought as Bœotians<sup>1</sup> right in the face of Bœotians, as might have been expected, for the hatred they bore them. Of Rhodians and Cytherians, again, both of Doric race, the Cytherians, though colonists of the Lacedæmonians, were fighting in concert with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians with Gylippus; while the Rhodians, who were Argives by race, were compelled to wage war against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and the Geloans, who were even their own colonists, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders around the Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians followed, indeed, as independent allies, but still, on account of their insular position, rather by constraint, because the Athenians commanded the sea. The Coreyræans, though not only Dorians but even Corinthians, followed openly against the Corinthians and Syracusans, though colonists of the one and kinsmen of the other; by compulsion, according to their specious profession, but rather with good will, for the hatred they bore the Corinthians. The Messenians, too, as they are now called, at Naupactus, and also from Pylus, which was then held by the Athenians, were taken to the war. Moreover some few Megarean exiles, owing to their misfortune, were fighting against the Selinuntines, who were Megareans. Of the rest the service was now more of a voluntary nature. For it was not so much on account of their alliance, as out of hatred for the Lacedæmonians, and for their own individual advantage at the moment, that the Argives followed in company of the Ionian Athenians to fight as Dorians against Dorians. While the Mantineans, and other mercenaries from Arcadia, went as being accustomed to go against the enemies who at any time were pointed out to them; and thought, for the sake of gain, that the Arcadians, who at that time came with the Corinthians, were no less than others their foes. The Cretans and Ætolians also came for consideration of pay; and it happened in the case of the Cretans, that although they had joined the Rhodians in founding Gela, they now came, not

<sup>1</sup> *καταβιωτοῖς*.] Such is perhaps the force of the word, in the absence of any instance in which Thucydides uses it for *ἀντικρυσ*. Otherwise the meaning of "absolute" or "downright Bœotians," would suit the passage much better, as distinguishing between the Plateans who actually lived in the country, and those before mentioned who were only colonies from it.

with their colonists, but *against* them—not by choice, but for pay. There were also some Acarnanians who served as auxiliaries, partly from motives of interest, but mainly as being allies, through their friendship with Demosthenes, and their good-will towards the Athenians. These, then, <sup>1</sup> were within the boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italiots, on the other hand, the Tharians and Metapontines, as they had been overtaken by such necessities at that time, owing to those seasons of faction, joined in the expedition; and of the Siceliots, the Naxians and Catanians. Of barbarians, there were the Segestans, who indeed invited them to their aid, with the greater part of the Sicels; and of those out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrhenians, on account of a quarrel with the Syracusans, and some Iapygian mercenaries. Such and so many were the nations that were serving with the Athenians.

58. To the aid of the Syracusans, on the other hand, came the Camarinæans, who lived on their borders; the Geloans, who lived next to them; and then (for the Acragantines were neutral) the Selinuntines, who were situated on the farther side of the island. These occupied the part of Sicily opposite to Libya, but the Himeræans the side towards the Tyrrhenian sea, in which they are the only Greek inhabitants, and from which they were the only auxiliaries of the Syracusans. Such then were the Grecian communities in Sicily that joined in the war, being all Dorians and independent. Of the barbarians, there were the Sicels alone, such of them as had not gone over to the Athenians. Of the Greeks beyond the limits of Sicily, there were the Lacedæmonians, who supplied a Spartan leader, while the rest of the troops were Neodamodes and Helots; (the term Neodamode being now equivalent to free;) the Corinthians, who alone of all the allies joined with both sea and land forces; the Leucadians, also, and Ambraciots, for the sake of their connexion with them; while mercenaries were sent from Arcadia by the Corinthians, and some Sicyonians, who were pressed into the service. From beyond the Peloponnese, some Boeotians joined them. Compared, however, with these who came as auxiliaries, the Siceliots themselves supplied larger numbers in every branch of the service, inasmuch as

<sup>1</sup> τῶ 'Ιονίῳ κόλπῳ ὁριζόμενοι,] i. e. who were separated by that sea from the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. Compare VI. 13, τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑσθίων, χωρήμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῶ τε 'Ιονίῳ κόλπῳ, κ. τ. λ.



they were powerful states; for numerous heavy-armed, ships, and horses, and an abundant 'crowd besides,' were collected by them. And compared, again, with all the rest put together, as one may say, the Syracusans by themselves furnished more numerous levies, both from the greatness of their city, and because they were in the greatest peril.

59. Such were the auxiliaries collected on either side, which, by this time, had all joined both parties, and there were no subsequent additions to either.

The Syracusans and their allies, then, reasonably conceived that it would be a glorious prize for them, after their recent victory in the sea-fight, to capture the whole armament of the Athenians, great as it was, and not to let them escape either way, neither by sea nor land. They began therefore immediately to close up the great harbour, the mouth of which was about eight stades across, with triremes ranged broadside, and merchant-vessels, and boats, mooring them with anchors; while they prepared every thing else, in case the Athenians should still have courage for a sea-fight, and entertained no small designs with regard to any thing.

60. The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour, and having received intelligence of their other plans, thought it necessary to hold a council. Accordingly the generals and the Taxiarchs assembled to deliberate on their difficulties, arising both from other causes, and especially because they had neither any more provisions for their immediate use, (for, thinking that they were going to sail away, they had sent before to Catana, and commanded them to bring them no longer,) nor were likely to have them in future, unless they should gain the command of the sea. They determined therefore to evacuate the upper part of their lines, and having enclosed with a cross wall just by the ships, the least space that could be sufficient to hold their stores and their sick, to garrison that, while with the rest of their troops, making every one go on board, they manned all their ships, both such as were sound and such as were less fit for service; and after a naval engagement, if they were victorious, to proceed to Catana; but if not, to burn their ships, throw themselves into line, and retreat by land, in whatever direction they would soonest reach some friendly town, whether barbarian or Grecian.

<sup>1</sup> *σμῖλος*,] i. e. of light-armed irregulars.

They, then, having resolved on these things, acted accordingly; for they gradually descended from their upper lines, and manned all their ships, having compelled to go on board whoever, even in any degree, seemed of age for rendering service. Thus there were manned in all about a hundred and ten ships; on board which they embarked a large number of bow-men and dart-men, taken from the Acarnanian and other mercenaries, and provided every thing else, as far as it was possible for them, when acting upon a plan which necessity alone dictated, such as the present. When most things were in readiness, Nicias, seeing the soldiers disheartened by their decided defeat at sea, and wishing, in consequence of the scarcity of provisions, to hazard a final battle as speedily as possible, assembled them, and on that occasion addressed them all together first, and spoke as follows:

61. "Soldiers of the Athenians, and of the other allies, the coming struggle will be common alike to all—for the safety and country of each of us, no less than of the enemy; since if we now gain a victory with our fleet, each one may see his native city again, wherever it may be. Nor should you be disheartened, or feel like the most inexperienced of men, who, after failing in their first attempts, ever after have the anticipation of their fear taking the colour of their disasters. But as many of you here as are Athenians, having already had experience in many wars, and all the allies who have ever joined us in our expeditions, remember the unexpected results that occur in warfare; and make your preparations with a hope that fortune may at length side with us, and with a determination to renew the conflict in a manner worthy of your numbers, which you see yourselves to be so great.

62. "Now whatever we saw likely to be serviceable against the confined space of the harbour, with reference to the crowd of ships that there will be, and the enemy's troops upon their decks, from which we suffered before, every thing has now been looked to and prepared by us also, as far as present cir-

<sup>1</sup> παρεκαλεύσατο τότε πρῶτον.] I have retained the old reading τότε, though all the editors have changed it into τε, because I think it is by no means inexpressive, if taken with πρῶτον; the two words being intended, in my opinion, to make a marked distinction between the speech addressed by Nicias "on that first occasion," to all the troops together, and that which he afterwards addressed to the trierarchs by themselves. See ch. 69. 2, αὐτῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, κ. τ. λ.

cumstances would allow, with the co-operation of the masters of our vessels. For great numbers of bow-men and dart-men will go on board, and a multitude such as we should not have used, had we been fighting in the open sea, as it would have interfered with the display of our skill through the weight of our ships; but in the present *land-fight* which we are compelled to make on board our ships, these things will be of service. We have also ascertained the different ways in which we must adapt the structure of our vessels for opposing theirs, and especially, against the stoutness of their cheeks, from which we received most damage, we have provided grappling irons, which will prevent the ship's retiring<sup>1</sup> again after it has once charged, if the soldiers on board then do their duty. For to this necessity are we reduced, that we must maintain a land-fight on board our fleet; and it seems to be our interest neither to retire ourselves, nor to suffer them to do it; especially as the shore, except so far as our troops occupy it, is in possession of the enemy.

63. "Remembering this, then, you must fight on as long as you can, and not be driven to land, but determine, when one ship has closed with another, not to separate before you have swept off the soldiers from your enemy's deck. And this exhortation I offer to the soldiers not less than to the sailors, inasmuch as this work belongs more to those upon deck. And we have still even now a general superiority with our troops. On the other hand, I advise the seamen, and entreat them too at the same time, not to be too much dismayed by their misfortunes, as we have now superior resources on our decks, and a larger number of ships. Consider, too, how well worth preserving is that pleasure enjoyed by those of you, who, being hitherto considered as Athenians, even though you are not, from your knowledge of our language and your imitation of our customs, were respected through Greece, and enjoyed no less a share of our empire as regarded the benefits you derived from it, and a far greater share as regards being feared by our subjects, and being secured from injuries. Since then you alone, as free men, share our empire with us, abstain, as just men, from now utterly betraying it. And with contempt for Corinthians, whom you have often conquered, and for Si-

[*ἡ δὲ πάλιν ἀνὰ πρῶτον*,] i. e. retiring in order to gain the momentum required for a fresh attack. See note on ch. 36.

celiots, none of whom presumed, while our fleet was in fine condition, so much as to stand up against us, repel them, and show that, even when attended by weakness and misfortunes, your skill is superior to the fortunate strength of any others.

64. "Those of you, again, who are Athenians, I must remind of this also, that you left behind you no more such ships in your docks, nor so fine a body of heavy-armed troops; and that if any thing else befall you but victory, your enemies here will immediately sail thither, and those of our countrymen who are left behind there will be unable to defend themselves against both their opponents on the spot and those who will join them; and thus at the same time you who are here will be at the mercy of the Syracusans, (and you know with what feelings you came against them,) and those who are there at home at that of the Lacedæmonians. Being brought then to this one struggle for both parties, fight bravely now, if you ever did; and reflect, both individually and collectively, that those of you who will now be on board your ships represent both the army and the navy of the Athenians, all that is left of your country, and the great name of Athens: in behalf of which, whatever be the point in which one man excels another, either in science or courage, on no other occasion could he better display it, so as both to benefit himself and to contribute to the preservation of all."

65. Nicias delivered this exhortation to them, and immediately commanded them to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans, on the other hand, were able to perceive, from the sight of their very preparations, that the Athenians were about to engage them at sea, and the device of throwing the grappling irons had also been previously reported to them. They prepared themselves therefore on all other points severally, and on this also; for they covered over with hides their prows and a considerable space of the upper part of the vessel, so that the grapple, when thrown, might slip off, and not obtain any hold on them. And now, when every thing was ready, their generals, together with Gylippus, exhorted them by speaking as follows:

66. "That our former achievements have been glorious ones, Syracusans and allies, and that this struggle will be for glorious results in future, most of you seem to us to be aware, (for you would not else have devoted yourselves so eagerly to

it,) and if any one is not as sensible of it as he ought to be, we will prove it to him. For when the Athenians had come to this country, for the subjugation of Sicily in the first place, and then, if they succeeded, for that of the Peloponnese also, and the rest of Greece; and when they possessed the largest empire enjoyed hitherto, either by Greeks of former times or of the present, you were the first men in the world who withstood their navy, with which they had borne down every thing, and have already conquered them in some sea-fights, and will now, in all probability, conquer them in this. For when men have been put down in that in which they claim to excel, their opinion of themselves in future is far lower than if they had never entertained such an idea at first; and failing through the disappointment of their boasting, they give way even beyond the degree of their power. And such, probably, is now the feeling of the Athenians.

67. "But in our case, both the opinion we entertained before, and with which, even while we were yet unskilful, we were full of daring, has now been confirmed; and from the addition to it of the thought that we must be the best seamen in the world, since we have conquered the best, each man's hope is doubled. And, generally speaking, it is the greatest hope that supplies also the greatest spirit for undertakings. Again, those points in which they are imitating our equipments are familiar to our habits, and we shall not be awkward at each of them: whereas, on their side, when many soldiers are on their decks contrary to their custom, and many dart-men, mere land-lubbers, (so to speak,) Acarnanians and others, have gone on board their ships, who will not so much as know how to discharge their weapons while stationary, how can they avoid swaying the ships, and falling all into confusion amongst themselves, by not moving according to their own fashion? For neither will they derive any benefit from the superior number of their ships, (if any of you

τοι,] or, as others take it, "unprepared against each of them."  
 \* χερσαῖοι.] I have ventured to use a rather *slang* term, because the qualifying expression, *ἐκ στεφίω*, which is added in the original, seems to imply that χερσαῖοι was employed by him with a similar meaning of reproach. The meaning of σφαλλω, as used just below, seems borrowed from the unsteady reeling motion of an intoxicated person; the simile used by the Psalmist with reference to mariners tossed in the storm, "they reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end." Or it may mean to "embarrass."

be afraid of this, I mean the idea of his not going to fight them with an equal number;) for many ships in a small space will be less effective for executing any of the movements they may wish, while they are most liable to be injured by our preparations. On the contrary, be assured of this, which is most true, according to the certain information which we believe we have received. It is through the excess of their miseries, and from being forced to it by their present distress, that they are induced to make a desperate effort; not so much from confidence in their resources, as from hazarding a chance, in whatever way they can, that they may either force their passage and sail out, or afterwards retreat by land; since, at any rate, they could not fare worse than at present.

68. "To avail yourselves then of such confusion, and of the very fortune of our bitterest enemies, which has betrayed itself, let us close with them in wrath, and consider that the feeling of those men is most lawful, with regard to their enemies, who determine, when taking vengeance on their aggressor, to glut the animosity of their heart: and that we too shall have an opportunity of avenging ourselves on our foes—the very thing which is every where said to be most sweet. For that they are our foes, and our bitterest foes, you all know; inasmuch as they came against our country to enslave it, and if they had succeeded, would have imposed on our men all that was most painful; on our children and wives, all that is most dishonourable; and on our whole country, the title which is most degrading. Wherefore no one ought to relent, or deem it gain that they should merely go away without danger to us. For that they will do just the same, even if they gain the victory. But that, through our succeeding (as we probably shall do) in our wishes, these men should be punished, and should leave a more secure liberty for the whole of Sicily, which even before enjoyed that blessing; this is a glorious object to contend for. And of all hazards those are most rare, which, while they cause least harm, by failure, confer most advantage by success."

69. The Syracusan commanders and Gylippus having in their turn thus exhorted their men, immediately manned the ships on their side also, since they saw that the Athenians were doing it. Nicias, on the other hand, being dismayed at the present circumstances of himself and his colleagues, and seeing how great and how close at hand now their peril was,

since they were all but on the point of putting out ; considering, too, (as men usually feel in great emergencies,) that in deed every thing fell short of what they would have it, while in word enough had not yet been said by them ; again called to him each one of the Trierarchs, addressing them severally by their father's name, their own, and that of their tribe ; begging each one who enjoyed any previous distinction, from personal considerations not to sacrifice it, nor to obscure those hereditary virtues for which his forefathers were illustrious ; reminding them too of their country—the most free one in the world—and the power, subject to no man's dictation, which all enjoyed in it with regard to their mode of life ; mentioning other things also, such as men would say at a time now so critical, not guarding against being thought by any one to bring forward old and hackneyed topics, and such as are advanced in all cases alike, about men's wives and children and country's gods, but loudly appealing to them, because they think they may be of service in the present consternation. Thus he, thinking that he had addressed to them an exhortation which was not so much a satisfactory one, as one that he was compelled to be content with, went away from them, and led the troops down to the beach, and ranged them over as large a space as he could, that the greatest possible assistance might be given to those on board towards keeping up their spirits. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who went on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, put out from their own station, and immediately sailed to the bar at the mouth of the harbour, and the passage through it which had been closed up, wishing to force their way to the outside.

[*εὖ τὸν παραλειφθέντα δέκλουν.*] As some correction of this reading seems necessary, I have preferred that which is adopted by Arnold, *καταλειφθέντα*, to that which Bekker proposes, *περιλειφθέντα* : because it seems far more probable from the next chapter that no passage at all was left by the Syracusans. If there had been, why should the Athenians, when they had defeated the squadron at the harbour's mouth, have attempted to break the fastenings of the vessels which formed the bar, (sec. 2,) instead of sailing out at once, as some of them probably would have done, under their present circumstances, if the passage had been open for them. Bloomfield indeed thinks that the mere fact of a Syracusan squadron having been posted near the mouth of the harbour proves that there must have been an opening left. But surely this is a very weak proof : for knowing as they did that the Athenians would break down the bar if they possibly could, it was a very natural precaution to defend it with a division of their fleet.

70. The Syracusans and their allies, having previously put out with pretty nearly the same number of ships as before, proceeded to keep guard with part of them at the passage out, and also round the circumference of the whole harbour, that they might fall upon the Athenians on all sides at once, while their troops also at the same time came to their aid at whatever part their vessels might put in to shore. The commanders of the Syracusan fleet were Sicanus and Agatharchus, each occupying a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians in the centre. When the Athenians came up to the bar, in the first rush with which they charged they got the better of the ships posted at it, and endeavoured to break the fastenings. Afterwards, when the Syracusans and their allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the engagement was going on no longer at the bar alone, but over the harbour also; and an obstinate one it was, such as none of the previous ones had been. For great eagerness for the attack was exhibited by the seamen on both sides, when the command was given; and there was much counter-manceuvring on the part of the masters, and rivalry with each other; while the soldiers on board exerted themselves, when vessel came in collision with vessel, that the operations on deck might not fall short of the skill shown by others. Indeed every one, whatever the duty assigned him, made every effort that he might himself in each case appear the best man. And as a great number of ships were engaged in a small compass, (for indeed they were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space that had ever been known, since both of them together fell little short of two hundred,) the attacks made with the beaks were few, as there were no means of backing water, or cutting through the enemy's line; but chance collisions were more frequent, just as one ship might happen to run into another, either in flying from or attacking a second. So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge, those on her decks plied their javelins, arrows, and stones in abundance against her; but when they came to close quarters, the heavy-armed marines, fighting hand to hand, endeavoured to board each other's ships. In many cases too it happened, through want of room, that on one side they were charging an enemy, and on the other were being charged themselves, and that two ships, and sometimes even more, were by compulsion en-



tangled round one. And thus the masters had to guard against some, and to concert measures against others—not one thing at a time, but many things on every side—while the great din from such a number of ships coming into collision both spread dismay and prevented their hearing what the boatswains said. For many were the orders given and the shouts raised by those officers on each side, both in the discharge of their duty, and from their present eagerness for the battle: while they cried out to the Athenians, “to force the passage, and now, if ever they meant to do it hereafter, to exert themselves heartily for a safe return to their country;” and to the Syracusans and their allies, “that it would be a glorious achievement for them to prevent the enemy’s escape, and by gaining the victory to confer honour on their respective countries.” The commanders, moreover, on each side, if they saw any captain in any part unnecessarily rowing astern, called out on him by name and asked him, on the side of the Athenians, “whether they were retreating because they considered the land, which was in the possession of their bitterest enemies, as more their own than the sea, which had been won with no small trouble?” on that of the Syracusans, “whether they were themselves flying from the flying Athenians, whom they knew for certain to be anxious to escape from them in any way whatever?”

71. The troops on shore too, on both sides, when the sea-fight was so equally balanced, suffered a great agony and conflict of feelings; those of the country being ambitious now of still greater honour, while their invaders were afraid of faring even worse than at present. For, since the Athenians’ all was staked on their fleet, their fear for the future was like none they had ever felt before; and from the unequal nature of the engagement they were also compelled to have an unequal view of it from the beach. For as the spectacle was near at hand, and as they did not all look at the same part at once, if any saw their own men victorious in any quarter, they would be encouraged, and turn to calling on the gods not to deprive them of safety; while those who looked on the part that was being beaten, uttered lamentations at the same time as cries, and from the sight they had of what was going on, expressed their feelings more than those engaged in the action. Others, again, looking on a doubtful point of the engagement, in con-

sequence of the indecisive continuance of the conflict, in their excessive fear made gestures with their very bodies, corresponding with their thoughts, and continued in the most distressing state, for they were constantly within a little of escaping, or of being destroyed. And thus amongst the troops of the Athenians, as long as they were fighting at sea on equal terms, every sound might be heard at once, wailing, shouting, "they conquer," "they are conquered," and all the other various exclamations which a great armament in great peril would be constrained to utter—very much in the same way as their men on board their ships were affected—until at length, after the battle had continued for a long time, the Syracusans and their allies routed the Athenians, and pressing on them in a decisive manner, with much shouting and cheering of each other on, pursued them to the shore. Then the sea forces, as many as were not taken afloat, put in to the land at different parts, and rushed from on board to the camp. while the army, no longer with any different feelings, but all on one impulse, lamenting and groaning, deplored the event, and proceeded, some to succour the ships, others to guard what remained of their wall; while others, and those the greatest part, began now to think of themselves, and how they should best provide for their own preservation. Indeed their dismay at the moment had been exceeded by none of all they had ever felt. And they now experienced pretty nearly what they had themselves inflicted at Pylus: for by the Lacedæmonians' losing their ships, their men who had crossed over into the island were lost to them besides: and at this time for the Athenians to escape by land was hopeless, unless something beyond all expectation should occur.

72. After the battle had been thus obstinately disputed, and many ships and men destroyed on both sides, the Syracusans and allies, having gained the victory, took up their wrecks and dead, and then sailed away to the city, and erected a trophy. The Athenians, from the extent of their present misery, did not so much as think about their dead or their wrecks, or of asking permission to take them up, but wished to retreat immediately during the night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias, and expressed it as his opinion, that they should still man their remaining ships, and force their passage out, if they could, in the morning; alleging that they still had

left more ships fit for service than the enemy; for the Athenians had about sixty remaining, while their adversaries had less than fifty. But when Nicias agreed with this opinion, and they wished to man them, the seamen would not embark, through being dismayed at their defeat, and thinking that they could not now gain a victory. And so they all now made up their minds to retreat by land.

73. But Hermocrates the Syracusan, suspecting their purpose, and thinking that it would be a dreadful thing, if so large a force, after retreating by land and settling any where in Sicily, should choose again to carry on the war with them, went to the authorities, and explained to them that they ought not to suffer them to retreat during the night, (stating what he himself thought,) but that all the Syracusans and allies should at once go out, and block up the roads, and keep guard beforehand at the narrow passes. But though the magistrates also agreed with him in thinking this, no less than himself, and were of opinion that it ought to be done, yet they thought that the people, in their recent joy and relaxation after the labours of a great sea-fight, especially, too, as it was a time of feasting, (for they happened to celebrate on this day a sacrifice to Hercules,) would not easily be induced to listen to them; as the majority, from excessive gladness at their victory, had fallen to drinking during the festival, and would, they expected, rather obey them in any thing than in taking arms, just at present, and marching out. When, on consideration of this, it appeared a difficulty to the magistrates, and Hermocrates could not then prevail upon them to attempt it, he afterwards devised the following scheme. Being afraid that the Athenians might get the start of them by quietly passing during the night the most difficult points of the country, he sent certain of his own friends with some cavalry to the Athenian camp, as soon as it grew dark. These, riding up to within hearing, and calling to them certain individuals, as though they were friends of the Athenians, (for there were some who sent tidings to Nicias of what passed within the city,) desired them to tell that general not to lead off his army by night, as

<sup>1</sup> ἂ καὶ αὐτῷ ἰδοῦναι.] I see no reason whatever for any such alteration of αὐτῷ, as Bauer and Dörrie propose; as the words evidently refer to the fact mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, that Hermocrates had himself suspected (ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάδοιν) what he stated to the magistrates as the design of the Athenians.

the Syracusans were guarding the roads ; but to retire leisurely by day after making his preparations. They then, after delivering this message, returned ; while those who heard it, reported the same to the Athenian generals.

74. They, in accordance with the information, stopped for the night, considering it to be no false statement. And since they had not, as it was, set out immediately, they determined to remain over the next day also, that the soldiers might pack up, as well as they could, the most useful articles ; and though they left every thing else behind, to take with them, when they started, just what was necessary for their personal support. But the Syracusans and Gylippus had marched out before with their troops, and were blocking up the roads through the country where it was likely the Athenians would advance, as well as guarding the passages of the streams and rivers, and posting themselves for the reception of the army, in order to stop it where they thought best ; while with their ships they sailed to those of the Athenians, and towed them off from the beach. Some few indeed the Athenians themselves had burnt, as they had intended ; but the rest they lashed to their own at their leisure, as each had been thrown up on any part of the beach, and, without any one trying to stop them, conveyed them to the city.

75. After this, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought they were sufficiently prepared, the removal of the army took place, on the third day after the sea-fight. It was a wretched scene then, not on account of the single circumstance alone, that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, and while both themselves and their country were in danger, instead of being in high hope ; but also because, on leaving their camp, every one had grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel in his heart. For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw a friend on the ground, he was struck at once with grief and fear. And the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, were to the living a much more sorrowful spectacle than the dead, and more piteous than those who had perished. For having recourse to entreaties and wailings, they reduced them to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and appealing to each individual friend or relative that any of them might any where see ; or hanging on their comrades, as they were now going away ; or following as far as they could, and

when in any case the strength of their body failed, not being left behind without many appeals to heaven and many lamentations. So that the whole army, being filled with tears and distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from an enemy's country, and although they had both suffered already miseries too great for tears to express, and were still afraid for the future, lest they might suffer more. There was also amongst them much dejection and depreciation of their own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city starved out and attempting to escape; and no small one too, for of their whole multitude there were not less than forty thousand on the march. Of these, all the rest took whatever each one could that was useful, and the heavy-armed and cavalry themselves, contrary to custom, carried their own food under their arms, some for want of servants, others through distrusting them; for they had for a long time been deserting, and did so in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what they carried was not sufficient; for there was no longer any food in the camp. Nor, again, was their other misery, and their equal participation in sufferings, (though it affords some alleviation to endure with others,) considered even on that account easy to bear at the present time; especially, when they reflected from what splendour and boasting at first they had been reduced to such an abject termination. For this was the greatest reverse that ever befell a Grecian army; since, in contrast to their having come to enslave others, they had to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home, they had to start on their return with omens the very contrary of these; going by land, instead of by sea, and relying on a military rather than a naval force. But nevertheless, in consequence of the greatness of the danger still impending, all these things seemed endurable to them.

76. Nicias, seeing the army dejected, and greatly changed, passed along the ranks, and encouraged and cheered them, as well as existing circumstances allowed; speaking still louder than before, as he severally came opposite to them, in the

[Ὀὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων.] Arnold thinks that "the negative must be twice repeated," as if it were οὐκ ἄνευ οὐκ ὀλίγων, just as "non modo" in Latin is used instead of "non modo non." Or, may it be considered as a confusion of two expressions, viz. οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν and μετ' οὐκ ὀλίγων?

earnestness of his feeling, and from wishing to be of service to them by making himself audible to as many as possible.

77. "Still, even in our present circumstances, Athenians and allies, must we cherish hope; for some men have, ere now, been preserved even from more dreadful circumstances than these. Nor should you think too meanly of yourselves, or yield too much to your misfortunes and present sufferings, which are beyond your desert. For my own part, though I am not superior to any of you in strength, (for you see what a state I am in through disease,) and though I consider myself to be second to none, whether in my private life or in other respects, yet now I am exposed to every danger, like the very meanest. And yet I have lived with much<sup>1</sup> devotion, as regards the gods, and much justice and freedom from reproach, as regards men. And therefore my hope is still strong for the future; and my calamities do not terrify me, so much as they might. Nay, they may perhaps be alleviated; for our enemies have enjoyed enough good fortune; and if we displeased any of the gods by making this expedition, we have already been sufficiently punished for it. Others also, we know, have ere now marched against their neighbours; and after acting as men do, have suffered what they could endure. And so in our case it is reasonable now to hope that we shall find the wrath of the gods mitigated; for we are now deserving of pity at their hands, rather than of envy. Looking, too, on your own ranks, what experienced and numerous men of arms there are with you, advancing in battle-array together, do not be too much dismayed, but consider that you are yourselves at once a city, wherever you may settle; and that there is no other in Sicily that would either easily resist your attack, or expel you when settled any where. With regard to the march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to that yourselves; with no other consideration, each of you, than that whatever the spot on which he may be compelled to fight, on that he will have, if victorious, both a country and a fortress. And we shall hurry on our way both by day and night alike, as we have but scanty provisions; and if we can only reach some friendly town of the Sicels, (for they, through their fear of the Syracusans, are still true to us,)

<sup>1</sup> νόμιμα.] Compare the use of the cognate participle, ch. 86. 5, τῇν πᾶσαν ἐν ἀρετῇ νομοσιμένην ἐπιτῆδευσιν.

then consider yourselves to be in security. And a message has been sent forward to them, and directions have been given them to meet us, and bring a fresh supply of provisions. In short, you must be convinced, soldiers, both that it is necessary for you to be brave men—since there is no place near which you can reach in safety; if you act like cowards—and, at the same time, that if you escape from your enemies now, the rest of you will gain a sight of all you may any where wish to see; and the Athenians will raise up again, though fallen at present, the great power of their country. For it is *men* that make a city, and not walls, or ships, without any to man them."

78. Nicias, then, delivered this exhortation, and at the same time went up to the troops, and if he saw them any where straggling, and not marching in order, he collected and brought them to their post; while Demosthenes also did no less to those who were near him, addressing them in a similar manner. They marched in the form of a hollow square, the division under Nicias taking the lead, and that of Demosthenes following; while the baggage bearers and the main crowd of camp followers were enclosed within the heavy-armed. When they had come to the ford of the river Anapus, they found drawn up at it a body of the Syracusans and allies; but having routed these, and secured the passage, they proceeded onwards; while the Syracusans pressed them with charges of horse, as their light-armed did with their missiles. On that day the Athenians advanced about forty stades, and then halted for the night on a hill. The day following, they commenced their march at an early hour, and having advanced about twenty stades, descended into a level district, and there encamped, wishing to procure some eatables from the houses, (for the place was inhabited,) and to carry on with them water from it, since for many stades before them, in the direction they were to go, it was not plentiful. The Syracusans, in the near time, had gone on before, and were blocking up the pass in advance of them. For there was there a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side of it, called the Acræum Lepas. The next day the Athenians advanced, and the horse and dart-men of the Syracusans and allies, each in great numbers, impeded their progress, hurling their missiles upon them, and annoying them with cavalry charges. The Atheni-

ans fought for a long time, and then returned again to the same camp, no longer having provisions as they had before; for it was no more possible to leave their position, because of the cavalry.

79. Having started early, they began their march again, and forced their way to the hill which had been fortified; where they found before them the enemy's infantry drawn up for the defence of the wall many spears deep; for the pass was but narrow. The Athenians charged and assaulted the wall, but being annoyed with missiles by a large body from the hill, which was steep, (for those on the heights more easily reached their aim,) and not being able to force a passage, they retreated again, and rested. There happened also to be at the same time some claps of thunder and rain, as is generally the case when the year is now verging on autumn; in consequence of which the Athenians were still more dispirited, and thought that all these things also were conspiring together for their ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their troops to intercept them again with a wall on their rear, where they had already passed: but they, on their side also, sent some of their men against them, and prevented their doing it. After this, the Athenians returned again with all their army into the more level country, and there halted for the night. The next day they marched forward, while the Syracusans discharged their weapons on them, surrounding them on all sides, and disabled many with wounds; retreating if the Athenians advanced against them, and pressing on them if they gave way; most especially attacking their extreme rear, in the hope that by routing them little by little, they might strike terror into the whole army. The Athenians resisted this mode of attack for a long time, but then, after advancing five or six stades, halted for rest on the plain; while the Syracusans also went away from them to their own camp.

80. During the night, their troops being in a wretched condition, both from the want of all provisions which was now felt, and from so many men being disabled by wounds in the numerous attacks that had been made upon them by the enemy, Nicias and Demosthenes determined to light as many fires as possible, and then lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but in the opposite direction



to, where the Syracusans were watching for them, namely, to the sea. Now the whole of this road would lead the army, not towards Catana, but to the other side of Sicily, to Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that direction, whether Grecian or barbarian. They kindled therefore many fires, and began their march in the night. And as all armies, and especially the largest, are liable to have terrors and panics produced amongst them, particularly when marching at night, and through an enemy's country, and with the enemy not far off; so *they* also were thrown into alarm; and the division of Nicias, taking the lead as it did, kept together and got a long way in advance; while that of Demosthenes, containing about half or more, was separated from the others, and proceeded in greater disorder. By the morning, nevertheless, they arrived at the sea-coast, and entering on what is called the Helorine road, continued their march, in order that when they had reached the river Caecyparis, they might march up along its banks though the interior; for they hoped also that in this direction the Sicels, to whom they had sent, would come to meet them. But when they had reached the river, they found a guard of the Syracusans there too, intercepting the pass with a wall and a palisade, having carried which, they crossed the river, and marched on again to another called the Erineus; for this was the route which their guides directed them to take.

81. In the mean time the Syracusans and allies, as soon as it was day, and they found that the Athenians had departed, most of them charged Gylippus with having purposely let them escape; and pursuing with all haste by the route which they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they overtook them about dinner-time. When they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were behind the rest, and marching more slowly and disorderly, ever since they had been thrown into confusion during the night, at the time we have mentioned, they immediately fell upon and engaged them; and the Syracusan horse surrounded them with greater ease from their being divided, and confined them in a narrow space. The division of Nicias was as much as fifty stades off in advance; for he led them on more rapidly, thinking that their preservation depended, under such circumstances, not on staying behind, if they could help it, and on fighting, but on retreating as quickly as possible, and only fighting as often as they were

compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, was, generally speaking, involved in more incessant labour, (because, as he was retreating in the rear, he was the first that the enemy attacked,) and on that occasion, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he was not so much inclined to push on, as to form his men for battle; until, through thus loitering, he was surrounded by them, and both himself and the Athenians with him were thrown into great confusion. For being driven back into a certain spot which had a wall all round it, with a road on each side, and many olive trees growing about, they were annoyed with missiles in every direction. This kind of attack the Syracusans naturally adopted, instead of close combat; for to risk their lives against men reduced to despair was no longer for their advantage, so much as for that of the Athenians. Besides, after success which was now so signal, each man spared himself in some degree, that he might not be cut off before the end of the business. They thought too that, even as it was, they should by this kind of fighting subdue and capture them.

82. At any rate, when, after plying the Athenians and their allies with missiles all day from every quarter, they saw them now distressed by wounds and other sufferings, Gylippus with the Syracusans and allies made a proclamation, in the first place, that any of the islanders who chose should come over to them, on condition of retaining his liberty: and some few states went over. Afterwards, terms were made with all the troops under Demosthenes, that they should surrender their arms, and that no one should be put to death, either by violence, or imprisonment, or want of such nourishment as was most absolutely requisite. Thus there surrendered, in all, to the number of six thousand; and the whole of the money in their possession they laid down, throwing it into the hollow of shields, four of which they filled with it. These they immediately led back to the city, while Nicias and his division arrived that day on the banks of the river Erinæus; having crossed which, he posted his army on some high ground.

83. The Syracusans, having overtaken him the next day, told him that Demosthenes and his division had surrendered themselves, and called on *him* also to do the same. Being incredulous of the fact, he obtained a truce to enable him to

send a horseman to see. When he had gone, and brought word back again that they had surrendered, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with the Syracusans, on behalf of the Athenians, to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent on the war, on condition of their letting his army go; and that until the money was paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did not accede to these proposals, but fell upon this division also, and surrounded them on all sides, and annoyed them with their missiles until late in the day. And they too, like the others, were in a wretched plight for want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless, they watched for the quiet of the night, and then intended to pursue their march. And they were now just taking up their arms, when the Syracusans perceived it and raised their pæan. The Athenians therefore, finding that they had not eluded their observation, laid their arms down again; excepting about three hundred men, who forced their way through the sentinels, and proceeded, during the night, how and where they could.

84. As soon as it was day, Nicias led his troops forward; while the Syracusans and allies pressed on them in the same manner, discharging their missiles at them, and striking them down with their javelins on every side. The Athenians were hurrying on to reach the river Assinarus, being urged to this at once by the attack made on every side of them by the numerous cavalry and the rest of the light-armed multitude, (for they thought they should be more at ease if they were once across the river,) and also by their weariness and craving for drink. When they reached its banks, they rushed into it without any more regard for order, every man anxious to be himself the first to cross it; while the attack of the enemy rendered the passage more difficult. For being compelled to advance in a dense body, they fell upon and trode down one another; and some of them died immediately<sup>1</sup> on the javelins and articles of baggage, while others were entangled together, and floated down the stream. On the other side of the river, too, the Syracusans lined the bank, which was precipitous, and

<sup>1</sup> i. e. some died immediately on the javelins, while others fell over the loose articles of baggage, and being too weak to regain their footing, were floated down the stream.

from the higher ground discharged their missiles on the Athenians, while most of them were eagerly drinking, and in confusion amongst themselves in the hollow bed of the stream. The Peloponnesians, moreover, came down to them and butchered them, especially those in the river. And thus the water was immediately spoiled; but nevertheless it was drunk by them, mud and all, bloody as it was, and was even fought for by most of them.

85. At length, when many dead were now heaped one upon another in the river, and the army was destroyed, either at the river, or, even if any part had escaped, by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, placing more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and desired him and the Lacedæmonians to do what they pleased with himself, but to stop butchering the rest of the soldiers. After this, Gylippus commanded to make prisoners; and they collected all that were alive, excepting such as they concealed for their own benefit (of whom there was a large number). They also sent a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who had forced their way through the sentinels during the night, and took them. The part of the army, then, that was collected as general property, was not large, but that which was secreted was considerable; and the whole of Sicily was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken on definite terms of surrender, like those with Demosthenes. Indeed no small part was actually put to death; for this was the most extensive slaughter, and surpassed by none of all that occurred in this Sicilian war. In the other encounters also, which were frequent on their march, no few had fallen. But many also escaped, nevertheless; some at the moment, others after serving as slaves, and running away subsequently. These found a place of refuge at Catana.

86. When the Syracusans and allies were assembled together, they took with them as many prisoners as they could, with the spoils, and returned to the city. All the rest of the Athenians and the allies that they had taken, they sent down into the quarries, thinking this the safest way of keeping them: but Nicias and Demosthenes they executed, against the wish of Gylippus. For he thought it would be a glorious distinction for him, in addition to all his other achievements, to take to the Lacedæmonians even the generals who had com-

manded against them. And it so happened, that one of these, namely Demosthenes, was regarded by them as their most inveterate enemy, in consequence of what had occurred on the island and at Pylus; the other, for the same reasons, as most in their interest; for Nicias had exerted himself for the release of the Lacedæmonians taken from the island, by persuading the Athenians to make a treaty. On this account the Lacedæmonians had friendly feelings towards him; and indeed it was mainly for the same reasons that he reposed confidence in Gylippus, and surrendered himself to him. But certain of the Syracusans (as it was said) were afraid, some of them, since they had held communication with him, that if put to the torture, he might cause them trouble on that account in the midst of their success; others, and especially the Corinthians, lest he might bribe some, as he was rich, and effect his escape, and so they should again incur mischief through his agency; and therefore they persuaded the allies, and put him to death. For this cause then, or something very like this, he was executed; having least of all the Greeks in my time deserved to meet with such a misfortune, on account of his devoted attention to the practice of every virtue.

87. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusans treated them with cruelty during the first period of their captivity. For as they were in a hollow place, and many in a small compass, the sun, as well as the suffocating closeness, distressed them at first, in consequence of their not being under cover; and then, on the contrary, the nights coming on autumnal and cold, soon worked in them an alteration from health to disease, by means of the change. Since, too, in consequence of their want of room, they did every thing in the same place; and the dead, moreover, were piled up one on another—such as died from their wounds, and from the change they had experienced, and such like—there were, besides, intolerable stench: while at the same time they were tormented with hunger and thirst; for during eight months they gave each of them daily only a *cotyle* of water, and two of corn. And of all the other miseries which it was likely that men thrown into such a place would suffer, there was none that did not

<sup>1</sup> The *cotyle* was a little more than half an English pint; and the allowance of food here mentioned was only half of that commonly given to a slave.—See Arnold's note

fall to their lot. For some seventy days they thus lived all together; but then they sold the rest of them, except the Athenians, and whatever Siceliots or Italiots had joined them in the expedition. The total number of those who were taken, though it were difficult to speak with exactness, was still not less than seven thousand. And this was the greatest Grecian exploit of all that were performed in this war; nay, in my opinion, of all Grecian achievements that we have heard of also; and was at once most splendid for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered. For being altogether vanquished at all points, and having suffered in no slight degree in any respect, they were destroyed (as the saying is) with utter destruction, both army, and navy, and every thing; and only a few out of many returned home. Such were the events which occurred in Sicily. •

## BOOK VIII.

1. WHEN the news was brought to Athens, for a long time they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers, who had escaped from the very scene of action, and gave them a correct account of it; not crediting that their forces could have been so utterly destroyed. When, however, they were convinced of it, they were angry with those of the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition; (as though they had not voted for it themselves;) and were enraged with the soothsayers and reciters of oracles, and whoever at that time by any practice of divination had put them on hoping that they should subdue Sicily. Every thing, indeed, on every side distressed them; and after what had happened, fear and the greatest consternation overwhelmed them. For they were at once weighed down by the loss which every man individually, as well as the whole state at large, had experienced, by the destruction of so many heavy-armed, and horsemen, and troops in the flower of their youth, like which they saw they had none left; and at the same time being aware that they had no competent number of ships in the docks, nor money in the treasury, nor crews for their vessels, they were at present without hope of saving themselves. They thought, too, that they should have their enemies in Sicily directly sailing with their fleet against the Piræus, especially after they had gained such a victory; and that their foes at home, then doubly equipped on all points, would surely now press them with all their might, both by land and by sea, and their own allies with them in revolt. But nevertheless it was determined, that, as far as their present resources allowed, they ought not to submit, but to equip a fleet, by whatever means they could, providing by contribution both timber and money; and to put matters on a secure footing amongst the allies, especially in Eubœa: and, moreover, to reform every thing in the city, with

a view to greater economy, and elect a council of elders, who should deliberate beforehand on their present measures, as there might be occasion. And through their excessive fear at the moment they were ready, (as is the people's fashion,) to be orderly in every thing. Having thus determined, they acted accordingly, and so the summer ended.

2. The following winter, all the Greeks were immediately excited by the great misfortune of the Athenians in Sicily. Those who were not in alliance with either side thought, that even if no one called on them for aid, they ought not any longer to keep aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, when they reflected, severally, that they might have attacked *them* also, if they had succeeded in their measures at Syracuse; and, moreover, that the remainder of the war would be but brief, and that it was creditable for them to take their share in it. The allies of the Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, felt to a greater degree than before a common anxiety to have done speedily with their heavy labours. But, above all, the subjects of the Athenians were ready, even beyond their power, to revolt from them; because they judged of affairs under the influence of strong feeling, and did not so much as leave them a chance of being able to hold out the following summer. The Lacedæmonian state was encouraged by all these things, and most of all, because their allies in Sicily, since their navy had now of necessity been added to their resources, would in all probability be with them in great force with the spring. And thus being on every account full of hope, they determined to devote themselves unflinchingly to the war, reckoning that by its successful termination they would both be released in future from all dangers, like that which would have encompassed them from the Athenians, if they had won Sicily in addition to their other dominion; and that, after subduing them, they would themselves then enjoy in safety the supremacy over the whole of Greece.

3. Agis, their king, set out therefore immediately, during this winter, with some troops from Decelea, and levied from the allies contributions for their fleet; and having turned in the direction of the Malian gulf, and carried off, on the ground of their long-standing enmity, the greater part of the exposed property of the Cetræans, he exacted money for the ransom of it; and also compelled the Achæans of Pthiotia, and the other



subjects of the Thessalians thereabouts, (though the Thessalians remonstrated with him, and objected to it,) to give both hostages and money; the former of which he deposited at Corinth, and endeavoured to bring their countrymen over to the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians also issued to the states a requisition for building a hundred ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Bœotians at five and twenty each; that of the Phocians and Locrians together at fifteen; that of the Corinthians at fifteen; that of the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians, at ten; and that of the Megareans, Trœzenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians at ten. They were also making all other preparations, with the intention of proceeding immediately to war at the very commencement of spring.

4. The Athenians too, as they had determined, were preparing during this same winter for building ships; having contributed towards the supply of timbers, and fortified Sunium, that their corn-ships might have a safe passage round; while they also evacuated the fort in Laconia, which they had built in that country when they were sailing by it for Sicily; and with a view to economy retrenched all their other expenses, whatever any where appeared to be useless expenditure; and, above all, kept their eye on the allies, to prevent their revolting from them.

5. While both parties were carrying out these measures, and engaged in preparation for the war, just as when they were commencing it, the Eubœans, first of all, sent during this winter an embassy to Agis, to treat of their revolting from the Athenians. He acceded to their proposals, and sent for Alcámenes son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthus, to come from Sparta and take the command in Eubœa. Accordingly they came with about three hundred of the Neodamodes, and he began to prepare for their crossing over. But in the mean time some Lesbians also came to him; for they, too, wished to revolt. And as the Bœotians supported their application, Agis was persuaded to defer acting in the cause of Eubœa, and made preparations for the revolt of the Lesbians, giving them Alcámenes as a commander, who was to sail to Eubœa; while the Bœotians promised them ten ships, and Agis the same number. These measures were undertaken without the authority of the Lacedæmonian state; for as long as Agis was at Decælea, and his forces with him, he had power both to send

troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy soldiers and money. And at this time, the allies obeyed him, one might say, much more than the Lacedæmonians in the city: for he was feared, because he went every where in person with a force at his command. He, then, furthered the views of the Lesbians. The Chians and Erythræans, on the other hand, who were also ready to revolt, made their application, not to Agis, but at Sparta. There went with them also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was governor of the sea-coast under king Darius, son of Artaxerxes. For Tissaphernes also was inviting the Lacedæmonians to co-operate with him, and promised to furnish them with supplies. For he had lately been called on by the king for the tribute due from his government, for which he was in arrears, as he could not raise it from the Greek cities because of the Athenians. He thought, therefore, that he should both get in his tribute more effectually, if he reduced the power of the Athenians; and at the same time should gain for the king the alliance of the Lacedæmonians; and either take alive, or put to death, as the king had commanded him to do, Amorges, the natural son of Pisuthnes, who was in rebellion on the coast of Caria. The Chians and Tissaphernes, then, were negotiating this business in concert.

6. About the same time Calligitus son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from their country, and living at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedæmon, being sent by Pharnabazus to bring a fleet despatched to the Hellespont; and that he himself, if possible, might, for the sake of the tribute, cause the cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians—the same object as Tissaphernes had in view—and gain for the king, by his own agency, the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. While these negotiations were severally carried on by each party, by the emissaries both of Pharnabazus and of Tissaphernes, there was great competition between them at Lacedæmon, the one striving to prevail on them to send a navy and army to Ionia and Chios first, the other, to the Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians, however, acceded with a very decided preference to the application of the Chians and Tissaphernes. For Alcibiades was also co-operating with them, being the hereditary and very intimate friend

of Endius, one of the ephors ;, for which reason also his family had a Lacedæmonian name, in consequence of this friendship ;<sup>1</sup> for Endius was called "the son of Alcibiades." However, the Lacedæmonians first sent to Chios Phrynīs, one of the *Periæci*, to ascertain whether they had as many ships as they said, and whether their city corresponded with the representations of its high character : and when he brought them word back that what they heard was true, they straightway took the Chians and Erythræans into alliance, and resolved to send them forty ships, as there were already there (according to the statement of the Chians) not less than sixty. Of these they themselves at first intended to send ten, with Melancridas, who was their high admiral ; but afterwards, an earthquake having occurred, instead of Melancridas they determined to send Chalciæus, and instead of the ten ships to equip but five in Laconia. And thus the winter ended, and the nineteenth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

7. The following summer, when the Chians straightway urged them to despatch the fleet, and were afraid that the Athenians might get intelligence of their measures, (for all parties sent their embassies without *their* knowledge,) the Lacedæmonians sent three Spartans to Corinth, to haul the ships as quickly as possible across the isthmus, from the opposite sea to that on the side of Athens, and to give orders for them all to sail to Chios, both those which Agis was preparing for Lesbos, and the rest. Now the total number of the ships belonging to the allied states that were there was thirty-nine.

8. Calligitus, then, and Timagoras, acting in behalf of Pharnabazus, did not join the rest in the expedition to Chios, or give, to forward the despatch of the fleet, the money which they had brought with them, namely, five and twenty talents ; but they intended to sail afterwards by themselves with a fresh armament. Agis, on the contrary, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were determined to send to Chios first, did not himself maintain any different view ; but the allies assembled at Corinth, and held a council, when they resolved to sail first to Chios, with Chalciæus as commander, who was equipping

<sup>1</sup> "That is, Alcibiades was the distinguishing family name of this Endius, borne by the members of his house in every alternate generation ; so that Alcibiades was the surname to every Endius, and Endius the surname to every Alcibiades."—*Arnold*

the five vessels in Laconia; then to Lesbos, with Alcarnenes in command, (the same person as Agis intended to appoint;) and, lastly, to go to the Hellespont, where Clearchus, son of Ramphias, was appointed to the command. But they determined to take only half the ships across the isthmus first, and let these sail off immediately; that the Athenians might not attend to those which were setting out, so much as to those which were being conveyed across after them. For in this case they were making their expedition openly, as they imputed to the Athenians a want of power to oppose them, because no numerous fleet belonging to them was yet visible. And so, according to their resolution, they immediately took across one and twenty ships.

9. But when they were urgent for setting sail, the Corinthians were not disposed to accompany them before they had kept the Isthmian festival, for which that was the time. Agis expressed to them his willingness that they (according to what they urged) should not break the Isthmian truce, but that he should make the expedition on his own responsibility. When, however, the Corinthians did not agree to this, but a delay was caused in the matter, the Athenians the more easily gained intelligence of the designs of the Chians; and sending Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them with the fact, and on their denying it, commanded them to send with them some ships, as a pledge of good faith in their alliance. Accordingly they sent seven. The reason of the ships being sent was, that the majority of the Chians were ignorant of the negotiations; while the few who were privy to them were both unwilling at present to incur the hostility of their commons, before they had gained some strength, and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to come, since they had so long delayed.

10. In the mean time the Isthmian games were being celebrated; and the Athenians (the sacred truce having been proclaimed) went to attend them; and thus the designs of the Chians became more evident to them. When they returned, they immediately took measures that the fleet might not put out from Cenchreae unobserved by them. After the festival the Peloponnesians set sail for Chios with one and twenty ships under the command of Alcarnenes; and the Athenians, having at first advanced against them with an equal number, then be-

gan to retreat towards the open sea. When the enemy did not follow them far, but drew back, the Athenians likewise returned; for they had the seven Chian vessels in the number of those with them, and did not consider them trustworthy. Afterwards, having manned others, so as to make in all thirty-seven, while the enemy were coasting along, they chased them into Piræus, in the Corinthian territory. This is a desert port, on the extreme borders of Epidaurus. The Peloponnesians lost one ship out at sea, but collected the rest, and brought them to anchor. And now, when the Athenians both attacked them by sea with their ships, and had landed on the shore, there was a great disorder and confusion; and the Athenians severely damaged most of their ships on the beach, and killed Alcamenēs their commander; whilst some also fell on their own side.

11. After parting, they posted a sufficient number of ships to keep watch over those of the enemy, and with the rest came to anchor at the small island <sup>1</sup>[opposite the mouth of the harbour]; on which, as it was not far off, they proceeded to encamp, and sent to Athens for a reinforcement. For the Corinthians, too, had joined the Peloponnesians on the day after the battle, coming to the succour of the ships; and not long after, the rest of the people in the neighbourhood also. But when they saw that to keep guard over them in so desert a spot was a difficult service, they were at a loss what to do, and thought of burning the ships; but afterwards they determined to draw them up on shore, and station themselves by them with their land forces, and keep guard until some favourable opportunity of escape presented itself. Agis also, on receiving intelligence of this, sent to them a Spartan, namely Thermon. Now news had first been taken to the Lacedæmonians that their ships had put to sea from the isthmus, (for Alcamenēs had been told by the ephors to send a horseman when that took place,) and they immediately wished to despatch their five ships, with Chalcideus in command, and Alcibiades with him. Afterwards, when they had resolved on this, the news of their fleet taking refuge in Piræus reached them; and being disheartened, because they had failed in their first operations in the Ionian war, they no longer thought of sending the

<sup>1</sup> *ἐν τῷ πελάγει.* This explanation of the article is taken from Col. Leake, as quoted by Arnold.

ships from their own country, but even of recalling some that had previously put out to sea.

12. When Alcibiades knew this, he again persuaded Endius and the rest of the ephors not to shrink from the expedition; telling them that they would have made their voyage before the Chians heard of the disaster which had befallen their fleet; and that he himself, when he had once reached Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt, by acquainting them both with the weakness of the Athenians and the forwardness of the Lacedæmonians; for he should be thought more credible than others. To Endius himself he also represented in private, that it would be a glorious thing to have caused by his own agency the revolt of Ionia, and to have brought the king into alliance with the Lacedæmonians, instead of that honour being earned by Agis; (for with him he happened to be at variance.) He, then, having prevailed on the rest of the ephors, as well as Endius, put out to sea with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, and they proceeded on their voyage with all speed.

13. About this same time also, the sixteen Peloponnesian vessels in Sicily which with Gylippus had assisted in bringing the war to a conclusion, were on their return; and after being intercepted near Leucadia, and roughly handled by the seven and twenty Athenian ships which Hippocles son of Menippus commanded, on the look-out for the ships from Sicily, the rest of them, with the exception of one, escaped from the Athenians, and sailed into harbour at Corinth.

14. With regard to Chalcideus and Alcibiades, while they were on their voyage, they seized all they met with, to prevent any tidings of their approach being carried; and after first touching at Corycus, and leaving them there, they themselves having previously had an interview with some of the Chians who were in co-operation with them, and being urged by them to sail up to the city without sending any notice beforehand, they thus came upon the Chians unexpectedly. Accordingly the greater part of them were astonished and dismayed; while it had been arranged by the few, that the council should be assembled just at the time. And when speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades, telling them that many more vessels were sailing up, and not acquainting them with the fact respecting their fleet being blockaded in Piræus, the Chians

revolted from the Athenians, and immediately after them the Erythræans. After this they sailed with three vessels and induced Clazomenæ to revolt also. The Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the continent, and began to fortify<sup>1</sup> Polichna, in case they might want it as a place to retreat to from the island on which they lived. They, then, having revolted, were all engaged in raising fortifications and preparing for the war.

15. News of the revolt of Chios quickly reached Athens, and considering that the danger which had now encompassed them was great and evident, and that the rest of the allies would not remain quiet when the most important state had changed sides; with regard to the thousand talents which throughout the whole war they had earnestly desired not to meddle with, they immediately rescinded, in consequence of their dismay, the penalties attaching to any one who proposed to use them, or put such a proposal to the vote; and passed a decree for taking them, and manning a large number of ships; while of those that were keeping watch at Piræus they at once sent off the eight which had left the blockade, and after pursuing those with Chalcideus and not overtaking them, had returned, (their commander was Strombichides son of Diotimus,) and resolved that twelve more, under Thrasyclus, should also leave the post of observation, and reinforce them shortly afterwards. They also removed the seven Chian vessels, which joined them in the blockade of Piræus; and liberated the slaves who were on board of them, while the freemen they put in bonds. In the place of all the ships that had departed they speedily manned others, and sent them to observe the Peloponnesians, resolving at the same time to man thirty more. So great was their ardour; and no trivial measure was undertaken with regard to the forces they sent to Chios.

16. In the mean time Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and having added one Samian vessel to his squadron, he sailed to Teos, and begged them to remain quiet. Chalcideus also was advancing with three and twenty ships from Chios to Teos; while at the same time the land forces of

<sup>1</sup> τῇ Πολίχνῳ.] "This is a general name which has become a proper one by usage, like Ham, Kirby, &c. in English; or more like 'Borgo' in Italian, the full name of the place being properly τῇ Πολίχνῳ τῶν Κλαζομενίων, Borgo dei Clazomeni; and thence in common speech, simply τῇ Πολίχνῳ, Borgo."—Arnold.

the Clazomenians and Erythræans moved along the shore. Strombichides, on receiving prior intelligence of this, weighed anchor beforehand; but when out in the open sea, on observing that the ships coming from Chios were so numerous, he fled towards Samos, while they pursued him. With regard to the land forces, although the Teians were not at first disposed to admit them, yet when the Athenians had fled, they received them into the city. The troops then waited for some time, expecting Chalcideus also to return from the pursuit: but when he was long in coming, they began themselves to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built on the land side of the city of the Teians; while a small body of the barbarians also, who had joined them under the command of Stages, lieutenant of Tissaphernes, assisted them in the demolition of it.

17. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing Strombichides into Samos, armed the seamen on board the vessels from the Peloponnese, and left them at Chios; and having manned these with substitutes from Chios, and twenty besides, they sailed to Miletus to effect its revolt. For Alcibiades, being on intimate terms with the leading men of the Milesians, wished to anticipate the ships from the Peloponnese by winning them over, and so to secure that honour, as he had promised, to the Chians, himself, Chalcideus, and Endius who had sent them out, by causing the revolt of as many cities as possible in concert with the Chian forces and Chalcideus. Having made therefore the chief part of their passage unobserved, and having arrived a little before Strombichides and Thrasyclus, who had just come from Athens with twelve ships, and joined in the pursuit of them, they prevailed on Miletus to revolt. The Athenians sailed up close after them with nineteen ships, and on the Milesians not admitting them, came to anchor at the adjacent island of Lade. And now the first alliance made between the king and the Lacedæmonians was concluded by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, immediately after the revolt of the Milesians, to the following effect:

18. "The following are the terms on which the Lacedæmonians and their confederates concluded an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes. All the country and cities which the king holds, or the forefathers of the king held, shall belong to the king: and from these cities whatever money, or any thing



else, came in to the Athenians, shall be stopped by the king, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, in common; so that the Athenians may receive neither money nor any thing else. —Moreover, the war with the Athenians shall be carried on in common by the king, the Lacedæmonians, and their confederates; and it shall not be lawful to bring the war with the Athenians to a conclusion, except both parties shall agree to it, the king, and the Lacedæmonians with their confederates. —Should any revolt from the king, they shall be considered as enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; and if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall be considered as enemies to the king, in like manner."

19. This, then, was the alliance that was concluded; immediately after which the Chians manned ten more ships, and sailed to Anæa, wishing both to get intelligence of those in Miletus, and at the same time to urge the cities to revolt. But a message having reached them from Chalcideus, that they were to sail back again, and that Amorges would be upon them with an army on shore, they sailed to the temple of Jupiter, and then descried sixteen ships, with which Diomedon again, subsequently to the arrival of Thrasicles, was sailing up from Athens. On seeing them they fled with one ship to Ephesus, while the rest proceeded towards Teos. The Athenians, then, took four of their ships empty, the men having escaped to shore beforehand; but the rest took refuge in the city of the Teians. And now the Athenians sailed away from Samos; while the Chians put out with their remaining vessels, and their land forces with them, and procured the revolt of Lebedos, and then again of Eræ. After this they returned to their respective homes, both the land and the sea forces.

20. About the same time, the twenty ships of the Peloponnesians that were in Piræus, which had been chased to land at the time we last mentioned them, and were blockaded by the Athenians with an equal number, having made a sudden sally against the Athenian squadron, and defeated it in an engagement, took four of the ships, and after sailing back to Cenchrea, proceeded to prepare again for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyocheus also joined them from Lacedæmon, as high admiral, to whom now belonged the command of all the naval forces. Mean-

while, after the troops had returned from Teos, Tissaphernes himself also repaired thither with an army, and further demolished the fort at Teos, whatever had been left of it, and then returned. Not long after his departure, Diomedon, having arrived with ten Athenian ships, concluded a treaty with the Teians for admitting his force, as they did the enemy's. And after coasting along to Eræ, and assaulting the city without taking it, he sailed away.

21. About the same time, too, occurred at Samos the insurrection of the commons against the nobles, in conjunction with some Athenians who happened to be there on board three vessels. The popular party of the Samians, then, put to death some two hundred of the nobles, in all, and condemned four hundred to banishment, and having themselves taken possession of their land and houses, (the Athenians, moreover, having after this passed a decree for their independence, considering them now as trusty allies,) they governed the city henceforth, and neither admitted the landowners to any other privilege, nor allowed any of the commons in future to give his daughter in marriage to them, nor to take a wife from them.

22. After these things, in the course of the same summer, the Chians went on as they had begun, without any falling off in their zeal; and as they found themselves, even independently of the Lacedæmonians, with a large force for bringing over the states, and at the same time were desirous that as many as possible should share the danger with them, they made an expedition by themselves with thirteen ships to Lesbos, according to the arrangement of the Lacedæmonians to go to that island in the second place, and thence to the Hellespont, while at the same time the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were there, and of the allies from the country itself, moved along shore towards Clazomenæ and Cuma; the commandèr of the troops being Evalas, a Spartan, and of the ships, Diniadas, one of the *Periæci*. The fleet having sailed first to Methymna, effected the revolt of the place, and four vessels were left there; while the remainder, again, effected that of Mytilene also.

23. Now Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, set sail, as he had intended, with four ships from Cenchrea, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his coming there, the Athe-

nian ships, five and twenty in number, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; for Leon had subsequently brought a reinforcement of ten ships from Athens. The same day, at a late hour, Astyochus also put out, and taking one Chian vessel in addition to his own, sailed to Lesbos, to render it whatever assistance he could. Accordingly he came to Pyrrha, and thence the next day to Eresus, where he heard that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians on the first assault. For the Athenians, immediately on sailing to the place, unexpectedly put into the harbour, and defeated the Chian ships; and having landed, and conquered in a battle those who opposed them, they took possession of the city. Receiving this intelligence, both from the Eresians and from the Chian ships coming from Methymna with Eubulus, three of which fell in with him, (for one had been taken by the Athenians,) after being left behind at the time, and so escaping when Mitylene was taken, Astyochus no longer advanced to Mitylene, but having persuaded Eresus to revolt, and supplied it with arms, he both sent the heavy-armed from on board his own ships to Antissa and Methymna, having appointed Eteonicus to the command, and himself coasted along thither with his own ships and the three Chians; hoping that the Methymnæans would be encouraged by the sight of them, and persevere in their revolt. But when every thing at Lesbos went against him, he took his own force on board, and sailed back to Chios; while the land forces also that had been disembarked from the vessels, and were to have proceeded to the Hellespont, returned again to their several cities. After this, six of the allied ships from the Peloponnese that were at Cenchrea came to them at Chios. The Athenians, on the other hand, arranged matters again at Lesbos, and sailing thence, took Polichna, belonging to the Clazomenians, which was being fortified on the mainland, and carried them over again to their city on the island, excepting the authors of the revolt, who had departed to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ came over again to the Athenians.

24. The same summer the Athenians, who were with their twenty ships at Lade for the observation of Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, slew Chalcoideus, the Lacedæmonian commander, who had come against them with a few men, and sailing across three days

after, erected a trophy; which, as it had been raised without their having command of the country, the Milesians threw down. And now Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian ships from Lesbos, advancing from the Cænussæ, the islands off Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, fortresses which they held in the Erythræan country, as well as from Lesbos, carried on the war against the Chians from their ships, having as *epibatai*, some of the <sup>1</sup>heavy-armed from the muster-roll, who had been pressed into the service. Having landed at Cardamyle and Bolissus, after defeating in battle those of the Chians who had come out against them, and killing many of them, they desolated the places in that neighbourhood. They defeated them again in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium, after which the Chians no longer went out to meet them; while they ravaged their country, which was finely stocked, and had continued unhurt from the Median wars down to that time. For the Chians are the only people that I am acquainted with, after the Lacedæmonians, who were at once prosperous and prudent; and the more their city increased in greatness, the more secure were their arrangements. And even their present revolt, if any think that they executed this without regard for the safer course, they did not venture to make, before they were likely to run the risk in concert with many brave allies, and perceived that even the Athenians themselves no longer denied, after their disaster in Sicily, that without doubt their circumstances were utterly bad. But if they were somewhat disappointed by the unexpected results that occur in the life of man, they found out their mistake in company with many others, who had in the same way imagined that the power of the Athenians would be quickly destroyed. When therefore they were excluded from the sea, and were being ravaged by land, a party of them endeavoured to bring over the city to the Athenians. Though the magistrates detected them, they remained quiet themselves, and having brought Astyochus the admiral from Erythræ with four ships, which he had with him, considered how they might stop the conspiracy by the mildest measures, whether by taking host-

<sup>1</sup> "The *ἐπιβάται* were usually drawn from the fourth class, or Thetes; although on some occasions men of the higher classes seem to have volunteered to serve amongst them. See III. 98. 3, note. Now, however, the citizens of the higher classes were actually compelled to serve as *ἐπιβάται*, owing to the peculiar exigency of the crisis."—Arnold.

ages, or in any other way. They, then, were engaged with this business.

25. At the close of the same summer, there sailed from Athens a thousand Athenian heavy-armed, fifteen hundred of the Argives, (for five hundred of the Argives who were light-armed, were provided with full armour by the Athenians,) and a thousand of the allies, in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides: these sailed into port at Samos, and after crossing over to Miletus, formed their camp there. The Milesians marched out, themselves to the number of eight hundred heavy-armed, the Peloponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and a body of foreign mercenaries with Tissaphernes himself, who was present with his cavalry, and gave battle to the Athenians and their allies. The Argives, advancing from the line with their own wing, and despising the enemy, while they pushed forward in some disorder, as against Ionians and men who would not receive their charge, were defeated by the Milesians, and not less than three hundred of them slain. But the Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians first, then beat back the barbarians and the rest of the multitude, and without engaging the Milesians, (for they retreated into their city after their rout of the Argives, on seeing the rest of their army worsted,) they pitched their camp, as being now victorious, close to the very city of Miletus. And it so happened, that in this battle the Ionians on both sides were superior to the Dorians; for the Athenians conquered the Peloponnesians opposed to them, and the Milesians the Argives. After erecting a trophy, the Athenians prepared to invest the place, (which stood on an isthmus,) thinking that if they could win Miletus, the other towns would easily come over to them.

26. In the mean time, when it was now about dusk in the evening, intelligence reached them that the five and fifty ships from the Peloponnese and from Sicily were all but there. For from the Siceliots, who were chiefly urged by Hermocrates the Syracusan to take part in what remained for the destruction of the Athenians, there came twenty ships of the Syracusans, and two of the Selinuntines; and those from the Peloponnese, which they were preparing, [when we last men-

<sup>1</sup> *Ξένικόν*,] i. e. foreigners to Tissaphernes, not Asiatics.

tioned them,] were now ready: and both squadrons being committed to Theramenes the Lacedæmonian to take to Astyochus the admiral, put in to Lerus first, the island before Miletus. Then, on finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed thence into the Iasic gulf in the first place, wishing to know the state of affairs with regard to Miletus. When Alcibiades therefore had gone on horseback to Tichiussa, in the Milesian territory, to which part of the gulf they had sailed and brought to for the night, they heard the particulars of the battle. For Alcibiades was present at it, taking part with the Milesians and Tissaphernes; and he now advised them, if they did not wish to sacrifice Ionia and the whole cause, to go as quickly as possible to the relief of Miletus, and not permit it to be invested.

27. They, then, intended to relieve it, in the morning. Phrynichus, the commander of the Athenians, on the other hand, when he had heard from Lerus a correct account of their fleet, and when his colleagues wished to await its arrival and give it battle, said that he would neither do so himself, nor, to the best of his power, allow them or any one else to do it. For when they might meet them hereafter with an accurate knowledge of the number of ships on the enemy's side, and with how many of their own opposed to them they would, after adequate and calm preparations, be able to give them battle, he would never run an unreasonable hazard through yielding to the disgrace of reproach. For it was no disgrace for the Athenians to retreat with a navy at a proper time; but in any way whatever, the result would be more disgraceful should they be defeated, and for the state to incur not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger. For after its late misfortunes, it was hardly expedient voluntarily for it to act on the offensive in any quarter, even with a force that could be relied upon, or even in a case of absolute necessity: how then could it without any such compulsion rush into self-chosen dangers? He ordered them therefore as quickly as possible to take up their wounded, and their land forces, with such stores as they had brought with them; but to leave behind what they had taken from the enemy's country, that their ships might be the lighter, and to sail away to Samos, and thence, when they had collected all their ships, to make their attacks upon them, whenever they had an opportunity. Having given this ad-

vice, he acted accordingly; and so Phrynichus, not on that immediate occasion more than on subsequent ones, nor in that business only, but in all that he had any thing to do with, proved himself to be a man of sound judgment. In this way, with an incomplete victory, the Athenians immediately broke up their camp, and retired from Miletus; and the Argives, in mortification at their defeat, sailed off home from Samos as quickly as they could.

28. As soon as it was morning, the Peloponnesians weighed anchor from Tichiussa, and put into Miletus after the enemy's departure; and after remaining one day, they took with them on the next the Chian vessels which had, in the <sup>1</sup>first instance, been chased in company with Chalcideus, and were disposed to sail back again for the stores which they had taken out of their vessels at Tichiussa. On their arrival, Tissaphernes came to them with his land forces, and persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which Amorges their enemy maintained himself. Accordingly, having assaulted Iasus on a sudden, and while the inhabitants thought nothing but that the ships belonged to the Athenians, they took it; and the Syracusans were most distinguished in the action. Amorges, who was a natural son of Pissuthnes, and had revolted from the king, the Peloponnesians took prisoner, and delivered him up to Tissaphernes to lead away to the king, if he pleased, according to his orders. They then sacked Iasus; and the army got very large treasures, for the place was one of ancient wealth. The mercenaries serving with Amorges they took to themselves, and added to their ranks, without doing them any harm, as most of them were from the Peloponnese: while they delivered to Tissaphernes the town and all the captives, both bond and free, for each one of whom they stipulated to receive from him a Daric stater; after which they returned to Miletus. Pedaritus the son of Leon, who had been sent by the Lacedæmonians to take the command at Chios, they despatched by land to Erythræ, with the mercenary force taken from Amorges, and appointed Philippus to remain on the spot, as governor of Miletus. And so the summer ended.

29. The following winter, when Tissaphernes had put Iasus into a state of defence, he passed on to Miletus, and distributed amongst all the ships a month's pay, as he had undertaken at

<sup>1</sup> τὰς—ἐνκαταδιωχθείσας.] See ch. 17. 3.

Lacedæmon, at the rate of an Attic drachma a man per day ; but, wished in future to give but three oboli, until he had consulted the king ; should he, however, command it, he said he would give them the full drachma. When Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, objected to this, (for Theramenes, inasmuch as he was not admiral, but only sailing with them to deliver up the fleet to Astyochus, was easy on the subject of pay,) there was fixed, notwithstanding, a sum [for the whole fleet] larger <sup>1</sup> by five ships than three oboli a man per day. For he gave three talents a month for five ships, and to the rest, according as they had vessels beyond this number, was given in the same proportion.

30. The same winter, more ships, to the number of thirty-five, having come from home to join the Athenians at Samos, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon in command, after collecting those from Chios and all the rest, they determined, having drawn lots for their respective services, to blockade Miletus with their naval force, and to send against Chios both a fleet and army. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, having with them thirty ships, and taking in transports a part of the thousand heavy-armed that

<sup>1</sup> *παρὰ πέντε ναύς.*] If these words could really be interpreted "for every five ships," as Gölter and Arnold think, I should then agree with the latter, that the whole passage might be allowed to remain as it stands at present. But neither of them brings forward a single instance of *παρὰ* being thus used with the distributive force commonly expressed by *κατά* ; and in the absence of all such proof, it seems safer to take the preposition, as Bloomfield has done, in a sense which is recognised by the grammarians. This method renders necessary one of the two corrections which have been made by the editors in the following sentence—either the omission of *καὶ πεντήκοντα*, or the insertion of *τριακόντα* instead of *τρία*—and though it is perhaps of little importance which is preferred, I have adopted the former, as the mistake of the copyists in that case seems more easily accounted for than in the other. See Gölter's or Arnold's note. With regard to the question, why the ships should be taken in divisions of five, that number might perhaps have been fixed on for mere convenience, as the lowest which gave a round sum in talents, without any fraction. Or may we conjecture that the Lacedæmonian government had sent out five ships on the expedition, and that their quota was first considered by Tissaphernes, as a compliment to the leading state? Arnold's supposition that "it was intended to exclude any state from the higher rate of pay, whose contingent fell short of five ships, in order to encourage the allies to greater exertions," does not seem very probable; and the idea of *τοῖς ἄλλοις* referring "to those other states who had no ships at the present moment afloat, but who might at any instant be supposed ready to send some," is surely inconsistent with the indicative mood of the verb *ἔσται*, which can only refer to such as were actually afloat at the time of the arrangement.



had come to Miletus, sailed, according to their lot, against Chios, while the rest, remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, secured the command of the sea, and advanced upon Miletus.

31. Astyochus, happening at that time to be collecting at Chios the hostages taken in consequence of the conspiracy, ceased from that, when he found that the ships with Theramenes were come, and that the affairs of the confederacy were more prosperous. And taking a squadron consisting of ten Peloponnesian and as many Chian ships, he put out to sea, and after attacking Pteleum without taking it, coasted along to Clazomenæ, and commanded those of them who favoured the Athenian cause to remove inland to Daphnus, and to join their party. Tamos also, who was lieutenant-governor of Ionia, united in this command. When they did not listen to it, he made an attack on the town, which was unwalled, and not being able to take it, sailed away before a strong gale himself to Phocæa and Cuma, while the rest of the ships put into the islands adjacent to Clazomenæ, namely, Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa. Having staid there on account of the winds eight days, all the property of the Clazomenians that had been <sup>1</sup>secretly stowed away there, they partly ravaged and consumed, and partly put on board their ships; and then sailed off to Phocæa and Cuma, to join Astyochus.

32. While he was there, ambassadors from the Lesbians came to him, wishing to revolt again. And as far as he was concerned, they gained his assent; but when the Corinthians and other allies were not zealous for it, in consequence of their former failure, he weighed anchor and sailed for Chios; at which place, after his ships had been dispersed in a storm, they arrived from different directions. After this, Pedaritus, who when we last mentioned him was moving along the coast by land from Miletus, arrived at Erythræ, and then passed over, himself and his forces, to Chios; where he had also about five hundred soldiers who had been <sup>2</sup>left by Chalcideus from the five ships, with their arms. And when certain Les-

<sup>1</sup> ἐκείναις.] Bloomfield follows Hobbes in translating this, "lay without the city," altogether omitting the peculiar force of the two prepositions thus meeting in composition, whether in neuter or transitive verbs. Compare I. 137, where the word occurs in exactly the same signification; I. 89, διὰ τὰς πόλεις αὐτὰς ἐκείναις ταῖς καὶ γυναικας, κ. τ. λ.; and Eurip. Med. 5, δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκείναις τῶν καὶ χόρον.

<sup>2</sup> See chap. 17. 1.

bians made offers of revolt, Astyochus urged to Pedaritus and the Chians, that they ought to go with their ships, and effect the revolt of Lesbos; for so they would either themselves gain an addition to the number of their allies, or, in case of failure, would still do the Athenians mischief. They, however, did not listen to them, and Pedaritus refused to give up to him the ships of the Chians.

33. He, therefore, taking the five of the Corinthians, a sixth from Megara, one from Hermione, and those of the Lacedæmonians which he had come with, sailed for Miletus, to take the command as admiral, after many threats to the Chians that assuredly he would not come to their aid, should they be in any need of it. Having touched at Corycus, in the Erythræan country, he staid there the night. The Athenians also, on their passage from Saffos to Chios with their troops, were only parted from them by being on the other side of a hill; and so they brought to for the night, and escaped each other's notice. On the arrival of a letter from Pedaritus in the night, to say that some Erythræan prisoners, after being set at liberty, had come from Samos to Erythræa for the purpose of betraying it, Astyochus immediately weighed anchor again for Erythræa: within so little was he of falling in with the Athenians. Pedaritus also sailed across to join him; and having investigated the case of the men who were thought to be traitors, when they found that the whole story had been made up in order to effect the escape of the men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge, and sailed away, one to Chios, the other to Miletus, as he had intended.

34. In the mean time also the army of the Athenians, while sailing round with the ships from Corycus, met with three Chian vessels of war off Arginus, and on seeing them gave them chase; when a violent storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty took refuge in the harbour. Of the Athenians, the three which had pursued most vigorously were wrecked, and thrown up near the city of Chios, the men being either taken prisoners or slain; while the remainder took refuge in the harbour under Mount Mimas, called Phœnicus, from whence they afterwards came to anchor in the port of Lesbos, and made preparations for the work<sup>1</sup> of fortification.

<sup>1</sup> ἐς τὸν ταχυμένον,] i. e. for the fortification of Delphinium. See ch. 38. 2.

35. The same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, having sailed from the Peloponnese with ten<sup>a</sup> Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, one Laconian and one Syracusan, sailed into port at Cnidus, which had now revolted at the instigation of Tissaphernes. When those at Miletus received intelligence of them, they gave orders for half of the vessels to keep guard at Cnidus, and the other half to cruise 'around Triopium, and seize the merchantmen that were approaching from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory running out from the Cnidian territory, and is consecrated to Apollo. But the Athenians, having had notice of it, and having sailed out from Samos, seized the six ships that were keeping guard at Triopium, though the crews escaped from them. After this they put in at Cnidus, and having assaulted the city, which was unfortified, were within a little of taking it. The next day they made a second assault on it; but as they did not now do it so much damage, since the inhabitants had provided better defences during the night, and the crews which had escaped from the ships at Triopium had gone in to join them, they withdrew, and after ravaging the territory of the Cnidians, sailed back to Samos.

36. Astyochus having come about the same time to the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abundantly supplied with every thing in their camp. For pay was given them to a sufficiently large amount, and the great sum of money which had been raised from the plunder of Iasus was still at the command of the soldiers, and the Milesians carried on the war with spirit. Nevertheless the Peloponnesians considered that the first convention with Tissaphernes, which had been concluded by Chalcideus, was defective, and not so much for their advantage [as for his]; and, consequently, while Theramenes was yet there, they concluded another, which was to the following effect:

• 37. "The convention of the Lacedæmonians and the allies with King Darius, the sons of the king, and Tissaphernes, that there should be a treaty and friendship between them on these terms: Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or did belong to his father, or his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedæmonians nor the allies of the Lacedæmonians shall be permitted to proceed for the purpose of war, or for any harm:

neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, exact tribute from these cities. Neither shall King Darius, or any states in the king's dominions, be allowed to proceed against the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, for the purpose of war or other injury.—Should the Lacedæmonians, or their allies, require any assistance from the king, or the king stand in need of any from the Lacedæmonians, or their allies; to whatever they may gain each other's assent, that shall be right for them to do.—Both parties shall carry on in common the war against the Athenians and their allies; and should they come to terms of peace, they shall both do so in common.—Whatever troops shall be in the king's country in consequence of the king's having sent for them, the king shall pay their expenses.—Should any of the states which have concluded this convention with the king proceed against the king's country, the rest shall prevent it, and assist the king to the utmost of their power. And should any of those in the king's country, or in all his dominions, proceed against the country of the Lacedæmonians, or of their allies, the king shall prevent it, and assist them to the utmost of his power."

38. After this convention Theramenes gave up the fleet to Astyochus, and sailing away in a small boat was <sup>1</sup>lost at sea. The Athenians, having now crossed over from Lesbos to Chios with their army, and commanding both land and sea, proceeded to fortify Delphinium, a place that was both naturally strong on the land side, contained several harbours, and was not far from the city of Chios. Now the Chians having been beaten in several previous engagements, and not being on very good terms amongst themselves, but regarding each other with suspicion, because Tydeus, son of Ion, and his party had already been executed by Pedaritus on the charge of Atticism; and the rest of the city was by compulsion reduced to an oligarchy; in consequence of these things they kept quiet, and thought neither themselves nor the mercenaries under Pedaritus to be a match for the enemy. They sent, however, to Miletus, urging Astyochus to come to their aid: and when he did not listen to them, Pedaritus sent a letter to Lacedæmon, representing him as being guilty of a misdemeanor. On this

<sup>1</sup> ἀφανίσεται.] Or, as others render it, "disappeared from the scene of action:" but Bishop Thirlwall's interpretation of the word seems undoubtedly the correct one.

footing stood the affairs of the Athenians at Chios: while from Samos their ships kept sailing out against those at Miletus, and when they did not advance to meet them, they returned again to Samos, and remained quiet.'

39. The same winter, the seven and thirty ships which had been equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, through the instrumentality of Calligitus the Mégarean and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out from the Peloponnese, and sailed for Ionia, about the period of the solstice, Antisthenes a Spartan being on board in command of them. The Lacedæmonians also sent eleven Spartans as assistant counsellors for Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. They were instructed on their arrival at Miletus to co-operate in the arrangement of all other affairs, as should be best, and to despatch these vessels—either just the number, more, or fewer—to the Hellespont to join Pharnabazus, should they think proper, appointing to the command of them Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who sailed out with them; and also, if the eleven commissioners deemed fit, to depose Astyochus from the office of admiral, and appoint Antisthenes; for they were suspicious of him in consequence of the letters from Pedaritus. Sailing therefore from Malea across the open sea the squadron touched at Melos, and there falling in with ten Athenian ships took three of them empty, and burnt them. After this, being afraid that those of the Athenian vessels which had escaped from Melos might (as was the case) give information of their approach to those at Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having made their voyage longer by taking this precaution, they made the land at Caunus, in Asia; from which place, considering themselves to be now in safety, they sent a message to the ships at Miletus, in order to be convoyed by them along the coast.

40. At this same time the Chians and Pedaritus sent messengers to Astyochus, notwithstanding his holding back, and begged him to succour them in their siege with all his fleet, and not to permit the largest of the allied cities in Ionia to be both excluded from the use of the sea, and wasted by forays on the land. For the slaves of the Chians being numerous, and indeed forming the largest body there was in any one city, except that of the Lacedæmonians, and at the same time being, in consequence of their great numbers, pun-

ished more severely than usual in cases of offence, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly established, with the advantage of a fortified position, the greater part deserted to them; and these did the most mischief to the country, through their acquaintance with it. The Chians therefore represented, that while there was still a hope and possibility of stopping them, while Delphinium was still being fortified, and not yet completed; and a higher wall was being erected round their camp and the ships, it was incumbent on him to assist them. And although Astyochus, because of his threat on the occasion already mentioned, had not intended to do it, when he saw that the allies also were anxious for their relief, he set out to succour them.

41. In the mean time tidings came from Caunus that the seven and twenty ships, with the Lacedæmonian counsellors, were come. And thinking every thing else of secondary importance, compared with his convoying so large a number of ships, in order that they might more entirely command the sea, and with the safe passage of the Lacedæmonians who had come to observe his conduct, he immediately gave up going to the relief of Chios, and sailed to Caunus. Having landed, as he coasted along, at <sup>1</sup> Cos Meropis, which was unfortified, and in ruins in consequence of an earthquake which they had experienced—the most violent one which I ever remember—he sacked the town, the men having fled to the mountains, and by incursions made spoil of the country, excepting the free population, whom he released. Having come from Cos to Cnidus by night, he was constrained by the advice of the Cnidians not to land his seamen, but to sail, just as he was, straightway against the twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus, one of the generals at Samos, was on the look-out for those seven and twenty ships that were approaching from the Peloponnese, and to join which Astyochus also was coasting along. For those at Samos had heard from Melos of their approach, and Charminus was watching for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and Lycia; as by this time he was aware of their being at Caunus.

<sup>1</sup> Κῶν τῇ Μερπίδα.] "According to the old mythical language, 'Cos first settled by the hero Merops.' See Stephan., Byzant., Hesychius, &c. According to the interpretation now given to this language, 'Cos first settled by the people called Meropes.'"—Arnold.

42. Astyochus therefore sailed immediately to Syme<sup>1</sup> before he was heard of, on the chance of finding the ships some where out at sea. But the rain and the cloudy state of the atmosphere which he encountered caused the dispersion of his ships during the dark, and threw them into confusion. In the morning, when his fleet had been separated, and the left wing was now in sight of the Athenians, while the rest of it was still dispersed around the island, Charminus and the Athenians put out against it with all speed, with fewer than their twenty ships, thinking that these were the vessels they were watching for, namely, those from Caunus. Having attacked them therefore immediately, they sank three, and severely damaged some others, and had the advantage in the action, until the larger division of the fleet unexpectedly came in sight, and they were surrounded on every side. Then they took to flight, and having lost six ships, fled for refuge with the rest to the island of Teutlussa, and thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians put into Cnidus, and the seven and twenty ships from Caunus having effected a junction with them, they sailed with the whole number, and erected a trophy on Syme, and then came to anchor again at Cnidus.

43. The Athenians, on hearing the particulars of the engagement, having sailed with all their ships from Samos to Syme, made no attack on the fleet at Cnidus, or that on them, but took their 'naval stores, which were at Syme, and after touching at Lorymi on the continent, sailed back to Samos. And now all the Peloponnesian ships at Cnidus were refitted, so far as they required it; and the eleven Lacedæmonian commissioners held a conference with Tissaphernes, (for he had come to meet them,) both respecting what had already been done, if there was aught that did not please them, and with reference to future hostilities, in what way they might be conducted most to the benefit and advantage of both parties. Lichas, more especially, kept an eye on the transactions, and said, "that neither of the two treaties was properly drawn up, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that of Theramenes, but it was a shameful thing that the king should even now claim to

<sup>1</sup> τὰ σκεύη, κ. τ. λ.] "i. e. the masts and sails of Charminus' squadron, which, according to custom, had been left on shore at Syme, when the ships put to sea suddenly to attack the fleet of Astyochus. See chap. 42. 2."—Arnold.

be master of all the country over which he and his ancestors had formerly had dominion. For in that was involved the re-subjugation of all the islands, with Thessaly, Locris, and as far as Bœotia; and so, instead of freedom, the Lacedæmonians would be putting the Median yoke on the Greeks. He told them therefore to conclude another and a better treaty, or at any rate they would not act according to this; nor did they want any of his supplies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, being offended at this, went away from them in a rage, and without settling any thing.

44. They, in consequence of communications from some of the most powerful men there, were disposed to sail to Rhodes; hoping to bring over to their side an island which was strong both in its number of seamen and its land forces; and moreover thinking that they should themselves be able to maintain their fleet from their own confederacy, without asking Tissaphernes for money. Having sailed therefore immediately, that same winter, from Cnidus, and having first put in with ninety-four ships to Camirus in the Rhodian territory, they frightened away most of the inhabitants, who were not aware of their intentions, and therefore fled, especially as the town was unfortified. Then, having assembled both these and the people from the two other towns, Lindus and Ialysus, the Lacedæmonians prevailed on the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians. And so Rhodes joined the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Athenians, having got notice of it, sailed at this time with their ships from Samos, wishing to anticipate them, and came within sight of the island as they lay out at sea; but being a little too late, they sailed back in the first instance to Chalce, thence to Samos, and afterwards carried on the war against Rhodes by attacks from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. The Peloponnesians levied money from the Rhodians to the amount of two and thirty talents; but in other respects lay still for eighty days, having drawn up the ships on shore.

45. In the mean time, and at even a still earlier period, before they removed to Rhodes, the following negotiations were being carried on. Alcibiades being suspected by the Peloponnesians after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, and instructions having been sent by them from Lacedæmon to Astyochus to put him to death, (for he was a personal enemy of Agia, and in other ways appeared to be unworthy of



trust,) he first retired in alarm to the court of Tissaphernes, and then did the greatest harm he could to the cause of the Peloponnesians with him. Being his adviser on all points, he cut down the pay, so that instead of an Attic drachma three oboli were given, and that not regularly; telling Tissaphernes to represent to them, that the Athenians, who for a longer time had had experience in naval matters, gave their men but three oboli; not so much from poverty, as that their seamen might not grow insolent from abundance, and either be less able-bodied, through spending money on such things as produce weakness, or desert their ships by means of leaving their arrears of pay as a security for them. He also gave him such instructions, that by giving money he persuaded the trierarchs and generals of the different states to concede these points to him; excepting the Syracusans; but of these Hermocrates alone opposed him on behalf of the whole confederacy. The states, too, which applied for money he dismissed with an answer from himself, on the part of Tissaphernes, alleging by way of refusal, that "the Chians were shameless, who, though the wealthiest of the Greeks, and being protected as they were by the aid they were receiving, expected others to risk both their persons and their purses for *their* liberty." With regard to the rest of the states, which used before their revolt to lavish their money on the Athenians, he said that they were wrong if they would not now also contribute as much, or even more, for their own interests. He also represented that Tissaphernes was naturally sparing at present, inasmuch as he was carrying on the war with his own resources; but that if supplies should ever come down from the king, he would give them their full pay, and afford the states all proper relief.

46. He likewise advised Tissaphernes "not to be in too great a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; nor to be anxious, by either bringing the Phœnician fleet which he was equipping, or giving pay to a larger body of Greeks, to confer on the same party the command both of land and sea; but to let them each hold a divided sway, and so leave the king the

<sup>1</sup> *de ἀμνηστία.*] That is, that the larger pay was considered as a security for the men's returning to their post, when summoned, and therefore as a reason for greater indulgence in granting leave of absence than was proved by the result to be consistent with the interests of the service.

power at all times to lead the one party or the other against those who were annoying him. If, on the contrary, the command both by land and sea were united, he would be at a loss for any party to assist in overthrowing the stronger; unless he should himself ever choose to arise and carry out the contest with them at a great expense and hazard. It was a cheaper risk to wear down the Greeks against each other, at a trifling share of the expense, and at the same time with security to himself. And the Athenians, he said, were a more desirable people to share the empire with him; for they were less desirous of possessions on shore, and carried on the war with both a profession and a practice most advantageous to him; as they would unite with him in subjugating, as far as the sea was concerned, to themselves and to him all the Greeks who lived in the king's country; while the other party, on the contrary, had come to liberate them. Nor was it likely that the Lacedæmonians should at the present time be liberating the Greeks from men of their own Grecian race, and should omit to liberate them from those who were barbarians; <sup>1</sup> unless they should ever fail in reducing the Athenians. He urged them therefore to wear them both out at first, and after cutting off as much as possible from the power of the Athenians, then to get rid of the Peloponnesians from his country." Tissaphernes adopted these views in the main, so far at least as might be conjectured from his actions. For having on this account placed himself in the confidence of Alcibiades, as of one who had given him good advice on the subject, he both scantily supplied the Peloponnesians with money, and would not allow them to fight by sea; but, by telling them that the Phœnician fleet should come to them, and that so they should contend with superabundant strength, he greatly injured their cause, and took off the vigour of their navy, which had been very great; and in all other respects, too evidently to escape observation, he wanted hearty zeal in co-operating with them.

47. Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, whilst he was with them, both because he thought it

<sup>1</sup> ἢν μὴ ποτε αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.] I have followed Haack's and Poppe's interpretation of this passage, "nisi si quando eos (Athenienses) non everterint," rather than Herman's, who supposes that the word μὴ only increases the force of the negative: "nisi hi barbari Græcos, quos sub ditione suâ tenebant, etiam deleverant."

best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing, that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest. And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted,] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals amongst them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them: but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.

48. This design therefore was first mooted in the camp, and thence spread to the city. Accordingly, certain individuals went over from Samos, and had an interview with Alcibiades; and when he held out that he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and then the king, in case they were not under a democratical government, (for so the king would place greater reliance on them,) the aristocratical party amongst the citizens, who also suffered most at present, entertained many hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well as of gaining the victory over the enemy. Accordingly they went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favoured their views, openly representing to the people at large that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed by a democracy. The multitude, though annoyed to a certain extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because of their abundant hopes of pay from the king; while those who were for establishing the oligarchy, after they had communicated their designs to the mass of the people, again considered the proposals of Alcibiades amongst themselves and

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.] Dobree, Gölter, Poppo, and Arnold, agree in thinking that *in* must be inserted before *ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς*, without which the passage seems to them not fairly intelligible. But may not this be regarded as

the greater part of their associates. To the rest, then, they appeared advantageous and worthy of their confidence; but Phrynichus, who was still general, was not at all pleased with them, but thought that Alcibiades (as was really the case) had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, or considered any thing else but how, by bringing the state to change its present constitution, he might obtain his recall by the invitation of his associates. "What they themselves, however, should most especially look to, was," he said, "to avoid being rent by factions. That it was not for the king's advantage, when the Peloponnesians were now on an equality at sea, and held none of the least cities in his dominion, to incur trouble by siding with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, when he might have made the Peloponnesians his friends, by whom he had never yet been injured. As for the allied states, again, to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, he well knew that neither those which had revolted would any the more on that account come over to them, nor those that were left be more staunch to them; for they would not wish to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy, rather than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of government they might obtain their liberty. And with regard to the respectable classes, as they were called, they considered that the oligarchs would not cause them less trouble than the popular government, being as they were the authors and in-

a "dativus instrumenti"? which is certainly used sometimes with reference to persons, though less commonly than to things. One instance of it is given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 608, Obs. 3, from Soph. El. 226, *τίμι γὰρ ποτ' ἀν, ὦ φίλῃα γενέθλα, πρόσφορον ἀκούσαιμ' ἔπος*; and perhaps a second might have been added from the same play, v. 441, *εἰ σοι προσφιλῶς αὐτῇ δοκεῖ Γέρα τάδ' οὖν τάφοισι δέξασθαι νέκυν*. Matthiæ, § 396, brings forward another undoubted instance from Eur. Heracl. 392, *ἀνδρα γὰρ χρεῖσθαι—οὐκ ἀγγέλοισι τοὺς ἐναντίους ὄρεσιν* and another less certain one from Xen.

ὅτι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν Τισσαφέρνῃ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φορεῖν, καίνοισι οὖς τὸν Τισσαφέρνῃ. There seems therefore to be no sufficient reason why the same construction should not have been used here. If this be admitted, I would apply the same principle to two other passages of our author, of which I have before taken a different view, viz. I. 25, *ὅτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι*, and V. 38. 4, *οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παρανοοῦσιν*. With regard to the former, when I wrote the note on it, I had not seen the quotation with which Poppe corroborates Bloomfield's interpretation, and which puts it beyond a doubt, I think, that Arrian, at any rate, took the same view of it.

roducers of projects which were evil for the people, and from which they themselves derived most benefit. Indeed as far as depended on *them*, they would be put to death without trial, and even by measures of violence; whereas the commons were their refuge, and the moderators of the other party. And as the states had learnt these things from positive facts, he well knew that such was their opinion on the subject. For himself, then, he was pleased with none of the schemes carried by Alcibiades at present, as before."

49. But those members of the association who had been enabled acceded to the present proposals, as they had at first determined, and prepared to send Pisander and some others on embassy to Athens, to treat for the return of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in that city, and so to gain friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians.

50. But when Phrynichus saw that there would be a pro for the recall of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would accede to it, being afraid, on considering the opposite tendency of what had been maintained by himself, that if he were restored he would do him some mischief, as one who had impeded his plans, he had recourse to the following device. He sent to Astyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral, who was still in the neighbourhood of Miletus, with secret instructions that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by bringing Tissaphernes into friendship with the Athenians; expressly mentioning all the other matters also, and pleading that it was pardonable in him to devise evil against a man who was an enemy, even though it were to the detriment of the state. Now Astyochus did not so much as think of punishing Alcibiades—especially as he no longer put himself in his power as he used to do—but having gone up to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, at once told them the contents of the letter from Samos, acting as an informer to them, and for his own private gain devoting himself, as was said, to the interest of Tissaphernes both on these and on all other matters; for which reason also he was the more gentle in remonstrating with him respecting the pay not being given in full. Alcibiades immediately sent a letter to Samos giving information against Phrynichus to the authorities there, telling them what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus, being confounded and in the most extreme danger, sent again to Astyochus, reproaching

him because his former information had not been duly kept secret, and telling him now that he was prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian armament at Samos; describing the particulars of the way in which he could do it, as Samos was unfortified; and pleading that it was not now culpable in him, being, as he was, in danger of his life through them, to do this, or any thing else, rather than be destroyed by his bitterest enemies. Astyochus gave information of this also to Alcibiades.

51. Now when Phrynichus had discovered beforehand that he was doing him injury, and that a letter from Alcibiades the subject was on the point of arriving, he himself anticipated it by announcing to the army, that as Samos was unfortified and all the ships were not stationed within the harbour, the enemy intended to attack the camp: that he had certain intelligence of this, and that they ought as quickly as possible to fortify Samos and put every thing else in a state of defence. Now he was himself general, and so had full authority to carry out these measures. Accordingly they prepared for the work of fortification; and owing to this Samos was the more quickly walled, though it would have been so under any circumstances. Not long after came the letters from Alcibiades, saying that the army was going to be betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were on the point of attacking them. As, however, Alcibiades was not thought to be worthy of credit, but to have had a previous acquaintance with the plans of the enemy, and through personal dislike to have attributed them to Phrynichus, as though he were privy to them, he did him no harm, but rather bore witness to his statement by sending this intelligence.

52. After this, Alcibiades tried to bring over and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; and he, though afraid of the Peloponnesians, because they were there with more ships than the Athenians, was still disposed to be convinced by him, if by any means he could; especially since he had observed the dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians which had been expressed at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, (for as at this time they were at Rhodes, it had

<sup>1</sup> ἡδὲ γὰρ—ἰσχυρόν.] "That is to say, the quarrel had taken place at Cnidus, (ch. 43. 2—4,) and from Cnidus the Peloponnesians had moved to Rhodes, (ch. 44. 1,) therefore as the Peloponnesians were arrived at Rhodes

already occurred,) in the course of which Lichas had verified the observation which had before been made by Alcibiades about the Lacedæmonians libelating all the states, when he said that it was an intolerable agreement that the king should be master of the cities over which, at any earlier period, either himself or his fathers had had dominion. Alcibiades then, inasmuch as he was struggling for a great object, was earnestly courting and soliciting Tissaphernes. *c*

53. The Athenian ambassadors, on the other hand, who had been sent from Samos with Pisander, on their arrival at Athens, delivered an address before the people, giving a summary of many arguments, but most especially urging, that by recalling Alcibiades, and not being under a democratical government in the same manner as hitherto, they might both have the king for an ally, and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians. When many others opposed them on the subject of the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades at the same time exclaimed, that it was a shameful thing if he were to return by doing violence to the laws; and the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces adjured them with regard to the mysteries, for which he had been banished, and appealed to the gods against their restoring him; Pisander came forward in the face of much opposition and indignant protesting, and taking aside each one of his opponents, asked him whether he had any hope of preservation for the state, since the Peloponnesians had no fewer ships than themselves opposed to them on the sea, and more cities in alliance with them, while the king and Tissaphernes supplied them with money; whereas they themselves had no longer any, unless some one should persuade the king to come over to their side. When, on being thus questioned, they allowed that they had not, he then said to them plainly, "This advantage, then, cannot be attained by us, if we do not adopt a more temperate policy, and put the offices into the hands of a smaller number, that the king may place confidence in us—and that we may not consult so much at present about a form of government as about the preservation of the state; for we shall have power to alter hereafter whatever may not please when Alcibiades made his application to Tissaphernes, it was perfectly possible for Tissaphernes to be influenced in his reception of the proposals by his feeling of resentment towards the Peloponnesians, as that, having occurred while they were at Cnidus, must have been prior to his interview with Alcibiades."—*Arnold*.

us)—and, moreover, if we do not restore Alcibiades, who is the only man at present that can effect this.”

54. The people were at first very indignant on hearing mention made of the oligarchy; but when plainly informed by Pisander that there were no other means of preservation, being afraid, and at the same time having hopes of changing it again, they gave way. Accordingly they resolved that Pisander and ten commissioners with him should sail and conclude, as they might think would be best; the negotiations both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time, on Pisander's falsely accusing Phrynichus, the people deposed him from his command with his colleague Scironides, and sent Diomedon and Leon to the fleet as generals in their stead. For Pisander calumniated Phrynichus by saying that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, only because he did not think him favourable to the negotiations carried on with Alcibiades. Pisander likewise visited all the clubs, which had previously existed in the city for mutual support in law-suits and elections to offices, and exhorted them to unite together and by common counsels abolish the democracy; and after making all his other preparations to suit the present state of affairs, so that there might be no more delay, he himself with the ten commissioners proceeded on his voyage to Tissaphernes.

55. In the course of this winter Leon and Diomedon, having by this time reached the Athenian fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes. The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up; and having made a descent on the territory, and defeated in an engagement those of the Rhodians who went out against them, they withdrew to Chalcæ, and carried on the war from that place, rather than from Cos; for it was more convenient for their observing whether the fleet of the Peloponnesians put out in any direction. Xenophantidas the Lacedæmonian also came to Rhodes from Pedaritus at Chios, telling them that the wall of the Athenians was now completed, and unless they

\* ἐπιτίγων.] Ἐπιτίγων is the reading which Bekker adopts from nine of the MSS. in the sense of “building their hope on this.” But as this use of the word appears to belong to later writers only, it would perhaps be better (supposing the compound verb to be the genuine reading) to give the preposition its very common force of addition, “having, besides their conviction of present helplessness, the hope of changing hereafter what they did not like.” Compare the use of ἐπιθεραπεύων, ch. 47. 1. Or, again, it might imply the idea of a hope in reserve—an after-hope, as in ἐπίνοια and some other words: e. g. Soph. Antig. 385, ψεύδεις γὰρ ἡ πίνουσι τὴν γνώμην.



succoured them with all their ships, their cause would be ruined at Chios. Accordingly they determined to relieve them. In the mean timē Pedaritus, with his mercenaries and the Chians, made a general assault on the fortification round the Athenian ships, and took a part of it, and got possession of some vessels that had been drawn up on shore: but when the Athenians had come out to the rescue, and had routed the Chians first, the rest of the force, more immediately around Pedaritus, was defeated, he himself killed; with many of the Chians, and a great number of arms taken.

56. After these things the Chians were besieged still more closely than before, both by land and sea, and the famine in the place was great. In the mean time, the Athenian ambassadors with Pisander arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with him respecting the convention. But as Alcibiades could not depend on the views of Tissaphernes, who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians, and wished still (as he had been instructed by him) to wear both parties out, he had recourse to the following plan, in order that Tissaphernes, by demanding the greatest possible concessions from the Athenians, might avoid coming to terms with them. Tissaphernes also, in my opinion, wished the same result, being himself led to do so by fear: but Alcibiades, when he saw that the satrap was not, under any circumstances, desirous of making an agreement, wished the Athenians to think that he was not incapable of persuading him, but that when Tissaphernes had been persuaded, and was willing to join them, the Athenians did not concede enough to him. For Alcibiades, speaking in person in behalf of Tissaphernes, who was also present, made such excessive demands, that the refusal of the Athenians, although for a long time they conceded whatever he asked, was still the apparent cause of their failure. For they required the whole of Ionia to be given up, and then again the adjacent islands, with other things; and when the Athenians did not object to these demands, at last, in their third interview, being afraid that he would certainly be convicted of inability to keep his word, he demanded that they should permit the king to build ships, and sail along his own coast, wherever and with how many soever he might please. Upon that the Athenians complied no longer, but considering that the business was impracticable, and that they had been

deceived by Alcibiades, they departed in a rage, and went to Samos.

57. Immediately after these things, in the very same winter, Tissaphernes proceeded to Caunus, wishing to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and after making still another convention with them, to give them pay, and not have them driven to absolute hostilities with him; being afraid that if they were without supplies for many of their ships, they might either be compelled to engage the Athenians and be defeated, or through their vessels being unmanned the Athenians might without his assistance attain the object of their wishes. And again, he was most of all afraid that they might ravage the continent in search of supplies. From calculating and forecasting all these things, in accordance with his wish to reduce the Greeks to a footing of equality with one another, he consequently sent for the Lacedæmonians, and gave them supplies, and concluded a third treaty with them, to the following effect:

58. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, while Alexippidas was ephor at Lacedæmon, a convention was concluded on the plain of the Mæander by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces, respecting the interests of the king, the Lacedæmonians, and their allies.—That the king's country, so far as it lies in Asia, shall belong to the king still; and that respecting his own territory, the king shall adopt such measures as he pleases.—That the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not invade the king's territory, nor the king that of the Lacedæmonians or their allies, to do it any harm.—That if any of the Lacedæmonians invade the king's territory to do it harm, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall prevent it; and that if any one from the king's country proceed against the Lacedæmonians or their allies to do them harm, the king shall prevent it.—That Tissaphernes shall provide the pay for the ships now present, according to the contract, until the king's fleet has come; but that when the king's fleet has come, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall be at liberty to maintain their own ships, if they wish it. That if, however, they consent to receive supplies from Tissaphernes, he shall furnish them, and the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall refund to him, at the conclusion of the war,

whatever sums of money they may have received.—That after the king's ships have arrived, those of the Lacedæmonians, and their allies and those of the king shall jointly carry on the war, according as Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their allies may think fit. And if they wish to terminate hostilities with the Athenians, they shall be terminated on the same footing."

59. This was the treaty that was made. And after this, Tissaphernes prepared to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as had been agreed, and all other things which he had promised; or, at any rate, he wished to *appear* to be thus preparing.

60. When the winter was now closing, the Bœotians took Oropus by treachery, while an Athenian garrison was holding it. There co-operated with them, also, some of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For as the place was just opposite to Eretria, so long as the Athenians held it, it could not fail to do much damage both to Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Being now therefore in possession of Oropus, the Eretrians came to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. They, however, were more disposed to relieve Chios in its distress, and so put out and sailed from Rhodes with all their fleet. When they were off Triopium, they descried that of the Athenians out at sea, sailing from Chalce: and as neither side advanced against the other, they arrived, the Athenians at Samos, the Peloponnesians at Miletus, finding that it was no longer possible to go to the relief of Chios without a sea-fight. And so the winter ended, and the twentieth year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

61. Immediately at the commencement of the spring of the following summer, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent with a small force by land to the Hellespont, to effect the revolt of Abydus, which is a colony of the Milesians; and the Chians, while Astyochus was at a loss how to succour them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to a naval engagement. They happened, while Astyochus was still at Rhodes, to have received from Miletus, as their commander after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named Leon, who had come out as a passenger with Antisthenes, and twelve ships which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which were Thurian, four Syracusan, one Anæan, one Milesian, and one Leon's own ship

When therefore the Chians had gone out against them in full force, and had occupied a strong position, while their ships at the same time to the number of six and thirty put out to meet the two and thirty of the Athenians, they engaged them by sea; and an obstinate battle having been fought, the Chians and their allies, who had not the worst in the action, returned (for it was now late) into their city.

62. After this, immediately that Dercyllidas had proceeded thither by land from Miletus, Abydus on the Hellespont revolted to him and Pharnabazus, as also did Lampsacus two days later. When Strombichides heard of this, he went to the rescue from Chios, as quickly as possible, with four and twenty Athenian ships, some of which also were transports carrying heavy-armed troops; and when the Lampsacenes came out against him, having defeated them in battle, taken at the first assault their city, which was unfortified, and made spoil of implements and slaves, (though he restored the free-men to their dwellings,) he proceeded against Abydus. When they did not capitulate, and he was unable to take the place by assault, he sailed away to the coast opposite Abydus, and appointed Sestus, a town of the Chersonese which the Medes had held at the time <sup>1</sup> so well known, as a post for a garrison, and for the defence of the whole of the Hellespont.

63. In the mean time the Chians were masters of the sea more than they had been; and Astyochus with those at Miletus, on hearing the particulars of the naval engagement, and the departure of Strombichides with his squadron, took fresh courage. And so having coasted along with two ships to Chios, he took the fleet from that place, and with all his force now united advanced against Samos. When the Athenians, in consequence of their being suspicious of one another, did not put out to meet him, he sailed back again to Miletus. For about this time, or still earlier, democracy had been abolished at Athens. For when Pisander and the ambassadors came from Tissaphernes to Samos, they both secured still more

<sup>1</sup> τότῃ] "The allusion is to the circumstance that Sestus was almost the last spot held by the Persians in Europe, and that it sustained a long and obstinate siege before it could be taken from them. (Herod. IX. 116, and seq.)"—Arnold."

strongly their interest in the army itself, and instigated the most powerful of the Samians also to try with them to set up an oligarchy among themselves, although they had been rising up against one another to avoid an oligarchical government. At the same time those of the Athenians at Samos determined, after communicating with each other, to give up Alcibiades, since he would not join them, (for indeed he was not a proper person, they said, to become a member of an oligarchy,) but to consider amongst themselves, since they were now actually imperilled, by what means their cause might escape abandonment; and at the same time to persevere in their measures for the war, and themselves to contribute with alacrity from their own private resources, both money and whatever else might be required, since they were no longer bearing the burden for any but themselves.

64. Having thus exhorted one another, they then immediately sent back home Pisander and half the ambassadors, to manage matters there; with instructions also to establish oligarchy in such of the subject cities as they touched at: the other half they sent to the rest of the places subject to them, some in one direction and some in another. They also dismissed to his government Diotrophes, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios, but had been elected to take the command of the countries Thraceward. He, on his arrival at Thasos, abolished the democratical government; but about two months after his departure the Thasians began to fortify their city, as wanting no more aristocracy in conjunction with the Athenians, but daily looking for liberty to be given them by the Lacedæmonians. For indeed there was a party of them with the Peloponnesians which had been expelled by the Athenians, and which, in concert with their friends in the city, was exerting itself with all its might to bring a squadron, and effect the revolt of Thasos. They had the fortune, then, to find what they most wished, namely, the city brought to the right side without any danger, and the democratical party deposed, which had been likely to prove an obstacle. Thus then in the case of Thasos, and, I imagine, in that of many other of the subjects, the result was the contrary of what was expected by those of the Athenians who were establishing oligarchy; for when the states had got a moderate government, and security

of action, they went on to absolute liberty, and did not value the specious <sup>1</sup> advantage of good laws which they received from the Athenians.

65. Pisander, then, and his companions, as they coasted along, abolished the popular governments in the cities, according to arrangement, and, moreover, took from some places heavy-armed troops as their allies, and so came to Athens. There they found most of the business already accomplished by their associates. For some of the younger men, having conspired together, secretly assassinated one Androcles, the most prominent leader of the commons, and who also had mainly procured the banishment of Alcibiades; and for both these reasons, on account of his being a popular leader, and because they thought they should gratify Alcibiades, who, they concluded, would be recalled, and would make Tisaphernes their friend, they were the more ready to kill him. There were some other obnoxious individuals also whom they secretly took off in the same manner. A proposal too had already been openly set on foot by them, that no others should receive pay but such as served in the war; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government, and those such as were most competent to do the state service both with their property and their persons.

66. Now this was but a specious profession for the people at large, since the same men would really hold the government as would bring about the revolution. The people, however, and the council of five <sup>2</sup> hundred still met notwithstanding, though they discussed nothing that was not approved of by the conspirators, but both the speakers belonged to that party, and the points to be brought forward were previously discussed by them. Indeed no one else any longer opposed them, through fear, and from seeing that the conspiracy was extensively spread; and if any one did speak against them, he immediately came to his end in some convenient way, and there was neither any search made for those who had perpetrated the deed, nor were they brought to justice if they were suspected;

<sup>1</sup> εὐνομίαν.] Or "independence," according to the reading αὐτονομίαν, which Bekker and Poppo adopt from the majority of MSS. See Arnold's note.

<sup>2</sup> βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κλάμου.] Literally, "the council of the bean," so called as being elected by ballot.

but the commons remained still, and in such consternation that every one thought himself fortunate who did not meet with some violent treatment, even though he held his tongue. From supposing, too, that the conspiracy was much more general than it really was, they were the more faint-hearted, and were unable to ascertain its extent, being powerless in consequence of the size of the city, and their not knowing one another's views. And on this same ground also it was impossible for a man to bemoan himself to another in his indignation, so as to repel one who was plotting against him; since he would either have found a person he did not know, to whom to speak his mind, or one whom he knew but could not trust. For all the members of the popular party approached each other with suspicion, supposing every one to have a hand in what was going on. For there were amongst them some whom one would never have supposed likely to join an oligarchy; and it was these that produced the greatest distrust in the many, and that contributed most to the safety of the few, by confirming the people's want of confidence in each other.

67. Pisander and his colleagues therefore having come at this critical time, immediately addressed themselves to the remainder of the work. In the first place, having assembled the people, they moved a resolution for electing ten commissioners with absolute powers for compiling laws, and that after compiling them they should lay before the people, on an appointed day, their opinion as to the manner in which the state would be best governed. Afterwards, when the day had arrived, they enclosed the assembly in the Colonus, (a temple of Neptune outside the city, at the distance of about ten stades,) and the compilers brought forward no other motion, but simply this, that any of the Athenians should be at liberty to express any opinion he might please; and if any one either prosecuted the speaker for illegality, or otherwise injured him, they imposed upon him severe penalties. Upon that it was at length plainly declared, that no one should any longer either hold

himself by  
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written ἀντιπεβουλευσάντα. In addition to the passage to which he refers, (III. 12. 3,) compare VI. 37, where φυλάσσεισθαι is used in just the same sense as ἀμύνεσθαι is here: ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπὸ φυλάσσεισθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀντιπεβουλεύσαι ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλλάξετε

office, or receive pay, according to the present constitution; that they should elect five men as presidents, who, again, should elect a hundred, and each of the hundred three for himself, and that these, amounting to four hundred, should enter the council-chamber, and govern as they might think best, with full powers, and should elect the five thousand also, whenever they might please.

68. Now it was Pisander who moved this resolution, and in other respects was openly the most forward in assisting to put down the democracy. But the person who devised the whole business, and the means by which it was brought to this issue, and who for the longest time had given the subject great attention, was Antiphon, a man second to none of the Athenians of his day in point of virtue, and who had proved himself most able to devise measures, and to express his views; who also, though he did not come forward in the assembly of the people, nor by choice in any other scene of public debate, but was viewed with suspicion by the people through his reputation for cleverness, yet was most able for any one man to help those who were engaged in contest, whether in a court of justice, or before a popular assembly, whoever of them might consult him on any point. And he himself, too, when the party of the Four Hundred had subsequently fallen, and was severely treated by the commons, appears to me to have made the best defence of all men up to my time, when tried for his life on the subject of this very government, on a charge of having assisted in setting it up. Phrynichus, too, showed himself, beyond all others, most zealous for the oligarchy, through fear of Alcibiades, and the certainty that he was acquainted with the intrigues he had carried on at Samos with Astyochus; for he thought that, in all probability, he would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And he showed himself, when once he had undertaken their business, by far the most capable of facing dangers. Theramenes the son of Hagnon was also a leader amongst those who joined in abolishing the democracy, a man of no small power, either of language or intellect. So that, conducted as it was by so many clever men, it was not unnatural that the business should succeed, though an arduous one. For it was a difficult matter to deprive the Athenian people of its liberty, about a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants, and when it had



not only been subject to none, but accustomed also, for more than half of that period, to rule over others.

69. When the assembly had been dissolved, without contradiction from any one, and by its own ratification of the measure, then they afterwards introduced the Four Hundred into the council-chamber, in the following manner. All the Athenians, in consequence of the enemy established at Decælea, were constantly under arms, either on the walls or in the ranks. On that day, then, they permitted those who were not privy to their design to go home, as usual; while to those who were in the conspiracy directions were given to wait about quietly, not just by the arms, but at some little distance; and if any one should oppose what was doing, to seize the arms and not suffer it. Moreover, some Andrians and Tenians, and three hundred Carystians, with some of the Æginetan colonists, whom the Athenians had sent to occupy that island, had come for this very purpose with their own arms; to whom directions had already been given on this subject. When these things had been thus arranged, the Four Hundred, each with a dagger concealed on his person, and the hundred and twenty Grecian youths, of whose services they availed themselves wherever any business required to be despatched, came and presented themselves to the council of Five Hundred, who were in their chamber, and told them to take their pay and go out; themselves bringing it for the whole of their remaining term of office, and giving it to them when they went out.

70. When in this way the council had withdrawn without speaking a word against it, and the rest of the citizens made no disturbance, but kept quiet, the Four Hundred then entered the council-chamber, and elected their prytanes by lot; and for what concerned the gods, offered prayers and sacrifices on installing themselves in their government. Afterwards, however, they departed widely from the popular administration, (except that they did not recall the exiles, because of Alcibiades,) and in other respects ruled the city by force. Some men, who appeared desirable to be taken out of their way, they put to death, though not many; others they put in prison, and others they banished. They also entered into

<sup>1</sup> ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμέτερου,] i. e. "after a sort of morning parade," as Arnold expresses, "leaving their arms piled in some open space, to be ready in case of any alarm."

communication with Agis, the Lacedæmonian king, who was at Decelea; telling him that they were desirous of making peace, and that it was but reasonable that, as he would treat with *them*, and no longer with the faithless multitude, he should more readily come to terms.

71. He, however, thought that the city was not in a settled state, and that the people would not so immediately give up their ancient liberty, nor remain quiet, if they should see a large force of Lacedæmonians; and not being quite sure at present that they were no longer in a disturbed condition, he made no conciliatory answer to those who had come from the Four Hundred, but sent for a large additional force from the Peloponnese, and not long after went down himself with the garrison from Decelea, in conjunction with the troops which had joined him, to the very walls of Athens; hoping that either the people there, being thrown into disorder, would submit on his own terms, or that in consequence of the confusion which would probably be created both within and without, he could not fail to carry the long walls on the first assault, owing to the absence of troops along them for their defence. But when he approached near to the city, and the Athenians made not the slightest stir within, while they sent out their cavalry, with a division of their heavy-armed, light-armed, and archers, and shot down some of the enemy in consequence of their near advance, and got possession of some arms and dead bodies, then indeed, finding this to be the case, he led his army back again. He and his own troops still remained in their former position at Decelea, but the newly arrived forces he sent home, after they had staid in the country some few days. After this, the Four Hundred sent an embassy to Agis nevertheless; and when he now received them more favourably, and advised them to that effect, they sent envoys to Lacedæmon also to negotiate a treaty, being desirous of peace.

72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to reassure the troops, and to tell them that the oligarchy had not been established for the injury of the city and the citizens, but for the preservation of the whole state; moreover, that there were five thousand, and not four hundred only, who had a share in the government; though never yet, in consequence of their expeditions and their foreign occupations, had the Athenians come to consult on a business of such importance that five

thousand of them assembled for the purpose. They gave them, too, all other instructions as to what was suitable for them to say, and despatched them immediately after their own establishment in power, being afraid that a mob of sailors might (as was really the case) both themselves refuse to continue under the government of an oligarchy, and through the evil spreading from that quarter be the means of deposing them.

73. For at Samos the oligarchy was already made the subject of new measures, and the following events happened at the very time that the Four Hundred were conspiring. Those of the Samians who had risen up against the aristocratical party, and constituted the commons, turning round again, and being prevailed upon by Pisander on his arrival, and by the Athenians who were in the conspiracy at Samos, both bound themselves by oaths to the number of three hundred, and were prepared to attack the rest, as forming the democratical party. They also put to death one Hyperbolus, an Athenian, a base fellow, who had been ostracised, not from fear of his influence or rank, but for his villany, and for being a disgrace to the city; acting in the matter in concert with Charminus, one of the generals, and a party of Athenians who were with them, and to whom they had given pledges of faith. They likewise perpetrated other such deeds in conjunction with that party, and had determined to make an attack on the populace. They, however, having notice of their design, revealed what was going to be done to Leon and Diomedon, two of the generals, (for these submitted to the oligarchy against their will, from being honoured by the people,) and to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the former serving as a trierarch, the latter in the heavy infantry, as well as some others who had always been thought to be most opposed to the conspirators; begging them not to stand still and permit them to be ruined, and Samos to be lost to the Athenians, through whose help alone their empire had held together up to this time. On hearing this, they went to every one of the soldiers, and exhorted them not to put up with it, and especially the crew of the *Paralus*, as all on board of that vessel were Athenians and freemen, and had always been most bitter against an oligarchical government, even before there was one established. Leon and Diomedon also left them some ships for their protection, whenever they might themselves sail any where. So that when the three hundred

made an attack on them, by the aid of all these, and especially of the crew of the *Paralus*, the popular party of the Samians gained the upper hand. Of the three hundred they put to death some thirty, and banished three who were the most guilty; while with the rest they entered into an amnesty, and lived together for the future under a democratical government.

74. The ship *Paralus*, and Chæreas son of Archestratus on board of it—an Athenian who had been forward in the revolution—were sent by the Samians and the soldiers with all speed to Athens, to carry the news of what had taken place; for they were not yet aware of the Four Hundred being in power. On their sailing into harbour, the Four Hundred immediately threw some two or three of the crew into prison, and having taken their vessel from them, and removed them into another employed as a troop-ship, they set them to keep guard round Eubœa. Chæreas, by some means or other, immediately secreted himself; and when he saw the present state of things, he went back to Samos, and took the soldiers an exaggerated report of affairs at Athens, aggravating every thing, and telling them that “they were punishing all with stripes, and it was impossible to speak a word against those who held the government; moreover, that their wives and children were outraged, and that they intended to seize and confine all the relatives of such as were in the army at Samos and not on their own side, in order that, if they would not submit to them, the prisoners might be put to death:” with many other false statements which he made beside.

75. On hearing this, they were at first strongly inclined to make an attack on those who had been the chief authors of the oligarchy, and such of the rest as had taken part in it. Afterwards, however, being prevented by the men of moderate views, and warned not to ruin their cause, while the enemy were lying so near them with their ships ready for action, they desisted from it. After this, wishing openly now to change the government at Samos to a democracy, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these were the chief leaders in the revolution,) bound all the soldiers, and, most of all, the oligarchical party themselves, by the most solemn oaths, that they would assuredly be governed by a democracy, and live in concord; and also that they would zealously prosecute the war with the Peloponnesians, and would be foes to

the Four Hundred, and hold no intercourse with them. All the Samians too, who were of full age, took the same oath with them; and the soldiers communicated to the Samians all the circumstances, and the probable results of their dangers, thinking that neither for them nor for themselves was there any resource that could save them, but that if either the Four Hundred or the enemy at Miletus should defeat them, they would be destroyed.

76. Thus they were engaged in contention at this time, the one party wishing to force the city to a democracy, the other to an oligarchy. And the soldiers immediately held an assembly, in which they deposed their former generals, and any of the trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others in their place, both trierarchs and generals; of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. They also stood up and exhorted one another, both on other topics and on this; "that they ought not to be disheartened because the city had revolted from them; for it was but the smaller party which had separated from them who were the larger, and better provided in all respects. For since they held the whole fleet at their command, they would compel the other cities under their dominion to give them money, just the same as though they were coming from Athens. For they had a city in Samos, and no weak one either, but such as, when at war with them, had been within a very little of taking away the command of the sea which the Athenians enjoyed. And as for the enemy, they were defending themselves against them from the same position as before. They, then, inasmuch as they had command of the ships, were more able to provide themselves with necessaries than those at home. Nay, it was through their being stationed in advance at Samos, that those at home had before commanded the entrance to the Piræus; and now also they would be brought to such a strait, should they not consent to give them back the government, that they themselves would be better able to exclude them from the sea than to be excluded from it by them. Indeed it was but a trifling and inconsiderable degree in which the city was of use to them towards gaining the victory over the enemy; and they had lost nothing in losing those who had neither any more money to send them, (but the soldiers provided it themselves,) nor yet good counsel to give them, for the sake of

which a state has authority over armaments. On the contrary, even on these points the other party had done wrong by abolishing the laws of their fathers; while they themselves maintained those laws, and would endeavour to make *them* do it also. So that neither had they the inferiority as regarded those who should give good counsel. Alcibiades, too, would gladly secure them the alliance of the king, should they grant to him security of person and a restoration to his country. And what was most important, should they fail on all points, yet, having so large a fleet as they had, there were many places for them to retire to, in which they would find both cities and territory."

77. Having thus debated the matter together, and encouraged one another, they proceeded to make preparations for the war no less than before; and the ten ambassadors who had been sent to Samos by the Four Hundred, hearing of this when they were now at Delos, remained quiet there.

78. About this time also the soldiers in the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus were raising a clamour amongst themselves, about their cause being ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. For Astyochus, they said, would neither fight before, while they themselves were still the stronger, and the Athenian fleet was small, nor would he now, when the enemy were said to be in a state of sedition, and their ships were not yet brought together; but they would run the risk of being worn out by delay, while waiting for the Phœnician fleet—an idle pretence, and not a reality. And Tissaphernes, on the other hand, did not bring up this fleet, and at the same time injured their own navy by not giving them supplies regularly, or to the full amount. They ought therefore to wait no longer, but to come to a decisive engagement at sea. It was the Syracusans that most especially urged this.

79. The confederates, and particularly Astyochus, hearing these murmurs, and having resolved in council to fight a decisive battle, since the disturbances at Samos were also reported to them, they weighed anchor with all their ships, amounting to a hundred and twelve, and having given orders for the Milesians to march by land towards Mycale, they sailed to the same place. But the Athenians with their eighty-two ships which were lying at Glaucæ in the territory of Mycale, (Samos being but a short distance from the mainland at this

point, opposite Mycale,) when they saw the Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired to Samos, not thinking themselves sufficiently strong in numbers to risk a battle for their all. Besides, as they had had notice from Miletus of the enemy's wish for an engagement, they were expecting Strombichides from the Hellespont, to reinforce them with the ships which had gone from Chios to Abydos; for a messenger had previously been sent to him. Thus they retired to Samos; while the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and formed their encampment, with the land forces of the Milesians and the people in the neighbourhood. The next day, when they were going to advance against Samos, tidings reached them of the arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the Hellespont, and they immediately sailed back again to Miletus. The Athenians, when their squadron had joined them, advanced themselves against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships, wishing to come to a decisive battle; but when no one came out to meet them, they sailed back again to Samos.

80. The same summer, and immediately after this, since the Peloponnesians had not with their whole united fleet offered battle to the enemy, not thinking themselves a match for them, they were at a loss from what quarter to get money for such a number of vessels, especially as Tissaphernes supplied it ill; and therefore they sent Clearchus the son of Ramphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, in accordance with the original orders from the Peloponnese. For Pharnabazus invited them to his aid, and was prepared to furnish them with supplies; and at the same time intelligence reached them that Byzantium had revolted. Accordingly, these ships of the Peloponnesians put out into the open sea, in order to escape the observation of the Athenians during their voyage; but were overtaken by a storm, and the greater part of them put into Delos with Clearchus, and subsequently returned to Miletus, (Clearchus, however, afterwards went to the Hellespont by land, and entered on his command,) while the rest, to the number of ten, arrived safe at the Hellespont with Helixus the Megarean, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. After this, when the commanders at Samos were aware of it, they sent some ships to the Hellespont to oppose them and keep guard against them; and a trifling battle was fought at sea before Byzantium, between eight vessels against eight.

81. Now the leading men at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, had all along retained the same purpose, ever since he had effected a change in the government, namely, to restore Alcibiades; and at length, in an assembly, he persuaded the greater part of the soldiers to the same, and when they had passed a decree for the return and security of Alcibiades, he sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, thinking that their only chance of preservation was his bringing Tissaphernes over from the Peloponnesians to them. An assembly therefore having been convened, Alcibiades both complained of and deplored his own calamity in having been banished, and by speaking at great length on public matters raised them to no slight hopes for the future; and extravagantly magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes, in order that both the members of the oligarchy at home might be afraid of him, and the clubs be the more quickly broken up; and also that those at Samos might hold him in the greater honour, and be more encouraged themselves; and that the enemy, moreover, might be as much as possible set against Tissaphernes, and cast down from their present hopes. Accordingly Alcibiades, in the most boastful strain, held out these promises to them; "that Tissaphernes had pledged himself to him, that if he could but trust the Athenians, assuredly they should not want for supplies, so long as any of his own property remained, even though he should have at last to sell his own bed; and that he would bring the Phœnician ships which were now at Aspendus to join the Athenians, instead of the Peloponnesians; but he could only place confidence in the Athenians, if Alcibiades himself were recalled to be his security for them."

82. On hearing these and many other representations, they immediately elected him general in company with the former ones, and committed to him the whole management of their affairs. And now for nothing would they have exchanged their several hopes at the moment, both of preservation and of vengeance on the Four Hundred. Nay, they were at once ready immediately to despise their enemies on the spot, on the strength of what had been said, and to sail to the Piræus. He, however, most positively forbade their sailing to the Piræus, and leaving behind them their enemies who were so much closer at hand, though many were urgent for it, and told them



that since he had been chosen their general, he would first of all sail to Tissaphernes, and arrange with him measures for the war. And so, on leaving this assembly, he took his departure immediately, that he might be thought to communicate every thing to him; at the same time that he wished to be more honoured by him, and to show him that he was now elected general, and was able to do him either good or harm. And thus it was the good fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by means of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by means of them.

83. When the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the recall of Alcibiades, though they were before distrustful of Tissaphernes, they were now far more disgusted with him than ever. For the truth was, that in the case of the Athenians advancing against Miletus, when the Peloponnesians would not put out to meet them and give them battle, Tissaphernes became far more sick of giving them pay; and indeed that he had even before this made some progress in their dislike, on account of Alcibiades. And so the soldiers, and some of the other men of consideration also, as well as the soldiery, clubbing together as before, began to reckon up their grievances; namely, that they had never yet received their full pay; that what was now given them was deficient in amount, and not even that paid regularly; that unless they either fought a decisive battle, or removed to some station<sup>2</sup> where they might have supplies, the men would desert their ships; and that for all this Astyochus was to blame, through his humouring Tissaphernes for his own profit.

84. While they were thus reckoning up their grievances, the following disturbance also occurred about Astyochus. The Syracusan and Thurian seamen, inasmuch as they were,

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλου. If καὶ must be changed, as most of the editors think, into either κατὰ or μετὰ, the former would certainly appear the preferable correction. But I think that Poppo is quite right in retaining the original reading of all the MSS.; though I should rather consider the accusative τὸν ἐπίπλου as an instance of anacoluthon, (if it cannot be considered as an "accusativus de quo,") than connect it with the infinitive ναυμαχῆσαι.

<sup>2</sup> ὅθεν τροφήν ἔξει. Bekker appears to me to be fully justified in retaining ἔξει, which has so large a majority of the MSS. in its favour, in preference to ἔξειν, which Poppo, Güller, Arnold, and Bloomfield have adopted. Would not the reason alleged by Arnold against the use of the indicative here apply with equal force to ch. 86. 7, and the passage there quoted by himself, V. 103. 1?

generally speaking, most free, applied to him also with the greatest boldness, and demanded their pay. He answered them somewhat haughtily, and threatened them; and indeed against Dorieus, who was supporting the plea of his own seamen, he even lifted up his bâton. When the mass of the armament saw this, sailor-like, they rushed <sup>1</sup>in a rage upon Astyochus to strike him; but he saw them in time, and fled for refuge to an altar. Notwithstanding their rage, therefore, he was not struck, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took the fort belonging to Tissaphernes which had been built in Miletus, having attacked it when unobserved, and drawn out of it the garrison that was in it. And the rest of the confederates also approved of these things, and especially the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was displeased with them, and said that the Milesians and the rest of the states in the king's country ought to submit to Tissaphernes, in such things as were reasonable, and to pay him court, until they had brought the war to a happy conclusion. But the Milesians were offended with him for this, and other things of the same kind; and afterwards, when he had died of sickness, they would not allow them to bury him where those of the Lacedæmonians who were present wished to do.

85. When their affairs, then, were involved in these dissensions both with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus as admiral, and assumed the command, while Astyochus sailed away. With him Tissaphernes also sent, as an ambassador, one of his courtiers named Gaulites, a Carian who spoke <sup>2</sup>two languages; both to lay an accusation against the Milesians on the subject of the fort, and at the same time to make an apology for himself; for he knew that the Milesians were going thither chiefly to raise a clamour against him, and Hermocrates along with them, who intended to represent Tissaphernes as ruining the cause of the Peloponnesians in concert with Alcibiades, and pursuing a double policy. For he had always been at enmity

<sup>1</sup> *ἰκραγόντες*.] Literally "breaking out upon him;" an excellent instance of the etymological meaning of our word "rage."—In illustration of *οἱ δὲ ναῦται*, compare Eurip. Hec. 604, *ἐν τοι μυχῷ στρατεύματι Ἀκόλαστος ὄχλος, ναυτική τ' ἀναρχία Κρείσσων πυρός*.

<sup>2</sup> *Κᾶρα δίγλωσσον*.] "One of those Carians who were accustomed from their childhood to speak two languages;" as is the case with the people of French Flanders, and many other such frontier districts."—*Arnold*.

with him about the payment of the money to the forces; and at last, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and some others of the Syracusans, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, had come to Miletus to take command of the Syracusan ships, Tissaphernes pressed far more severely than ever on Hermocrates, when he was now an exile; both laying other things to his charge, and especially, that having once asked him for money and not obtained it, he displayed his enmity to him in consequence. Astyochus, then, with the Milesians and Hermocrates, sailed away to Lacedæmon; while Alcibiades had by this time crossed over again from Tissaphernes to Samos.

86. And now the ambassadors from the Four Hundred, whom they sent at the time we mentioned to appease and inform those at Samos, arrived from Delos, after Alcibiades had come; and when an assembly had been called, they attempted to make a speech. But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out, that they should put to death those who were abolishing the democracy; afterwards, however, they were with difficulty calmed down, and gave them a hearing. They, then, delivered to them this message; "that it was neither for the destruction of the state that the recent change had been made, but for its preservation; nor in order that it might be delivered up to the enemy, (for they might have done that when they invaded the country during their government:) that all in their turn should share the privileges of the Five Thousand; and that their relatives were neither being outraged, as Chæreas had slanderously reported to them, nor suffering any harm, but remained as they were, each in the enjoyment of his property." Though they made this and many other statements besides, they listened none the more favourably, but were angry, and expressed different opinions, though most generally, that they should sail to the Piræus. And on that occasion Alcibiades appeared to have benefited the state for the first time, and in a degree inferior to no one else. For when the Athenians at Samos were bent on sailing against their countrymen, in which case most certainly the enemy would have taken possession of Ionia and the Hellespont, he was the man who prevented them. Indeed on that emergency no one else would have been able to restrain the multitude. He, however, both made them desist from the

attack, and silenced with rebukes those individuals who were on their own account most angry with the ambassadors. He then dismissed them with an answer from himself, "that he did not object to the Five Thousand being in power, but ordered them to depose the Four Hundred, and to establish the council of Five Hundred as before. That if any retrenchment had been made with a view to economy, in order that those who were on service might be better provided with supplies, he entirely approved of it. In other respects also he urged them to stand out, and not at all to submit to the enemy. For if only the state were preserved, there was great hope of their being reconciled to one another; but if either of the two parties were once destroyed, either that at Samos, or that at home, there would no longer be any one for them to be reconciled to." There came also ambassadors from the Argives, with offers of assistance to the popular party of the Athenians at Samos; but Alcibiades thanked them, and desiring them to come when they should be called upon, thus dismissed them. Now the Argives came in company with the crew of the *Paralus*, who, when last mentioned, had been commanded by the Four Hundred to cruise in the troop-ship round Eubœa; and who, while taking to Lacedæmon some Athenians that had been sent as ambassadors by the Four Hundred, namely, *Læspodias*, *Aristophon*, and *Melesias*, when off Argos in their passage, seized the ambassadors, and delivered them up to the Argives, as being some of those who had been most instrumental in abolishing the democracy; while they themselves did not go to Athens again, but taking the ambassadors from Argos to Samos arrived there with the trireme they were in.

87. The same summer, and at the very time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with *Tissaphernes*, both on other accounts, and especially because of the return of *Alcibiades*, thinking that he was now evidently Atticizing, he, wishing, as it seemed, to clear himself to them of these charges, prepared to go to *Aspendus* for the Phœnician ships, and desired *Lichas* to accompany him; saying, that with regard to the armament, he would appoint *Tamos* as his lieutenant, to furnish the supplies while he was himself absent. The same account, however, is not given by all; nor is it easy to decide with what motive he went to *Aspendus*, and yet, after going, did not bring the fleet. For it is certain that the Phœnician

ships, a hundred and forty seven in number, came as far as Aspendus ; but why they did not come on, is a subject of many conjectures. For some think it was, that by going away he might, in accordance with his plan, wear down the power of the Peloponnesians ; (at any rate Tamos, who was intrusted with the charge, provided them with supplies no better, but even worse, than himself.) Others, that after bringing the Phœnicians to Aspendus, he might exact money from them for their discharge ; (for under no circumstances did he intend to employ them on any service.) Others, that it was on account of the clamour against him, which had spread to Lacedæmon—to have it said that he was not wronging them, but was certainly gone for the ships, which were undoubtedly manned for service. To me, however, it appears most evident that it was with a view to wear out the Greeks, and to keep them in suspense, that he did not bring the fleet ; to weaken them, during all the time that he was going there and delaying ; and to keep them balanced, in order that he might make neither party too strong by joining them. For had he wished to bring the war to a conclusion, it is surely evident that he *might* have done it without any doubt. For by bringing the fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedæmonians ; since even at present they maintained their opposition with their navy, on terms of equality rather than of inferiority. But what most clearly convicts him is the excuse which he alleged for not bringing the ships. For he said that they were fewer in number than the king had commanded to be collected. But surely he would have gained still greater thanks by that, through not spending so much of the king's money, and yet effecting the same object at a less cost. At any rate, with whatever intention it might have been, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and had an interview with the Phœnicians ; and the Peloponnesians, by his desire, sent Philippus, a man of Lacedæmon, with two triremes to fetch the fleet.

88. Alcibiades, on finding that Tissaphernes had gone to Aspendus, sailed thither himself also with thirteen ships,

<sup>1</sup> ἡ τινι δὲ γνώμη.] This passage affords a very good instance of the force which the conjunctions δ' οὐν most commonly have, though not always ; the doubtfulness being here expressed, which in most cases is only implied, when they are thus joined together. See note, p. 93.

promising the forces at Samos a sure and great benefit; for that, he would either himself bring the Phœnician fleet to the Athenians, or at any rate prevent its going to the Peloponnesians. For in all probability he had long known the purpose of Tissaphernes, that he did not intend fetching them, and wished to prejudice him as much as possible with the Peloponnesians, on the ground of his friendship for himself and the Athenians, that so he might be the more compelled to join the side of Athens. Accordingly he set sail and pursued his voyage upwards, straight for Phaselis and Caunus.

89. When the ambassadors sent from the Four Hundred arrived at Athens from Samos, and delivered the message from Alcibiades, namely, that he begged them to hold out, and not submit at all to the enemy; and that he had great hopes of reconciling the army to those at home, and of getting the better of the Peloponnesians; they gave much more courage to the greater part of those implicated in the oligarchy, who had even before been discontented with it, and would gladly have been quit of the business by any safe means. Accordingly they now united, and found fault with the present state of things, having as their leaders some of the most influential generals and men in office, such as Theramenes the son of Diagnon, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, and others; who, though amongst the first members of the government, were yet afraid, as they alleged, of the army at Samos, and of Alcibiades most especially, as also of those whom they were sending as ambassadors to Lacedæmon, lest without the authority of the greater part of them they might do the state some harm; and so they declared, not that they wished to

<sup>1</sup> ἄνω,] "i. e. towards the countries on the way to the East, and the centre of the Persian government."—*Arnold*.

<sup>2</sup> φοβούμενοι δ', ὡς ἔφασαν, κ. τ. λ.] This passage, as it stands in Arnold's text, being utterly untranslatable, I was compelled either to omit it altogether, or to adopt such corrections as would at any rate give some sense to it, whether the true one or not. I have therefore, with Güller, changed τοὺς into οὓς, taken away the comma after πρεσβενομένους, and substituted ἀπαλλάξειν for ἀπαλλάξαι. With regard to the τό before that infinitive, I am disposed to think that it is not so hopeless a reading as has been con-

προσταλαίπωρῆν τῷ δόξαντι καλῶ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν; Xen. Apol. Soc. 13, τὸ προιδέναι τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον πάντες λέγουσι. Id. Symp. III. 3, οὐδεὶς σοι, ἔφη, ἀντιλέγει τὸ μὴ οὐ λέγειν. The last two quotations prove

escape from the administration falling into too few hands, but that they ought to establish the Five Thousand in reality, not in mere name, and to settle the government on a more equal basis. This, however, was but a public profession made by them in word; but it was from private ambition that most of them pursued<sup>1</sup> that very method by which an oligarchy formed out of a democracy is most sure to be overturned. For all at once not only claim to be equal, but every one decidedly the first man. [And in such a case failure is intolerable:] whereas, when an election is made under a democracy, a man more easily submits to the result, as he does not think himself beaten on equal terms. But what most evidently encouraged them was the interest of Alcibiades being so strong in the army, and their not thinking that the power of the oligarchy would be permanent. Each one therefore strove to be himself the first to take the lead of the commons.

90. But those of the Four Hundred who were most opposed to such a form of government, and who now took the lead, namely, Phrynichus, (who when general at Samos had quarrelled, as already mentioned, with Alcibiades;) and Aristarchus, a man in the highest degree and for the longest time opposed to democracy; and Pisander, and Antiphon, and others who were most influential, had before—as soon as they were established in power, and afterwards, when the forces at Samos revolted from them for a democracy—sent members of their body as ambassadors to Lacedæmon, and been very anxious for peace with them, and been engaged in building the fort in what is called<sup>2</sup> Eetionia. And far more than ever was this the case, after their ambassadors from Samos had arrived; seeing, as they did, that both the majority of the people, and those of their own members, who before appeared

that this construction is common after verbs of 'saying;' and in the present instance I suppose the infinitive to depend upon such a verb understood from *ὡς ἔφασαν* in the preceding part of the paragraph. There seems therefore to be no reason for changing *τό* into *τοί*, as I was once led by the various reading *τῶι* to conjecture, before I knew that Götter had done the same.

<sup>1</sup> *ῥᾶν τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα—ῥίπει.*] Because, as Arnold observes, "they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing therefore to lessen the mortification of defeat."

<sup>2</sup> *Ἡτιωνία.*] For the nature and object of this fort, see Arnold's note.

trustworthy, were now changing their views. And so they despatched Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others with all speed, (for they were afraid of what was going on both at home and at Samos,) with instructions to make terms with the Lacedæmonians in any way whatever that was at all tolerable. And they worked with still greater earnestness at the fort in Ectionia. Now the object of the fort, as Theramenes and his party maintained, was this; not that they might avoid admitting the army at Samos into the Piræus, should they attempt to sail in by force; but rather that they might admit the enemy, whenever they pleased, both with ships and troops. For Ectionia is a mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into the harbour is straight by it. It was being fortified therefore in such a manner, in connexion with the wall previously existing on the land side, that, with only a few men posted in it, it would command the entrance. For in the very tower standing on one of the two sides, at the mouth of the harbour, which was narrow, was the termination both of the original wall on the land side, and of the new and inner one which was being built on the side of the sea. They also built a portico, which was very large and in immediate connexion with this wall in the Piræus; of which they themselves had the command, and in which they compelled all to deposit both what corn they had before and what was now brought in, and to take it out thence when they sold it.

91. On these subjects, then, Theramenes had long been murmuring; and ever since the ambassadors had returned from Lacedæmon without effecting any general arrangement for them, he did so still more, saying that there would be danger of this fort's proving the ruin of the city. For some ships from the Peloponnese, whose aid the Eubœans had invited to the number of two and forty, including some Italian and Sicilian vessels from Tarentum and Locri, also happened to be now lying off Las, in Laconia, and preparing for their passage to Eubœa, under the command of Agesandridas son of Agesander, a Spartan. These Theramenes declared to be sailing, not so much to the aid of Eubœa, as of those who were fortifying Ectionia; and that if they were not on their guard now, they would be lost before they were aware of it. And there really was some plan of this kind entertained by those who were charged with it, and it was not merely a ver-



bul misrepresentation. For it was the wish of that party, if possible, to retain their dominion over the allies with an oligarchical government; if not, to retain their independence, with the possession of their ships and walls; but if excluded from that also, at any rate not to perish themselves under the restored democracy before and above all others, but even to call in the enemy, and without walls and ships to make peace with them, and retain the government of the city on any terms whatever, if they had only security for their persons.

92. For this reason they were also diligently raising this fortification, with both posterns and entrances, and facilities for introducing the enemy, and were desirous to have it completed in time. Now what was said of them was previously advanced in small parties only, and with greater secrecy; but when Phrynichus, on his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, had been designedly stabbed in the full market by a man who served in the *peripoli*, and after proceeding but a short distance from the council-chamber expired immediately, and the assassin escaped; while his accomplice, who was an Argive, though seized and tortured by the Four Hundred, mentioned no one's name as having instigated him to it, nor any thing else, but that he knew many men assembled in different houses, both that of the commander of the *peripoli* and others; then indeed, when no disturbance arose from this, Theramenes and Aristocrates and all the rest of the Four Hundred, as well as of those out of doors who held the same views, proceeded with greater confidence to the execution of their measures. For at this same time the ships had now sailed round from Las, and after coming to anchor at Epidaurus, had overrun Ægina; and Theramenes remarked, that it was not probable that, while on their passage to Eubœa, they should have run into the bay, and be lying again at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited, and come for the purposes with which he had all along been charging them; and therefore it was not possible any longer to remain quiet. At length, after many more seditious speeches and suspicions had been uttered, they now proceeded to business, in real earnest. For the heavy-armed who were in the Piræus, building the wall in Eetionia, amongst whom also was Aristocrates a taxiarch, with his company, arrested Alexicles, who was a general on

<sup>1</sup> τῶν περιπόλων.] See note, p. 266.

the side of the oligarchy, and very favourably inclined to the associates, and taking him into a house confined him there. There were others who assisted them in this, and particularly one Hermon, commander of the *peripoli* stationed in Munychia; and, what was of most importance, the mass of the heavy-armed were in favour of these measures. When this news reached the Four Hundred, (who happened to be sitting together in their council-chamber,) immediately, with the exception of such as did not approve of the present government, they were prepared forthwith <sup>1</sup> to arm themselves, and threatened Theramenes and those with him. He, however, said in his defence that he was ready to go at once and assist in rescuing Alexicles; and taking with him one of the generals who held the same views with himself, he proceeded to the Piræus; while Aristarchus and some young men of the cavalry went to the rescue. The tumult, then, was great and alarming: for those in the city thought that the Piræus was already taken, and the general under arrest put to death; while those in the Piræus believed that the men in the city were all but attacking them. But when the elder men stopped those in the city who were running about, and rushing to the stands of arms; while Thucydides the Pharsalian, the Proxenus of the state, was also present, and earnestly opposed the several parties, calling upon them not to destroy their country while the enemy were still waiting to attack them; they were with difficulty quieted and forbore from attacking one another. Now when Theramenes came into the Piræus, (for he too was one of the generals,) as far as shouting went, he was angry with the soldiers; but Aristarchus and those who were opposed to the popular party were in a violent rage. Most of the soldiers however joined in the work, without changing their purpose, and asked Theramenes, whether he thought that the wall was being built for any good, or would be better demolished. He said, that if they thought right to demolish it, he also agreed with them. Upon that both the soldiers and many of the men in the Piræus immediately mounted, and began to pull down the fortification. And the cry for the encouragement of the multitude

<sup>1</sup> ἐς τὰ ὄπλα λίσσασθαι.] "To run to the spears and shields," (which in the present circumstances of the city were always kept piled in the open spaces in different parts of the town,) "and so to arm themselves for battle. See ch. 69. 1, 2; VII. 28. 2."—Arnold.

was this; "that whoever wished the Five Thousand to rule instead of the Four Hundred, must go to help in the work." For they continued, notwithstanding, to conceal their real views under the name of the Five Thousand, so that whoever wished the commons to hold the government did not expressly mention that word; fearing that the Five Thousand might really have been elected, and that so by saying something to one [who belonged to that body,] he might, through his ignorance of the fact, commit himself. And, indeed, for this reason the Four Hundred neither wished the Five Thousand to be elected, nor to have it known that they were not; thinking, on the one hand, that to instal so many partners with them would amount to a downright democracy; and, on the other hand, that uncertainty on the subject would strike them with fear of one another.

93. The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed, assembled nevertheless in their council-chamber; while the soldiers in the Piræus, after releasing Alexicles, whom they had arrested, and demolishing the fortification, came to the temple of Bacchus close to Munychia, and having piled their arms, <sup>1</sup> held an assembly there out of the usual place; and in accordance with a resolution made by them, proceeded straightway to the city, and piled their arms in the <sup>2</sup> Anaceum. But when certain chosen deputies from the Four Hundred came to them, they conversed man with man, and such as they saw to be men of moderate views they persuaded both to remain quiet themselves, and to restrain the rest; telling them that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that from these the Four Hundred should be elected in rotation, in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit: but, in the mean time, they begged them by no means to destroy the city, or drive it into the hands of the enemy. So the whole body of the soldiers, when such addresses were made by many and to many, were more pacified than before, and most alarmed for the whole state; and they agreed to hold, on an appointed day, an assembly in the temple of Bacchus, with a view to restoring concord.

<sup>1</sup> ἐξεκλησίασαν.] Or simply, "held an assembly," according to Bekker's reading, ἐξεκλήσιασαν.

<sup>2</sup> ἐν τῷ Ἀνακείῳ,] i. e. the temple of Castor and Pollux, to whom the title of ἀνακοί, "the princes," was given, according to Eustathius.

•• 94. When the day for holding the assembly was come, and they had all but met, news were brought that the two and forty ships with Agesander were<sup>1</sup> advancing from Megara along the coast of Salamis; and every one of the soldiers in general considered this to be the very thing which had so long been asserted by Theramenes and his party, namely, that it was to the fort that the ships were sailing; and it appeared to have been thrown down to good purpose. And it *might*, perhaps, in some measure have been by appointment that Agesandridas lingered about Epidaurus and that neighbourhood; though it is also probable that he stayed there in consequence of the present sedition amongst the Athenians, in hope of coming up at the moment favourable for action. But the Athenians, on the other hand, on receiving this intelligence, immediately ran down in full force to the Piræus, considering that a war with the enemy, of greater importance than that amongst themselves, was threatening them at no great distance, but close to their harbour. Some of them therefore went on board the ships that were already afloat; others launched additional ones; and some others ran to the defence of the walls and the mouth of the harbour.

95. But the Peloponnesian ships, after sailing by and doubling Sunium, came to anchor between Thoricus and Prasie, and subsequently went to Oropus. So the Athenians were compelled to go to sea in a hurry and with<sup>1</sup> untrained crews, inasmuch as the city was in a state of sedition, and they were anxious with all speed to go to the rescue of what was their most important possession; (for since Attica had been closed against them, Eubœa was every thing to them;) and accordingly they sent Thymochares in command of some ships to Eretria. When they arrived there, they amounted, with those that were in Eubœa before, to six and thirty; and they were immediately forced to an engagement. For Agesandridas, after his men had dined, put out from Oropus; which is distant from Eretria about sixty stades by sea. When, then, he was advancing against them, the Athenians straightway prepared to man their ships, supposing that their

<sup>1</sup> ἀξυγκροτήτοις.] Literally, "not hammered together;" i. e. not blended into one body, like two pieces of metal welded together by the hammer. To the examples of this metaphorical use of the verbs quoted by Arnold may be added Demosth. 23. 3, (Reiske,) θανμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου; 520. 12, συγκροτεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν τὸν χορόν.

men were near their vessels. They, however, were purchasing provisions for their dinner, not from the market-place, (for by an arrangement of the Eretrians there was nothing on sale there,) but from the houses in the outskirts of the town, in order that the enemy, while the Athenians were long in manning their ships, might attack them by surprise, and compel them to put out just as they might happen. Moreover, a signal had been raised at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus of the time when they should put to sea. The Athenians then, having put out with such scanty preparations, and fought a battle off the harbour of Eretria, held out against them, notwithstanding, for some little time, and were then put to flight and pursued to the shore. And now such of them as took refuge in the city of the Eretrians, as being friendly to them, fared worst of all, for they were butchered by them; but those who fled to the fort in the Eretrian territory, which the Athenians themselves occupied, were saved; as also were all the ships that reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, having taken two and twenty of the Athenian vessels, and either killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. And not long after they effected the revolt of the whole of Eubœa, excepting Oreus, (which was held by the Athenians themselves,) and arranged all other matters thereabout.

96. When the news of what had happened at Eubœa reached the Athenians, a greater consternation was felt by them than had ever been before. For neither had the disaster in Sicily, though it appeared a great one at the time, nor any other event, ever yet alarmed them so much. For when, after their army at Samos had revolted from them, and they had no more ships nor men to go on board them, while they were in a state of sedition, and did not know when they might break out into conflict with one another; [when, I say, under such circumstances] so great a calamity had befallen them—one in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was most of all, Eubœa, from which they derived more advantages than from Attica—how could their dejection be unnatural? But what especially and most immediately alarmed them, was the thought that the enemy would venture, on the strength of their victory, to sail straightway to the attack of their port Piræus, while it had no ships for its protection; and they supposed that they were already all out there. And indeed,

• If they had been more bold, they might easily have done that, and so have either divided the city still more than ever, by lying near it, or if they had remained and blockaded it, have compelled the fleet in Ionia, though opposed to the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their own relatives and the whole city; and in the mean time the Hellespont would have been theirs, with Ionia, the islands, every thing as far as Eubœa, in a word, the whole empire of Athens. But it was not on this occasion, but on many others also, that the Lacedæmonians proved themselves most convenient people for the Athenians to be at war with. For by being very widely different in character—the one people being quick, and the other slow; the one enterprising, and the other unadventurous—they presented very many advantages, especially in the case of a naval empire. • A proof of this was given by the Syracusans; for they, through being of a congenial disposition, were also most successful in carrying on war with them.

97. On receiving therefore this news, the Athenians, notwithstanding, manned twenty ships, and called an assembly; one immediately, which was summoned to meet on that occasion for the first time in what was called the Pnyx, (where they had been accustomed to meet in other days,) and in which they deposed the Four Hundred, and resolved that the government should be put into the hands of the Five Thousand; that <sup>1</sup> in that body should be included all who furnished themselves with heavy armour; and that no one should receive pay for the discharge of any office; or if any one did, they declared him to be accursed. Many other assemblies were also held subsequently, in which they appointed persons to frame a code of laws, and every thing else requisite for the government. And during the first period of this constitution the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best polity they ever did, at least in my time; for the blending together of the few and the many was effected with moderation; and this • was what first raised the state up again after the disastrous occurrences which had taken place. They also passed a decree for the recall of Alcibiades, and some others with him; and

<sup>1</sup> εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.] “We must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible into the number of the Five Thousand; whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the whole number of the Five Thousand. See ch. 93. 2.”—*Arnold*.

sending to him and to the army at Samos, they urged them to attend diligently to their interests.

98. On this change being made, the party of Pisander and Alexicles, and all who were most devoted to the oligarchy, withdrew privily to Decelea; while Aristarchus alone of them, happening to be in office as general, took with all haste some of the most barbarous amongst the archers, and proceeded to CEnoe. This was a fortress belonging to the Athenians on the borders of Bœotia, and in consequence of a blow that had been inflicted on them by the garrison, by cutting off a party of men on their return from Decelea, it was being besieged by the Corinthians, who had volunteered for the service, and had called the Bœotians also to their aid. After communicating therefore with these, Aristarchus deceived those in CEnoe, by telling them that their countrymen in the city had made a general surrender to the Lacedæmonians, and *they* must give up the place to the Bœotians; for that such were the terms of the capitulation. They therefore, believing him, inasmuch as he was one of the generals, and knowing nothing that had happened, in consequence of their being blockaded, evacuated the fort under truce. It was in this manner that the Bœotians took and occupied CEnoe, and that the oligarchy and sedition at Athens came to an end.

99. About the same period of this summer the Peloponnesians at Miletus also executed the following measures. When none of those who were intrusted with the business by Tissaphernes, at the time that he went to Aspendus, afforded them supplies, and neither the Phœnician ships nor Tissaphernes made their appearance hitherto, but Philippus who had been sent with him, as well as another Spartan named Hippocrates, who was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus the admiral, that the ships would not join them, and that they were being wronged by Tissaphernes in every respect; and when again Pharnabazus was calling them to his aid, and was desirous to get the ships in his turn, like Tissaphernes, and cause the remaining cities in his government to revolt from the Athenians, hoping to gain some advantage thereby; under these circumstances, I say, Mindarus, with great regularity, and with orders suddenly given, to escape the observation of those at Samos, weighed anchor from Miletus with three and seventy ships, and sailed for the Hellespont. (Sixteen ships had at an

earlier period of this same summer entered that sea, and over-ran some parts of the Chersonese.). But being caught in a storm, and compelled to do so, he put in at Icarus, and after remaining there through stress of weather five or six days, arrived subsequently at Chios.

100. When Thrasyllus heard of his having put out from Miletus, he himself also set sail straightway from Samos with five and fifty ships, hurrying on to prevent his sailing into the Hellespont before him. But on finding that he was at Chios, and expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts both in Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that in case of the ships stirring in any direction they might not do so unobserved; while he himself coasted along to Methymna, and gave orders for preparing meal and other necessaries, with a view of advancing from Lesbos to attack them at Chios, if any length of time should be spent there. At the same time, since Eresus in Lesbos had revolted, he wished to sail against and take it, if he could. For some exiles of the Methymnæans, and those the most influential, having carried over from Cuma about fifty heavy-armed men who had been associated with them, and hired others from the continent, with three hundred in all, of whom Alexander, a Theban, took the command on the strength of his connexion with them, made an attack on Methymna first; and when beaten off from the attempt by means of the Athenian garrison troops which had advanced from Mytilene, and again repulsed in an engagement outside of the town, made their way over the mountain, and procured the revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus therefore sailed against it with all his ships, intending to assault it. Thrasybulus, too, had arrived there before him with five ships from Samos, on receiving tidings of the exiles thus crossing over; but being too late, he went to Eresus, and lay at anchor before it. They were also joined by two vessels on their return home from the Hellespont, and by those of the Methymnæans; and so there were present, in all, seven and sixty ships, with the troops of which they made their preparations for taking Eresus by storm, if they could, with the aid of engines, or in any way whatever.

101. In the mean time Mindarus and the Peloponnesian ships at Chios, after being victualled for two days, and receiving from the Chians three Chian tessaracostes a man, on the



third day put out with all speed from the island, not into the open sea, to avoid falling in with the fleet at Eresus, but sailing to the continent with Lesbos on their left hand. After touching at the port of Carteria, in the Phocæan territory, and dining, they proceeded along the coast of Cuma, and supped at Argennusa on the mainland, over against Mytilene. Thence they still coasted on, though it was late in the night, and arrived at Harnatus on the continent, just opposite Methymna, and after dinner passing quickly by Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the towns in those parts, came somewhat before midnight to Rhœteum, and so were now in the Hellespont. Some of the ships also put in, at Sigeum, and other places in that neighbourhood.

102. Now the Athenians were at Sestos with eighteen ships; and when their friends gave them notice by fire signals, while they also observed the fires on the hostile shore suddenly appear numerous, they were aware that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont. Accordingly that same night, sailing as quickly as they could, and keeping close under the shore of the Chersonese, they coasted along towards Elæus, wishing to escape from the enemy's fleet into the open sea. And they eluded the observation of the sixteen ships at Abydus, although orders for keeping guard had been before given by their friends who went to them, that they might be on the alert against the Athenians in case they should sail out. But descrying those with Mindarus in the morning, and being immediately chased by them, they had not all time to escape, but the greater part of them did, to Imbros and Lemnus; while four of the ships, which were sailing last, were overtaken off Elæus. One of these, which was stranded opposite the temple of Protesilaus, they took together with its crew, and two others without their crews; while the remaining one they burnt, after it had been deserted, close to Imbros.

103. After this, with the vessels which had joined them from Abydus and the rest, amounting in all to eighty-six, they besieged Elæus that day, and when it did not surrender, sailed back to Abydus. As for the Athenians, they had been deceived by their scouts, and did not imagine that the passage of the enemy's fleet could ever escape their vigilance, but were leisurely assaulting the walls of Eresus. When, how-

• ever, they were aware of it, they immediately left Eresus, and proceeded with all haste to the defence of the Hellespont. And they took two of the Peloponnesian ships, which having on that occasion put out into the open sea more boldly than the rest, fell in with them. The next day they arrived and cast anchor at Elæus, and bringing in from Imbros such ships as had taken refuge there, they were five days making preparations for the battle.

• 104. After this they fought in the following manner. The Athenians, drawn up in column, were sailing close along shore towards Sestos; while the Peloponnesians, observing this from Abydus, put out on their side also to meet them. When they found that they were on the eve of an engagement, they extended their flank, the Athenians along the Chersonese, from Idacus to Arrhiana, with seventy-six ships, the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, from Abydus to Dardanus, with eighty-six. On the side of the Peloponnesians, the right wing was held by the Syracusans, the other by Mindarus himself and the fastest sailing vessels; on that of the Athenians, the left was held by Thrasyllus, the right by Thrasybulus; while the other commanders took their position as might severally happen. It being the object of the Peloponnesians to strike the first blow, and by outflanking the Athenians' right with their own left to exclude them, if they could, from sailing out of the straits, as well as to drive their centre on to the shore, which was at no great distance; the Athenians, aware of this, extended their own wing also where the enemy wished to hem them in, and had the advantage over them in sailing; while their left had by this time passed the headland called Cynossema. But in consequence of this, they had to form their centre with weak and scattered ships, especially as they had the smaller number at their command, and the coast about Cynossema formed a sharp and angular projection, so that what was doing on the other side of it was not visible.

• 105. The Peloponnesians therefore, falling on their centre, drove the Athenian ships ashore, and landed to follow up their attack, having had a decided advantage in the action. To assist their centre was neither in the power of Thrasybulus on the right, owing to the superior number of ships that were pressing on him, nor of Thrasyllus on the left; for it was concealed from him by the headland of Cynossema, and, moreover,

the Syracusans and the rest who were opposed to him with no inferior numbers prevented his doing it: until the Peloponnesians, from pursuing, in the security of victory, different vessels in different directions, began to fall into greater disorder in one part of their force. Thrasybulus therefore, observing this, ceased now from extending the flank, and facing about immediately attacked and routed the ships opposed to him; and then proceeding to those on the victorious part of the enemy's line, handled them roughly in their scattered condition, and threw most of them into a panic without striking a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time yielded the victory to Thrasybulus, and taken to flight more decidedly, when they saw the rest doing so likewise.

106. The rout having thus been effected, and the Peloponnesians having most of them taken refuge at the mouth of the river Midius in the first instance, and then at Abydos, though the Athenians took but few ships, (for the narrow breadth of the Hellespont gave their opponents places of refuge at a little distance,) yet the victory which they gained in this sea-fight was most opportune for them. For whereas they had before been afraid of the Peloponnesian fleet, in consequence of losses in detail, as well as of the disaster in Sicily, they now ceased to think disparagingly of themselves, and to consider their enemies as good for any thing at sea. However, they took from their opponents eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and one Leucadian, Lacedæmonian, Syracusan, and Pellenian, respectively; while they themselves lost fifteen. After erecting a trophy on the headland of Cynossema, securing the wrecks, and restoring the enemy their slain under a truce, they then despatched a trireme to Athens with the news of their victory. On the arrival of the vessel, and on hearing of their unexpected good fortune, after the disasters which had recently befallen them in Eubœa, and through their own sedition, they were much encouraged, and thought that their cause might still possibly prevail, if they supported it with vigour.

107. On the fourth day after the engagement, the Athenians at Sestos having hastily refitted their ships, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted. And descrying the eight ships from Byzantium lying at anchor off Harpagium and Priapus,

they attacked them, and took the vessels, after defeating in a battle those who came to help them on shore. On their arrival also at Cyzicus, which was unfortified, they got possession of it again, and levied a contribution from it. In the mean time the Peloponnesians also sailed from Abydus to Elaëus, and recovered such of their ships as were in sound condition, (the rest having been burnt by the inhabitants,) and then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch the squadron that was there.

108. About this same time, too, Alcibiades returned to Samos with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis, bringing word that he had prevented the Phœnician ships from joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes a more decided friend to the Athenians than before. Having then manned nine ships in addition to those he had already, he levied large sums of money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After executing these measures, and placing a governor in Cos, it being now towards autumn, he sailed back to Samos. As for Tissaphernes, when he heard that the Peloponnesian squadron had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he set out again from Aspendus, and proceeded to Ionia. Now while the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (of Æolian extraction,) conveyed by land over Mount Ida some heavy-armed troops from Abydus, and introduced them into their city, in consequence of being ill-treated by Arsaces the Persian, Tissaphernes' lieutenant. This same man, pretending to have a quarrel which he had not yet avowed, and offering service to the chief men amongst them, had induced the Delians, who had settled at Atramyctium, when driven from their homes by the Athenians for the purpose of purifying Delos, to go out as though on terms of friendship and alliance with him; and then, having watched when they were at dinner, had surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down. Since therefore they were afraid, on account of this deed, that he might some time or other commit some outrage on themselves too, and since he also imposed upon them burdens which they could not bear, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

109. When Tissaphernes heard of this act also on the part of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus and that at Cnidus, (for there too his garrisons had been driven out,) con-

sidering that he must have incurred their violent displeasure, and fearing that they might do him still further mischief, and, moreover, being vexed to think that Pharnabazus, by receiving them, might in less time and at less expense be more successful in his measures against the Athenians, he determined to go to them at the Hellespont, that he might both complain of what had been done at Antandrus, and defend himself as plausibly as he could against their charges respecting the Phœnician fleet, and all other matters. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus, and offered sacrifice to Diana.

[When the winter following this summer shall have terminated, the twenty-first year will be completed.]

# INDEX.

- **ABDERA**, 108, 153.
- Abronychus**, 55.
- Abydus**, 548, 578.
- Acanthus**, 276, 322.
- Acarnan**, son of Alcæmon, 158.
- Acarnanians**, 4. excellent slingers, 142. conquer the Ambraciots, 133. make peace with them, 227.
- Acesines**, the river, 243.
- Acharnæ**, 104, 106.
- Achelous**, the river, 157, 222.
- Acheron**, the river, 29.
- Acherusian lake**, *ib.*
- Achilles**, 3.
- Acraë**, 380.
- Acragas**, 379, 480.
- Acropolis**, the, 74, 102, 106.
- Acte**, 292.
- Actium**, 18, 19.
- Admetus**, king of the Molossians, 80.
- Æantidas**, tyrant of Lampsacus, 415.
- Ægaleos**, Mount, 104.
- Æginetæ**, formerly of great power at sea, 10. stir up the war against the Athenians. 39. conquered by the Athenians at sea, 62. how and why expelled Ægina by the Athenians, 107. are settled by the Lacedæmonians at Thyrea, 108. how used by the Athenians when they reduced Thyrea, 261.
- Ægittium**, 217.
- Ægræans**, 222.
- Ægyptians**, which of them most warlike, 64.
- Æneas**, 298.
- Enesias**, 90.
- Æniadæ**, 157, 227, 487.
- Æoliars**, tributary to Athens, 487.
- Æolis**, 219.
- Æstmidæ**, 29.
- Æson**, 368.
- Ætæans**, 214.
- **Ætolians**, 4. invaded by the Athenians, 215. defeat them, 217.
- Ætna**, 228.
- Agamemnon**, 5, 6.
- Agatharchidas**, 143.
- Agatharchus**, 464, 497.
- Agasander**, 83, 573.
- Agæsiptidas**, 349.
- Agis**, king of Sparta, 212, 228. he commands against the Argives, 348. lets them go without a battle, 350. is accused for it at Sparta, 351. marches a second time against them, *ib.* gains the victory at Mantinea, 358. fortifies Decelea in Attica, 460. makes an unsuccessful attempt on Athens, 555.
- Agæaræ**, 157, 225, 273.
- Agrianians**, 153.
- Agrirentines**, 311. neutral in the Sicilian war, 488.
- Alcæus**, archon at Athens, 323.
- Alcæmenes**, 514, 517.
- Alcibiades**, son of Clinias, 340. his expedition into Peloponnesus, 347. and to Argos, 367. named for one of the commanders in Sicily, 382. his speech on that occasion, 387. is accused about the Mercuries, and for profaning the mysteries, 395. insists on a trial, 396. sets out for Sicily, *ib.* his opinion at a council of war, 409. is recalled to take his trial, *ib.* flies and is outlawed, 411. takes refuge at Sparta, 418. his speech at Sparta, 435. advises the Lacedæmonians, about prosecuting the war, 515, 519. sent to Chios with Chalcideus, 519. his transactions at Miletus, 521. goes to Tissaphernes, and becomes a favourite, 538. contrives his own recall to Athens, 541. his quarrel with Phrynichus, 542. is recalled, 561, 576. his management at Samos, 561, 564. goes to Aspendus, 566.
- Alcidas**, the Lacedæmonian admiral, sent to Lesbos, 167, 173. he flies, 176. returns to Peloponnesus, 202. sails to Corecyra, 203. one of the three leaders of the colony to Heraclea, 214.
- Alcinidas**, 323, 325.
- Alciphron**, 351.
- Alcæmon**, 158.
- Alcæmonidæ**, 416.
- Alexander**, a Theban, 577.
- Alexarchus**, 461.
- Alexicles**, put under arrest, 570. flies to Decelea, 576.
- Alexiæpidas**, 547.
- Almopians**, 155.
- Alope**, 107.
- Alyzia**, 469.
- Ambracia**, gulf of, 18, 34.
- Ambraciots**, aid the Corinthians against

- the Corcyraeans, 16, 17, 29. make war on the Amphilocheians, 132. and the Aearnians, 140. make another expedition against both, 221. take Olpa, 16. are defeated, 223. make peace, 227. send aid to the Syracusans, 488.
- Amebias, 307.
- Aminias, 132.
- Aminocles, 9.
- Ammias, son of Coraelius, 170.
- Amorges, revolts from the king of Persia, 515. is taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians, and delivered to Tissaphernes, 528.
- Ampelidas, 324.
- Antiphas, 298.
- Amphilochian Argos, 220, 221.
- Amphilochians, 132, 137.
- Amphilochus, 132.
- Amphipolis, 59, 287, 310, 321, 366.
- Amphissians, 218.
- Amyclæ, 322.
- Amyntas, 153, 156.
- Amyrtæus, 64.
- Anactorium, 18, 34, 227, 257, 329, 469.
- Anæa, 271, 522.
- Anapus, the, 142.
- Anaxilas, 380.
- Andocides, son of Leogoras, 32.
- Andrians, 253, 487, 554.
- Androcles, 551.
- Androcrates, 172.
- Andromedes, 339.
- Androthenes, 345.
- Andrus, 124.
- Aneristus, 131.
- Antandrus, 258, 271, 581.
- Anthemus, 153.
- Anthene, 238.
- Anticles, 68.
- Antimenidas, 339.
- Antiochus, king of the Orestians, 141.
- Antiphemus, 379.
- Antiphon, 553, 568.
- Antippos, 323, 325.
- Antissa, 168, 174.
- Antisthenes, 534, 548.
- Aphrodisia, 260.
- Aphytis, 38.
- Apidanus, 274.
- Apodoti, 215.
- Apollo, Delian, 9, 220, 296. temples of, 18, 322, 344.
- Malcois, 160.
- Archegetes, 378.
- Apollonia, 16.
- Arcadia, 2, 828.
- Arcadians, furnished with ships by Agamemnon in the Trojan expedition, 6. mercenaries, 488.
- Archedices, 413.
- Archelaus, 156.
- Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, 35.
- Archestratus, 18.
- Archias, of Samaria, 243.
- Archias, the Corinthian, founder of Syracuse, 379.
- Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech on war with the Athenians, 44. commands in the invasion of Attica, 96. his speech, 97. commands in another invasion, 118. and against Platæa, 134.
- Archonidas, 449.
- Argilus, 622.
- Arginus, 531.
- Argives, 3. have thirty years' truces with the Lacedæmonians, 318. are irritated by the Corinthians against the Lacedæmonians, 327. aim at being a leading state, 328. make war upon the Epidaurians, 347. are surrounded by the Lacedæmonians, but let go, 351. are defeated at Mantinea, and make peace, 358, 369.
- Argos, 6, 260.
- in Amphilochia, 132.
- Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, 288.
- Arianthidas, 280.
- Aristagoras, 288.
- Aristarchus, 568, 571, 576.
- Arkteus, son of Pellichas, 18.
- son of Adimantus, 36—38, 131.
- the Lacedæmonian, 307.
- Aristides, son of Lysimachus, 55.
- son of Archippus, 257, 271.
- Aristo, 475.
- Aristocles, 320, 358.
- Aristocrates, 323, 325, 567, 570.
- Aristogiton, 12, 13, 412.
- Aristonous, 379.
- of Larissa, 106.
- Aristonymus, 299.
- Aristophon, 565.
- Aristoteles, son of Timocrates, 232.
- Arne, 8, 288.
- Arnissa, 304.
- Arrhiana, 579.
- Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians, 274. warred against by Brasidas and Perdicas, 274, 300.
- Arsacea, 581.
- Artabazus, 76.
- Artaphernes, 257.
- Artas, 470.
- Artaxerxes Longimanus, 61. begins to reign, 81. dies, 257.
- Artemisium, the month, 323.
- Asia, athletic games in, 5.
- Asine, 236, 259, 440.
- Asopius, son of Phormio, his exploits and death, 162.
- Aspendus, 561, 565.
- Astacus, 109, 157.
- Astmachus, 190.
- Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, 522. goes to Chios, 523. in great danger, 530. refuses to succour the Chians, 531. betrays Phrynichus, 542. is mutinied against by his own seamen, and returns to Sparta, 562.
- Atalanta, 110, 156, 212, 322.
- Athenæus, 298.
- Athenagoras, his speech at Syracuse, 402.
- Athenians, gave shelter at first to all who

would settle amongst them, 11. how they became a naval power, 12. origin of their great war with the Peloponnesians, 15. rebuild their walls, 54. made war against the king of Persia, under Pausanias, 57. gradual growth of their power, 58. gain a victory at Eurymedon, 59. reduce the isle of Thasos, 60. receive the Helots, and settle them at Naupactus, 61. their war in Egypt, *ib.* with the Corinthians, *ib.* and Epidaurians, and Æginetæ, 62. with the Lacedæmonians, 63. Bœotians, *ib.* Sicyonians, 65. Cyprians, *ib.* recover Charonea, 66. defeated at Coronæa, *ib.* reduce Eubœa, *ib.* make war upon Samos, 67. make alliance with the Corcyreans, 28. assist them against the Corinthians, 30. they take measures to repress the revolt of the Potidæans, 35. speech of their ambassadors at Lacedæmon in reply to the Corinthians, 44. make war upon Perdiccas, 35. fight the Potidæans and Corinthians, 37. besiege Potidæa, 39. reduce Samos, 67, 68. deliberate about the Peloponnesian war, 83. prepare for defence, 94. send their fleet to cruise upon Peloponnesus, 106. attack Methone, *ib.* invade Locris, 107. eject the Æginetæ from the isle of Ægina, 108. make an alliance with Sitalces, *ib.* take Solium and Astacus, 109. invade the Megaris, *ib.* fortify Atalante, 110. celebrate the public funerals, 111. are afflicted with the plague, 119. send their fleets to cruise on Peloponnesus, 124. are angry with Pericles, 125. take Potidæa, 134. war upon the Chalcidians, 139. fight the Peloponnesians at sea, 144, 150. send a fleet to Lesbos, 160. besiege Mytilene, 162. reduce it, 174. seize the island of Minoa, 189. send a fleet to Sicily, 211. their war in Acarnania, 215. are defeated by the Ætolians, 217. their proceedings in Sicily, 227. they seize and fortify Pylus, 232. fight between them and the Lacedæmonians, 236. fight the Syracusans, 240. invade the Corinthians, 253. take Anaclorium, 256. conquer Cythera, 259. take Thyrea, 261. surprise Nisæa, 268. invade Bœotia, and are defeated at Delium, 283. lose Amphipolis, 290. make a truce with the Lacedæmonians, 295. take Mende, 304. besiege Scione, 306. eject the Delians, 309. are conquered by Brasidas at Amphipolis, 316. make a peace, 321. take Scione, 332. want to break the peace, 340. make an alliance with the Argives, 343. invade and reduce Melos, 367. determining on the Sicilian expedition, 377. their preparations, 390. they sail for Sicily, 398. land at Syracuse, 420. fight, 422. solicit the alliance of Camarina, 426. take Epipolæ, 445. besiege Syracuse, 443. fight with Gylippus, 453. send a reinforcement to Syracuse, 455. fight

the Corinthians at Erineus, 471. defeated in the attack of Epipolæ, 478. are raising the siege, 484. are stopped by an eclipse of the moon, *ib.* fight a battle in the harbour, 497. march away, 501. forced to surrender, 507, 508. the consternation at Athens, 512. their measures, 513. take Mytilene, 524. subdue the Clazomenians, *ib.* besiege the Chians, 525. defeat the Milesians, 526. quit Miletus for fear of the Peloponnesians, 527. fight and are defeated, 536. solicit the friendship of Tissaphernes, 546. fight with the Chians, 549. lose their democracy, *ib.* lose Eubœa, 574. defeat the Peloponnesians in the battle of Cynossema, 579.

Athos, Mount, 292, 310.

Atintanians, 141.

Atramyctum, 309, 581.

Atreus, 6.

Attica, 2, 6, 35, 68.

Aulon, 288.

Autocharidas, 317.

Autocles, 258, 298.

Axius, the river, 155.

Bacchus, temples of, 101, 207, 572.

Battus, 254.

Bœœa, 36.

Bisaltia, 155, 292.

Borotarcha, 280, 336.

Brotia, 2.

Bœotians, 7. ejected out of Arne, 8. conquered by the Athenians at Œnophyta, 63. become free, 66. win the battle of Delium, 284. besiege Delium, *ib.* take Panactum, 310. send aid to the Syracusans, 460.

Bœum, 63.

Bolbe, lake, 35, 288.

Bolissus, 525.

Boriades, 218.

Borniensians, 217.

Bottians, 35, 139.

Bottice, 39.

Brasidas, saves Methone, and receives the public commendation at Sparta, 107. is of the council to Alcidas, 202. his gallant behaviour at Pylus, 235. saves Megara, 268. marches to Thrace, 274. his character, 275. marches against the Lyncestians, *ib.* harangues the Acarnathians, 276. gets possession of Amphipolis, 289. is repulsed at Eion, 290. marches into Acte, 292. takes Torone, 295. and Lecythus, 294. crowned by the Sclæoneans, 299. marches a second time against the Lyncestians, 300. his brave retreat, 303. makes an unsuccessful attempt on Potidæa, 308. opposes Cleon at Amphipolis, 312. resolves to attack, 314. harangues, *ib.* sallies, 316. conquers and dies, 317. his funeral, *ib.* Brauro, wife of Eurymachus, 290. Brulinis, 311.



- Brilassus, 106.  
 Bromiscus, 288.  
 Buccolion, 308.  
 Budorun, 152, 189.  
 Byzantines, revolt from the Athenians, 67.  
  
 Cacyparis, the river, 506.  
 Cæadas, the, 79.  
 Calex, the river, 271.  
 Calirrhoe, the spring of, 101.  
 Callias, son of Calliades, 36. killed, 38.  
 Callicrates, 18.  
 Calliensians, 217.  
 Calligitus, 515, 534.  
 Calydon, 219.  
 Camarineans, twice ejected, 380. their conduct in the Sicilian war, 261, 414, 426, 434, 470.  
 Cambyses, 9.  
 Camirus, 537.  
 Caranus, 106.  
 Carcinus, 62.  
 Cardamyle, 525.  
 Carians, 3, 5.  
 Carneian holy-days, 348, 361.  
 Carteria, 578.  
 Carthaginians, 9.  
 Caryæ, 349.  
 Carystians, 58, 253, 487, 554.  
 Casmenæ, 380.  
 Catana, 311.  
 Catanæans, dwell under Mount Ætna, 228. reduced by the Athenians, 411, 468.  
 Caunus, 534.  
 Cecrops, king of Athens, 100.  
 Cecryphalea, sea fight at, 61.  
 Cenchreæ, 254, 522.  
 Centotripi, 441.  
 Cephalenia, 17, 95, 109, 140, 215, 469.  
 Cercine, 154.  
 Cerdylum, 312.  
 Ceryces, 544.  
 Cestrine, 29.  
 Chæreas, 557.  
 Chæronea, 66, 272.  
 Chalcæans, 218.  
 Chalcideans of Eubœa, make war with the Eretrians, 10. subject to the Athenians, 487.  
 Chalcideans of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, 35, 37. defeat them, 140. enter into league with the Argives, 331.  
 Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, 516. his exploits, 520, 521. killed by the Athenians, 524.  
 Chalcidice, 39, 274.  
 Chalcis, 64, 574.  
 Chaonians, 133, 140.  
 Charadrus, the river, 352.  
 Charicles, 461.  
 Charminus, an Athenian commander, 520. defeated by the Peloponnesians, 523. helps the oligarchical party at Samos, 536.  
 Charceades, son of Euphiletus, 211. killed, 212.  
 Charybdis, 242.  
 Chersonese, 7, 253.  
 Chians, 258. allies to the Athenians, 12, 62. suspected, 518. revolt from the Athenians, 520. their war, 522.  
 Chiimerium, 19, 29.  
 Chionis, 323.  
 Chromon, 217.  
 Chrysippus, 6.  
 Chrysis, 90, 307.  
 Cilicians, 65.  
 Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 58. beats the Persians at Eurymedon, 59. dies in the expedition to Cyprus, 65.  
 Cinæum, 214.  
 Cithæron, 137, 172.  
 Cithium, 63.  
 Citium, 65.  
 Clarus, 176.  
 Clazomenæ, 530.  
 Clearchus, 517, 534, 560.  
 Clearchus, commands in Amphipolis, 307, 312, 313. conquers Cleon with Brasidas, 317. endeavours to break the peace, 324.  
 Cleipplides, 160.  
 Cleobulus, 335.  
 Cleomedes, 367.  
 Cleomenes, 74, 173.  
 Cleon, his speech, 178. command at Pylius, 245, 247. his command in Thrace, 309, 315. conquered by Brasidas, and killed, 316.  
 Cleonæ, 292, 356, 441.  
 Cleopompus, 107, 124.  
 Clophyxus, 292.  
 Cnemus, the Spartan, commands a squadron against Zacynthus, 131. sent into Acarnania, 140. retires from Stratus, 144.  
 Cnidos, 212, 532.  
 Cœcinus, 220.  
 Colonæ in the Troad, 77.  
 Colophonians, 310.  
 Conon, 469.  
 Corcyræans, 9. founders of Epidamnus, 15. were themselves a Corinthian colony, 16. make war on Epidamnus, 17. beat the Corinthians at sea, 19. beg the alliance of Athens, 20. their speech at Athens, 21. their success, 28. engage the Corinthians at sea, 30. their sedition, 202, 255. aid the Athenians in the war of Sicily, 488.  
 Corinthians, first built ships of war, 9. origin of their hatred for the Athenians, 61. their quarrel with the Corcyræans about Epidamnus, 16. their speech at Athens, 24. continuation of their war with the Corcyræans, 20. send aid to Potidæa, 36. cry out against the Athenians, 39. their first speech at Lacedæmon, 40. their second, 69. invaded by the Athenians, 255. excite discontent in Peloponnesus, 326, 327. make alliances with the Eleans and Argives, 331. aid the Syracusans, 435, 459.

- mē, 157.  
 yta, 260.  
 Corycus, 519, 531.  
 Coryphastum, 230, 296, 322.  
 Cos Meropis, 535.  
 Cranii, 109, 334, 349.  
 Cranonians, 106.  
 Cratæmenes, a founder of Zancle, 380.  
 Crenæ, 221.  
 Crestonia, 155, 292.  
 Cretans, 488.  
 Crissæan gulf, 63, 155, 143.  
 Crocyleum, 216.  
 Cræsus, 10.  
 Crommyon, 254.  
 Cropæa, 104.  
 Crusis, 140.  
 Cuma, 523, 530.  
 Cyclades, 3.  
   clopes, 377.  
   donia, 145.  
 Cyllene, 19, 144.  
 Cylon, his history, 73.  
 Cyme, 175.  
 Cynes, 157.  
 Cynossema, 579.  
 Cynuria, 260, 318.  
 Cyprus, 61, 65.  
 Cypselæ, 333.  
 Cyrene, 64.  
 Cyrrhus, 156.  
 Cyrus the elder, 9, 10.  
   — the younger, 131.  
 Cythera, 258, 296, 318, 322.  
 Cytherians, the, 488.  
 Cytinium, 216, 219.  
 Cyzicus, 580.  
  
 Daithus, 323.  
 Damagetus, 323.  
 Damagon, 214.  
 Demotimus, 298.  
 Danaans, 3.  
 Daphnus, 524, 530.  
 Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Camby-  
   ses, 9. reduces the Ionian isles, 10.  
   — son of Artaxerxes, 515. his leagues  
   with the Lacedæmonians, 521, 532, 547.  
 Dascon, 380.  
 Dascylium, 76.  
 Daulia, 108.  
 Deceleæ, 438, 460, 554, 576.  
 Delians, removed out of Delos by the  
   Athenians, 309. brought thither again,  
   332.  
 Delium, 280.  
 Delos, 5, 58, 95, 174, 220, 581.  
 Delphi, oracle of, 15, 18, 69, 74, 79, 214,  
   320, 332.  
   — temple at, 65, 193, 308, 321.  
 Demagogus, 448.  
 Demarchus, 564.  
 Demodocus, 271.  
 Demosthenes, 213. his war in Ætolia, 215,  
   223. his seizure of and exploits at Py-  
   lus, 230, 232. his harangue, 233. his at-  
   tempt on Megara, 265. carries up a rein-  
   forcement against Syracuse, 458. arrives  
   at Syracuse, 476. repulsed at Epipolæ,  
   498. is for raising the siege, 480. de-  
   camps, 501. surrenders with the troops  
   under his command, 507. is put to  
   death, 509.  
 Demoteles, 243.  
 Dercylidas, 548.  
 Dersas, 35, 36.  
 Dersæi, 157.  
 Deucalion, 3.  
 Diana, take Thyasus, 333. dwell on Mount  
   Athos, 365. revolt from the Athenians,  
   ib.  
 Didyme, 212.  
 Diemporus, 90.  
 Dil, 153.  
 Diitrephes, 467.  
 Diniadæ, 523.  
 Dingotus, his speech against putting the  
   Mytilenæans to death, 183.  
 Diomedon, besieges the Chians, 522, 524.  
   favours the democracy, 556.  
 Diorilus, 442.  
 Diotimus, son of Strombichus, 28.  
 Diotrephes, 550.  
 Niphilus, 471.  
 Dium, 274, 292, 365.  
 Doberus, 154.  
 Dolopes, 58.  
 Dolopia, 157.  
 Dorcis, 57.  
 Dorians, in Peloponnesus, 8. founders of  
   Lacedæmon, 11, 63. border on the Ca-  
   rians, 96. warred upon by the Phocians  
   63. the perpetual enemies of the Ionians,  
   429.  
 Dorieus the Rhodian, 162.  
   —the Thurian, 532, 563.  
 Drabescus, 59, 288.  
 Droi, the, of Thrace, 157.  
 Drymusæa, 530.  
 Dyme, 144.  
  
 Eccritus, 460.  
 Echinades, 158.  
 Edones, 59, 155, 288, 292, 312.  
 Ectonia, 568.  
 Egypt, expedition of the Athenians to,  
   61, 64.  
 Elon, 58, 231, 257, 288, 312.  
 Elæus, 578.  
 Elaphebolion, the month, 207, 323.  
 Eleans, aid the Corinthians against the  
   Corcyreans, 17, 19, 29. defeated by the  
   Athenians, 107. in alliance with the  
   Corinthians and Argives, 330. with the  
   Athenians, 343.  
 Eleusis, 155.  
 Eleusians, made war against Erectheus,  
   101.  
 Eleusis, 66, 267.  
 Elomenus, 215.  
 Elymi, 378.  
 Embatium, 174.

- Empedias, 323, 325.  
 Endius, the Spartan, 516. ambassador to Athens, 341. his enmity with Agis, 519.  
 Enipeus, 273.  
 Entimus, the Cretan, founder of Gela, 379.  
 Eordians, 153.  
 Ephesus, 81, 176, 257, 582.  
 Ephyre, 29.  
 Epicles, 581.  
 Epicydidas, 317.  
 Epidamnians, harassed with seditions, 15. beg aid at Corcyra, *ib.* at Corinth, *ib.* besieged by the Corcyreans, 17. reduced, 19.  
 Epidaurians, 17, 60, C6, 347.  
 Epipolæ, 425, 441, 477.  
 Epirus, 227.  
 Epitadas, 233, 248.  
 Eræ, 522.  
 Erarchus, 109.  
 Erasinides, 453.  
 Eretheus, 101.  
 Eresus, 168, 177, 524.  
 Eretrians, at war with the Chalcians, 10. subject and tributary to Athens, 487.  
 Erythræ, 172, 515, 520.  
 Etronicus, 524.  
 Evalas, 523.  
 Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, 110.  
 — a founder of Catana, 379.  
 Eubœa, 14, 53, 66, 100, 514, 574.  
 Euhulæ, 524.  
 Eucles the Athenian, 289.  
 — the Syracusan, 447.  
 Euclides, founder of Himera, 380.  
 Euctemon, 529.  
 Evenus, the, 143.  
 Eueperitæ, 483.  
 Eumachus, 110.  
 Eumolpidæ, 544.  
 Eumolpus, 101.  
 Eupalium, 216, 219.  
 Eupharnidas, 110, 298.  
 Euphemus, his speech at Camarina, 430.  
 Eupomidas, 169.  
 Europus, 156.  
 Eurybates, 29.  
 Euryelus, 442, 478.  
 Eurylochus the Spartan, 218, 219, 220. killed, 223.  
 Eurymachus, 90.  
 Eurymedon, sent to Corcyra, 206. to Sicily, 228, 229. is fined for returning, 265. sent thither again, 458. arrives at Syracuse, 476. killed, 484.  
 Eurymedon, the river, 59.  
 Eurytheus, king of Mycenæ, 6.  
 Eurytians, 215.  
 Eustrophus, 338.  
 Euthydemus, 323, 325. a commander at Syracuse, 458. unsuccessful in the last battle, 459.  
 Galepsus, 290, 312.  
 Gaulites, 563.  
 Gela, 261, 311, 379.  
 Gelo, king of Syracuse, 379, 380.  
 Geloans, build Agrigæum, 379. all the Syracusans, 488.  
 Geræstus, 160.  
 Geranea, §2, 63.  
 Getæ, 153.  
 Gigonus, 36.  
 Glaucus, 559.  
 Glaucus, son of Leager, 32.  
 Goaxis, 290.  
 Gongylus the Eretrian, 76.  
 — the Corinthian, 450.  
 Gortynia, 156.  
 Graæans, 153.  
 Grecians, account of the old, 3. how they undertook the Trojan expedition, 7. applied themselves to maritime affairs, 11, 12.  
 Gylippus, sent to command at Syracuse, 447. arrives there, 450. his battles, 453. takes Plemmyrium, 461. procures succours, 483. fights the Athenians, 484. stops their decampment, 501. takes Nicias prisoner, 508. brings home the fleet from Sicily, 519.  
 Gytonians, 106.  
 Hæmus, Mount, 153.  
 Hagnon, 68, 124, 153, 288, 317, 323, 325.  
 Halex, the, 218.  
 Halizæ, 61, 124, 255.  
 Halicarnassus, 536.  
 Halys, the, 10.  
 Hamaxitus, 578.  
 Harmatus, 578.  
 Harmodius, his history, 12, 13, 412.  
 Harpagium, 580.  
 Hebrus, river, 153.  
 Hegesander, 460.  
 Hegesippidas, 347.  
 Helen, 5.  
 Helixus, 560.  
 Hellanicus, 58.  
 Hellas, 2.  
 Hellen, son of Deucalion, 2, 3.  
 Helots, their revolt from, and war with, the Lacedæmonians, 60. 61. are feared, and 2000 of them made away with, 275.  
 Helus, 259.  
 Heraclea, in Trachynia, 214, 218, 273, 317, 347.  
 Heracledæ kill Eurystheus, 6, 8.  
 Heracledes the Syracusan, 425, 447.  
 Hermæans, 356.  
 Heratoclidæ, 15.  
 Hercules, 15.  
 Hermiondas, 161.  
 Hermione, 17, 75, 124.  
 Hermocrates, his speech to the Sicilians, 201. to the Syracusans, 399. his character, 424. encourages the Syracusans, *ib.* made a commander, 425. his speech at Camarina, 426. his stratagem, 500. banished, 564.  
 Hermon, 571.

Hesiod, 216.  
 Hessians, 218.  
 Hiera, 212.  
 Hieramenes, 517.  
 Hierians, 214.  
 Hierophon, 222.  
 Hinera, 227, 380, 418, 449.  
 Hippagretas, 251.  
 Hipparchus, his history, 12, 13, 412.  
 Hippas, the eldest son of Pisistratus, his history, 13, 412.  
 — the Arcadian, 477.  
 Hippocles, son of Menippus, 519.  
 Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus, 520.  
 Hippocrates the Athenian, 265. his attempt on Megara, 266. his harangue, 283. killed at the battle of Delium, 286. tyrant of Gela, 380.  
 — the Lacedæmonian, 532.  
 Hippelochidas, 273.  
 Hipponicus, 213.  
 Hipponoidas, 358.  
 Histians, 46.  
 Histiodorus, 134.  
 Homer, 3, 6, 7, 221.  
 Hyæans, 219.  
 Hyleans, 441.  
 Hyblo, 379.  
 Hyccara, 418.  
 Hyllas, the river, 472.  
 Hyperbolus, 556.  
 Hysæ, 172, 366.  
 Ialysus, 537.  
 Iapygia, 470.  
 Iasus, 528.  
 Iberians, 377.  
 Icarus, 174.  
 Ichthy, promontory of, 107.  
 Ida, 258, 581.  
 Idæus, 579.  
 Idomene, 156, 225.  
 Illyrians, 15, 17, 301.  
 Imbrians, 161, 246, 313, 487.  
 Inarus, a Libyan king, revolts from the Persian monarch, 61. crucified, 64.  
 Inessa, 220.  
 Iolais, 37.  
 Iolcius, 323, 325.  
 Ionia, 2, 8.  
 Ionians, 4. had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and were masters at sea, 9. subdued by Cyrus, 10. revolt, 57. enemies to the Dorians, 429. used to assemble at Delos, 220.  
 • Ipneans, 218.  
 Isarchidas, 18.  
 Ischagoras, 306, 323, 325.  
 Isocrates, 143.  
 Isthmionius, 323, 325.  
 Istona, 211, 255.  
 Italus, 378.  
 Italy, 8, 23, 94.  
 Itamenes, 177.  
 Ithome, revolt of the Helots at, 60.  
 Itonæans, 312.

Itys, 108.

Jetæ, 450.

Jtho, temples of, 15, 205, 207, 307.

Jupiter, temples of, on Ithome, 60.

— Milichius, festival of, 74.

— Nemean, 216.

Labdulum, 445.

Lacedæmonians, their power in Peloponnesus, 6. their dress, 4. were the first who stripped in the public games, 4. demolished tyrants, 11. origin of their great war with the Athenians, 15. deluded by Themistocles, 54. accuse him, 45. war against their Helots, 60. at war with the Athenians, 61. and the Dorians, *ib.* beat the Athenians at Tanagra, 63. make a truce for five years, 65. begin the holy war, *ib.* make a thirty years' truce with the Athenians, 66. consult about the Peloponnesian war, 48. determine for it, 53. send embassies to Athens to spin out time, 73. invade Attica, 98. assign Thyrea to the Æginetæ, 108. invade Attica, 118. make war on Zacynthus, 131. march to Platæa and besiege it, 134. invade Acarnania, 140. fight at sea, 143. their project to seize the Piræus, 151. invade Attica, 159. resolve to succour the Mitylenæans, 166. become masters of Platæa, 190. put the Platæans to death, 201. beat the Corcyreans at sea, 205. send a colony to Heraclea, 214. their expedition against the Amphilochians, 219. invade Attica, 229. their endeavours to recover Pylus, 231. send an embassy to Athens to solicit a peace, 238. vanquished in Sphacteria, 247. make away with 2000 Helots, 275. take Amphipolis, 290. make peace with the Athenians, 295, 321. march into Arcadia, 330. forbid to assist at the Olympic games, 345. succour the Epidaurians, 348. gain a victory at Mantinea, 358. determine to succour the Syracusans, 440. fortify Decolea, *ib.* succour the Chians, 516. enter into league with the Persian monarch, 521, 532, 547. take Iasus, 528. fight with and beat the Athenians, 530. seize Rhodes, 537. are beaten in the sea-fight of Cynossema, 579.

Lacedæmonius, son of Cimon, 28.

Laches, commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 211, 323, 325. makes war on Mylæ, 212. defeats the Locrians, 220.

Lacon speaks in behalf of the Platæans, 190.

Laconia, 124, 162, 230, 258.

Lade, 521.

Læspodias, 448, 565.

Lamachus, loeth a squadron, 271. one of the three commanders in Sicily, 382. his opinion at a council of war, 409. killed, 446.

- Lamis, 379.  
 Lampon, 323, 325.  
 Iampsachus, 83, 415, 549.  
 Laodicium, 307.  
 Laphilus, 323, 325.  
 Læmans, 153.  
 Larissæans, 106.  
 Laurium, 123, 439.  
 Learchus, 132.  
 Lebedos, 522.  
 Leocythus, 294.  
 Lemnians, 246, 313. accompany the Athenians to Sicily, 487.  
 Lemnos, 67, 119.  
 Leocorium, 13.  
 Leocrates, 62.  
 Leon the Lacedæmonian, 214, 341, 548.  
 — the Athenian, 323, 325, 524, 545.  
 Leontines, 243. at war with the Syracusans, 211. in sedition, 311.  
 Leotychides, 53.  
 Lepreum, 330, 345.  
 Lerus, 527.  
 Lesbians, 12, 67, 159, 161, 258, 514.  
 Leucadians aid the Corinthians against the Corcyræans, 16, 17.  
 Leucas, 19, 140, 215, 447.  
 Leuconium, 525.  
 Leuctra of Arcadia, 348.  
 Leucimna, 19, 29, 32.  
 Lichas, an Olympic victor, but scourged, 346. his embassies 324, 362. public host of the Argives, *ib.* his dispute with Tissaphernes, 536, 563. his death, *ib.*  
 Ligurians, 377.  
 Limnæa, 141, 222.  
 Lindi, 379, 537.  
 Lipara, 212.  
 Locri Epizephyril, 449.  
 — Ozolæ, & lose Naupactus, 61. confederate with the Athenians, 229.  
 Lorymi, 536.  
 Lycæum, 320.  
 Lycophron, 144, 254.  
 Lynceatæ, 155, 275.  
 Lynceus, pass of, 275, 300.  
 Lysicles, 169.  
 Lysimeleia, the marsh, 485.  
 Lysistratus, 392.  
 Macarius, 218. killed, 223.  
 Macedonia, Athenian expedition to, 35.  
 Machaon, 143.  
 Mæander, 169, 547.  
 Mædians, 154.  
 Mænalia, 334.  
 Magnesia of Asia, 82, 542.  
 Males, 160, 288, 534.  
 Mantineans, 223, 224. war with the Tegeatæ, 307. make alliance with the Argives, 328. at war with the Lacedæmonians, 333. renew the peace with them, 364. mercenaries, 458.  
 Marathon, 11, 44, 416.  
 Marma, 61.  
 Marathusa, 530.  
 Mecerbernæans, 322.  
 Medeon, 222.  
 Medes, 11, 27.  
 Megabates, 76.  
 Megabazus the Persian, 64. son of Zopyrus, *ib.*  
 Megareans, their revolt from the Corinthians, 61, 62. from the Athenians, 66. aid the Corinthians against Corcyra, 17, 29. prohibited the harbours and markets of Athens, 39, 83. scheme to betray their city to the Athenians, 265. demolish their long walls, 292.  
 Melaneridas, 516.  
 Melanthus, 514.  
 Meleas, 161.  
 Melesander, 133.  
 Melesippus, 83, 98.  
 Melians, 214. their conference with the Athenians, 367. besieged, 375. reduced, *ib.*  
 Melitia, 273.  
 Melos, 213, 534.  
 Memphis, 61, 64.  
 Menander, an Athenian commander in Sicily, 458, 477, 496.  
 Menas, 323, 325.  
 Mende, 231, 299, 305.  
 Menecolus, 380.  
 Menecrates, 298.  
 Menedæus, 218, 223.  
 Menon, 106.  
 Messana, 229.  
 Messanians of Sicily, 212, 213.  
 Messapians, 218, 470.  
 Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected by the Lacedæmonians, 61. settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, *ib.* take Phela, 107.  
 Metagenes, 323.  
 Metapontines, 470, 489.  
 Methone, 106, 255, 322.  
 Methydrum, 350.  
 Methymnæans, 159, 487, 523, 577.  
 Miclades, 29.  
 Milesiææ, their war with the Samians, 67. beat the Argives, 526. demolish the fort built by Tissaphernes, 563.  
 Mindarus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, 563, 576. defeated, 579.  
 Minerva, temples of, 79, 101, 295.  
 Minoa, island of, 189, 266, 296.  
 Minoæ, his naval power, 3, 5.  
 Mitylenæans, revolt from the Athenians, 159. their speech at Olympia, 162. reduced, 174. ordered to be massacred, 178. debate on its execution, *ib.* countermanded, 188.  
 Molossians, 141.  
 Molycrium, 144, 145.  
 Molyntium, 219.  
 Morgartina, 265.  
 Mycæ, 53, 559.  
 Mycalesians massacred, 497.  
 Mycenæ, 6.  
 Myconus, 174.

- Mygdonia, 55, 155.
- Mylæ, 213.
- Myonæans, 218.
- Myonnesus, 176.
- Myrcinians, 200, 312.
- Myronides, 62, 63, 283.
- Myrrhine, 413.
- Myrtilus, 323, 325.
- Myscon, 564.
- Myus, 83, 169.
- Nauchides, 90.
- Naupactus, 61, 140, 144, 218, 257, 272, 469.
- Naxians, 58, 243. favour the Athenians.
- 410, 487. vanquish the Messenians, 243.
- Neapolis, 483.
- Nemea, 350.
- Neodamodes, 333, 356, 460, 489, 514.
- Neptune, temples of, 75, 296, 553.
- Nericus, 162.
- Nestus, the river, 153.
- Nicanor, 141.
- Nicasus, 298.
- Niclades, 297.
- Nicias, son of Niceratus, 189, 213, 245, 253, 258, 298, 305, 319, 342. his speeches, 382, 391, 421, 491, 503. named for the command in Sicily, 382. his opinion at a council of war, 408. defeats the Syracusans, 423, 446. his stratagem, 446. left in the sole command, 447. his letter to the Athenians, 454. refuses to raise the siege of Syracuse, 481. raises the siege, 500. surrenders to Gylippus, 508. put to death, 509.
- the Cretan of Gortys, 145.
- Nicer, 466.
- Nicolaus, 131.
- Nicomachus, 279.
- Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, 63.
- Niconidas, 273.
- Nicostratus, aids the popular faction at Corcyra, 204. takes Cythera, 258, 298. takes Mende, 305. besieges Scione, 352.
- Nile, the river, 61.
- Nisæa, 61, 66, 110, 151, 266, 296, 320.
- Notium, 177.
- Nymphodorus, 108.
- Odomanti, 157.
- Odrysæ, 108, 287.
- Œanthians, 218.
- Œneon, 219.
- Œnce, 65, 103.
- Œnophyta, 65, 283.
- Œsyme, 290.
- Œtæans, 513.
- Œthians, 60.
- Olpeæans, 218.
- Olympia, 70, 162, 322.
- Olympic Games, 4, 73.
- Olympia, 452, 474.
- Olympus, 274.
- Olynthians, 573.
- Olynthus, 36, 87, 139, 300, 322.
- Onasimus, 298.
- Oneum, Mount, 254.
- Onomacles, 526, 529.
- Ophloneans, 215.
- Opicans, 378.
- Opus, 110.
- Orchomenos, 66, 212, 272, 352.
- Orestes, son of Echekratidas, 65.
- Orestheum, 354.
- Orestians, 141.
- Oreus, 574.
- Orneans, 356, 381.
- Orobæ, 212.
- Orœdus, 141.
- Oropians, 106, 284, 548.
- Oropus, 213, 284, 466.
- Osciua, the river, 151.
- Paches, sent by the Athenians to reduce Mitylene, 168. takes it, 174. and Notium, 177. and Pyrrha and Eresus, *ib.*
- Pæonians, 153, 154.
- Pagondas, his harangue to the Bœotians, 281. wins the battle of Delium, 284.
- Palægeans, 109.
- Pale, 17.
- Palæans, 109.
- Pallene, isthmus of, 84, 38, 295.
- Pamillus, 379.
- Pamphylia, 59.
- Panactum, 310, 322, 335.
- Panæi, 157.
- Panærus, 273.
- Panathenæic procession, 13, 414.
- Pandion, 108.
- Pangæus, 155.
- Panormus of Achaia, 145. of Miletus, 524.
- Pantacyas, the river, 379.
- Paralians, 214.
- Paralus, the vessel, 556.
- Paravæans, 141.
- Parnassus, 216.
- Parnes, Mount, 106, 284.
- Parrhasia, 335.
- Pasitêidas, 307, 310.
- Patmos, 177.
- Patræ, 143.
- Pausanias, captain-general of Greece, 56. subdues Cyprus, 57. besieges Byzantium, *ib.* grows a tyrant, *ib.* recalled and tried at Sparta, *ib.* returns to the Hellespont, 75. his letter to Xerxes, 76. driven from Byzantium, 77. betrayed, 78. starved to death, 79.
- Pedaritus, 528, 530, 546.
- Pegæ, 61, 63, 65, 66, 265.
- Pelasgi, 3.
- Pelasgium, the, 102.
- Pella, 155, 156.
- Peloponnesians, their colonies, 6—9. their character, 84. originally Dorians, 129. their war with the Athenians, see Athenians and Lacedæmonians.
- Pelops, 6.
- Pelorus, Cape, 242.
- Peparethus, 212.
- Persebiæans, 274.
- Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, his political turns, 34, 36, 37, 109. invaded by Sitalces, 152. in conjunction with Brasidas

- invades Arrhibreus, 275, 300. quarrels with Brasidas, 304. makes peace with the Athenians, 306. is again their enemy, 364.
- Pericles, commands the Athenians, 65. conquers Kubœa, 66. and Samos, 67. his speech for war, 83. makes the funeral oration, 111. his speech in defence of himself, 125. his death and character, 130, 131.
- Perieres, 380.
- Periceci, 60, 214.
- Perseus, 6.
- Persians, at Thermopylæ, 250. their noble custom, 154.
- Phacium, 274.
- Phœaciens, 16.
- Phœay, 311.
- Phœnia, priestess of Juno, 307.
- Phagres, 155.
- Phalerus, the, 62.
- Phallus, 15.
- Phanæ, 525.
- Phanommachus, 134.
- Phanoteus, 279.
- Phanotis, 272.
- Pharnabazus, 515, 534, 560, 576.
- Pharnaces, 132, 309.
- Pharsaliens, 106.
- Pharsalius, 65.
- Phaselis, 133, 567.
- Phela, in Ellis, 107.
- Phœreans, 106.
- Philip, brother to Perdiccas, 35, 36, 152.
- Philippus, the Lacedæmonian, 528, 566, 576.
- Philocharidas, 298, 323, 341.
- Philoctetes, 7.
- Philiassians, 17, 448.
- Phœceans, found Massalia, 9. beat the Carthaginians at sea, *ib.*
- Phocians, at war with the Dorians, 63. recover the temple of Delphi, 66.
- Phœnicians, exercised piracy, 5. inhabited the isles, *ib.* had settlements in Sicily, 378.
- Phœnippus, 297.
- Phormio, an Athenian commander, 38, 68, 100. commands their fleet at Naupactus, 133. beats the Peloponnesians at sea, 144. prepares for a second engagement, 146. his harangue, 147. beats them again, 150.
- Photys, 141.
- Phrynus, 526. his intrigues against Alcibiades, 542. deprived of the command, 548. is of the oligarchical faction, 553, 554. is assassinated, 570.
- Phryniæ, 518.
- Phthiotis, 3.
- Phyreus, 345.
- Phyrea, 155.
- Phylis, 223.
- Phylisus, 156.
- Pindus, Mount, 157.
- Piræus, 62, 100, 151, 326, 570.
- Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, 545, 549, 563. flies to Deceleæ, 576.
- Pisistratus, the tyrant, 13, 220, 412. purifies Delos, 220. dies an old man, 412.
- the son of Hippias, 413. dedicated stars, *ib.*
- Pisuthnes, 67, 176, 177.
- Pitanensian Lochus, 13.
- Pithias, 202, 203.
- Pittacus, 290.
- Plateans, confederate with Athens, 99. besieged, 134. a body of them make their escape, 170. surrender, 189. their speech to the Lacedæmonians, 190. are put to death, 201.
- Pleistarchus, 77.
- Pleistonax, king of Sparta, 63. 66. banished, 104. restored, 319, 323, 335, 361.
- Pleistolas, 323.
- Plemyrion, 451, 462.
- Pleuron, 219.
- Polychna, 524.
- Polichnites, 145.
- Polles, 312.
- Pollis, 131.
- Polyanthes, 471.
- Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, powerful at sea, 9. consecrates Ithaca to the Delian Apollo, *ib.*
- Polydamidas, 300, 305.
- Polymedes, 106.
- Potamis, 564.
- Potidæans, originally from Corinth, 34. revolt from the Athenians, 35. defeated, 37. besieged, *ib.*, 125. surrender, 134.
- Potidæans, 216.
- Prasæ, 124, 448, 573.
- Priene, 67.
- Procles, 213, 218, 323.
- Procne, 108.
- Pronœans, 109.
- Proschium, 219, 222.
- Prosopis, island of, 64.
- Prote, island of, 236.
- Proteas, son of Epicleas, 23, 106.
- Proxapus, 220.
- Pteleum, 322, 525, 530.
- Pterodorus, 272.
- Ptychia, island of, 255.
- Pydna, 36, 81.
- Pygæians, 106.
- Pylus, 230, 275, 318.
- Pyrrha, 168, 173, 177, 524.
- Pystilus, 379.
- Pythagelus, 90.
- Pythen, 447, 449, 497.
- Pythia, 322.
- Pythodorus, the archon at Athens, 90. the son of Isolochus, in the command, 227, 323, 448. banished, 265.
- Ramphias, 83, 317.
- Rhégians, 211. attacked by the Locrians, 229. neutral in the Sicilian war, 407.
- Rhetii, 104, 263.
- Rhenea, 9, 220.
- Rhium, 144, 145.

- Rhodians, Doric by descent, 488.  
 Rhodope, 153.  
 Rhœtæum, 258, 578. •  
 Rhypa, 471.  
 Sabylinthus, 141.  
 Saco, 380.  
 Sadocæ, son of Sitalces, 109. made a citizen of Athens, *ib.*  
 Salæthus, sent to Mitylene, 173. taken prisoner and put to death by the Athenians, 178.  
 Salaminia, the trireme, 205, 414.  
 Salamis, 44, 81, 152. in Cyprus, 65.  
 Salynthus, king of the Agræans, 225, 227, 273.  
 Samæans, 109, 322.  
 Samians, 9, 26. conquered by the Athenians, 67. their insurrection, 523.  
 Saminthus, 351.  
 Sandius, 469.  
 Sane, 292.  
 Sardis, 67.  
 Sargeus, 461. •  
 Scandea, 259.  
 Scioneans, of the Pelene, originally from Peloponnesus, 298. revolt. *ib.* crown Brasidas, 299. reduced and severely treated by the Athenians, 332.  
 Scironides, 526, 545.  
 Scirphondas, 468.  
 Scolus, 322.  
 Scomius, Mount, 153.  
 Scyllæus, 347.  
 Scyros, 58.  
 Segestans, 380, 408.  
 Selinuntians, 489. at war with the Segestans, 384.  
 Selinus, 379, 408.  
 Sernyilians, 39, 322.  
 Sestos, 53, 549, 578.  
 Seuthes, 154. succeeds Sitalces in the kingdom of Odryse, 287. marries the sister of Perdiccas, 157.  
 Sicanas, 425.  
 Sicanians, 377.  
 Sicels, 378, 434.  
 Sicilians, 213. •  
 Sicily, 8, 9, 11, 23, 94.  
 Sicyonians, 18, 64, 65, 66, 287.  
 Sidusa, 525.  
 Sigæum, 416, 578.  
 Simus, 380.  
 Singæans, 322.  
 Sintians, 154.  
 Siphia, 272, 279.  
 Sitalces, king of Thrace, 108. ally to the Athenians, 109, 132. invades the Macedonians, 152. his power, 153. conquered by the Triballians, 287.  
 Socrates, son of Antigènes, 106. •  
 Solium, 109, 216, 329.  
 Solygian Hill, 233.  
 Sophocles, son of Sostratides, 228. sent to Sicily, 329. his acts at Cotyra 55.  
 banished from Athens, 285.  
 Sparta, 76.  
 Spartolus, 139, 322.  
 Sphacteria, 232.  
 Stages, 521.  
 Stagiræa, 270, 312, 322.  
 Stesagoras, 68.  
 Sthenelaidas, his speech at Sparta on war with the Athenians, 52.  
 Stratodemus, 131.  
 Stratonice, 157.  
 Stratus, 141, 157, 222.  
 Strombichides, 520. his exploits, 520, 549.  
 Strongyle, 212.  
 Strophæus, 273.  
 Strymon, the river, 58, 153, 257, 291.  
 Styphon, 251.  
 Styrians, 487.  
 Sunium, 514.  
 Sybota, the island, 29, 33.  
 — port of Thesprotis, 31, 32, 33, 205.  
 Syca, 443. •  
 Syme, 535.  
 Syracusans, at war with the Leontines, 211. are defeated by the Athenians, 242. draw up against the Athenians, 420. prepare for battle, *ib.* are defeated, 423. fortify their city, 425. send ambassadors to Camarina, 426. to Corinth and Sparta, 435. engage and are defeated by the Athenians, 442, 445. raise their counterworks, 444. are about treating with Nicias, 447. prepare their fleet, 462. attack the Athenians by land and sea, 463, 474. erect two trophies, 480. prepare again for an engagement, 484. defeat them again, *ib.* prepare for the last battle, 490. engage, 497. are victorious, 499. stop the Athenians by a stratagem, 501. pursue them and take them all prisoners, 507. send aid to the Peloponnesians, 526, 579.  
 Tænarus, temple of Neptune at, 76.  
 Tamos, 530, 565.  
 Tantalus, a Lacedæmonian commander, 261.  
 Tarentum, 407, 447.  
 Tanagra, 63, 213, 272, 467.  
 Taulantii, 15.  
 Taurus, 298.  
 Tegeans, fight with the Mantineans, 307.  
 Tellias, 447.  
 Tellis, 323, 325.  
 Temenidæ, 155.  
 Tenedians, 159, 487.  
 Tenians, 487, 520, 554.  
 Tere, father of Sitalces, 108. gets the kingdom of Odryse, *ib.* enlarges it, *ib.*  
 Tereus, 108.  
 Terias, the river, 410, 441.  
 Terinæan Gulf, 447.  
 Teutiaplus, 175.  
 Teutlus, 536.  
 Thapsus, 379, 442, 483.  
 Tharypus, king of the Molossians, 141.  
 Thasians, revolt from Athens, 59. defeated, *ib.* beg aid from the Lacedæmonians, *ib.* surrender, 60.  
 Thasos, 362, 550.



- Themetus, 169.  
 Theagenes, 73.  
 Theians, 17. surprise Platea, 90. their speech to the Lacedæmonians, against the Plateans, 195. demolish the walls of Therapæ, 307.  
 Thebes, 64.  
 Themistocles, 10, 45. by his advice the battle was fought in the strait of Salamis, 45. is sent ambassador to Sparta, 54. deludes the Lacedæmonians, *ib.* gets the Long-walls and Piræus secured, 55. banished Athens by the ostracism, 80. resides at Argos, *ib.* accused by the Lacedæmonians, *ib.* flies to Corcyra, *ib.* to Admetus, *ib.* the danger he escaped, *ib.* his letter to the king of Persia, 81. his character, 82.  
 Theogenes, 323, 325.  
 Theramenes the Athenian, 323. one of those who overturned the democracy, *ib.* turns to the other side, 567, 570.  
 ——— the Lacedæmonian, carries the fleet to Asia, 527, 532.  
 Therme, 36, 109.  
 Thermon, 518.  
 Thermopylae, 156, 214, 250,  
 Theseus, 100.  
 Theopians, 441.  
 Theoprotis, 19, 29, 31.  
 Thessalians, drive the Boeotians from Arne, 8. confederate with the Athenians, 63. send them aids, *ib.*, 105. their form of government, 273.  
 Thessalus, brother of Hippis, 13.  
 Thessaly, 2.  
 Thorius, 573.  
 Thracians, overthrow the Athenians, 59, 290. are free, 108. their sordid custom, 164. fight with the Thebans after the massacre at Mycalessus, 468.  
 Thrasybulus, 556. supports the democracy, 557. made a commander, 558. brings back Alcibiades, 561. beats the Peloponnesians at sea, 579.  
 Thrasycles, 323, 325, 520.  
 Thrasyllus the Argive, 351.  
 Thrasyllus the Athenian, 556, 558, 577, 579.  
 Thrasytelidas, 235.  
 Thrium, 66.  
 Thucles, 273.  
 Thucydides, son of Olorus, why he wrote the history of this war, 1, 12, 326. had the plague, 119. his gold mines and great credit in Thrace, 289. commands in Thrace, *ib.* arrives too late to save Amphipolis, *ib.* secures Eion, 290. was an exile for twenty years, 327.  
 ——— the colleague of Agnon and Phormio, 68. the Pharsalian, 671.  
 Thurians, 69, 470, 469.  
 Thyamis, the river, 29.  
 Thyamus, Mount, 222.  
 Thymocharia, 573.  
 Thyrea, 108, 260, 338, 441.  
 Thyrgus, 292, 333.  
 Tichium, 216.  
 Tichlusa, 527.  
 Tilateans, 153.  
 Timagoras of Cyzicus, 515, 516, 534.  
 ——— of Tegea, 131.  
 Timanor, 18.  
 Timocrates, 144. kills himself, 150.  
 Timoxenus, 110.  
 Tisamenus, 214.  
 Tisander, 518.  
 Tisiaa, 367.  
 Tissaphernes, lieutenant of Darius, 519. his compacts and leagues with the Peloponnesians, 521, 532, 547. is conquered at Miletus by the Athenians, 526. fortifies Iasus, 528. pays the Lacedæmonian ships, *ib.* lessens their pay by the advice of Alcibiades, 538. wants to be reconciled to the Lacedæmonians, 547. inveigled against by the mariners, 559, 563. why he did not bring up the Phœnician fleet, 566.  
 Tlepolemus, 68.  
 Tolmidas, son of Tolmæus, 64, 66.  
 Tolophonians, 218.  
 Tolophus, 218.  
 Tomeus, the, 296.  
 Torone, 292, 310.  
 Torylaus, 273.  
 Trachinians, 214.  
 Tragia, island of, 67.  
 Treres, 153.  
 Triball, 153. conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, 287.  
 Trinacria, 377.  
 Triopium, 532.  
 Tripodiscus, 268.  
 Tritæana, 218.  
 Træzæniens, 17.  
 Trogilius, 443.  
 Trojans, how enabled to resist the Greeks for ten years, 7, 8. some of them settled in Sicily after the taking of Troy, 377.  
 Trotilus, 379.  
 Tydæus, 535.  
 Tyndarus, 6.  
 Tyrrhenes, 392.  
 Ulysses, 242.  
 Xenares, Ephorus at Sparta, 335, 342.  
 ——— commander of the Heracleots, killed, 347.  
 Xeno, 460.  
 Xenocides, 29, 227.  
 Xenophantidas, 545.  
 Xenophon, son of Euripides, 134, 139.  
 Xerxes, 10, 68. his letter to Pausanias, 76.  
 Zacynthians, aid the Coreyræans against the Corinthians, 29. a colony of Achæans, 131, 215. aid the Athenians in the Sicilian war, 469, 488.  
 Zanol, 379.  
 Zeuxidas, 323, 325.









